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ABSTRACT 
 
The degree of institutionalization has become a paramount criterion to classify Third Wave 
party systems. Yet, in as much as institutionalization has attracted interest, it has also been 
surrounded by few conceptual challenges regarding measurement and scope. Moreover, there 
remain relatively open questions about the sources and mechanisms of varying degrees of 
party system institutionalization (PSI). This thesis tackles these issues through three 
questions: “To what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized?” “Why 
do levels of PSI vary across countries and time?” and “What mechanisms underlie the 
different patterns of PSI?” These questions are sequentially analyzed through a mixed 
methods design that unfolds as follows. We start with applying a partly new model of PSI to 
19 Sub-Saharan African countries that have held regular and competitive lower house 
elections up until 2011. This analysis stresses that institutionalization entails a two-fold 
variance; one in terms of degree and the other in terms of quality. Secondly, we seek to 
explain PSI variance using an original pooled time-series cross-sectional dataset that 
assembles a range of independent variables considered relevant by the literature on 
institutional and party system development. We argue that variance in PSI is influenced by 
exogenous (social structure, polity durability, institutional design) and endogenous factors 
(party and party system characteristics). Lastly, we seek mechanisms of causality behind the 
results given by the quantitative analysis focusing on Mozambique and Zambia, which differ 
both in degree and quality of PSI. Furthermore, other exogenous (critical juncture) and 
endogenous factors (interparty networks and party-citizen linkages) are added to the study, 
and semi-structured interviews, conducted during fieldwork, are used to enrich the narrative. 
The case study analysis shows that the way through which external factors, notably party 
funding/finance and electoral system, are modeled by internal factors such as the structure of 
the party system helps explain PSI variance. 
 
Key words: party system institutionalization, sources, mechanisms, Mozambique, Zambia.  
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SUMMARY  
 
Esta tese conduz uma análise comparativa dos processos de institucionalização dos sistemas 
partidários (ISP) na África Subsaariana, e tem dois argumentos principais. Em primeiro lugar, 
que a institucionalização encerra duas formas de variação: uma em termos de grau, que aponta 
para uma ideia de linearidade ou não-linearidade ao longo do tempo, e outra em termos de 
qualidade, que é função de uma determinada relação entre o grau de institucionalização e os 
níveis de participação política e de democraticidade de uma sociedade política. Em segundo 
lugar, que a variação nos processos de ISP pode ser entendida à luz de fatores exógenos, ou 
seja dos contextos históricos, institucionais e estruturais em que os sistemas partidários estão 
inseridos, mas também de fatores endógenos, isto é de dinâmicas próprias de funcionamento 
dos sistemas partidários, nomeadamente o grau de competitividade ou de fragmentação, e as 
redes de relações que ligam os partidos políticos entre si e estes aos cidadãos.  
Estes argumentos estruturam três questões investigação: “Em que medida os sistemas 
partidários da África Subsariana estão institucionalizados?” “Que fatores explicam a sua 
variação entre países e ao longo do tempo?” e “Que mecanismos sublinham diferentes 
processos de institucionalização?” Estas questões são analisadas sucessivamente através de 
um desenho de investigação multimétodo designado por explanotory sequential design. Este 
método arranca com uma fase quantitativa em que se pretende explicar um determinado 
fenómeno utilizando dados e metodologias eminentemente quantitativos, e continua com uma 
fase qualitativa em se procura refinar os resultados obtidos na etapa anterior. Neste sentido, 
adequa-se perfeitamente ao estudo das três questões aqui propostas.  
Na fase quantitativa foram considerados 19 países que realizaram eleições legislativas 
consecutivas e competitivas até 2011 (englobando um total de 102 eleições) e analisaram-se 
as duas primeiras questões de investigação. Partindo de Huntington (1965; 1968), começámos 
por examinar as propostas disponíveis na literatura para medir a institucionalização. Porém, é 
sobretudo a partir de Mainwaring e Scully (1995) e Mainwaring (2008; 2008) que este 
exercício se torna mais relevante para o nosso estudo, na medida em que estes autores 
propuseram um dos modelos mais influentes para analisar os sistemas partidários em novas 
democracias. É neste âmbito que propomos um modelo parcialmente novo para medir a ISP, 
que se distingue por se centrar exclusivamente em elementos estruturais (observados nas 
várias arenas da sociedade política) e por considerar o grau e a qualidade da 
institucionalização (inspirado em Welfling 1973; Mainwaring e Scully 1995; Mair 1996; 
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Kuenzi e Lambright 2001; e Lindberg 2007). A análise empírica confirmou estes pressupostos 
identificando três configurações possíveis. 
(1) Sistemas partidários com elevados níveis de institucionalização e que envolvem os 
maiores níveis de democraticidade e de participação eleitoral (e.g. Botswana e Cabo Verde, 
que são casos de institucionalização adequada); (2) sistemas partidários com elevados níveis 
de institucionalização mas que se conjugam com os níveis mais baixos de democraticidade e 
de participação eleitoral (e.g. Moçambique e Gâmbia, que são casos de 
hiperinstitucionalização); e, finalmente, (3) sistemas partidários com os mais baixos níveis de 
institucionalização mas com níveis intermédios de participação e de democraticidade (e.g. 
Zâmbia e Lesotho, que são casos de institucionalização inadequada). Em termos globais as 
configurações (2) e (3) são as mais frequentes, indicando assim que os sistemas partidários 
africanos enfrentam importantes dilemas de institucionalização.  
Ainda na fase quantitativa procurámos responder à segunda questão de investigação. 
Para esse efeito recolhemos um conjunto de explicações que têm vindo a ser utlizadas para 
compreender a evolução das instituições políticas em África (Bayart 1989; Bratton e van de 
Walle 1997; Le Vine 2000; Lindberg 2001; Chabal 2002; van de Walle 2001; van de Walle 
2002; van de Walle 2003) e a mudança dos sistemas partidários em novas democracias (para a 
América Latina: Roberts e Wibbels 1999; para a Europa pós-Comunista: Tavits 2005; para 
África: Riedl 2008 e Ferree 2010; e para comparações mais globais: Mainwaring e Torcal 
2005 e Mainwaring e Zoco 2007). 
Com bases nestes estudos foi possível identificar seis explicações principais – estrutura 
social, institucionalização ao longo do tempo, desenho institucional, características dos 
partidos e dos sistemas partidários, situação da economia e participação eleitoral – que 
testámos numa análise de regressão do grau de ISP. Os resultados demonstraram que a 
clivagem religiosa, a estabilidade do regime, o financiamento partidário, o sistema eleitoral e 
a fragmentação do sistema partidário explicam diferentes graus de ISP no contexto africano.  
Partindo destes resultados iniciámos então a fase qualitativa deste estudo com o objetivo 
principal de explicar que mecanismos sublinham as diferentes trajetórias de 
institucionalização. Os casos selecionados, Moçambique e Zâmbia, foram escolhidos por 
variarem no grau e qualidade de institucionalização, mas também nas variáveis independentes 
que entraram no modelo quantitativo, nomeadamente no tipo de sistema eleitoral e no modelo 
de financiamento partidário. Para além de discutir os mecanismos associados a estes desenhos 
institucionais esta fase incluiu variáveis explicativas adicionais. Nomeadamente, a transição 
para a democracia, entendida enquanto critical juncture que cria possibilidades para a 
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alteração de trajetórias institucionais, as relações entre os partidos (padrões de coligação) e as 
relações entre os partidos e os cidadãos (a sua natureza ideológica ou clientelar).  
Os estudos de caso demonstraram, em primeiro lugar, que os efeitos institucionais são 
também moldados por fatores endógenos, nomeadamente pela estrutura do sistema partidário. 
Assim, a fórmula eleitoral de representação proporcional utilizada em Moçambique reforça 
um sistema que se caracteriza à partida por baixos níveis de fragmentação e pelo 
desenvolvimento de um partido dominante, enquanto que a fórmula maioritária aplicada na 
Zâmbia resulta em níveis de fragmentação mais elevados porque os partidos são 
enfraquecidos por cisões, fações e defeções, e porque existe uma forte competição eleitoral ao 
nível subnacional. No que diz respeito ao financiamento partidário, em Moçambique os 
critérios favorecem os partidos que têm assento parlamentar e logo o partido dominante, 
enquanto na Zâmbia a ausência de regulação tem acentuado episódios de conflito 
intrapartidário assim como a emergência de partidos liderados por empresários proeminentes.  
Em segundo lugar, que o processo de transição deixa marcas importantes no sistema 
partidário. Em Moçambique a dupla transição para a paz e para a democracia encapsulou o 
regime em torno dos ex-beligerantes, que tiveram uma grande margem de manobra para 
negociar os termos do acordo de paz assim como para escolher os desenhos institucionais que 
lhes seriam mais favoráveis no novo sistema político. Na Zâmbia, pelo contrário, a transição, 
movimentada “a partir de baixo”, implicou mudanças institucionais mais reduzidas mas 
resultou em maiores níveis de fragmentação, uma vez que o movimento de abertura 
democrática agregou vários grupos sociais cujos interesses acabaram por colidir entre si.  
Por fim, no que diz respeito às relações entre os partidos, verificámos que em 
Moçambique os padrões de coligação seguem uma estratégia sobretudo nacional, enquanto na 
Zâmbia o enfoque é tendencialmente subnacional. Nas relações com os eleitorados em 
Moçambique predomina um padrão mais clientelar, ao passo que na Zâmbia prevalece um 
padrão mais programático. Esta diferença faz sentido se tivermos em conta que em 
Moçambique a institucionalização tem sido moldada por um partido dominante fortemente 
estruturado pela sua relação com o estado, e que tem sido capaz de desativar as principais 
linhas de clivagem política e de se reinventar politicamente, enquanto na Zâmbia a 
fragmentação do sistema partidário e os episódios de faccionalismo e personalismo têm 
polarizado a competição política para além de diminuir os níveis de institucionalização.  
 
Palavras-chave: Institucionalização do sistema partidário, causas, mecanismos, Moçambique, 
Zâmbia.
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INTRODUCTION  
 
This thesis conducts a comparative study of party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is 
structured on the concept of institutionalization, which was originally proposed by Samuel 
Huntington (1965) and which, particularly since Mainwaring and Scully (1995), has gained 
traction in the research agenda of political science and comparative politics.  
Theoretically, it argues that institutionalization entails a two-fold variance: one in terms 
of degree and the other in terms of quality. The former is linked to the idea of linearity (or 
non-linearity) and the latter to that of scope. In addition, it also argues that institutionalization 
is explained by exogenous factors, namely, the historical, structural, and institutional settings 
within which party systems operate and endogenous factors, namely, party and party system 
characteristics and networks linking the various actors within the system.  
Empirically, it focuses on 19 Sub-Saharan African countries with regular lower house 
elections up until 2011 and then takes a closer look at the cases of Mozambique and Zambia, 
which vary in the degree and quality of institutionalization, with the former being highly and 
overinstitutionalized and the latter weakly and inadequately institutionalized (the most 
common configurations in the continent).  
The research developed here is relevant for at least three reasons. Firstly, it subjects 
existing conceptions of party system institutionalization (here after PSI) to a rigorous scrutiny 
and it suggests more fruitful ways of analyzing it. Secondly, it focuses on Sub-Saharan 
Africa, which seems to be facing a puzzling scenario as far as party system development is 
concerned, with few cases of linear development over time and many of steadiness and even 
political decay. Moreover, a complex set of relationships between PSI, electoral participation, 
and democratic performance seems to exist, with highly institutionalized party systems having 
low levels of popular support and poor democratic practices (just to mention one of the many 
possible configurations). This of course raises many dilemmas of PSI in contemporary Sub-
Saharan Africa, which are addressed in the case study analysis. Thirdly, it treats PSI as a 
dependent rather than an independent variable. This is important, as the majority of studies in 
this field have been more concerned with how PSI predicts democratic performance than with 
the sources and mechanisms of its variance form a cross-sectional and longitudinal 
perspective.  
Following this introductory chapter, we lay out the questions that structured this 
research and present the outline of the thesis. 
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From research problem to research questions  
 
Samuel Huntington’s (1965; 1968) pioneering studies defined institutionalization as the 
process whereby the organizations and procedures of a political system or polity became more 
valued and stable over time. This concept was part of a larger research agenda through which 
the author sought to address one major problem in the social sciences: political development 
in changing societies.  
Taking institutionalization as equivalent to political development, Huntington broke 
with the more or less established view that political institutions developed linearly over time 
and that institutionalization was necessarily compatible with all facets of modernization. In 
the counter-flow of the then dominant theories, Huntington sustained that development and 
decay (thus non-linearity) were possible outcomes of institutional change and that different 
qualities of institutionalization could emerge as results of the interplay between economic and 
political modernization and the strength of political institutions (Huntington 1965, 393-194). 
Thus, the relevance of this concept rested on the possibility it created to study several 
compelling questions in Political Science, namely, “Why some polities or political systems 
develop into being more stable than others?” and “What is the interaction between macro 
changes in society, such as political and economic modernization, and the strength, stability, 
or weakness of political institutions?” Huntington’s (1965; 1968) seminal works addressed 
these central problems and placed institutionalization at the core of this exercise.  
To date, this debate has remained lively and dynamic both theoretically and empirically. 
Theoretically, it has been nuanced by the emergence of the “new institutionalisms”, a group 
of approaches «developed in reaction to the behavioral perspectives that were influential 
during the 1960s and 1970s» which sought to «elucidate the role that institutions play in the 
determination of social and political outcomes» (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936). Its several 
approaches, each in its own way, have provided an explanatory narrative that help to 
understand political institutions’ change or stability in contemporary times (Rhodes, Binder, 
and Rockman 2006; Mahoney and Thelen 2010a).  
Empirically, the Third Wave of democratization has created new opportunities to revisit 
the concept of institutionalization and to use it to not only to classify political institutions’ 
trajectories in new democracies but also to understand how similar or different these are from 
the ones found in more established democracies. Particularly, since Mainwaring and Scully 
(1995), several scholars have applied the concept of institutionalization to compare party 
systems in Third Wave democracies, focusing on post-Communist Europe, Latin America, 
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
3 
 
and Africa (Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring 1999; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Lindberg 
2007; Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2010, among many).  
The studies that focused on Sub-Saharan African countries have highlighted the low 
levels of PSI, as well as its non-linear evolution over time (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; 
Lindberg 2007; Basedau 2007; Bogaards 2008; Riedl 2008). Indeed, more than twenty years 
since the African wave of democratization started, hallmarked by the popular protests that 
defeated the nearly twenty years (1972-1991) of Mathieu Kérékou’s authoritarian rule and the 
end of Apartheid in South Africa (Diamond and Plattner 1999), party systems remain either 
institutionalized or deinstitutionalized from the outset of multipartism (Lindberg 2007) or 
exhibit a non-liner trajectory of development (Bogaards 2008).  
Persisting characteristics of African party systems are the high levels of electoral and 
legislative volatility, the loose linkages with constituencies and civil society organizations, 
and the low legitimacy accorded to elections and political parties (Kuenzi and Lambright 
2001; Lindberg 2007; Basedau 2007; Riedl 2008).  
It is within this literature that this thesis is framed. The major problem it addresses, 
however, is the one inherited from Huntington and that concerns all institutionalists, which is 
of explaining why some institutions come to be more stable, autonomous, and valued over 
time while others eventually decay. This is the major umbrella that covers our three research 
questions:  
 
1. To what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized? 
2. Why do levels of PSI vary across countries and time?  
3. What mechanisms underlie the different patterns of PSI?  
 
In the following section, we explain how we dealt with these questions and structured our 
study.  
 
Framing the analysis of party system institutionalization 
 
The field of studies about institutionalization (whether applied to parties, party systems, or to 
other political institutions) has grown with several controversies at its core. Scholars have 
been at odds with how many dimensions, indicators, and elements are necessary to 
empirically measure it. This debate will be addressed at greater length in Chapter I; for now, 
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we summon the main points of that discussion as means to justify our own conceptual 
choices.  
The studies that applied Huntington’s and Mainwaring’s conceptualizations have 
perceived institutionalization as a multidimensional concept encompassing both structural 
(stability) and attitudinal (value) elements and suitable for the analysis of individual (parties) 
and systemic properties (party systems) in the various arenas of a polity (Kuenzi and 
Lambright 2001; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Basedau 2007; Riedl 2008). Those diverging 
from it showed preference for the structural element, privileged national party systems, as unit 
of analysis and focused on a single arena of competition (government or legislature) (Mair 
1996; Lindberg 2007; Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2010). There are things to be gained and lost 
with any of these conceptualizations. The first delivers a more complete measurement of 
institutionalization and yet it falls short at addressing its internal complexity (Randall and 
Svåsand 2002; Levitsky 1998). The second encompasses less conceptual ambiguities, but the 
scope of the concept is somewhat minimalist because it is centered on one single arena of 
party competition.  
To answer the first research question, “To what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan 
Africa institutionalized?” we stood half-way between these two approaches. Building on 
Levitsky (1998) and Randall and Svåsand (2002b), we have unpacked the concept while at the 
same time increasing its scope. More precisely, we propose a partly new framework for 
analysis that focuses solely on structural institutionalization and having national party systems 
as units of analysis. It is measured by eleven indicators, which are clustered into three 
dimensions. The first dimension, stable patterns of interparty competition, is measured by 
electoral volatility, legislative seats’ volatility, total percentage of votes won by new parties, 
alternation in government, and share of seats for the most voted party. The second dimension, 
stable roots in society, is measured by the share of seats for parties founded by 1960, 1970, 
and 1980 and by the share of seats for independent candidates. Finally, the third dimension, 
organizational continuity, is measured by the legislative and electoral strength of merging and 
splitting political parties.  
As we show later in Chapter III, this measurement combines indicators suggested by 
Welfling (1973), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mair (1996), Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), 
and Lindberg (2007); yet, its final outlook is innovative, as it covers arenas of party 
competition – governmental, parliamentary, electoral, and organizational – that have never 
been combined under the same model. In this sense, it is more complete than previous 
measures that took institutionalization as structural phenomena (for example, Lindberg 2007; 
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Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2010) and it is less exposed to the conceptual ambiguities that are 
associated with those equating different levels and elements under the same measurement (for 
example Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001).  
After measuring the degree of PSI, our approach deals with the scope of 
institutionalization; more concretely, it considers the extent to which institutionalization is 
accompanied by higher or lower levels of electoral participation and democraticity. 
Considering this two-fold variance expresses our concern with institutionalization not only as 
a matter of degree (even if this attribute is given more salience throughout the thesis), but also 
as a matter of quality. In fact, there is added valued in distinguishing cases where there are 
high levels of institutionalization, electoral participation, and democraticity from those where 
there is discontinuity in these features. For this exercise, we go back to the first studies about 
institutionalization to test three possible outcomes: adequate institutionalization, inadequate 
institutionalization (Huntington 1965, 1968), and overinstitutionalization (Ben-Dor 1975). 
The second research question, “Why do levels of PSI vary across countries and time?” 
remains understudied, as the majority of studies either focused on (i) the measurement of PSI 
or (ii) used it as a predictor for democratic stability or performance. Indeed, one of the most 
consensual propositions emerging from this literature is that parties and party systems are 
essential conditions for democracy and that their level of institutionalization shapes the 
prospects that a stable democracy will emerge. Nevertheless, a lot remains to be written about 
the causes of PSI, particularly in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, from a cross-sectional 
and longitudinal perspective, despite recent inputs (Riedl 2008; Ferree 2010). To contribute to 
this still-evolving debate, we relied on the abundant literature that has focused on the sources 
of party system change – understood as stability or institutionalization – in Latin America 
(Roberts and Wibbels 1999), post-Communist Europe (Tavits 2005), or in both old and new 
democracies (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Taken as a whole, 
these studies suggest six main explanations for PSI, which we test in this thesis: social 
structure, institutionalization over time, institutional design, party and party systems 
characteristics, economic performance, and electoral participation.  
The third research question, “What mechanisms underlie the different patterns of PSI?” 
takes two mechanisms into consideration: environmental and relational. Environmental 
mechanisms are about the external conditions within which the party systems develop, 
whereas relational mechanisms address political actors and their interpersonal networks; for 
example, whether they develop patterns of cooperation, coercion, and coalition, inter alia 
(Tilly 2001). Environmental mechanisms will comprise some of the variables used to test the 
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institutional explanation of PSI (electoral system and party funding/finance) and a new one 
anchored on the literature of regime transition (path to democratic transition). Relational 
mechanisms are explored on an interparty level (party coalitions) and on an extraparty level 
(party-citizen linkages) and are theoretically justified in the literature that features 
neopatrimonialism and its web of informal practices as the general framework within which 
African political institutions have evolved (Bayart 1989; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Le 
Vine 2000; Lindberg 2001; Chabal 2002; van de Walle 2001; van de Walle 2002; van de 
Walle 2003; Riedl 2008).  
These three questions are successively analyzed trough a mixed methods design called 
explanatory sequential design, which starts with a quantitative strand and follows up on 
specific results with a qualitative strand. The first and the second research questions are 
analyzed in the quantitative strand. The sample for this phase includes 19 Sub-Saharan 
African countries that have held competitive and regular lower house elections up until 2011 
(for a total of 102 elections). The analysis draws on raw electoral statistics to measure PSI and 
some independent variables. All together, this strand will tell us how far party systems in 
Africa have institutionalized (differences in terms of degree and quality) and explain variance 
in institutionalization. 
The qualitative strand centers on the third research question. To show the environmental 
and relational mechanisms at work in the process of institutionalization, we have selected two 
countries that represent a wide range of variation not only in terms of PSI but also in terms of 
the relevant explanatory variables: Mozambique and Zambia. Data for this strand results from 
a series of fieldwork activities conducted in Mozambique between October and November 
2012 and in Zambia between March and June 2013, including semi-structured interviews with 
political elites, journalists, members of civil society organizations, and academics (a total of 
35 in Mozambique and 28 in Zambia) and documental research (electoral and party laws, 
media coverage). This strand will discuss the results of the quantitative strand while adding 
new elements in the analysis for a more comprehensive investigation of institutionalization.  
 
What is new about this research?  
 
The present investigation is innovative for several reasons. Firstly, it contributes to the theory 
of institutionalization by addressing its puzzles one at a time and by delivering a partly new 
measure of PSI that easily travels across different political systems and countries. Secondly, it 
adds new empirical data for African party systems, which have been less frequently analyzed 
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when compared to other recently democratized regions, namely Latin America and post-
Communist Europe. Thirdly, it suggests indicators to measure arenas of competition usually 
neglected in the measures of PSI applied to the African context (stability at the government 
and organizational level). Fourthly, both the method employed (mixed method), and the 
outputs generated (the construction of a dataset assembling time series and cross-sectional 
political data) can foster comparisons not only within the African continent but also in other 
regions of the world. This is particularly relevant, as lack of data usually figures among the 
factors discouraging the study of certain topics in African countries. Finally, it suggests a new 
institutional feature, party funding/finance, as relevant to understanding PSI.  
 
Outline of the thesis  
 
This thesis is organized in six chapters and a concluding section. Chapter I presents the state 
of the art about the concept of institutionalization, covering the main studies produced within 
this research field since Huntington’s pioneering article (1965). Within this debate, relevance 
is given to Huntington (1965; 1968) for insightfully detaching institutionalization from 
several aspects of modernization and for providing a typology for different qualities of 
institutionalization and to Janda (1970) and Welfling (1973) for delivering the first models of 
party and PSI, with the latter exclusively dedicated to African states. The studies of 
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1998; 1999) have also been influential and 
are the basis of numerous studies about PSI in Africa (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Riedl 
2008; Basedau 2007).  
Chapter II features the methodology adopted in this research. It starts by introducing the 
research questions, the framework for analysis, the hypotheses, and the mechanisms of PSI. It 
continues describing the sequential mixed methods research adopted, explaining step by step 
how the data was collected and how the cases for each strand of analysis were selected. The 
chapter also presents the historical and the network institutionalisms as useful approaches to 
the study of African politics, as they allow studying political institutions as simultaneously 
formal and informal structures that are both a product of history and of contingency (Olsen 
1968; Hall and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; Ansell 1998).  
Chapter III presents the framework for analysis, specifying the theoretical and 
methodological underpinnings of our PSI measure. Drawing on the works of Welfling (1973), 
Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mair (1996), Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg 
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(2007), three dimensions are suggested: stable patterns of interparty competition, stable roots 
in society and organizational continuity. After measuring each of these dimensions a 
complementary analysis is made to identify what varieties of PSI exist in the sample. This 
chapter then closes with a comparison across different PSI measures.  
Chapter IV tests six explanations of PSI: social structure, institutionalization over time, 
institutional design, party and party systems characteristics, economic performance, and 
electoral participation. It starts by reviewing each of these explanations in order to justify the 
hypotheses that follow from them. Then, it explains how the independent variables are 
measured, shows descriptive statistics (univariate and bivariate) for all independent variables, 
and ends with a regression analysis of PSI.  
Chapter V presents the framework for the comparative study of the mechanisms of PSI 
in Mozambique and Zambia. It presents the mechanisms of PSI and then it provides a 
historical description of both countries as means to contextualize the main political parties, 
political institutions, and political outcomes since the outset of independence.  
Chapter VI conducts the analysis of the mechanisms which underlie PSI, starting with 
the environmental ones – path to democratic transition, electoral system, and party 
funding/finance – and then addressing the relational ones – party coalitions and party-citizen 
linkages. The analysis shows that the moment of transition has formative effects on the way 
the upcoming party systems work, whereas the effects of political institutions seem to be 
modeled by the strength of the political parties and by how dispersed or concentrated the 
political competition is around certain lines of cleavage. The analysis of relational 
mechanisms gives support to the idea that there is a loose programmatic linkage between 
political parties and their constituencies; however, this is truer for Mozambique than it is for 
Zambia.  
Finally, the concluding section summarizes the main findings of this study and raises 
further implications for a future research agenda.  
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CHAPTER I – RESEARCH ON INSTITUTIONALIZATION  
 
This chapter presents the concept of institutionalization and it is organized as follows. Section 1.1 
introduces the classical work of Samuel P. Huntington (1965; 1968) who first developed this concept 
in Political Science. In this regard, particular relevance is given to the way he defined 
institutionalization as a non-linear process that is autonomous from several aspects of economic and 
political modernization – e.g. urbanization, rationalization, mass mobilization and democratization –, 
and which is suitable for the analysis of organizations and procedures of modern, traditional or 
transitional political systems. Section 1.2 features the first studies about institutionalization and the 
dilemmas it encloses, namely its different outcomes, levels and dimensions of analysis. Section 1.3 
presents the second wave of studies regarding institutionalization, which emerged following the Third 
Wave of democratization and which took parties and party systems as the main units of analysis. In 
this context, Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) seminal framework is of chief relevance since it became 
one of the most influential works having been, fully or partly, employed in the study of several post-
1974 party systems. Despite being widely used, it has also been criticized and pushed forward in light 
of important theoretical contributions such as the ones delivered by Levitsky (1998) and Randall and 
Svåsand (2002b). Section 1.4 critically reviews of what is already known and which questions remain 
unanswered in the study of PSI in Africa. Section 1.5 summarizes the main theoretical and empirical 
challenges within this research field while proposing a new research agenda that takes 
institutionalization as a dependent variable.  
 
1.1 The concept of institutionalization: Huntington’s classical definition  
 
In view of the crucial importance of the relationship between mobilization and participation, 
on the one hand, and the growth of political organizations, on the other, it is useful for many 
purposes to define political development as the institutionalization of political organizations 
and procedures (Huntington 1965, 393).  
  
Only by measuring institutionalization will we be able to buttress or disapprove hypotheses 
about the relation between social, economic and demographic changes on the one hand, and 
variations in political structure on the other (Huntington 1965, 405).  
 
Despite its recent popularity, the concept of institutionalization is far from novel. Its origins 
can be traced back to, at least, forty years ago and more concretely to the works of Samuel P. 
Huntington, who introduced this concept into contemporary Political Science in his 1965 
seminal article «Political Development and Political Decay». In this work, institutionalization 
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is, for the first time, identified as a unique political outcome and as a relevant conceptual tool 
to understand order and change in societies; particularly in those areas of the world 
undergoing profound political changes since the end of the Second World War – Africa, Asia 
and Latin America. Theoretically different from political and economic modernization and 
not necessarily equated with democracy, the concept of institutionalization is here presented 
as the true content or manifestation of political development; the latter being defined by the 
degree to which the organizations and procedures of a specific polity are institutionalized at a 
certain point in time. Thus, for Huntington, the institutionalization of a political system, «of 
any sort, not just modern ones» (Huntington 1965, 393), is also understood as the 
institutionalization of its organizations and procedures.  
To operationalize this conceptualization, he proposes four measurements of 
institutionalization, each along a continuum: adaptability-rigidity, complexity-simplicity, 
autonomy-subordination, and coherence-disunity. The first dimension – adaptability – 
expresses the capacity of institutions to resist to challenges over time and it opposes rigidity, 
which represents a characteristic of newer institutions. Possible indicators of adaptability are: 
chronological age, for «the longer an organization or procedure has been in existence, the 
higher the level of institutionalization»; generational age, for «as long as an organization still 
has its first set of leaders, as long a procedure is still performed by those who first performed 
it, its adaptability is still in doubt»; and number of leadership successions and functional 
changes as «an organization which has adapted itself to changes in its environment and has 
survived one or more changes in its principal functions is more institutionalized than one 
which has not» (Ibid., 395).  
The second dimension is complexity. Contrary to simplicity, it involves «both 
multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation 
of separate types of organizational subunits». It can be measured by the number and diversity 
of organizational subunits and the number and diversity of functions performed by the 
organizations. Autonomy, the third dimension, has subordination as its opposite type. This 
dimension indicates the «extent to which political organizations and procedures exist 
independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior» (Ibid., 401-402) and it can 
be measured by personnel controls (e.g. co-optation, penetration, purging) and the degree to 
which the organization manages its own material resources. The final dimension of an 
institutionalized political system is coherence, which contrasts with internal disunity and 
which is measured by the ratio of contested successions (Ibid., 403). 
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
11 
 
According to this framework, the more adaptable, complex, unified and coherent the 
organizations and procedures of a given polity, the more highly institutionalized the polity 
(Ibid., 394-404). This assumption does not necessarily imply that societies evolve from lower 
to higher degrees of institutionalization linearly. In fact, one of Huntington’s central argument 
is that the process of political development or institutionalization (the two concepts are often 
used interchangeably) is far from being linear and that institutions can «decay and dissolve as 
well as grow and mature» (Ibid.,393). For this reason, any conceptualization of political 
development should be reversible entailing «[...] the circumstances under which political 
decay is encouraged» (Ibid., 392). Those circumstances are to be found, he argues, on the on-
going relationship between the political structures – whether they are of traditional, 
transitional, or modern nature – and the process of modernization itself (Ibid.). In Political 
Order in Changing Societies, Huntington deepens this initial approach and delivers a more 
refined definition of institutionalization as «the process by which organizations and 
procedures acquire value and stability» (Huntington 1968, 12). Furthermore, he shows how, 
depending on the degree of mobilization and development of a given polity, different qualities 
of institutionalization can arise: no-institutionalization, adequate institutionalization and 
inadequate institutionalization. To sum up, institutionalization emerges from Huntington’s 
studies as a multidimensional concept measured by four criteria and an array of indicators that 
express both structural (stability) and attitudinal (value) elements, which are suitable for the 
analysis of any kind of political system, organization or procedure. As such, this conceptual 
framework anticipates the main challenges experienced in this field of studies from the onset 
of its formation to the present days. This will be clarified throughout this chapter, but, for 
now, we highlight three virtuosities of Huntington’s pioneer studies.  
First of all, they went against the mainstream conceptualizations found in sociological 
literature of the 1960s and 1970s that equated political development with the process of 
modernization of a given polity. This can be traced to the sociological tradition of Max Weber 
(1947) and Shmuel Eisenstadt
1
 (1964), but also to the studies of several political sociologists, 
as for example Shils (1960a, 1960b, 1960c), Binder (1964) and Taylor (1972), who identified 
political development with certain political aspects of modernization. In fact, at that time 
political development was being identified with four different processes (Huntington 1965, 
386-387): rationalization (legal-rational or modern systems of institutions); nationalism and 
                                                          
1
 In Institutionalization and Change, this author asserts that «the institutionalization of any social system means 
that certain norms, sanctions and organizations must be set up, and that policies through which these norms can 
be up-held and applied to a relatively large and complex variety of social situations must be implemented 
(Eisenstadt 1964, 245). 
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national integration (firmly delimited ethnic basis for the political community); 
democratization (pluralism, competitiveness, equalization of power and similar qualities) and 
mobilization or participation (mass mobilization). Against this background, Huntington 
argued that political development and modernization should be treated as independent 
processes since they involved different sequences of change. For instance, whereas political 
modernization implied «the rationalization of authority, the differentiation of structures, and 
the expansion of political participation» (Huntington 1968, 93), political development 
expressed the level of institutionalization of political organizations and procedures 
(Huntington 1965, 394).  
Second, Huntington shows very clearly that when one equates political development 
with modernization the scope of the concept is limited to the analysis of modern nation-states 
being therefore «impossible to speak of a politically developed tribal authority, city-state, 
feudal monarchy, or bureaucratic empire» (Ibid., 393). Hence, his proposal of freeing the 
concept of political development or institutionalization from modernization is crucial to the 
extent that it enables the study of political systems of any sort, not just modern ones.  
Third, Huntington went beyond mere theorization and proposed the first model for 
measuring the level of institutionalization of political systems, organizations and procedures. 
Even if he fell short of attaining this objective, as sustained by some authors cited in the next 
section, his is the first effort made to develop a comparative framework for the study of 
institutionalization and he clearly contributed to set the marks and boundaries of a new field 
of studies in Comparative Political Science.  
 
1.2 The first studies on institutionalization  
 
Following Huntington’s seminal framework, several scholars began to apply the theory of 
institutionalization to the study of a variety of political organizations in the following decades. 
The growing interest in this topic raised a series of debates about its theoretical, but mostly, 
its empirical definition. The relevance of institutionalization was, however, far from being 
contested. In fact, one year after Huntington’s «Political Development and Political Decay», 
Pennock (1966), argued that:  
 
Whether political and governmental structures are formal or informal, incorporated in the legal 
structure or not, it is of greatest importance that they should be institutionalized; and the process 
of institutionalization is as surely part of development as are specialization of function and 
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differentiation of structure. It is when certain forms and procedures become the accepted ways 
of doing things that they become effective instruments of stability and of legitimation (Pennock 
1966, 418)  
 
Along the same lines, Polsby (1968) recognizes that «for a political system to be viable [...], 
for it to succeed in performing tasks of authoritative resource allocation, problem solving, 
conflict settlement, and so on, on behalf of a population of any substantial size, it must be 
institutionalized [...]» (1968, 144). Despite agreeing on the general value of this concept, this 
author develops a rather different framework in his study of the United States House of 
Representatives Congress, in which he includes only one of Huntington’s criteria 
(complexity), while the others (boundaries and universalistic and automatic internal decision 
making) are new. In his words, an institutionalized organization is:  
 
1) […] relatively well-bounded, that is to say, differentiated from its environment. Its members 
are easily identifiable, it is relatively difficult to become a member, and its leaders are recruited 
principally from within the organization. 2) The organization is relatively complex, that is, its 
functions are internally separated on some regular and explicit basis, its parts are not wholly 
interchangeable, and for at least some important purposes, its parts are interdependent. There is 
a division of labor in which roles are specified, and there are widely shared expectations about 
the performance of roles. There are regularized patterns of recruitment to roles, and of 
movement from role to role. 3) Finally, the organization tends to use universalistic rather than 
particularistic criteria, and automatic rather than discretionary methods for conducting its 
internal business. Precedents and rules are followed; merit systems replace favoritism and 
nepotism; and impersonal codes supplant personal preferences as prescriptions for behavior 
(Polsby 1968, 145).  
 
It followed that the House of Representatives would have become institutionalized over time 
if it had become more bounded, more complex, and more universalistic and automatic in its 
internal decision making process. This conceptualization actually inspired several studies; 
since for instance, Chaffey (1970) used it in the comparative analysis of the Montana House 
of Representatives and the Wisconsin Assembly (the lower house in each state), and Canon 
(1989) applied it to the study of leadership in the United States Congress. Outside the North 
American context, Leonardi, Nanetti, and Pasquino (1978, 162) analyzed the 
institutionalization of the Italian parliament in rather different terms; they considered: «[...] 
(1) the autonomy of the representative assembly in the formulation of public policy vis-à-vis 
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such other political forces as political parties, the bureaucracy, state economic enterprises, and 
interest groups; and (2) the existence of a consensus on Parliament’s internal decision-making 
rules». Shifting from national to international political organizations, Keohane (1969) takes 
the United Nations General Assembly as the unit of analysis and conceives institutionalization 
as: 
the process by which the international organization becomes differentiated, durable, and 
autonomous. Differentiation refers to the development of organizational distinctiveness from its 
environment, or, as S. N. Eisenstadt puts it, "the development of specific collectivities and roles. 
Durability can be defined as the tendency of an organization to persist over time. Autonomy 
implies that the organization’s norms and patterns of behavior significantly affect the outcomes 
of its political process (Keohane 1969, 861-862).  
 
Differently from the studies mentioned above, in the sense that it goes beyond the simple 
measurement of institutionalization, Brass (1977) researched the relationship between PSI and 
government stability in Indian states. In his formula [PSI = (W/C)-(L/V)]: 
 
PSI for each election equals the ratio of seats won by all parties that have won at least one seat 
in the state’s legislature in any election since 1952 (W) to the number of seats contested by such 
parties (C) minus the ratio of the number of security deposits forfeited by the candidates of 
those parties (L) to C (Brass 1977, 1396).  
 
As a result, «[...] states whose party systems are dominated by parties that persist over time, 
that regularly win a number of seats, and that know their areas of strength well enough not to 
field candidates who lose their security» will have higher degrees of PSI, which, in turn, are 
linked with higher levels of government stability. In the context of this first wave of studies, 
Janda (1970) and Welfling (1973) merit attention due to their development of the first models 
of party and PSI. In Janda’s study we find an emphasis on the individual aspect of 
institutionalization (political parties). Although generally agreeing with Huntington’s 
definition of institutionalization as a process entailing both value and stability, this researcher 
disagrees with the proposed ingredients for its measurement as, for instance, a «party could be 
highly institutionalized and yet lack independence of other groups (Huntington’s 
‘autonomy’)» (Janda 1970, 19). In his view, an institutionalized party is «[...] one that is 
reified in the public mind so that ‘the party’ exists as a social organization apart from its 
momentary leaders, and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns of behavior valued 
by those who identify with it». Such capacity could be measured according to six variables: 
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year of origin, frequency of name changes, organizational discontinuity (measured by the 
number of splits and mergers), leadership competition (whether there is an unambiguous 
identification of legitimate party leadership at the national level and change of personnel in 
top leadership positions over time), legislative instability (measured by the fluctuations in the 
proportion of seats held over time) and electoral instability (whether political parties are stable 
competitors in elections). This approach differs substantially from the one delivered a few 
years later by Cotter and Bibby (1980), in the sense that, in this case, the institutionalization 
of a national party system is seen as «a process involving changing roles of party chairmen 
national committee members, and staff; the development of staff continuity; the elaboration of 
programmatic activity and division of labor; the development of regular financing; and rule 
elaboration» (1980, 2).  
Welfling’s (1973) investigation, in turn, was the first to focus on the study of African 
party systems. In our opinion, this is the most interesting model within this first wave of 
studies as Welfling devoted a lot of attention to conceptualizing institutionalization as well as 
to justifying the dimensions that can operationalize it. Firstly, she sets a general system 
perspective that is the basis for her definition of institutionalization as «the process of 
crystallizing (i.e., defining, creating, developing, maintaining) social institutions, and the 
extent or degree of institutional characteristics at any time» (Welfling 1973, 11). Secondly, 
her definition places emphasis on political institutions, while for Huntington, 
institutionalization related to organizations and procedures. Thirdly, in approaching the 
institutionalization of parties in the African context, she made a clear distinction between 
individual parties and party systems, since political parties as individual organizations may be 
institutionalized, but that may not be the case for their operation in a party system (Ibid., 17). 
Furthermore, she identifies four dimensions of an institutionalized party system: stability, 
adaptability, boundaries and large scope. Given that institutions are necessarily characterized 
by structure – stable regular patterns of interaction among components – stability and 
adaptability are necessary and complementary aspects of any social institution. Regarding 
boundaries, they are proposed in substitution to Huntington’s notion of autonomy: whereas 
the latter implies closure, in which the system is independent of its units in the environment, 
the former refers to the delineation and definition of the system. Boundaries are permeable 
and permit considerable interaction with and dependence upon environment. Finally, scope 
refers to the effects or impacts of institutionalization on the environment. The significance of 
both Janda’s and Welfling’s models has to do with the effort made to develop concrete 
indicators for the comparative analysis of parties and party systems as separate entities. Some 
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of these indicators have been used in more recent studies (e.g. seats of independent candidates 
and electoral instability, splits and mergers), and are particularly influential in our own 
framework for analysis (to be developed in Chapter III).  
 
Table 1.1 – Models for the study of institutionalization 
Author  Criteria/dimensions  Indicators  
Polsby (1968)  
US House of 
Representatives  
Boundaries  
Percentage of first term leaders; the establishment of boundaries; 
increase in terms served by incumbent members; years served in 
congress as the first speaker 
Complexity 
Growth in the autonomy and importance of committees; growth of 
specialized agencies of party leadership and general increase in the 
provision of various emoluments; and auxiliary aids to members in the 
form of office space, salaries, allowances, staff aid, and committee staffs 
Universalistic 
Automated decision 
making 
Growth of seniority as a criterion determining committee rank; and the 
growth of the practice of deciding contested elections to the House 
strictly on the merits  
Keohane (1969) 
United Nations 
General 
Assembly 
Differentiation  Polsby’s (1968) criteria for boundaries 
Durability  
The universality of membership (particularly with respect to states that 
exclude themselves from the organization); the rank and number of 
representatives sent by governments; the number and intensity of 
challenges to the organization's right to exist; and the willingness of 
governments to financially support the organization  
Autonomy  
Distinctiveness of organizational norms and values; personnel controls; 
control of material resources; impact of organizational norms on 
political processes 
Janda (1970) 
Political parties  
Party 
institutionalization  
Year of origin; name changes; organizational discontinuity; leadership 
competition; legislative instability and electoral instability  
Welfling (1973) 
Party systems  
Stability  Legislative instability; splits; mergers and name changes 
Adaptability 
Electoral discrimination (1 if an election was postponed); legal single 
party (1 if there was a legal single party; the more years a party is the 
only legal party, the less adaptable the system); and behaviors which 
destroy entities or prevent their creation: arrests, partial bans, bans and 
refusing registration 
Scope 
Vertical scope: electoral participation  
Horizontal scope: the national orientation 
Boundary Percentage of seats held by independents 
Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
 
It is to be noted that Table 1.1 presents a summary of the most acknowledged empirical 
studies comprised in this first wave of studies. Despite the variety of organizations studied as 
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well as the plethora of indicators and dimensions put forward, there is a general prevalence of 
multidimensional and structural approaches of institutionalization. Indeed, the great majority 
of works here discussed seems to be more concerned with developing indicators that measure 
organizations’ stability and durability, whereas the process through which organizations come 
to be valued, that is considered legitimate, is largely overlooked.  
 
1.2.1 Conceptual dilemmas of institutionalization  
 
This first wave of studies was also marked by important theoretical contributions that 
discussed the implications and the limitations of Huntington’s theory of institutionalization. 
Kesselman's (1970) «Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France», 
Ben-Dor's (1975) «Institutionalization and Political Development: A Conceptual Theoretical 
Analysis», Brown's (1977) «Dilemmas of Institutionalization», and Groth's (1979) «The 
Institutional Myth: Huntington’s Order Revisited» were all instrumental in deepening our 
understanding of what is actually going on under the umbrella of institutionalization. 
 Kesselman's (1970) main contribution had to do with the review of Huntington’s ratios 
between mobilization (social and economic) and development (the growth of political 
institutions to accommodate, channel, and contain increased participation) by adding a fourth 
variant of institutionalization: overinstitutionalization. Huntington foresaw three possible 
outcomes out of the interaction between mobilization and development (Table 1.2). In the first 
– no-institutionalization – neither participation or development had occurred and institutions 
were not autonomous or adaptable (this is the case of traditional societies). In the second – 
inadequate institutionalization – political development was outstripped by social and 
economic mobilization, that is, the erosion of the political order resulted from the breakdown 
of the institutionalization process and the capture of the political arena by nonpolitical 
institutions (social forces, usually the army). In this scenario institutions were autonomous, 
but not adaptable (transitional polities). Finally, in the third – adequate institutionalization – 
political development adequately accommodated increased participation and thus 
institutionalization is satisfactory; political institutions were both autonomous and adaptable 
(civic polities). Overinstitutionalization, the fourth scenario proposed by Kesselman, differs 
from inadequate institutionalization, because it «[...] refers to a “clutter” of institutions, to the 
fact that institutions are so strong and integrate participation so successfully that change is 
stifled» (Kesselman 1970, 26).  
 
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
18 
 
Table 1.2 – Varying relationships between mobilization and development 
 
 
Development 
- + 
M
o
b
ili
za
ti
o
n
 - 
(1) Traditional Polities 
 
(4) Postindustrial Societies- Political constraint 
(Overinstitutionalization) 
+ 
(2) Transitional Polities- Political decay 
(Inadequate institutionalization) 
(3) Civic Polities- Political order 
(Adequate institutionalization) 
Source: Kesselman (1970, 25) 
 
Ben-Dor (1975), in turn, summarizes in six points the main theoretical and 
methodological problems with Huntington’s conceptualization. Even though he does not 
suggest any definition or measurement of institutionalization, he conducts a serious scrutiny 
of this concept that is extremely useful for anyone interested in applying the concept of 
institutionalization to the study of political organizations. The first problem he identifies is the 
lack of a clear distinction between institutions and organizations (Ben-Dor 1975, 311). The 
second problem concerned the fact that Huntington’s definition of institutionalization as «the 
process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability» encompassed both 
an attitudinal and a structural dimension. This is problematic for while the «stability of 
organizations is a structural trait that can be explained by any number of variables [...] 
‘procedures acquiring value’ is a distinctly behavioral process (if so desired, this may be 
regarded a trait of political culture)». Moreover, this statement could imply that «if a given 
organization is stable (presumably meaning that it endures over a lengthy period of time) it 
must be valued (presumably not only by its members but also by major segments of the 
relevant outside population) and vice versa». Nonetheless, stability and being valued can be 
contradictory (Ben-Dor 1975, 311-312) given that:  
 
challenges of modernization are such that in order for organizations to be valued, they may be 
called upon to introduce major innovations, including innovations of a magnitude threatening 
the stability of the organization. In this sense, if constant innovation indeed characterizes 
modernization, valuing organizations may indeed mean danger to their stability, while stability 
may mean that the organization may no longer be valued (Ibid. 313).  
 
The third problem is the interplay between different levels of analysis. Huntington’s criteria 
of institutionalization apply to the political system as such, but also to political organizations 
and procedures, and this introduces a micro-macro duality (Ben-Dor 1975, 315). The fourth 
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problem derives from a possible mismatch between his four criteria of institutionalization: 
«organizations may lack adaptability but may at the same time increase their autonomy; they 
may lack autonomy but develop a good deal of complexity and so forth. Obviously sometimes 
the four criteria go together, and sometimes they do not» (Idem.). The fifth problem is that he 
does not describe how institutions become valued and, finally, the sixth is that he neglects the 
different outcomes of institutionalization, namely asymmetrical institutionalization and 
overinstitutionalization. Slightly differently from Kesselman (1970), Ben-Dor (1975) states 
that overinstitutionalization can occur in contexts where participation is silenced by 
institutional development, or if institutions were built (and strengthened) prior to socio-
economic modernization. Therefore, «overinstitutionalization may bring about a strange 
asymmetry, whereby the political system is strong out of all proportion to other social 
systems, even though the latter may even be more highly valued» (Ibid., 319). Moreover, 
overinstitutionalization can lead to asymmetrical institutionalization. This means that 
institutionalization may be strong on the macro level and weak on the micro level, and vice 
versa; or it can be strong along one or two of the four dimensions and weak on the others. 
Focusing on the interaction between the individual and the systemic face of 
institutionalization, Brown (1977) adds that overinstitutionalization can result from structural 
dilemmas between the individual and the institution, which require a balance between 
spontaneity and stability. Depending on the extent to which the equilibrium between these 
two poles is achieved, two scenarios can emerge: «At the extreme society may be 
characterized by overinstitutionalization which crushes the individual and causes him to 
revolt, or it may be characterized by a breakdown of institutional structures which leaves him 
in a state of psychological confusion and cultural chaos» (Brown 1977, 141).  
Within this group of studies, Groth (1979, 204) is the most critical of Huntington’s 
proposal. Defending the Weberian approach of institutionalization, he points out five 
problems in Huntington’s thesis. First, the definition linking organization and 
institutionalization is vague, since the different indicators that measure it are quite arbitrary 
and «are not related to one another in any precise, or even roughly calculable fashion» (Ibid., 
205). Second, the moral inferences from the characteristics of organization – the more 
complex, autonomous, adaptable and durable the better – raise crucial questions of whether a 
society would be better served by «[...] a stronger or a weaker presidency? A stronger or 
weaker legislature? More centralization of less centralization of power? [...]» (Ibid., 210). 
Third, the dichotomy of politics between developed nation-states and undeveloped ones 
reduces the variety of processes that take place within these two groups (Ibid., 212). Fourth, 
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the connection between political organization and political institutionalization is insufficient 
in face of empirical evidence of several organizations, such as parties and social movements, 
which have attempted to institutionalize and failed (Ibid., 226). Finally, the theory of 
institutionalization, power and order does not take contingency into account: «In particular, 
the episodic qualities of its leaders, the virtues and vices of its political class and people 
cannot be dispensed with or ‘factored out’ of the political equation by any organizational 
devices» (Groth 1979, 233). These mechanisms are more valued in the Weberian approach, 
according to which «[...] regardless of the nature, amount or quality of change which any 
society may have experienced, acute conditions of crisis and conflict – whether economic, 
social, cultural, military, or otherwise – are generally likely to increase the proportion of 
system management through patrimonial – charismatic as opposed to institutional means» 
(Groth 1979, 233-234).  
These studies indicate several problems one should be aware of when applying the 
concept of institutionalization to the study of political organizations of any sort; but to a 
certain degree, they also refine it. In fact, inasmuch as they draw attention to the different 
phenomena enclosed under the label of institutionalization, as well as to its conceptual and 
empirical dilemmas, they also leave a prescription of how to make it a stronger and more 
tangible concept.  
 
1.3 The institutionalization of party systems  
 
Following this initial interest, the studies of political institutionalization virtually 
disappeared
2
. In fact, it was only with the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization 
that the curiosity around this field re-emerged. In the mid-1990s, scholars brought 
institutional analysis back into the research agenda of social sciences and, this time, they used 
parties and party systems as the main unit of analysis, whereas during the 1960s and 1970s 
the theory of institutionalization had been applied to a variety of political organizations. This 
new series of studies was inaugurated by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) in Building 
Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America, a book that contested the existing 
models of party system analysis and proposed a new framework, taking institutionalization as 
the main criterion for classifying party systems. In the sequence of this work, further 
improved by Mainwaring (1998; 1999), an impressive number of studies has sought to 
                                                          
2
 Panebianco's (1988) Political Parties Organization and Power is among the few studies published during the 
1980s.  
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measure the degree of institutionalization of party systems
3
 and to account for its actual or 
potential impact on the prospects for democratization. As in the first wave of studies, the 
growing interest on this topic stimulated an intense debate about both the definition and the 
measurement of institutionalization. Yet, some conceptual ambiguities remain and it is still 
unclear how many characteristics should be part of it and how its constituent elements are 
related to each other. The next two parts of this section summarize the studies about party and 
PSI around two broad umbrellas: the first lays out the studies that have evolved around one 
dimension only and the second the ones that have adopted a multidimensional 
conceptualization of institutionalization. 
 
1.3.1 Party system institutionalization as a one-dimensional concept  
 
Although institutionalization was introduced in Political Science as a multidimensional 
concept (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968), several scholars have approached it as a one-
dimensional concept, that is, as susceptible of being equated with one of its most fundamental 
sets of interactions, the ones that create stability. Mair’s (1996) study of party system 
stabilization in Western Europe is a good example of this. Taking stability as a replacement 
for institutionalization and focusing on the most important arena of party competition (i.e. 
government), Mair distinguishes three different variables to measure the level of structural 
stabilization, namely: alternation of government or the extent of change in party composition 
of government over time; governing formula, that is, the degree of familiarity in cabinet 
composition over time; and access to government, meaning the extent to which political 
parties in the system have clear possibilities to participate in government over time. This 
framework has been advanced in more recent studies such as the ones of Casal Bértoa and 
Mair (2010), Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2010), and Casal Bértoa (2011), who have delivered 
concrete indicators to measure each of these three dimensions. In these studies alternation in 
government is measured by the Index of Ministerial Volatility (IMV), which is an adaptation 
of Pedersen’s index of volatility to cabinet composition (it considers the percentage of 
ministers gained and lost by each party from one government to the next). Governing formula 
is measured by an Index of Familiar Alternation (IFA) that takes into account different 
combinations of governing parties. Lastly, access to government is measured by an Index of 
                                                          
3
 For studies on African countries, see Kuenzi and Lambright (2001 and 2005), Lindberg (2007), Basedau (2007) 
Bogaards (2008); on Eastern and Central European countries, see Bielasiak (2002), Meleshevich (2007), Lewis 
(2008), Jurek (2010), Enyedi (2005), Enyedi and Casal Bértoa (2010), Casal Bértoa (2011); on Latin American 
countries, see Roberts and Wibbels (1999), on Asian countries, see Stockton (2001). 
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Closure (IC) which just takes into consideration the percentages of ministries belonging to 
“old governing parties”, i.e. those parties which have already been constituent part of a 
previous government (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2010)
4
. 
Building upon the same principle, that is, that stable interactions among political parties 
are the most relevant dimension of party systems, Lindberg (2007) measured the degree of 
PSI of 21 African electoral democracies employing 10 indicators that express legislative 
(in)stability (see Table 1.3). Overall, he concluded that institutionalization had not occurred 
over an extended period of time, and that more stable party systems are found in countries 
where very few (sometimes only one), but strong political parties take over the electoral and 
the legislative arenas (e.g. Botswana, South Africa and Namibia). This approach differs 
substantially from the one previously developed by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), both on the 
number of dimensions and observations included.  
Globally speaking, the one-dimensional approaches of institutionalization have broadly 
privileged the structural element over the attitudinal one, featuring stability – at the legislative 
or the governmental level – as the primary criteria of institutionalization. The relevance given 
to the structural element is made even more evident if we take into account the number of 
studies that have focused on the topic of stabilization without directly linking it with 
institutionalization. These studies include, among others, Bartolini and Mair (1990) on the 
stabilization of Western European party systems, Roberts and Wibbels (1999) on the origins 
of electoral instability in Latin American countries, Bogaards (2008) on the relationship 
between the number of political parties and electoral instability in Africa, and Tavits (2005) 
and Bakke and Sitter (2005) on the development of stable patterns of party support in post-
Communist European countries.  
One-dimensional approaches of institutionalization have the advantage of being more 
parsimonious and straightforward. Yet, because they have tended to focus in only one arena 
of competition (either parliament or government) they seem to obscure what is going in the 
other arenas of the polity. In the following section we present the multidimensional 
approaches to the study of PSI.  
 
                                                          
4
 Method to compute IFA: a) if the very same combination of parties has already governed together, IFA=100 
(i.e. total familiarity); b) if an entirely new combination of forces constitutes the government, IFA=0 (i.e. total 
innovation); and finally, c) if only part of the parties in a cabinet has shared responsibilities in a previous 
government, the IFA will be equal to the percentage of ministries belonging to the “familiar” part. For a 
comprehensive explanation of the rules of calculation of each of these indexes, see Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 
(2010). 
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1.3.2 Party system Institutionalization as a multidimensional concept  
 
In 1995, Mainwaring and Scully broke with existing models of party system analysis and 
suggested the level of institutionalization as the foremost criterion to understand differences 
in party system development in Third Wave democracies. Although institutionalization had 
been applied to the study of party systems in the past – Wefling (1973); Duvall and Welfling 
(1973a); Duvall and Welfling (1973b); Ozbudun (1981) – the more recent and more 
mainstream approaches continued to use the number of parties (Duverger 1959; Rae 1967; 
Laakso and Taagepera 1979) as the basic element for the classification of party systems. In 
this context, Sartori (1976) was one of the few that went beyond the quantitative criteria of 
party system categorization to propose a qualitative dimension, which focused on the patterns 
of interactions between political parties – ideological distance. His definition of the party 
system as the system of interactions resulting from interparty competition (Sartori 1976, 44) 
remains one of the most prominent conceptual proposals in contemporary Political Science, 
having inspired several authors [e.g. Mair’s (1996) typology of closed and open structures of 
competition and, more particularly, Mainwaring and Scully (1995)]. While acknowledging 
relevance of the two criteria put forward by Sartori (1976) – number of parties and ideological 
distance –, Mainwaring and Scully sustain that they should be accompanied by a third one – 
the degree of institutionalization. Concomitantly, an institutionalized party system would 
display: stability in the rules and the nature of interparty competition; stable roots in society; 
legitimacy of major political parties and elections; and organizationally strong parties. This 
seminal framework would later be developed by Mainwaring (1998) and applied to the study 
of Brazil (Mainwaring 1999). Particularly in this last study, this researcher re-examined the 
existing frameworks for the analysis of party systems, and proposed a paradigm shift 
considering the variance in the level of institutionalization, the capacity of the elites and of the 
state to reshape party systems from above, as well as the adequacy of Lipset and Rokkan’s 
(1967) traditional cleavages model to explain party system formation and development in 
post-1974 countries. Partly inspired by Huntington (1965), Mainwaring defines 
institutionalization as «[...] the process by which a practice or organization becomes well 
established and widely known, if not universally accepted» (Mainwaring 1999, 25). This 
process is relevant to understand how a political system works as: 
 
the belief that a given ensemble of procedures and organizations will endure shapes 
expectations, attitudes, and behavior. In particular, party-system institutionalization means that 
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actors entertain clear and stable expectations about the behavior of other actors, and hence about 
the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior (Mainwaring 1999, 25).  
 
In this study, four dimensions of PSI (which were first presented in Mainwaring and Scully 
1995) were applied to the study of Brazil: (i) stability in patterns of interparty competition 
(measured by legislative and presidential volatility); (ii) rootedness in society (measured by 
difference in share of votes across presidential and legislative elections, widespread ticket 
splitting, percentage of respondents who report having a party preference, percentage of 
recent lower-chamber vote for parties founded by 1950, and years since founding of parties 
with 10% of the lower-chamber vote); (iii) legitimacy of parties and elections (measured by 
survey questions inquiring on sympathy towards parties, whether respondents approve 
dissolution of parties and parliaments, percentage that prefer one party system, whether 
respondents believe that democracy could exist without political parties); and, finally (iv) 
party organization is measured by party discipline or congruence between deputies and the 
party leader, proportion of individuals switching parties, and how far campaigns are 
individualistic. Over the years this model has been widely used and revised by Mainwaring
5
 
(with Torcal 2005; and Zoco 2007), as well as by other authors who sought to apply his model 
from Latin America to other regions of the world.  
Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) developed a comparative PSI index to measure the level 
of PSI in 30 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa using all criteria proposed by Mainwaring 
and Scully (1995) except for party organization, which, in their view, addressed party rather 
than PSI. For stability of interparty competition and stable roots in society, Kuenzi and 
Lambright tested the indicators suggested by Mainwaring and Scully. Notwithstanding, to 
measure the legitimacy of parties and elections, they proposed completely new indicators, 
namely: 1) whether any major party boycotted the election; 2) whether losers accepted the 
results; and finally, 3) whether the election was deemed free and fair. Their comparative 
analysis concluded that African party systems exhibited weaker levels of institutionalization 
when compared with Latin American countries. An additional finding determined levels of 
institutionalization to be higher in long-standing democracies, especially those with dominant 
party systems, with the top five countries ranked in their index of PSI being ruled by 
                                                          
5
 In Mainwaring and Torcal (2005), a huge comparison is conducted between party systems in democratic and 
semi-democratic less-developed countries. The authors focus solely on three issues - high electoral volatility, 
weak ideological linkages, and personalism - «[...] because of the difficulties of obtaining comparable valid 
empirical information for all four dimensions» (2005, 6) suggested by Mainwaring and Scully (1995). In 
Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), the focus is placed only on electoral volatility which is used as an indicator for the 
analysis of the stabilization of party systems.  
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dominant parties: Botswana (Botswana Democratic Party - BDP); Gambia (Alliance for 
Patriotic Reorientation and Construction - APRC); Namibia (South-West African People’s 
Organization - SWAPO); South Africa (African National Congress - ANC); and Zimbabwe 
(Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front – ZANU-PF).  
Basedau’s (2007) four-fold framework for the analysis of party systems and 
democratization in 28 African countries was also influenced by Mainwaring (and Scully) as 
the following quote denotes: 
 
a) all relevant political parties should enjoy strong and stable roots in society; b) political parties 
should have high levels of bureaucratic organization and cohesion (low or moderate 
factionalism) as well as a sufficiently competitive and participatory mechanism of electing 
leaders; c) the party system should display low volatility between consecutive elections and 
stable patterns of competition (low floor crossing, low ‘death and birth rate’ of political parties); 
finally, d) the party system should be accepted as and actually be the key decision making 
forum in the political arena as a whole, being paramount to potential veto actors such as the 
military or powerful individuals (‘Big Men’ or ‘political entrepreneurs’) (Basedau 2007, 110). 
 
Picking only one indicator per dimension, Basedau (2007) measured stability of interparty 
competition as the Pedersen’s volatility index, stable roots in society as average party age, and 
legitimacy of parties and elections as the percentage of voter turnout. Concerning the fourth 
criterion of institutionalization – that required political parties to have high levels of 
bureaucratic organization – this researcher identified a series of indicators «such as the 
number of card-carrying members, funds, (paid) full-time party officials, number and 
maintenance of party offices throughout the country» but he does not measure them due to 
lack of data (Basedau 2007, 121). All three indicators were individually measured and then 
combined into an aggregated Total Institutionalization Score (TIS) that ranges between 1 (low 
TIS) and 3 (high TIS). After distributing the countries in a contingency table according to 
level of institutionalization and democratic performance (measured by Freedom House 
average scores), Basedau (2007) discovers a pattern in which more institutionalized countries 
figure among the most democratic ones.  
In fact, the results reveal that five out of the eight free countries included in the sample 
are highly institutionalized (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa), 
while one (Sao Tome and Principe) presents medium TIS and two (Benin and Mali) present 
low TIS. Regarding the thirteen partly free countries, the overwhelming majority is weakly 
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institutionalized (Burkina Faso, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Niger, Nigeria, Zambia); 
whereas only three have a medium TIS (Gabon, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia). Of the nine non 
free countries only one has high TIS (Cameroon); the remaining exhibit medium (Central 
African Republic, Equatorial-Guinea, Guinea and Togo) or low (Chad Côte d’Ivoire, 
Mauritania and Zimbabwe) TIS (Basedau 2007, 111). On the basis of this analysis, this 
researcher concludes that party systems with strong roots in society, high stability and 
uncontested legitimacy of political parties are the most favorable for democracy. Previously, 
Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) had also shown that there is a positive association between 
party system characteristics (legislative volatility, the average age of parties, and the effective 
number of parliamentary parties) and the level of democracy in African countries. In this 
sense, both these studies consider PSI as a requisite of democratic performance.  
Riedl (2008) also applied the criteria established by Mainwaring and Scully to the 
African sample, even though with slight modifications. For stable roots in society, she added 
new indicators, namely, percentage of currently represented parties competing in first 
elections and average age of parties that received at least 5% of the vote in most recent 
legislative elections. For legitimacy of parties and elections, Riedl used Kuenzi and 
Lambright’s three criteria. Moreover, she also took into consideration whether an elected 
government was disrupted by military intervention during its legal tenure. Her final ranking 
for 23 countries placed South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Tanzania as the most 
institutionalized party systems, and Madagascar, Mali, Benin, Lesotho and Zambia as the 
least institutionalized ones. 
Kuenzi and Lambright’s (2001) model was also the source of inspiration for our first 
studies of PSI in Lusophone Africa (Sanches 2008; Sanches 2011). It allowed to us to feature 
unique, and until that moment, unexplored features about the party systems in Angola, Cape 
Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe, since the early 1990s. Only 
recently we opted for a slightly different version of PSI in which we focused only on the 
structural element of party systems (Sanches 2013). 
Moving out to studies that have analyzed party systems in other Third Wave regions, we 
find that Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) influence remains strong. Lewis (2008), for 
instance, has evaluated the level of PSI in Central and Eastern European drawing on stability 
of interparty competition (expressed by electoral volatility); stable roots in society (measured 
by percentage of population close to a political party); and legitimacy towards the political 
parties and the electoral process (expressed by the proportion of respondents that value 
democracy, think that parties are necessary for the political system and also expressed by trust 
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in political parties). Croissant and Völkel (2010), in turn, although maintaining the four-fold 
scheme suggested by Mainwaring and Scully (1995), have substituted several indicators
6
 by 
new ones, producing the following list: vote volatility and seat volatility (for stability patterns 
of inter-party competition); party identification and party distance (for party roots in society); 
party indispensability, party confidence, clean election and real vote choice (for legitimacy of 
parties and elections); and lastly, party age and party continuity (for party organization).  
Yet, other studies have drawn inspiration from other models rather than from 
Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995). Meleshevich's (2007) rested upon two conditions – 
autonomy and stability – to measure PSI in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine. Partly as in 
Huntington (1965), he defined autonomy as the degree of independence a party system has 
from other social institutions as well as from external environments, and operationalized it as 
the extent of partisan basis in the executive and legislative recruitment, and as the uniformity 
of parties’ electoral support across regions. As far as stability is concerned, it refers to 
regularity in parties’ patterns of interaction, and it is measured by the level of electoral 
volatility and new parties’ vote share. Other than this, Meleshevich (2007, 111) also pointed 
out four crucial factors to explain variance in the level of PSI: «(1) the role of ruling 
Communist elites during the initial stage of the party-system formation; (2) the type of 
executive-legislative relations; (3) laws that regulate the electoral process and activities of 
political parties; and (4) the influence of the parties of power on political institutionalization». 
Alternatively, Rose and Munro (2009), and later Rose and Mishler (2010), put forward an 
interactive model of institutionalization
7
 that encompassed four criteria: (1) laws – the extent 
to which election laws are stable; (2) elite commitments – the extent to which political elites 
have durable commitments to a party; (3) voter demands – the extent to which voters have 
durable commitments to a party; and (4) learning – a process of elite and mass learning after 
the founding election. This proposal is innovative in the extent to which it has devoted more 
attention than the preceding ones, into assessing the scope of PSI more than simply measuring 
its indicators.  
Moreover, within this research field we find several studies focusing on the analysis of 
political parties instead on that of party systems, or even on both simultaneously. Despite the 
fact that party institutionalization is not our main interest here, it is important to exemplify 
how some dimensions/indicators have migrated from one level to the other across different 
                                                          
6
 They kept electoral volatility and party age only.  
7
 Rose and Munro (2009) analyzed Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Russia, while Rose and Mishler (2010) studied only Russia.  
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studies. Focusing on parties as organizations, Panebianco (1988) defines institutionalization 
vaguely as «the way the organization ‘solidifies’» (Ibid., 49) and suggests two scales to 
measure it: «(1) that of the organization’s degree of autonomy vis-à-vis its environment, and 
(2) that of its degree of systemness, i.e. the degree of interdependence of its different internal 
sectors» (Ibid., 55). In this framework «autonomy is reached when the organization can 
directly control exchange processes with its environment»; whereas a high degree of 
systemness «implies a great deal of interdependence among the subgroups assured by the 
centralized control of organizational resources and exchanges processes with the environment 
(Ibid., 56). Both dimensions are related «for a low degree of systemness often implies little 
autonomy and vice versa» (Ibid., 57).  
Dix (1992), in turn, employed Huntington’s adaptability, complexity, autonomy and 
coherence to the analysis of Latin American political parties. Later, Stockton (2001) 
replicated Dix’s (1992) and Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) frameworks to measure political 
party institutionalization and PSI in South Korea and Taiwan. More recently, Basedau and 
Stroh (2008) combined the approaches of Huntington (1965), Mainwaring and Scully (1995) 
and Randal and Svåsand (2002b) to create a new conceptualization of party 
institutionalization along four dimensions: (i) external stability, was equated with “roots in 
society”, (ii) internal stability dimension with “party organization”, (iii) external value-
infusion with “autonomy” and internal value-infusion with “coherence”. These four 
dimensions were unfolded into 15 indicators and measured across 48 political parties of nine 
African countries (Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Tanzania, 
and Zambia).  
Following similar theoretical lines, Yardimci-Geyikci (2013) defines organizational 
development and strong roots in society as dimensions of his conceptualization of party 
institutionalization. The first dimension is operationalized by membership strength, 
membership density for individual parties, territorial comprehensiveness and financial 
resources of parties, while the second dimension involves electoral volatility, party 
identification and trust in political parties (Yardimci-Geyikci 2013, 4).  
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Table 1.3 – Models for the study of PSI  
Dimensions 
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) 
Mainwaring (1998, 1999) 
Kuenzi and Lambright 
(2001) 
Basedau (2007) Meleshevich (2007) 
Stable patterns of interparty 
competition/ stability  
Electoral volatility Electoral volatility Electoral volatility Electoral volatility; new parties’ vote share 
Stable roots in society  
Difference between presidential and 
legislative elections; widespread ticket 
splitting; % of respondents who report having 
a party preference; % of recent lower-
chamber vote for parties founded by 1950; 
years since founding of parties with 10 % of 
the lower-chamber vote 
Share of seats for parties 
founded until 1970s 
Average party age - 
Legitimacy of parties and 
elections  
Sympathy index towards parties; whether 
respondents approved of dissolution of parties 
and parliaments; % that prefer one party 
system; whether respondents believed that 
democracy could exist without political parties 
If any major party boycotts 
the election; if losers accept 
the results; if the election 
was deemed free and fair 
Turnout of registered 
voters 
- 
Party organization  
Party discipline or congruence between 
deputies and the party leader; proportion of 
individuals switching parties; and the extent to 
which campaigns are individualistic 
- - - 
Autonomy  - - - 
Degree of partisan basis in executive and 
legislative recruitment; uniformity of parties’ 
electoral support across regions 
Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
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Table 1.3 – Models for the study of PSI (continuation) 
Dimensions Riedl (2008) Lewis (2008) 
Mair (1996), Mair and Casal 
Bértoa (2009) Enyedi and Casal 
Bértoa (2010) 
Lindberg (2007) 
 
Stable patterns of 
interparty 
competition/ stability  
Electoral volatility  Electoral volatility 
Ministerial volatility 
Index of Familiar Alternation  
Index of Closure 
Number of parties in legislature; 
number of new parties; share of new 
parties in legislature; number of 
parties voted out of the legislature; 
share (%) of parties voted out due to 
losing in legislative elections; share 
of seats in the legislature occupied 
by the largest party; share of seats in 
the legislature held by the runner-up; 
and legislative seat volatility 
Stable roots in 
society  
% of currently represented parties competing in first 
elections; presidential-legislative difference; 
average age of parties that received at least 5% of the 
vote in most recent legislative elections (as % of age 
since democratization) 
% of population close to 
a party 
- - 
Legitimacy of parties 
and elections  
The opposition boycotted the elections; the losers did 
not accept the results; whether the elections were 
deemed irregular (not free and fair) by international 
observers; and whether an elected government was 
disrupted by military intervention during its legal tenure 
% of respondents that 
value democracy and 
think that parties are 
necessary for the political 
system; trust in political 
parties 
- - 
Party organization   - - - 
Autonomy  
Degree of partisan basis in executive and legislative 
recruitment; uniformity of parties’ electoral support 
across regions 
- - - 
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
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These studies have been mentioned to make the point that a migration of indicators and 
dimensions between party and PSI frequently takes place. In this sense, our objective was not 
so much to review the body of literature that has focused on political parties instead of on 
party systems but to call attention to the fact that institutionalization in both cases is distinct 
and that it can sometimes diverge. For this reason, we concur with authors like Randall and 
Svåsand (2002b) and Levitsky (1998) who assert that the best thing to avoid ambiguities is to 
separate these two levels, that is to measure them separately and then to investigate how they 
relate to each other. This will be briefly addressed in the following section and at a larger 
length on Chapter III. Now, revolving the multidimensional approaches to the study of PSI, 
this section has shown that Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) original scheme has turned into 
one of the most influential works so far, and to this extent is has substantially contributed to 
the revival of a research field that seemed to be forgotten after Huntington’s 1965 essay. As 
Table 1.3 shows, Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) four criteria of institutionalization have 
been partly or fully applied to the study of post-1974 party systems in all four continents, thus 
proving their ability to cross distant regions. That being said, it is worth underlying that 
stability (of interparty competition) stands out as the most consensual dimension, being 
systematically measured by the index of electoral volatility, while the remaining dimensions 
have been measured variously, frequently according to the data available for each pool of 
countries. 
 
1.4 What do we know about the sources and the mechanisms of party system 
institutionalization in Africa?  
 
Scholarly work about PSI in Africa has mainly revolved around two questions: (i) how 
institutionalized are party systems at a certain point in time?; and (ii) to what extent can the 
degree of PSI predict higher levels of democratic performance? Apart from Welfling (1973), 
Riedl (2008), and to some extent Ferree (2010), the majority of studies mentioned in the 
previous section measured the degree of PSI as a means to predict varying degrees of 
democratic performance. Let us point out some examples.  
Kuenzi and Lambright’s (2001) first study essentially focused on the measurement of 
institutionalization, but the second one – «Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in 
Africa’s Electoral Regimes» – went further in exploring the relationship between 
institutionalization and democratization. Here, they used three party system characteristics – 
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legislative volatility, the average age of parties, and the effective number of parliamentary 
parties – to explain variance in the level of democracy (measured by Freedom House scores) 
in 33 African regimes. The results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression they 
conducted revealed that low levels of both volatility and fragmentation predicted higher levels 
of democracy. By exploring the relationship between his TIS and democratic performance 
(also measured by Freedom House scores), Basedau (2007) also identified an association 
between higher levels of TIS and democracy. Another group of studies, particularly of 
Lindberg (2007) and Bogaards (2008) has equally contributed to this debate, but in different 
terms. Lindberg (2007) compared the degree of legislative (ins)stability in 21 African 
countries and, in the end, delivered a typology of stable/fluid/destabilized party systems; 
whereas Bogaards (2008), even though measuring a diverse selection of indicators,
8
 was more 
concerned with the varying degrees of electoral volatility in dominant party systems. 
One underlying finding of all these studies suggests an unclear relationship between 
time and institutionalization (or stabilization). Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) found higher 
levels of institutionalization in older democracies (e.g. Botswana and Mauritius), while 
Bogaards (2008) noted that in «[...] contrast to what Tavits (2005) found for Eastern Europe, 
but in line with Mainwaring and Zoco’s (2007) findings for third-wave democracies 
worldwide, no general trend towards stabilization over time is discernible», as for example: 
 
the four countries with a longer tradition of multiparty elections show stark contrast. The only 
two long-standing African democracies, Botswana and Mauritius, display a stable level of 
electoral instability between the last elections, whereas the two countries with a tradition of 
unfree multiparty elections, Senegal and Zimbabwe, exhibit a strong rise in volatility (Bogaards 
2008, 118).  
 
On the same topic, Lindberg (2007) concluded that African party systems were either 
institutionalized or non-institutionalized from the onset of multipartism, and thus that 
institutionalization as such had not occurred over time. The question of whether time per se 
leads to higher levels of institutionalization is, therefore, still relatively open.  
Ferree’s (2010) and Riedl’s (2008) studies detach from this group insofar as they focus 
on party system characteristics – stability and institutionalization, respectively – as dependent 
variables and inquire on their social, economic and institutional roots. Ferree’s (2010) 
                                                          
8
 Other indicators used descriptively were: vote share winner, seat share winner, incumbent vote change and vote 
on new parties.  
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analysis on the sources of electoral volatility in Africa, tests the «hypothesis about how the 
size and distribution of groups shape volatility levels». The results showed that «countries 
with one, and only one, majority group should have less volatility than countries with no 
majority group or countries with multiple nested majority groups» (Ferree 2010, 778). Riedl’s 
(2008) mixed methods study covering a sample of 23 African countries and then focusing on 
Ghana, Senegal (both highly institutionalized), Benin and Zambia (both weakly 
institutionalized) also provides interesting explanations about differentials in PSI levels. Her 
analysis reveals that whether the incumbent had control over the transition process matters 
more for PSI than the historical legacy (colonial background), the type of electoral system, the 
state of the economy or the strength of social cleavages.  
Within a literature concerned not so much with institutionalization or stabilization but 
with the development of democratic political institutions in Africa it is possible to find 
interesting explanations about varying degrees of political performance. In fact, the 
persistence of the “Big man rule” (Diamond 2008; van Cranenburgh 2008), the high levels of 
ethnic fragmentation or the consummation of state resources by the ethnic kin in office (Salih 
2001; Posner 2005; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Moyo 2009), the historical legacies (Njoh 
2000; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005a; Chiriyankandath 2007; Riedl 2008) and the overall lack of 
resources (Teshome 2009) have all been cited, at some point, to explain Africa’s weak formal 
political institutions.  
In this sense, even though only a handful of studies have focused on PSI (or stability) as 
a dependent variable, there is a wide literature on which we can rely on to elaborate our 
explanations and hypotheses of PSI (as described in Chapter IV).  
 
1.5 Balance  
 
We have to ask how useful a concept (institutionalization) can be when not only is it multi-
dimensional but its different dimensions are in tension with one another. It might be argued that 
it was more sensible to discuss the different dimensions separately rather than embrace them in 
one conceptual package. All we can suggest here is that most interesting and fruitful concepts in 
political science are multi-dimensional and riddled with ambiguities and tensions: if this 
objection was consistently applied, the discipline would have a severely depleted tool-kit 
(Randall and Svåsand 2002b, 8). 
  
From its emergence in the 1960s until more recent times, the study of political 
institutionalization has been accompanied by theoretical and empirical ambiguities. The truth 
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is that, the dilemmas that stood out of the first pool of studies are still being currently debated 
and seem to expand as more (and sometimes conflicting) dimensions and indicators of 
institutionalization are put forward. The growing interest on this topic has highlighted, 
however, two major problems, particularly in what regards the analysis of party systems.  
The first problem derives from the existing plethora of models identifying different 
dimensions and indicators of institutionalization. As a result of that abundance, a dilemma 
arises on whether to focus on the individual vs. systemic level of organizations, or on 
structural vs. attitudinal behaviors. At the same time, some studies propose a 
multidimensional framework for the analysis of PSI (e.g. Huntington 1965, 1968; Welfling 
1973; Mainwaring and Scully 1995); others reduce complexity by equating PSI with its most 
fundamental set of interactions: the ones that create stability (Mair 1996; Lindberg 2007; Mair 
and Casal Bértoa 2010; Casal Bértoa 2011). In addition, while some studies focus solely on 
the structural element of institutionalization, others also take into account how institutions 
become valued or legitimatized. Those that have followed the one-dimension-stability 
approach clearly equate institutionalization with the stabilization or routinization of certain 
rules (Barley and Tolbert 1997). However, those preferring multidimensional models have 
tended to lump both elements under the same definition (e.g. Huntington 1965, Huntington 
1968; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring 1999) without providing 
clear explanations of how they may individually vary. Furthermore, the treatment of the 
attitudinal element has been rather problematic. As displayed in Table 1.3, the indicators 
suggested so far vary widely from survey questions, such as sympathy towards and trust in 
political parties, citizens’ value of democracy and of political parties, to the analysis on 
whether political parties accepted the electoral results or boycotted the elections. Wolinetz 
(2006) has argued that some of these indicators say more about the attitudes toward 
democracy than about the institutionalization of party systems. Apart from the measurement 
problem, there are further implications with respect to measuring both elements of PSI in the 
same framework.  
According to Levitsky (1998), the two notions of institutionalization – as value infusion 
and as routinization of certain rules of the game – comprehend very different organizational 
phenomena. Whereas the first is about the process by which an organization becomes valued 
and acquires a life of its own at any given time (Huntington 1968, 15-16), institutionalization 
as behavioral routinization: 
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takes as the unit of analysis not the organization as a whole but rather specific patterns of 
behavior within the organization. Analysts who use these definitions focus on ‘the rules of the 
game’ that shape social interaction and they define institutionalization as the process by which 
such rules or patterns become routinized or entrenched (Levitsky 1998, 81). 
 
Yet, because an organization may be infused with value without being internally routinized, 
value infusion and routinization should be analyzed as distinct organizational phenomena that 
do not necessarily occur together. «For this reason scholars may be better off distinguishing 
more clearly between the two types of institutionalization treating them as distinct concepts» 
(Ibid.).  
Randall and Svåsand (2002b) also defined institutionalization as having both a 
structural and an attitudinal component, which, in turn, encompassed an internal and external 
dimension. In what concerns the internal dimension, the structural component referred to the 
relationship between parties themselves (systemness), while the attitudinal counterpart 
implied that parties accepted each other as legitimate competitors (value infusion). Regarding 
the party system’s external relationships with other parts of the polity, the structural 
dimension is especially concerned with the interaction of the party system with the state 
(decisional autonomy), and the attitudinal dimension relates to the public attitudes towards the 
party system, to the degree of trust in parties as institutions and to the commitment to the 
electoral process (reification) (Randall and Svåsand 2002b, 7-12).  
For Randall and Svåsand (2002b), the study of institutionalization requires a separate 
analysis of both these dimensions as well as a disjunction between the institutionalization of 
(individual) political parties and of party systems since they are two different phenomena. 
Actually, scenarios are possible where, despite having territorially comprehensive structures, 
political parties are unable to develop stable patterns of competition. It may also be the case 
that parties are capable of changing alliances, labels or ideology, but are unable to modify the 
existing set of systemic rules and procedures; therefore creating uneven PSI (Randall and 
Svåsand 2002b). All these issues pose several challenges to anyone interested in the study of 
political institutionalization, namely of whether to treat it as a one-dimensional or a 
multidimensional concept, as a result of how political organizations crystallize certain rules or 
become valued, or as an expression of individual or systemic behaviors.  
The second problem is that scholars have been more concerned with how PSI predicts 
differentials in democratic performance than with the identification of the causes and the 
mechanisms of its variance. It is more or less established that parties and party systems are 
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necessary conditions of democratic performance (Crotty 1993; Randall and Svåsand 2002a; 
Lapalombara 2007) and that their level of development (institutionalization or stabilization) 
crucially shape the prospects for democratization. Studies focused on Latin America (Dix 
1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995), post-Communist Europe (Enyedi 2006; Tavits 2005; 
Kreuzer and Pettai 2011), Southern Europe (van Biezen 2000b), and Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Basedau 2007) have all contributed to construct that view. Even 
if cases of non-linear relationship were also found, there remains a general proposition about 
the relevance of PSI, particularly in new democracies. 
This thesis addresses these two problems. Regarding the first (the problem of 
measurement) it seeks to provide a more fruitful framework for the analysis PSI; one that 
combines the advantages of one-dimensional and multidimensional models and that observes 
more arenas within the polity. Moreover, it argues that the quality of institutionalization is 
important to understand the actual scope of political institutions in new democracies. This 
means considering the different interplays between the degrees of PSI, electoral participation 
and democraticity.  
Regarding the second problem, this thesis proposes treating PSI as a dependent variable. 
This matters since there is not as much of systematic work about the sources and mechanisms 
of varying degrees of institutionalization, both from the longitudinal and the cross-sectional 
perspective. Randall and Svåsand (2002b) have accurately drawn attention to this gap, 
referring to party institutionalization:  
 
The strong assumption in the democratization literature that party institutionalization is a vital 
ingredient of democratic consolidation has not been accompanied by any extended examination 
of the notion of party institutionalization itself (Randall and Svåsand 2002b, 8). 
 
To the extent that this statement remains current and that it can be extrapolated to this 
study it suggests that more attention should be given to PSI as a dependent variable. Building 
on the above, the next chapter presents the questions and the methods that structured this 
research.  
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CHAPTER II – METHODOLOGY  
 
In the previous chapter we summarized the main findings produced within the sub-field of studies 
about institutionalization, political parties and party systems, from the 1960s onwards. From this 
literature three relatively open questions emerge. The first question pertains to the problem of 
measuring institutionalization. After more than four decades of research, the list of dimensions and 
indicators necessary to quantify the degree of institutionalization remains contested, while the 
different units and levels to which the concept can be applied have been too narrowly addressed. The 
second and the third questions – about the causes and mechanisms of PSI, respectively – arise from the 
recognition of a literature bias. Although knowledge is fairly consolidated as to the level of 
institutionalization of newly-formed party systems and on how it may shape the prospects that a stable 
democracy will emerge, little is known about the sources and the mechanisms of institutionalization. 
As referred in the Introduction, the main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate these three 
research questions in the context of contemporary Sub-Saharan African party systems. Throughout six 
sections, this chapter details how this research was developed. Section 2.1 introduces the research 
questions and explains their relevance and complementarities. Section 2.2 proposes the historical and 
the network institutionalisms as the theoretical approaches of this study. Section 2.3 briefly 
summarizes the hypotheses and the mechanisms of PSI. Section 2.4 presents the research design 
(mixed methods design) and justifies the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods. Section 2.5 
features the cases selected for each strand of the analysis. Finally, section 2.6 details the sources 
consulted and makes some notes regarding the process of data collection. 
 
2.1 Research questions  
 
This dissertation deals with three main research questions. First, to what extent are party 
systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized? Second, why do the levels of PSI vary across 
countries and time? Third, what mechanisms underlie the different patterns of PSI? These 
questions are sequentially analyzed given that it is only by defining and measuring PSI that it 
becomes possible to investigate the sources and the mechanisms of its variance.  
The first question – to what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa 
institutionalized? – encloses the problem of defining and measuring institutionalization. It 
may not be an original question, in the sense that it has been dealt with in the past (Welfling 
1973) and more recently by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg (2007); however it 
remains crucial in two aspects. On the one hand, there is a need to revise the existing 
measures in light of important theoretical contributions that call attention to a conflict 
between levels, elements and dimensions of institutionalization; on the other hand as more 
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and more elections take place it becomes necessary to update the level of institutionalization 
of African party systems. As previously demonstrated, scholarly work has produced several 
definitions, dimensions and indicators of institutionalization since Huntington’s (1965, 1968) 
seminal studies (see summary in Table 1.3). Over the years, his theoretical definition 
remained largely accepted – even if partly reviewed (e.g. Mainwaring 1999; Randall and 
Svåsand 2002b) – while his four-fold typology has been more contested. Indeed, 
controversies persist on whether to treat institutionalization (i) as a one-dimensional or 
multidimensional concept, (ii) as a structural or attitudinal phenomenon, or both, and (iii) 
applicable to study of individuals or systems. We begin by clarifying our positions over each 
of these dilemmas with the choice of the theoretical definition.  
In this study, institutionalization is defined as «the process by which a practice or 
organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted» 
(Mainwaring 1999, 25). This Huntington-based definition encompasses both a structural 
(stability) and an attitudinal (legitimacy) element, which have been treated variously within 
this research field. While much attention has been devoted to the study of structural 
institutionalization, either alone or in combination with the attitudinal element, the latter has 
never been autonomously assessed. Furthermore, the way it has been measured is rather 
dubious. Even though several indicators
9
 have been suggested to quantify it, they fail to 
actually express how far party systems create a distinct culture or value-system (Randall and 
Svåsand 2002a, 13) that provides for cohesion and long term stabilization and durability
10
. 
The structural element has been measured more consistently across models (see Table 1.3); 
however its assessment may also prove problematic when combined or equated with 
attitudinal institutionalization (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968; Mainwaring and Scully 
1995). In fact, before Ben-Dor (1975), Levitsky (1998) and Randall and Svåsand (2002b) 
have sustained that both elements deserve a distinct empirical approach as they relate to 
distinct organizational phenomena.  
Building upon these contributions we have assembled a set of indicators that measure 
the structural institutionalization of party systems, only. Lacking comprehensive data prevents 
us from accurately measuring the attitudinal element, which is, thus, not analyzed in this 
                                                          
9
 As depicted in Table 1.3, according to Mainwaring (and Scully 1995, and alone 1998, 1999) legitimacy of 
parties and elections can be measured by surveys questions such as: sympathy index [scale ranging from 1 (less 
sympathy) to 10 (greatest)] towards parties, whether respondents approved of dissolution of parties and 
parliaments, etc. The Afrobarometer includes some of these questions; however the data is not available for all 
countries/years covered in this study. The first round of surveys started in 1999 and included 12 countries.  
10
 Basedau’s (2007) option for turnout is problematic as this is an indicator of political mobilization (Huntington 
1965, 1968). Kuenzi and Lambright’s (2001) indicators, on the other hand, are more an expression of the 
attitudes towards democracy (Wolinetz 2006; Casal Bértoa 2010) (see full list of indicators in Table 1.3). 
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study, although its relevance is acknowledged. Additionally, based on Huntington’s 
understanding of institutionalization as a multidimensional concept we propose a three-fold 
framework for the analysis of PSI, which combines indicators put forward by Welfling 
(1973), Mainwaring and Scully (1995)
11
, Mair (1996) and finally Kuenzi and Lambright 
(2001) and Lindberg (2007) who have specifically measured institutionalization in party 
systems of Sub-Saharan Africa. The first dimension is stable patterns of interparty 
competition and is measured by (1) electoral volatility, (2) legislative seats volatility, (3) total 
percentage of votes won by new parties, (4) alternation in government and (5) share of seats 
for the most voted party. The second dimension is stable roots in society, and is measured by 
the (6) share of seats for parties founded by 1960, 1970 and 1980 and by (7) share of seats for 
independent candidates. The third dimension is organizational continuity and is measured by 
the (8) legislative and (9) electoral strength of (10) merging and (11) splitting political 
parties. This third dimension has never been measured in the way here proposed, despite 
suggested in the earlier models of Janda (1970) and Welfling (1973). As we shall see in more 
detail in Chapter III, the inclusion of indicator (4) and the way indicator (6) is computed is 
also innovative vis-à-vis preceding measures of PSI.  
To calculate these eleven indicators we use the results of systematic and competitive 
lower house elections, held in Sub-Saharan Africa until 2011
12
. Given that the units of 
observation are national elections, the measure here proposed is applicable to the study of 
national party systems. The specification of the unit (party systems) and the level (national) of 
analysis is critical in the study of institutionalization (Ben-Dor 1975; Randall and Svåsand 
2002b) since there is a temptation to fall into the ecological/individual fallacy (Landman 
2005, 50-52). In the present research we would incur in this fallacy if from the level of 
institutionalization of national party systems, the level of institutionalization of individual 
political parties and of subnational party systems was also inferred. In addition to the unit and 
the level of analysis, it is important to take into consideration that political parties operate 
across different arenas – electoral, legislative, governmental, and societal – within a polity, 
and thus that the degree of PSI might vary across these different arenas. Furthermore, 
institutionalization is said to vary not only in level but in quality (Huntington 1965; 
Huntington 1968; Ben-Dor 1975), depending on how its interaction with other processes 
                                                          
11
 This seminal work has been taken further mainly by Mainwaring, either alone (1998 and 1999) either in co-
authorship (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007).  
12
 We stopped in 2011 to allow fieldwork activities in the countries/case studies selected to start in 2012 and 
2013.  
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occurs. All these aspects will be developed at greater length in Chapter III. Hence, for now, 
we summarize the basis of our framework for analysis in four premises:  
 
- (i) institutionalization is a multidimensional concept (e.g. Huntington 1965; 
Huntington 1968; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring 
1999); clustering both attitudinal and structural behaviors that should be separately 
assessed (Levitsky 1998; Randall and Svåsand 2002b);  
- (ii) the institutionalization of parties is different from that of party systems (e.g. 
Welfling 1973; Randall and Svåsand 2002b; Casal Bértoa 2010);  
- (iii) the institutionalization of party systems varies across the different territorial levels 
(national and subnational) and the different arenas of competition (electoral, 
legislative, governmental) within a polity (Bardi and Mair 2008);  
- (iv) institutionalization varies in level and in quality; therefore it is possible to identify 
patterns of adequate, inadequate and overinstitutionalization (Huntington 1965; 
Huntington 1968; Ben-Dor 1975).  
 
Reconciling these principles, our framework for analysis can be characterized as a 
multidimensional structural measure of institutionalization which applies to national party 
systems observed across the electoral, the parliamentary, the governmental and the 
interparty/organizational arenas.  
The second stage of our study researches the causes of PSI variance. As stated earlier 
this question remains quite unexplored after more than forty decades of research, particularly 
in the case of African countries. So far, the literature about party system development has 
provided several evidences of the distinctive nature of party systems emerging after 1974. 
These have been commonly portrayed as having higher levels of volatility and fragile links 
with civil society, whereas political parties suffer from low organizational capacity and are 
highly dependent on state resources (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998; 
Mainwarin 1999;  Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Lindberg 2007; Salih and Nordlund 2007). 
While these labels have been consistently reinforced, little is known about what is going on 
behind them. Even though the sources of party system stability (usually measured by electoral 
or legislative volatility) have been analyzed in numerous studies
13
, the question of what 
explains weaker levels of institutionalization, or more broadly put «what explains the 
                                                          
13
 Some examples are: Roberts and Wibbels (1999), Tavits (2005), Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), among others.  
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variation in the level of institutionalization across countries and time?» has attracted much 
less interest. This dissertation offers a contribution to abridge this gap as it focus on PSI as a 
dependent variable and examines how far differences in the timing of political events, level of 
competition as well as in the structural, institutional and economic settings explain the 
panorama of African party systems.  
In the final stage of this study the attention is placed on the mechanisms of PSI. But 
what do we mean by mechanisms and how do we move from mechanisms to processes? Tilly 
(2001, 25-26) provides very clear-cut answers to these questions. He defines mechanisms as 
«a delimited class of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical 
or closely similar ways over a variety of situations», and processes as «occurring 
combinations or sequences of mechanisms». Concomitantly, he identifies three sorts of 
mechanisms: environmental, cognitive, and relational. Quoting at length: 
 
Environmental mechanisms are externally generated influences on conditions affecting social 
life; words such as disappear, enrich, expand, and disintegrate – applied not to actors but their 
settings – suggest the sorts of cause-effect relations in question. Cognitive mechanisms operate 
through alterations of individual and collective perception, and are characteristically described 
through words such as recognize, understand, reinterpret, and classify. Relational mechanisms 
alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks; words such as ally, attack, 
subordinate, and appease give a sense of relational mechanisms Tilly (2001, 24). 
 
Building on Tilly’s conceptual framework, the relevance of this question is three-fold. Firstly, 
to add a micro perspective to the study of institutionalization by discussing the patterns 
observed at the macro level in case studies. Secondly, to understand what are the 
environmental and relational mechanisms that underlie the process of institutionalization; thus 
we leave aside the cognitive element as we do not have enough information to assess it
14
. 
Moreover, as Barley and Tolbert (1997) have argued, we also believe that this is the most 
effective way to analyze the scripts and the lines of action of political organizations; therefore 
we consciously emphasize «the behavioral and the structural rather than the cognitive and the 
cultural. Although we believe such an approach has value because it enables systematic 
empiricism, it does so at the cost of relegating interpretations to the background. 
                                                          
14
 Cognition has been described as «the capacity of human beings to acquire and store knowledge, communicate 
it and use it for behavioral purposes» (Martens 2004). This condition is very difficult to assess, especially in a 
study like this, where the type of quantitative and qualitative (semi-structured interviews, party documents etc.) 
data collected focuses more on the institutional and the structural conditions of PSI than on how the individuals’ 
search for knowledge is mobilized into – or promotes – greater PSI.  
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Consequently, our approach is far less sensitive to the role that cognitions and interpretive 
frames play in institutionalization (Barley and Tolbert 1997, 18). Thirdly, to explore the 
mechanisms of concurrent explanations of PSI, which are either omitted, or poorly assessed, 
at the quantitative strand. We are particularly thinking of the strategies developed by political 
parties to promote changes in existing distributions of power and on the effect of informal 
political practices – clientelism and patronage – on institutional change. Furthermore, the 
focus on the mechanisms of PSI is relevant because it brings together the two faces of 
institutional change: on the one side the model or schema of resources and interactions that 
defines the possible paths for the political action of self-reflective actors and on the other side 
the interpretive processes that make a certain pattern self-sustaining or not (Clemens and 
Cook 1999). 
 
2.2 The theoretical approach: Institutionalism and African Politics  
 
One thing that the institutionalists agree is that institutions matter, and although they have all 
sought to explain the main puzzle of institutional change or stability that have tended to 
emphasize different things (Schmitter 2009). Whether institutionalists focus on structure, 
agency, choices, path dependency, actors’ calculations and strategies they have endorsed and 
developed a considerable variety of approaches in which one can rely on to study political 
institutions (March and Olsen 1984; Immergut 1998; Thelen 1999; Rhodes, Binder, and 
Rockman 2006; Mahoney and Thelen 2010a).  
Given that institutionalization is a political outcome that expresses how far 
organizations, procedures or practices have become valued and stable over time it makes 
sense to frame it along the lines of the new institutionalisms. More precisely, this research is 
anchored in two theoretical approaches which derive from the new institutionalisms
15
: 
historical and network institutionalism. Together they enable the study of the two sides of 
political institutions, formality and informality, which are at the core of this dissertation. The 
historical institutionalism is the principal framework, it defines institutions as «the formal or 
informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational 
structure of the polity or political economy», ranging «from the rules of a constitutional order 
or the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade 
union behavior or bank-firm relations (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938).  
                                                          
15
 For a thorough discussion see inter alia: Immergut (1998), Thelen (1999), Hall and Taylor (1996), Hay and 
Wincott (1998) and Rhodes, Binder, and Rockman (2006). 
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Different from rational choice theories that analyze political institutions and events as a 
result of choices made by rational actors under conditions of interdependence, and 
organizational theories that focus on how individual rationality is bounded by preexisting 
organizational scenarios and procedures (Immergut 1998, 12-15), historical institutionalism 
holds the premise that political processes are structured by collective actors such as political 
institutions and state structures, which bear their own history and express particular political 
interests, i.e., structures of power. In this sense, political institutions, political authorities, 
political culture and the structure of political opportunities not only crucially shape the 
mobilization and the organization of interests, but also the individuals’ belief that certain lines 
of action are possible. In fact, political actors, here conceived as “self-reflective actors”, can 
reinvent the structure of interests and power within which they operate (Immergut 1998, 18-
21), and this is facilitated during the so called critical junctures. These are «often understood 
as periods of contingency during which the usual constraints on action are lifted or ease» 
(Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 7), therefore opening up opportunities for historic agents to alter 
trajectories of development. 
Even though historical institutionalism has been frequently used in Political Science and 
Comparative Politics, it has been less applied in the African context due to «a widespread 
epistemological reservation in African Studies about the use of an institutionalist approach 
towards African politics» (Erdmann, Elischer, and Stroh 2011, 22). This position is essentially 
motivated by the view that African politics is mainly driven by informal institutions. Against 
this position Erdmann, Elischer, and Stroh (2011) argue that historical institutionalism should 
be used without suspicion as «[...] a substantial degree of formal institutionalization has taken 
place in Africa». Moreover, because historical institutionalism defines institutions as both 
formal and informal, it facilitates the «institutionalist approach to African politics that is often 
perceived as being dominated by informality», without creating a theoretical dichotomy 
(Erdmann, Elischer, and Stroh 2011, 23).  
Therefore, historical institutionalism perfectly suits the general goals of this study as it 
allows an institutional approach to the study of party systems in Africa without creating a 
conflict between formality and informality. More than enabling a tradeoff between the 
different faces of political institutions, it is flexible enough to (i) combine with the macro-
comparative approach when we propose the institutional design as one of the most interesting 
explanations of institutionalization and it proves relevant (ii) when we examine the 
environmental and relational conditions affecting the different paths of institutionalization, 
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
44 
 
where informal networks as well as strategic choices in critical junctures in the countries’ 
history gain relevance.  
In this theoretical framework, the role of the network institutionalism is secondary. In 
fact, it is invoked as a way to conceptually structure the study of the mechanisms of PSI 
(party coalitions party-citizens linkages). Networks are «stable or recurrent pattern of 
behavioral interaction or exchange between individuals organizations» (Ansell 1998, 75). 
These interactions are considered to be complex and highly differentiated (in resources and 
constraints) and are likely to generate patterns of exchange, solidarity, mutual obligations, 
reciprocity, coalitions (Ansell 1998) or else clientelism and personalism, which are frequently 
associated to the African context (van de Walle 2003; Gyimah-Boadi 2007; inter alia). In this 
sense, this approach will allows a more operative analysis of informality in African party 
systems and it combines well with historical institutionalism, which already foresees a 
complementarily with other institutionalism (Immergut 1998; Thelen 1999).  
 
2.3 Hypotheses and mechanisms of party system institutionalization  
 
While the first research question does not imply the test of any hypotheses, since it strictly 
deals with the problem of measuring institutionalization, the second question demands such a 
specification as it is explanatory by formulation. Otherwise, the third research question 
requires the identification of the mechanisms of PSI that will be compared across the cases 
studies. In the previous chapter we noted that only a handful of studies focused on 
institutionalization as a unitary dependent variable (e.g. Riedl 2008; Casal Bértoa 2012). 
Indeed, the trend within the wider literature of party system development has been to focus on 
the origins of party system stabilization rather than on institutionalization. Same examples are 
Tavits (2005; 2006; 2007), Horowitz and Browne (2005), and Casal Bértoa (2011) for post-
Communist Europe; Roberts and Wibbels (1999) for Latin America; Croissant and Völkel 
(2010) for East and South Asia: Ferree (2010) and Riedl (2008) for Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) and Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) for cross-regional 
comparisons.  
Riedl's (2008) and Ferree's (2010) research are very relevant for the purposes of our 
study. Focusing on African party systems as dependent variables both authors have distanced 
themselves from the approaches of Kuenzi and Lambright (2001, 2005) and Basedau (2007), 
which treat institutionalization or its individual dimensions as predictors of democratic 
performance. Riedl (2008) has specifically analyzed why party systems in African 
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democracies formed and functioned so differently, relying on explanations such as the 
authoritarian legacies and the centrality of patronage. Ferree (2010), for its part, studied the 
origins of electoral volatility in Africa carrying out a macro-comparative analysis using 
pooled time-series cross-sectional data. Her analysis featured the size and configuration of 
politically salient ethnic groups as the foremost predictors of party system stabilization.  
The present research aims at contributing to this recent debate about the sources of party 
system development
16
 in Africa. To this end it will consider the main hypotheses that been 
tested in the study of other Third Wave party systems, but it will encompass new hypotheses 
and variables as well. Building on Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) we aggregated our 
hypotheses around six main explanations: social structure (H1), institutionalization over time 
(H2 and H3), institutional design (H4 and H5), party and party system characteristics (H6 and 
H7), economic performance (H8) and electoral participation (H9). Each one will be 
extensively reviewed in Chapter IV, thus only a brief summary is provided now.  
Ethnic fragmentation has been widely presented as an explanation for interparty 
competition in Africa, given that it is relevant for party identification and voting behavior 
(Salih 2001; Norris and Mattes 2003). It usually figures as the main social cleavage in Africa 
(Erdmann 2007a); and has been associated to lower levels of stability (Salih and Nordlund 
2007). Hence, more fragment societies are expected to have lower levels of PSI (H1).  
While it has been argued that party system characteristics such as electoral volatility 
will stabilize over time (Bartolini and Mair 1990), more recent studies focusing on Third 
Wave countries have demonstrated that the mere passing of years since (semi)democratic 
transition may not be enough to structure party systems (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; 
Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Riedl 2008). In the African context, mixed findings indicate that 
older democracies such as Botswana and Mauritius may have more stable party systems 
(Kuenzi and Lambright 2001, 462), but also that there is not a linear development over time 
(Lindberg 2007; Bogaards 2008). Given this mixed scenario, two hypotheses are tested. One 
considers time as the number of years since (semi)democratic transition, while the other as the 
number of years the regime has remained unchanged. This second time perspective is relevant 
for while the majority of countries here analyzed may have introduced multiparty elections in 
the beginning of the 1990s; some have experienced important reversals in more recent years 
and have changed the nature of the regime (e.g. Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and 
Zambia). Thus, we anticipate that (H2) time as the number of years since (semi)democratic 
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 This wider label is used to encompass both the studies of party system stability and PSI.  
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transition will bear no significant effect on institutionalization, while (H3) the number of 
years a polity has stayed unchanged will increase the degree of PSI.  
A number of institutional features can condition the nature of interparty competition. 
We consider two. The first is the existence of regulated funding of political parties and of 
rules encouraging finance transparency and accountability. According to Salih and Nordlund 
(2007, 21) political parties’ development in the African continent has been strongly affected 
by the following variables: the extent to which parties are dependent on government 
resources; the impact of an underdeveloped private sector on civil society organizations’ and 
on the relationship between civil society and political parties; the extent to which parties 
perceive state capture as a source of elite enrichment; the extent to which parties rely on the 
elite as resource-seekers and the weakness of African opposition parties. In the context of 
post-Communist European countries, Booth and Robbins (2010) confirmed that campaign 
finance and donation restrictions can effectively thwart PSI or stability. In this sense, we 
anticipate that PSI will be higher where provisions for public funding and party finance are 
more widely regulated (H4).  
The second is the form of government. A few studies – Shugart and Carey (1992), 
Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) and van Cranenburgh (2011) – have called attention to the high 
risks of presidentialism, or of the concentration of high presidential powers for the stability of 
political institutions. In the extent to which these conclusions can be extrapolated to the 
analysis of party systems, they seem to suggest that the higher the presidential power the 
lower the degree of PSI (H5).  
Endogenous features such as fragmentation and party institutionalization are also 
relevant to understand how party systems evolve. Bartolini and Mair (1990), Roberts and 
Wibbels (1999), Tavits (2005) and Ferree (2010) have demonstrated that an increased number 
of competing political parties increases party system instability, therefore PSI is likely to be 
lower where fragmentation is higher (H6). Party institutionalization, usually measured as the 
average party age (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005), is also seen as a predictor of PSI 
variance with the assumption being that the older the political parties within a polity are, the 
higher the level of PSI (H7); this is expected to occur because political parties with stronger 
and more durable roots in society are, in principle, more capable of changing or defending the 
existing rules of competition.  
Now considering economic explanations; according to Bartolini and Mair (1990) short-
term factors such as the voters’ perceptions of the economy influence vote shifts, thus, 
increasing party system instability. The majority of studies mentioned in this section tested 
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the effect of economic performance. For instance Tavits (2005) has found a negative effect of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on party system stabilization but a positive effect of inflation; 
whereas Ferree (2010) found no statistically significant effect of economic growth (measured 
as the growth rate of per capita income between the first election year and the year before the 
final election year) on electoral volatility in Africa. Otherwise the regression coefficient found 
by Ferree (2010) indicated that an increase in per capita income would actually decreased 
stability. We test the hypothesis that comes out as more consensual in the literature, that is, 
levels of PSI will decrease when a country’s economy performs worst (H8).  
Finally, changes in the levels of electoral participation, resulting from the extension of 
voting rights, emergence of new parties or improvements in balloting processes are also likely 
to affect party system development (Bartolini and Mair 1990). Where changes in electoral 
participation are higher, voter instability increases; hence PSI is expected to be lower (H9) 
These nine hypotheses are tested with help of a regression analysis and the results are 
presented in Chapter IV (Section 4.4) following a more extensive review of each of these 
hypotheses.  
The purpose of the third research question is to refine the story being told by the 
quantitative data analysis. To this end, we rely on a whole new set of methodological tools 
appropriate for smaller-N analysis. The cases are selected according to the diverse case 
method, which is known for maximizing cross-unit variance in key variables, as we explain 
later (Gerring 2004; Seawright and Gerring 2008). The case studies will be compared across 
two types of mechanisms: environmental and relational. 
Environmental mechanisms include political institutions that emerged as relevant 
predictors of PSI in the quantitative analysis; but there is more. Building on the principles of 
historical institutionalism, attention is also given to critical junctures (Hogan 2006) in the 
countries’ history and to how those moments shaped choices, cleavages and both formal and 
informal institutions. The path to democratic transition naturally emerges as a crucial moment 
with far reaching effects in the nature of competition of the upcoming political systems 
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Riedl 2008). With regards to relational mechanisms, 
scholarly work consensually shows that neopatrimonial practices such as tribalism, 
clientelism and patronage, inherited from the pretransition period, remain the general 
framework within which African political institutions (van de Walle 1994; Bratton and van de 
Valle 1997; Le Vine 2000; Lindberg 2001; van de Walle 2003; Gyimah-Boadi 2007; Riedl 
2008). Chapter V will open with a discussion of these mechanisms, before conducting the 
comparative case study analysis. 
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
48 
 
2.4 Methods and research design  
 
To analyze the research questions, hypotheses and mechanisms of PSI a mixed methods 
design called explanatory sequential design (Creswell et al. 2003; Creswell 2006) is adopted. 
Before explaining in which step of the research the different methods – quantitative and 
qualitative – are combined, we explain next what is at stake when applying a mixed methods 
research design.  
 
2.4.1 Mixed Methods: Definition and relevance  
 
The term mixed methods design emerged in the 1980s
17
 and roughly describes a distinct 
design in social sciences that mixes both quantitative and qualitative data collection in the 
same study (Creswell 2006b). It became increasingly influential since the 1990s, as scholars 
faced complex research problems that required answers «beyond simple numbers in a 
quantitative sense or words in a qualitative sense» (Creswell 2006b, 21). In fact, they were 
better assessed by a combination of both methods: 
 
A combination of both forms of data provides the most complete analysis of problems. 
Researchers situate numbers in the context and words of participants, and they frame the words 
of participants with numbers, trends, and statistical results. Both forms of data are necessary 
today (Creswell 2006b, 21). 
 
Supporters of this design Fearon and Latin (2008, 759) sustain that mixed methods have the 
advantage of combining «the strength of large-N designs for identifying empirical regularities 
and patterns, and the strength of cases studies for revealing the causal mechanisms that give 
rise to political outcomes of interest». Without using the term mixed methods, Schmitter 
(2009) also praises the fact that more and more students are mixing qualitative and 
quantitative methods in the field of comparative politics. The most common practice, he 
states, frequently starts with: 
 
an initial large N comparison wielding relatively simple quantitative indicators to establish the 
broad parameters of association, followed by a small N analysis of carefully selected cases with 
sets of qualitative variables to search for specific sequences and complex interactions to 
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 Creswell et al. (2003) provide an extensive review of the historical foundations of mixed methods designs as 
well as a list of terms that elsewhere have been used to describe the combination of both quantitative and 
qualitative data in the same study (also in Creswell 2006a, 56-59).  
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demonstrate causality (as well as the impact of neglected or ‘accidental’ factors) (Schmitter 
2009, 36). 
 
Previously, Ragin (1987) has demonstrated that the gap between qualitative and quantitative 
methods was partly artificial and that for certain questions and units of analysis it was 
possible to bring them together. Without denying that they entail different research 
strategies
18
, Ragin (1987) sustains that they are also surprisingly complementary. Case studies 
can be extremely useful tools to assess whether the arguments proposed to explain empirical 
regularities are plausible (Fearon and Laitin 2008, 758). With this being said, mixed methods 
designs are more than just a combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods.  
Creswell et al. (2003) argue that four principles must be considered in the selection of a 
mixed methods design, namely the «nature of data collection (e.g., whether data is gathered 
concurrently or sequentially), the priority each form of data receives in the research report 
(e.g., equal or unequal), and the place in the research process in which “mixing” of the data 
occurs such as in the data collection, analysis, or interpretation phase of inquiry» (Creswell et 
al. 2003, 212). From here, a more elaborate definition of mixed methods design is also 
provided:  
 
A mixed methods study involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and/or qualitative 
data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or sequentially, are given a 
priority, and involve the integration of the data at one or more stages in the process of research 
(Creswell et al. 2003, 212).  
 
From the combination of these four principles, six types of mixed methods designs are 
possible: convergent parallel design, explanatory sequential design, exploratory sequential 
design, embedded design, transformative design and multiphase design (Creswell 2006, 69-
70). In each of these types there are different ways in which the quantitative and the 
qualitative strands of the study relate to each other
19
. Figure 2.1 provides a clear-cut example 
of quantitative and qualitative strands in a mixed methods study. As schematized, the research 
                                                          
18
 Quantitative or variable-oriented designs allow «testing propositions derived from general theories» and 
«assessing probabilistic relationships between features of social structures […]» while qualitative and case-
oriented methods, «emerge from one of the central goals of comparative social science that is to explain and 
interpret the diverse experiences of societies, nations, cultures and other significant macro-social units» (Ragin 
1987, 54-55). 
19
 «A strand is a component of a study that encompasses the basic process of conducting quantitative or 
qualitative research: posing a question, collecting data, analyzing data, and interpreting results based on that 
data» and mixed methods studies includes at least one quantitative strand and one qualitative strand». (Creswell 
2006, 63) 
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starts with a quantitative question that is researched with quantitative data and methods and 
proceeds to the qualitative strand where both the data and the methods applied to generate the 
results are qualitative (Creswell 2006, 63-64). The structure of our research is very much 
similar to this one. We explain how in the next section.  
 
Figure 2.1 - Example of quantitative and qualitative strands in a mixed methods study 
 
Source: Creswell (2006a, 64). 
 
2.4.2 Applying an Explanatory Sequential Design: Embedded methods and techniques  
 
In this study, data will be collected sequentially, that is, we start with the collection of 
quantitative data and then proceed with the qualitative data collection; priority is given to the 
quantitative data collection since it largely determines what gaps will be filled in with the 
qualitative data. The combination or integration of methods occurs from the onset of the 
study, in the definition of the research questions and throughout the process of analyzing and 
interpreting the results. Looking at the scheme displayed by Figure 2.2, the sequential design 
of the study is straightforward. Therefore the very nature of the research questions justifies the 
choice for an explanatory sequential design.  
 
The explanatory design is a mixed methods design in which the researcher begins by conducting 
a quantitative phase and follows up on specific results with a second phase [...]. The second, 
qualitative phase is implemented for the purposes of explaining the initial results in more depth, 
and it is due to this focus on explaining results that is reflected in the design name. [...] The 
overall purpose of this design is to use a qualitative strand to explain initial quantitative results 
[...] (Creswell 2006, 81-82). 
  
The basic procedures of data collection and analysis are the following. To investigate the first 
research question, a rich amount of election data was compiled on countries from Sub-
Saharan Africa. Results of lower house elections constituted the elemental data to compute 
the indicators of stable patterns of interparty competition and rootedness in society. However, 
to operationalize organizational continuity an intensive work of qualitative data collection was 
Quantitative Strand 
State quantitative question and 
collect quantitative data. 
Analyze quantitative data and 
interpret quantitative results. 
Qualitative Strand 
State qualitative question and 
collect qualitative data. 
Analyze qualitative data and 
interpret qualitative results. 
Overall 
Interpretation 
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conducted, since the type of information required was not systematized in any type of 
quantitative source. First, we searched for records of parties’ splits20 and mergers in 
monographs and encyclopedias that offered a description of political parties in Africa, as well 
as in the websites of political parties and non-profit organizations that supported or monitored 
the development of political parties in Africa
21
. Afterwards we weighted the electoral and 
legislative strength of all episodes of merger and split using the election data previously 
collected. In this sense, we relied both on quantitative (election results) and qualitative data, 
since written records of mergers and splits were translated into quantitative items.  
To examine the hypotheses of PSI, a series of quantitative indicators were collected. For 
the most part it was possible to rely on information from free online data sources (e.g. World 
Bank and Polity IV; see Section 2.5); however some variables were created by us (e.g. shifts 
in voter turnout and average party age). All the data collected in this phase was then stored in 
a file, which featured, for each country*election: (i) all indicators of PSI, (ii) a composite 
index of PSI and (iii) all independent variables. The structure of this dataset is technically 
known as Time-series–cross-section (TSCS), which calls for the use of appropriate statistics 
methods – pooled time-series cross-section regression. This type of data is «characterized by 
repeated observations (often annual) on the same fixed political units (usually states or 
countries)» (Beck 2001, 271). In other words, it means that for each cross sectional unit (i) 
there is a given number of time periods or observations (Ti). For example, in our dataset there 
are 83 country*election observations for the 19 countries observed between 1966 and 2011.  
Despite being very popular, TSCS data and analysis have been subjected to several 
criticisms (Blaikie 1993; Kittel 1999; Kittel 2006; Cartwright 2002). Cartwright (2002) has 
even called this a “crazy methodology” for placing the study of social and political 
phenomena at the country-level. In the same line, Kittel (2006) indentifies a few problems in 
the use of TSCS of data for statistical analysis, namely: «the insufficient robustness of 
findings from cross-country statistical analysis», the «cross-country differences at the level of 
the concepts, definitions or measurement», and finally the level of analysis itself. Social 
macro-phenomena, he sustains, are not aggregated from “typical” individual behavior, but are 
the result of a multidimensional interaction between individuals or between groups within a 
collectivity and, therefore, they are too dependent on specific social constellations and 
                                                          
20
 We counted as splits those situations resulting from factionalism, involving the main party cadres; therefore 
episodes of individual defection or switch in between parties were not counted as splits.  
21
 Sources will be listed later but just to mention a few: Nohlen et al. (1999), the Encyclopedia of the South of 
Sahara, the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) 
(http://www.eisa.org.za/EISA/about.htm) and party official websites when available.  
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historical situations to be able to produce predictable regularities at the macro-level (Kittel 
2006, 651-666). Despite these shortcomings, Kittel does not think that scholars should stop 
using macro-quantitative comparative research designs. In his opinion the user of TSCS 
methods should be very careful and conscious about its limitations and specially use them for 
descriptive purposes as they «can be useful devices for describing non-evident regularities» 
(Kittel 2006, 662). In face of this controversial debate, it even makes more sense to 
complement quantitative data collection with qualitative data collection, and furthermore to 
interpret the results of the quantitative analysis in light of the evidence provided by cases 
studies.  
The third question about the mechanisms of PSI offers this possibility as it discusses 
and complements the results of the quantitative level. In fact, although the quantitative 
analysis tests the main hypotheses suggested by the literature, there are variables which are 
not directly observed that can also account for divergent processes of PSI; for example, the 
extent of informal practices in politics and parties’ strategies and expectations towards 
systemic opportunities and constraints. Indeed, only through in-depth case studies and 
qualitative data collection it is possible to assess the impact of such relational mechanisms on 
institutionalization. These variables are of chief concern for the purpose of our study as for 
several authors, including those that defend the institutional approach to the study of African 
politics, informal rules and procedures (e.g. clientelism and personalism) strongly shape the 
development of formal institutions in Africa (van Cranenburgh 2003; Posner and Young 
2007; Riedl 2008).  
As schematized in Figure 2.2, all these research activities are developed within the 
framework of an explanatory sequential design that starts with the measurement of PSI in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, proceeds with the test of the explanations of PSI (social structure, 
institutionalization over time, institutional design, party and party system characteristics, 
economic performance and electoral participation) in a pooled time-series cross-section 
regression and finally concludes with the discussion and the refining of statistical results in 
two case studies, where a series of fieldwork activities were conducted.  
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Figure 2.2 – Explanatory sequential design for the analysis of PSI 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: authors’ adaptation of Creswell (2006b, 64). 
 
2.5 Selection of cases  
 
Returning to pears and apples are they comparable or not? Yes, they are comparable with 
respect to some of their properties, i.e., the properties they share, and non-comparable with 
respect to the properties they do not share. Thus, pears and apples are comparable as fruits, 
thing that can be eaten, as entities that grow in trees; but incomparable, e.g., in their respective 
shapes (Sartori 1991, 245-246). 
 
This study is framed within the research field of Comparative Politics. At each strand of 
analysis it uses concepts applicable to more than one country with the aim of making larger 
inferences about the institutionalization of party systems in Africa. For the quantitative strand, 
the N used is larger since the main interest is to test the theoretical hypotheses about 
institutionalization in a concrete pool of countries. In the qualitative strand, the number of 
cases is necessarily lower given that the purpose is to refine the “story” being told by the data. 
In this sense, different research questions require different comparative methods. The 
following two parts of this section outline the comparative method used to select the cases for 
both the quantitative and the qualitative strand.  
Research 
questions (RQ. 
 
 
 
QUANTITATIVE STRAND QUALITATIVE STRAND 
RQ #1 Measurement of PSI 
 
Data collection: election data and 
records of parties’ splits and 
mergers 
Data analysis: building a composite 
index of PSI 
N/OBS: 19 countries/102 elections  
 
 
 
RQ #3 Mechanisms of PSI 
 
Data collection: semi-structured 
interviews, documental and 
archival research 
Data analysis: comparative case 
study 
 N/OBS: 2 
 
RQ #2 Sources of PSI 
 
Data collection: quantitative 
measures for the explanatory 
dimensions of PSI 
Data analysis: TSCS Regression 
Analysis 
N/OBS: 19 countries/83 elections  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Integration of 
quantitative 
and 
qualitative 
findings 
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2.5.1 Case selection for the quantitative strand  
 
To be selected for this strand of the analysis, Sub-Saharan African countries had to combine 
four criteria. Firstly; continuous elections, with a minimum threshold of three consecutive 
lower house elections, so we could capture some PSI variation over time. Secondly; regular 
cycle of elections that was not interrupted by episodes of political instability or major armed 
conflicts, since in those cases parties and party systems are profoundly affected (e.g. some 
parties are banned or dissolved and formal rules are frequently changed with the draft of new 
constitutional laws). Thirdly; competitive elections, meaning that: (a) more than one political 
party is allowed to run for elections; and (b) there are (minimum) legal provisions that 
guarantee political rights and civil liberties. Lastly, full data on all indicators of PSI, that is, 
no missing data in what regards the dependent variable. This fourth criterion is relevant 
because if PSI is our political outcome of interest we want to make sure that we have 
systematic data collected about it, so that the results can be applicable to all countries*years 
included in the analysis.  
These four criteria were observed in the then 49 states of Sub-Saharan Africa for the 
election period between 1966
22
 and 2011. For the most part we did not have problems in 
verifying them. Continuous, competitive and regular cycle of elections were possible to 
confirm with information from African Elections Database, IPU PARLINE Database on 
National Parliaments
23
, Center for Systemic Peace (provides extensive data about major 
political conflicts in world) and National Election Commissions. To capture whether there 
were (minimal) legal provisions protecting political rights and civil liberties at the moment of 
the election, we used Freedom House time series ratings and selected countries with average 
scores below 5.0 (threshold for partly free), for the entire period of the analysis. The reason 
why we use average ratings instead of annual scores is because the latter have been subjected 
to some criticisms (Basedau 2007; Steiner 2012), concerning both the subjectivity of the 
assessments and a possible US-bias. According to Basedau (2007, 113-114) while Freedom 
House indices adequately show tendencies they might be less precise with regard to the exact 
values per year. In this sense, averages can be a good tool to handle this problem because, for 
each country, they capture the trend of development for the entire period analyzed. The fourth 
criteria mainly depended on the process of data collection and on how far it was possible to 
                                                          
22
 The Gambia introduced multiparty elections in 1966, Botswana in 1969, and Mauritius in 1976. For this 
reason the time frame starts in 1966. Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) also start from this year going up until 1999.  
23
 Both projects have very useful and extensive archives about elections in Africa, and generally use official 
sources. African Elections Database covers all types of elections (the degree of detail varies across countries and 
elections) while the IPU Parline only parliamentary elections.  
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aggregate data for all elections per country. From the universe of 49 eligible countries, 30 
were excluded because they did not meet one or more criteria, while 19 were included. The 
countries presented in Table 2.1 all have in common the fact that they share the four criteria 
specified for selection. Nevertheless, they vary in a few dimensions of electoral competition 
and party system format, as will be further detailed.  
First, the number of multiparty elections covered for each country differs. The largest 
group of countries (includes Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania) is observed four times; Cape Verde, Ghana, Namibia, 
Seychelles and Zambia are observed five times, Senegal, Benin and Sao Tome and Principe 
are observed six times and, finally, Botswana, Mauritius and The Gambia are observed nine 
times
24
. Botswana, Mauritius and The Gambia, the countries with the highest number of 
elections covered, introduced multiparty elections almost immediately after gaining 
independence from Britain, in 1966, 1968 and 1965 respectively. Nonetheless, while the first 
two remained uninterrupted multiparty democracies until the present day The Gambia 
experienced a few steps backs. For 29 years (1965-1994) the country had a multiparty setting 
but, in 22 July 1994, a coup d’état led by Colonel Yahya Jammeh ousted President Dawda 
Jawar from power. In the aftermath, the 1970 Constitution was suspended, military rule 
installed and political parties banned until 2001, when democratic practices were readopted 
(Saine 2002, 168-169).  
Differently from these three cases; in the generality of African countries multiparty 
elections were introduced in the beginning of the 1990s, as result of major changes in the 
international order, namely the collapse of the communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, the end of the Cold War and the start of the Third Wave of democratization. At the 
domestic level, the economic and the political failure of the one-party states and the 
increasing contestation of civil society groups and masses (national conferences in Togo, 
Benin, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger and Republic of Congo and union 
mobilization in Zambia) also contributed to open the window of multipartism (Bratton and 
                                                          
24
 This variance makes our TSCS dataset unbalanced (Wooldridge 2009). Unbalanced datasets – i.e., in which 
we do not have the same number of observations across all units – are very common in social sciences, since it is 
very difficult to guarantee that the same group of units or individuals is followed across time without any lost. 
Since all consecutive, competitive elections were covered for each country we cannot speak of missing 
observations. Nevertheless, because the number of multiparty elections held can have an effect on the level of 
PSI, some statistical precautions must be taken into consideration (e.g. inclusion of lagged dependent variables 
in the regression model). This point shall be discussed again in Chapter IV. 
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van de Walle 1997; Chabal 1998; Diamond and Plattner 1999; Young 2012)
25
. In fact, for 
decades since independence, African peoples lived under civil or military authoritarian 
regimes, in which political participation and pluralism were severely repressed. Some 
countries also experienced major episodes of armed conflicts (protracted civil wars or 
interstate wars) in the immediate postcolonial period. It was only in the late 1980s’ that most 
African leaders decided to adopt political liberalization measures that would ultimately lead to 
the realization of the first multiparty elections, ever or in decades, in the country’s history. In 
fact, by the end of 1997, only four out of the then 48 states of Sub-Saharan Africa had not 
held multiparty elections (Bratton 1999). Despite the different moments in which multiparty 
elections were introduced, all those that have been observed within this sample are 
continuous, that is, no major political instability affected their natural cycle. In the case of 
Nigeria, which is particular in this regard, six elections occurred since the first multiparty 
elections of 1992 (1998, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011); however because the 1998 balloting 
was annulled, as all parties participating were affiliated with the government and true 
opposition was prevented from participating, only the elections held between 1999 and 2011 
were considered. Furthermore this decision was supported by the fact that the 1999 elections 
were held under a completely different political framework
26
, in which new political parties 
emerged and a new Constitution was drafted (Falola and Heaton 2008; Omotola 2010).  
Second, the overall status of civil rights and political liberties (here measured by the 
Freedom House ratings) differs substantially across countries. As Table 2.1 displays, the 
highest scores (= less free democratic regimes) are found in Burkina Faso (4.2), Nigeria (4.1), 
Guinea-Bissau (4.0), Tanzania (3.9) and Zambia (3.8), whilst the lowest scores (= freer 
democratic regimes) are found in Cape Verde (1.7), South Africa (1.7), Mauritius (1.8), Sao 
Tome and Principe (1.8), Botswana (2.2) and Benin (2.2). The remaining eight countries score 
between 2.6 and 3.7. Seven countries are in the group of free democracies, which are 
characterized by higher degrees of civil rights and political liberties, while 12 countries are in 
the group of partly free democracies. It is possible to say that, in the long run, only a limited 
number of countries display a stable and unidirectional development towards democratization 
(e.g. Cape Verde, Mauritius, Botswana, Ghana and Seychelles). In fact, although maintaining 
                                                          
25
 From a different angle Doorenspleet (2004) argues that transitions to democracy must be thought of in light of 
structural dimensions such as the state’s level of economic growth, whether there are democratic neighbor 
countries, and the state’s role in the world-system.  
26
 The Provisional Ruling Council promulgated a new constitution, before the May 29, 1999 and included 
provisions for a bicameral legislature: the National Assembly, consisting of a 360-member House of 
Representatives and a Senate with 109 members. The executive branch and the President retained strong federal 
powers. 
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the multiparty elections basis, the majority of countries here analyzed either experienced 
important setbacks (e.g. Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia and Nigeria) or revealed few 
improvements from the onset of the democratic transition as far as civil liberties and political 
rights are concerned (e.g. Mozambique, Zambia, Burkina Faso and Malawi).  
Third, on average 67% of the electorate cast their votes. In the majority of countries (N 
= 12), turnout is lower than average, with the most extreme cases being Senegal (49,3%), 
Burkina Faso (49,7%) and Mozambique (59,1%). In Nigeria (61,4%), Ghana (61,8%), Benin 
(62,7%), Zambia (63,2%), Lesotho (65,0%), Tanzania (65,3%), Botswana (66,0%), The 
Gambia (66,8%) and Cape Verde (62,7%) elections mobilize about 2/3 of the electorate. 
Conversely, higher rates of political mobilization are found in Mauritius (83,8%), Seychelles 
(83,6%), South Africa (82,5%), Namibia (77,9%), Malawi (73,0%), Guinea-Bissau (70,3%) 
and Sao Tome and Principe (69,2%).  
Fourth, there is some variance in the party system formats, even though “dominant” is 
the most widespread type. According to Sartori (1976) dominant party systems are those in 
which a single party wins more than 50% of the seats in three consecutive elections
27
. Out of 
the 19 countries selected, ten fall into this category: Botswana, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, 
Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa and Tanzania. Other cases 
such as Ghana (where NDC won more than 50% of the seats in two consecutive elections: 
1992 and1996), Zambia (from 1991 to 2011) and Senegal (from 1983 to 1998) have had 
experiences of party system dominance but recently changed towards two-party and 
multiparty frameworks. 
Cape Verde, otherwise, had a classical two-party system for years, but recently acquired 
a dominant feature. Until 2006, the dynamics between PAICV and MpD perfectly fitted into 
Mair’s (1990) definition of a two-party system as a system in which two parties of equivalent 
size compete for office and where each has more or less equal chance of winning sufficient 
electoral support to gain an executive monopoly (Mair 1990 420-422). The MpD won the 
1991 and the 1995 elections; while the PAICV won the 2001 and the 2006 elections; 
however, in 2011, the PAICV was again the winner of the election with over 50% of the seats. 
Since the PAICV won three consecutive elections, the party system gained a dominant mark.  
 
  
                                                          
27
 Other definitions are proposed by Doorenspleet (2003) who states that is possible to speak about a dominant 
party after a single re-election; and (Ware 1996) for whom a predominant party system is one in which a party 
regularly wins enough parliamentary seats to control government alone.  
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Table 2.1 – Political profile of the 19 Sub-Saharan African countries selected  
# Country Election years  
No. of 
elections 
FH scores
(a) 
(average) 
Turnout
(b) 
(average) 
Party system 
format 
Main Parties 
1 Benin 
1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 
2011 
6 2.2 62,7 Multiparty 
PRD - Parti du Renouveau Democratique; RB - Renaissance du Bénin; PSD - 
Parti Social Democrate; FARD-Alafia - Front d’Action pour le Renouveau la 
Démocratie et le Développement; ADD - Alliance pour une Dynamique 
Democratique 
2 Botswana 
1969, 1974,1979,1984, 1989, 
1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 
9 2.2 66,0 Dominant BDP - Botswana Democratic Party; BNF - Botswana National Front 
3 Burkina Faso 1992,1997, 2002, 2007 4 4.2 49,7 Dominant 
CDP - Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès; ADF-RDA - Alliance pour 
Démocratie et la Fédération-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain; PDP-
PS - Parti pour la Démocratie et le Progrès-Parti Socialiste 
4 Cape Verde 1991, 1995, 2001, 2006, 2011 5 1.7 67,2 
Two party - 
Dominant  
PAICV - Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde; MpD - 
Movimento para a Democracia 
5 Gambia, The 
1966, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 
1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 
9 3.7 66,8 Dominant 
PPP - People's Progressive Party; APRC - Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation 
and Construction 
6 Ghana 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 5 2.6 61,8 
Quasi Dominant - 
Two party 
NDC - National Democratic Congress; NPP - New Patriotic Party 
7 Guinea-Bissau 1994, 1999, 2004, 2008 4 4.0 70,3 Multiparty 
PAIGC - Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde; PRS 
- Partido da Renovação Social; RGB-MB - Resistência da Guiné-Bissau - 
Movimento Bafatá 
8 Lesotho 1993, 1998, 2002, 2007 4 3.3 65,0 Dominant 
LCD - Lesotho Congress for Democracy; BNP - Basotho National Party; ABC - 
All Basotho Convention  
9 Malawi 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 4 3.3 73,0 Multiparty 
UDF - United Democratic Front; MCP - Malawi Congress Party; Aford - 
Alliance for Democracy; DPP - Democratic Progressive Party 
10 Mauritius 
1976, 1982, 1983, 1987, 1991, 
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 
9 1.8 83,8 Multiparty 
MMM - Mouvement Militant Mauricien; MSM - Mouvement Socialiste 
Mauricien; PT - Parti Travailliste; PMSD - Parti Mauricien Social Democrate 
11 Mozambique 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 4 3.5 59,1 Dominant 
Frelimo - Frente de Libertação de Moçambique; Renamo - Resistência 
Nacional Moçambicana 
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Table 2.1 – Political profile of the 19 Sub-Saharan African countries selected (continuation) 
# Country Election years  
No. of 
elections 
FH scores
(a) 
(average) 
Turnout
(b) 
(average) 
Party system 
format 
Main Parties 
12 Namibia  1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 5 2.4 77,9 Dominant 
SWAPO - South-West African People's Organization; DTA - Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance; CoD - Congress of Democrats 
13 Nigeria 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 4 4.1 61,4 Dominant 
PDP - People's Democratic Party; ANPP - All Nigeria People's Party 
(previously APP - All People's Party);  
AD - Alliance for Democracy  
14 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 
2010 
6 1.8 69,2 Multiparty 
MLSTP-PSD - Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe-Partido 
Social Democrata; PCD-GR - Partido da Convergência Democrática - Grupo 
de Reflexão; ADI - Acção Democrática Independente 
15 Senegal 
1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2001, 
2007 
6 3.3 49,3 
Dominant - 
Multiparty 
PS - Parti Socialiste du Sénégal; PDS - Parti Démocratique Sénégalais 
16 Seychelles 1993, 1998, 2002, 2007, 2011 5 3.1 83,6 Dominant 
PL - Parti Lepep (previously SPPF - Seychelles People's Progressive Front); DP 
- Democratic Party; SNP - Seychelles National Party  
17 South Africa 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 4 1.7 82,5 Dominant 
ANC - African National Congress; DA - Democratic Alliance; IFP - Inkatha 
Freedom Party 
18 Tanzania 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 4 3.9 65,3 Dominant 
CCM - Chama Cha Mapinduzi; Chadema - Chama cha Demokrasia na 
Maendeleo; CUF – Civic United Front (Chama cha Wananchi)  
19 Zambia 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011 5 3.8 63,2 
Dominant - 
Multiparty 
MMD - Movement for Multiparty Democracy; PF - Patriotic Front; UPND - 
United Party for National Development 
Source: Author’s own elaboration with data from: 
(a)
 Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org). The average is calculated for the period of analysis of each country (e.g. for Zambia, the 
average is for the period from 1991 to 2011). Countries rated between 1.0 and 2.5 are “free” and countries rated higher than 2.5 and lower than 5.0 are “partly free”. The highest the score the 
least free is the democratic regime in a given country. 
(b)
 International IDEA Voter Turnout Website (http://www.idea.int/vt/). The average turnout for the entire sample is 67,3%. 
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In the remaining cases we find two types of multiparty systems. The first type depicts 
situations of two-and-a-half-party systems where two major parties, with more or less equal 
size coexist with a smaller party (Blondel 1968)This is the case of Guinea- Bissau where the 
PAIGC and the PRS (the major parties) coexist with RGB-MB or other minor 
parties/alliances; or of Senegal since 1998 where the PS and the PDS are the main parties but 
are occasionally challenged by minor parties with whom they enact electoral coalitions. The 
second type is one in which there are many relevant parties with real chances of winning 
elections but no party comes close to a majority status, over the long run (Doorenspleet 2003, 
175). We find this second type in Benin, Malawi, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal 
and Zambia (since 2011). 
Now let us observe the reasons why 30 countries had to be excluded from this study. 
Their profile is presented in Table 2.2. The largest group (N = 17) is composed of countries 
that: (i) score higher than 5.0 in the Freedom House ratings; and/or (ii) have experienced 
major episodes of armed conflict. Within this group, five countries are excluded for both 
reasons – Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Angola.  
In Central African Republic civil violence started in 2003, when former Army Chief of 
Staff Francois Bozize launched a coup attempt that culminated in the overthrow of President 
Patasse and the takeover of the capital. Despite the attempts of conflict resolution armed 
clashes are recurrent (Crisis Group 2008). In the Republic of Congo, after the multiparty 
elections of 1992 that marked the regime change, the country experienced a civil war that 
opposed partisans of Pascal Lissouba, the first democratically elected president, to partisans 
of Denis Sassou-Nguesso (elected in the 1997). The war ended in 1999 with the signature of 
agreements between the government and part of the rebel groups (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999; 
Magnusson and Clark 2014). In Burundi, ethnic warfare involving Tutsis and Hutus broke out 
after the 1993 elections and lasted until 2000 when the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation 
Agreement for Burundi was signed. This agreement and subsequent cease-fire agreements 
paved the way for the holding of democratic elections in 2005 (Crisis Group 2007). Finally, 
Angola experienced a problematical transition to peace and democracy, which only succeeded 
in 2002, following twenty seven years of civil war. The conflict opposed the government 
party Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) to the União Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), and ended with the signature of Luena 
Memorandum of Understanding after the failed attempt of the first conflict resolution 
agreement – the Bicesse Accords (Almeida and Sanches 2011).  
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Table 2.2 – Countries not included in the analysis 
FH scores higher than 5.5 and/or experienced major armed conflicts in 
between electoral periods (N = 17) 
Did not held three consecutive multi-party elections (N = 7) Missing data (N = 6) 
Country 
FH scores 
(average) Description Country 
FH scores 
(average) Description Country 
FH scores 
(average) 
Central African Republic 4.7 Civil war between 2003-2007 Sierra Leone 3.3 Two multiparty elections held Mali 2.5 
Congo (Brazzaville) 5.0 Civil war between 1992-1999 Liberia 3.6 Two multiparty elections held Madagascar 3.4 
Ethiopia 5.0   Uganda 3.6 Two multiparty elections held Comoros 4.3 
Togo 5.2   Sudan 7.0 Only one multi-party election held Niger 4.2 
Djibouti 5.2   Eritrea 6.1 No elections held Gabon 4.6 
Congo (Kinshasa) 5.3   Somalia 6.8 No elections held Kenya 4.6 
Chad 5.4   Swaziland 5.4 Elections without multiparty competition     
Cameroon 5.5   
   
    
Rwanda 5.5   
   
    
Guinea 5.5   
   
    
Cote d'Ivoire 5.5   
   
    
Mauritania 5.6   
   
    
Burundi 5.6 Civil war between 1993-2005 
   
    
Zimbabwe 5.6    
 
     
Angola 5.9 Civil war between 1992-2002    
 
      
Equatorial Guinea 6.7     
 
      
Sudan 7.0            
Source: Author’s own elaboration, using online data from Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org) and The Centre for Systemic Peace (http://www.systemicpeace.org/).
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The second largest group (N = 7) is composed of countries that did not record a 
minimum of three multiparty elections. Eritrea did not held any election after the 23-25 April 
1993 Independence Referendum. Somalia fragmented and engaged in civil war following the 
departure of President Siad Barre in early 1991. Elections never took place and since 2000 a 
transitional parliament has been responsible for nominating the president. Swaziland held 
elections between 1964 and 2011, although only the first three were multiparty elections; 
since 1978 elections are organized, but they are non-partisan.  
Uganda has organized four parliamentary elections and two referendums, since the 1994 
Constituent Assembly Election. Until 2005, political parties could not compete in the 
elections, not only due to a legal rule but also due to the citizens’ wish. Indeed, in the 2000 
referendum, when questioned about the nature of the regime, 90,7% of the citizens voted in 
favor of a “movement political system” instead of a multiparty regime. Five years later, a new 
referendum took place, and to the question «Do you agree to open up the political space to 
allow those who wish to join different organizations/parties to do so to compete for political 
power?» 92,4% responded “yes”. The following two elections – 2006 and 2011 elections – 
were organized under multiparty framework. Sierra Leone and Liberia have only held two 
elections since the end of the civil wars in 2001 and 2003, respectively (see African Elections 
Database).  
Lastly, there is a group of six countries that could have been included in this study as 
they complied with the first three criteria stipulated for case selection, but had to be excluded 
due to the lack of data. Indeed, for the cases of Mali, Madagascar, Comoros, Niger, Gabon 
and Kenya despite the multiple contacts established and the intensive search developed, it was 
impossible to obtain the official map of results for all elections. More specifically, the data 
missing was related to the number of votes per party at the national level. Without this 
information it is not possible to create several indicators of PSI, namely electoral volatility, 
votes of new parties and the share of votes of merging and splitting political parties. 
 
2.5.2 Case selection for the qualitative strand 
  
How do we define the qualitative path of analysis? Which criteria should be used to select the 
cases for in-depth study? These are the most fundamental questions in the transition from the 
quantitative to the qualitative strand, and answers to them are far from consensual. For Fearon 
and Laitin (2008), the usual approaches of selecting the cases that confirm or infirm the 
theories and predicted causal mechanisms or that suit a preferable narrative can have 
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important costs, insofar as they may possibly sacrifice representativeness and introduce bias 
in the analysis. In this sense, they consider that the most reasonable and unbiased way to 
select the cases in the context of mixed methods design is to sort all eligible cases 
numerically, and then to use a random number generator to select which one(s) will be studied 
(Ibid., 761-776). In our view although this is a guarantee of neutrality it may also sacrifice 
important research goals such as theory building. Seawright’s and Gerring’s (2008) diverse 
case method can be a good alternative here.  
This method’s primary objective is to achieve maximum variance along relevant 
dimensions, and with a wider range of variation representativeness is increased in the sample 
of cases chosen. In this sense «the diverse case method probably has stronger claims to 
representativeness than any other small-N sample (including the typical case)» (Seawright and 
Gerring 2008, 301). It requires: 
 
selection of a set of cases – at minimum, two – which are intended to represent the full range of 
values characterizing X, Y, or some particular X/Y relationship. The investigation is understood 
to be exploratory (hypothesis seeking) when the researcher focuses on X or Y and confirmatory 
(hypothesis testing) when he or she focuses on a particular X/Y relationship (Seawright and 
Gerring 2008, 300).  
 
As previously mentioned in this strand of the analysis we seek to discuss and to refine 
the findings delivered by the quantitative strand; this means that the research carried out here 
is confirmatory instead of exploratory. Indeed, although new dimensions are introduced in the 
analysis, their purpose is more to discuss and fill the gaps left open by the previous strand 
than to raise or seek new hypotheses.  
Mozambique and Zambia are the two cases selected for the qualitative strand. This 
choice was based on several factors (see Table 2.3). First, early measurements of PSI 
suggested that these two countries could be potentially good for in-depth comparative 
analysis. Even though they were selected in a preliminary stage, mainly to allow fieldwork 
activities to take place in the end of 2012 and early 2013, further quantitative analysis 
continued to corroborate our choice. In fact, as the following chapter reveals, both cases 
illustrate an asymmetric party system development. While the former is a clear example of 
high and overinstitutionalization, that is, of high levels of PSI occurring at the cost of low 
electoral participation and democraticity; the latter exemplifies weakly and inadequately 
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
64 
 
institutionalized party systems, where the lower levels of institutionalization are accompanied 
by (slightly) better degrees of participation and democratization.  
 
Table 2.3 – Mozambique and Zambia: historical, political and economic overview
28
  
 
Mozambique Zambia 
Date of Independence 25 June 1975 24 October 1964  
(former colonial power) (Portugal) (Britain) 
Nature of post-colonial 
regime 
One-party rule (Frelimo): 1975-1992 
Multiparty: 1964-1972 
One-party rule (UNIP): 1972-1991 
Armed Conflict  
Colonial war: 1964-1975 
Civil war between Frelimo and Renamo: 
1977-1992 
No episodes of armed conflict 
Multiparty general 
elections 
1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011 
Form of government  Semipresidential* Presidential  
Electoral system 
Proportional Representation for parliament  
Two round majority for presidency 
First-past-the-post for parliament 
Simple majority for presidency  
Ethnic fragmentation
1
 0.7 0.8 
Party system format Dominant (Frelimo): 1994-to the present 
Dominant (MMD): 1991 - 2011  
Multiparty (PF, MMD, UPND): 2011- to the 
present  
FH status
2
  
3.5: 1994-2009 3.8: 1991-2011  
Partly free Partly free 
GDP growth
3
 7,5% : 1994-2009 6,1: 1991-2011 
Sources: 
1
Alesina et al. (2003); 
2
Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org); 
3
World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/). 
*Semipresidentialism with a strong President who is also the Head of Government. 
 
Second, these two cases are chosen due to the nature of the party system. Until very 
recently both Mozambique and Zambia were dominant party systems (Zambia changed to 
multiparty system in 2011), despite operating in rather different ways. In Mozambique, the 
Frelimo, an anti-colonial movement founded in 1962, has been the major political party in the 
political arena since the country’s independence in 1975. Ever since, Frelimo has governed 
the destinies of the country without ever being removed from power by any other political 
force. Between 1975 and1992 it was the sole legitimate political force, ruling the country 
under a Marxist-Leninist ideology (adopted in 1977) that allowed no differences of race and 
ethnicity, repressed traditional authorities and prohibited the existence of other political forces 
                                                          
28
 Mozambique’s and Zambia’s Maps are featured in Appendix B.  
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(Newitt 2002, 196-198). The nature of the regime was, from the outset, contested by the 
neighboring countries and by the Renamo, a guerrilla movement formed in the aftermath of 
the independence with the support of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization. The 
Renamo started a civil war against the Frelimo government in 1977 which ended in 4
th
 of 
October 1992 with the signature of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome (Rupiya 
1998). Through the inclusion of seven Protocols, the GPA established the rules of ceasefire 
and disarmament, reinstated the changes predicted in the constitutional amendment of 1990, 
namely the lift of the ban on political parties and the protection of a series of political and 
civil rights, and included guidelines for the first multiparty elections in 1994. Despite these 
changes, the outcome of the elections brought no change to the political system: the Frelimo 
won all elections between 1994 and 2009 (national and sub-national: local and provincial), 
whereas the Renamo and other minor political parties have been systematically voted for 
opposition.  
Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, became independent from the United Kingdom 
on 24 October 1964. Since then and up until 1991 it was ruled by Kenneth Kaunda and his 
United National Independence Party (UNIP); first in a multiparty setting, and from 1972 
onwards under a one-party rule. In 1991, Zambia became the first English-speaking African 
country to re-introduce multiparty politics. The general elections of 1991 signaled the first 
alternation in government in the story of the country, giving electoral victory to Frederick 
Chiluba and his MMD (Krennerich 1999b, 939-940). Between 1991 and 2011 the country had 
a dominant party system in which the MMD was the main political contender. However, after 
two decades of dominance the MMD, which had been losing votes since 2001, was peacefully 
replaced by the PF in the following of 2011 general elections (see Table 2.3).  
While in Mozambique Frelimo’s electoral and parliamentary strength went on 
increasing election after election, in Zambia MMD’s dominance decreased election after 
election at the same time as the party was challenged by internal contestation, namely in 2001. 
In this year, several defections and splits occurred within the MMD as a reaction to President 
Fredrick Chiluba intent of running to a third term. The Forum for Democracy and 
Development (FDD), the Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC), the Heritage Party (HP) and 
the PF are some examples of parties that were formed by senior party cadres and government 
members of the MMD (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003; Momba 2003; Momba 2006).  
The third and final reason to compare Zambia and Mozambique is the variation in a set 
of structural and institutional characteristics that are partly assessed in the quantitative 
analysis of the sources of PSI and which will potentially benefit the analysis of the 
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environmental and relational mechanisms of PSI. As Table 2.3 demonstrates, Zambia and 
Mozambique are distinguished by colonial background (Portugal vs. Britain), type of electoral 
system (proportional vs. majoritarian) and form of government (semipresidential vs. 
presidential). But there are also important similarities as they are two partly free democracies, 
characterized by high levels of ethnic, religious and linguistic fragmentation, and that in 
recent years have experienced positive rates of GDP growth.  
 
2.6 Data collection and sources  
 
This section describes the sources and the type of data collected at each stage of the research. 
Concerning the first research question, to compute the nine indicators that measure the PSI 
index we relied on the results of lower house elections in terms of vote share per party at the 
national level for the time frame between 1966 and 2011. In Appendix A the list of sources 
consulted for each country*election is provided. National Election Commissions’ websites 
were our primary source since they provide official results, which are, in principle, more 
reliable and detailed than those found in other sources. However, in some countries, the 
National Election Commission did not have a website or when it had the information made 
available was very scarce (results were provided only for the last lower house election). 
Therefore, a series of non-official sources were also consulted, namely: African Elections 
Database (http://africanelections.tripod.com/); Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 
(www.eisa.org.za), IPU PARLINE Database on National Parliaments 
(http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp) and Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) 
Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook. There are some differences in the quality of the data 
collected per country. For the most part the results were available only at the national level, 
while the subnational distribution of votes and seats was frequently missing. Moreover, for 
the same country, it was possible to find comprehensive information and detailed data on 
some elections and less detail for others.  
Still regarding the first research question, a series of secondary sources were consulted 
to measure the organizational continuity of the party systems. In fact, before using electoral 
data to compute the indicators of electoral and legislative strength of merging and splitting 
groups, it was necessary to identify and count the number of mergers and splits occurred in 
the years between elections, per country. For this purpose, the following sources were 
valuable: Political Handbook of the World (all years from 1975 to 2000), Africa South of the 
Sahara (all years from 2000 to 2011) and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa 
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(www.eisa.org.za). Occasionally, party’s websites were also consulted either to obtain more 
data or as a way of cross-checking the data collected.  
For the second research question, the data was mainly retrieved from free online data 
sources. In H1, time is measured as the number of years since the first multiparty election; in 
H2, polity durability expresses the number of years since the last change in the 
authority/regime characteristics; the data is from Polity IV 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). In H3, turnout change is the measured by 
the difference in turnout in two consecutive lower house elections; the data is from IDEA 
Voter Turnout Database (http://www.idea.int/vt/). In H4, ethnicity is measured with Alesina et 
al. (2003) Fractionalization Data 
(http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1).  
Presidential form of government (H5) is measured by a dummy variable where 1= 
presidentialism and 0=otherwise. Countries were classified according to Shugart’s (1999) and 
Elgie’s (2004) definitions of parliamentary, semipresidential and presidential regimes. 
Fragmentation (H6) is measured by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) Effective Number of 
Electoral Parties (ENEP); party institutionalization is measured by party age (H7) as 
Mainwaring and Scully (1995). Party funding/finance (H8) is measured by an additive index 
that varies between 0= weakly regulated party funding/finance and 11= highly regulated party 
funding/finance. The data is from IDEA’s Political Finance Database 
(http://www.idea.int/political-finance/index.cfm). Economic performance (H9) is measured 
by GDP (as annual growth rate) and inflation (as annual percentage of average consumer 
prices), which were retrieved from the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/) and the 
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database 
(http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm), respectively.  
Finally, the third research question, on the mechanisms of PSI, is mostly researched 
with qualitative data – namely archival and documental resources and semi-structured 
interviews – collected during fieldwork in Mozambique and Zambia. In both cases, the 
research activities were financed by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology 
(FCT), the Gulbenkian Foundation Fellowships for PhD Students and the Institute of Social 
Sciences – University of Lisbon. Moreover, they were developed in coordination with 
Universities in both countries, with which it was possible to establish an affiliation link as 
Visiting Researcher. Fieldwork in Mozambique lasted three months (September, October and 
November of 2012) and benefited from the support of the researchers at the Center for 
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African Studies and at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration from 
University Eduardo Mondlane (www.uem.mz/ ). The main results were:  
 
- Semi-structured interviews: from the total of 48 contacts realized, 35 resulted in 
interviews, thus the response rate was about 73%, which is frankly positive. Twenty 
political elites (from 11 different political parties); ten members/leaders of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs); three journalists and three academics were 
interviewed in total
29
 (see Table 2.4). This sample resulted from a snowball process 
following the initial contacts provided by researchers and colleagues at the University
30
. 
Additional contacts were gathered during two meetings co-organized by the Mozambican 
delegations of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) 
(http://www.nimd.org/page/mozambique) and the Association of European 
Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA) 
(http://www.awepa.org/programmes/mozambique-programme/)
31
.  
- Documental and archival research consisted in: 1) collecting and analyzing all relevant 
political news published by Jornal de Notícias
32
 two months before and after the elections 
of 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009, in order to identify the main issues of interparty 
competition in election times; 2) assembling party laws and ideological documents; the 
Center of Documentation of the Center for African Studies had comprehensive data (e.g. 
manifestos, statuses, ideological programs) for the parties that participated in the first 
multiparty election, although it was impossible to find documents for the subsequent 
years, as the majority of parties do not have organized archives or even an office; in fact, 
Frelimo was the only party providing longitudinal party documents; 3) collecting further 
electoral statistics and legislation, which were largely available at the Center of 
Documentation of the National Election Commission.  
 
                                                          
29
 Interview Guide is in Appendix C and full list of interviewees in Appendix D.  
30
 The author would like to thank the availability and dedication of Professors Teresa Cruz e Silva, Isabel 
Casimiro and Carlos Serra from the Center of African Studies, and Professors José Jaime Macuane, João Pereira 
and Domingos do Rosário from the Department of Political Science and Public Administration and Claudia 
Almeida, friend and colleague for the unconditional support and practical advices.  
31
 Over twenty political parties participated at the National Conference about Peace Consolidation and Political 
Parties /Conferência nacional sobre a consolidação da paz e os partidos políticos, held 23-24 October 2012 in 
Maputo, and the Round Table 2013 Local Elections – Legal issues, opportunities and challenges for the political 
parties/Eleições Autárquicas de 2013 Questões Legais, Oportunidades e Desafios para os Partidos Políticos, 
which took place on May 2013. 
32
 This newspaper was available at the Historical Archives of Mozambique.  
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Fieldwork in Zambia had the backing of the Department of Political and Administrative 
Studies at the University of Zambia (http://www.unza.zm/) and lasted four months (March, 
April, May and June of 2013) for two main reasons. In the first place we did not have any 
previous contact with any researcher there (apart from the formal contacts established to get 
affiliation as Visiting Researcher), thus we anticipated more challenges, since the political 
landscape was rather unfamiliar and ways to get interviewees more uncertain. In the second 
place, there were some pending interviews in Mozambique that we wanted to conduct if there 
was a possibility for a second round. In this sense we spent ten additional days in 
Mozambique. The results of the fieldwork in Zambia were also satisfactory:  
 
- Semi-structured interviews: from the total of 41 contacts made, 28 led to interviews; the 
response rate was only slightly lower (68%) than in Mozambique (see Table 2.4). The 
interviews were distributed as follows: twelve political elites (of 12 different political 
parties); eleven members/leaders of NGOs; three journalists and two academics
33
. The 
sampling process was also snowball. 
- As in Mozambique documental and archival research consisted in: 1) analyzing political 
news published in the background of the 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011 general 
elections; the newspapers covered were Post and Daily Mail
34
; 2) assembling party laws 
and manifestos; which was quite a challenge; exception made to the main political parties 
(MMD, PF, UPND, UNIP); and, finally, 3) collecting complementary electoral statistics 
and legislation at the Electoral Commission of Zambia. 
 
Table 2.4 – Interviews conducted in Zambia and Mozambique 
Groups Mozambique Zambia 
Political Elites (Parties’ Presidents /Vice-Presidents/Senior cadres) 20 12 
Members/Leaders of NGOs and religious groups 10 11 
Journalists 3 3 
Academics 3 2 
Total (N) 35 28 
Number of contacts (N) 48 41 
Response rate (%) 73 68 
 
Having layout the overall structure of this study we move on to the quantitative strand and 
address the first research question in the following chapter.  
                                                          
33
 Interview Guide is in Appendix C and full list of interviewees in Appendix D. 
34
 These were available at the National Archives of Zambia, and at the Library of the National Assembly.  
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CHAPTER III – MEASURING PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN SUB-
SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
To what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized? This question has already 
been answered in the past. We argue, however, that the type of measurement used for that purpose 
does not fully tap into the different arenas and properties of systemic institutionalization. Thus, 
throughout Chapter III this question is approached once more, taking into account the application of a 
partly new multidimensional measure of institutionalization to national party systems of 19 Sub-
Saharan African countries which have held consecutive and competitive lower house elections 
between 1966 and 2011. The chapter is organized in four sections. Section 3.1 outlines the theoretical 
and methodological basis of our measure – specifying, once more, the levels, arenas, dimensions and 
elements of this concept. Section 3.2 features the framework for analysis which is inspired in the 
works of Welfling (1973), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mair (1996), Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) 
and Lindberg (2007), and that consists of three structural dimensions measured along eleven 
indicators. Hence, the first dimension – stable patterns of interparty competition – is measured by 
electoral volatility, legislative seats’ volatility, total percentage of votes won by new parties, 
alternation in government and share of seats for the most voted party. The second dimension – stable 
roots in society – is measured by the share of seats for parties founded in 1960, 1970 and 1980 and by 
the share of seats for independent candidates. Lastly the third dimension – organizational continuity – 
is measured by the legislative and the electoral strength of merging and splitting political parties. 
Section 3.3 presents the descriptive results for each indicator of PSI and Section 3.4 displays an 
additive index which summarizes the results of our findings and reveals trend of PSI across country 
and time as well as its different outcomes. Finally, Section 3.5 compares our findings to the ones 
produced by other measures of PSI that have also been applied to the study of party systems in Sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
3.1 Party system institutionalization: The framework for analysis 
 
The first research question – “to what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa 
institutionalized?” – is not a new one. In fact, it has been answered in the past by Welfling 
(1973) and more recently by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), Basedau (2007), Lindberg (2007) 
and Riedl (2008). These studies are relevant since they have tested existing frameworks and 
have put forward new dimensions and indicators to compare party systems in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Even if focusing on different time periods and covering different sets of countries they 
have disclosed important features about how party systems in contemporary Africa work, both 
from a longitudinal and from a comparative perspective (see Chapter I). Furthermore, they 
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have revealed interesting aspects regarding the relationship between institutionalization, time 
and democratization. More precisely, they have noted that time per se may not lead to higher 
levels of institutionalization given that some African party systems seem to be 
institutionalized from the onset of multipartism or seem to develop in a non-linear fashion. 
Despite the clear contribute of these studies; they still reflect some of the dilemmas that have 
permeated this field of studies since the 1960s. Indeed, a conflict between the levels, the 
elements and the dimensions of institutionalization is still visible, and it goes beyond the 
studies just mentioned. In what follows, we briefly recover this debate to explain how we 
tackled each of these dilemmas and to justify the proposal of a new measurement of 
institutionalization. Later we, argue about its advantages vis-à-vis other measurements.  
 
3.1.1 Theoretical and methodological foundations  
 
The levels and arenas of analysis. In Parties and Party Systems (1976) Sartori provided one 
of the most enduring and often-cited definitions of parties and party systems. He defined 
political parties as functional, representative and expressive agencies that develop a set of 
tasks (of social and institutional nature) linking the citizens to a government (Sartori 1976, 
24-28) and party systems, as «the system of interactions resulting from interparty 
competition» (Sartori 1976, 44). This distinction is highly relevant for political analysis and 
particularly for this study. As previously noted, in several studies that follow Mainwaring and 
Scully’s (1995) seminal framework, party institutionalization and PSI are usually measured 
interchangeably; that is, we find dimensions and indicators that measure both the 
institutionalization of parties (e.g. party organization) and of party systems (e.g. stability of 
interparty competition) in the same model. Kuenzi and Lambright’s (2001) adaptation of 
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) is a clear example of this situation. To measure stable roots in 
society they use a systemic indicator – share of seats for parties founded until 1970 – 
combined with an individual one – average age of parties. This is relevant if one takes for 
granted that in a competitive party system which is institutionalized, there is stability and 
continuity among political alternatives, or that individual political parties are likely to be 
institutionalized where there are stable patterns of party support (Randall and Svåsand 2002). 
Nevertheless, these inferences from the ecological to the individual level, and vice versa, 
cannot be assumed without appropriate research. Indeed, party institutionalization may either 
be mutually supportive or at least compatible with PSI or be at odds with it. In fact, there are 
cases of continuity between these two poles, but there are also cases of uneven party system 
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development (Randall and Svåsand 2002b). The relationship between the institutionalization 
of individual parties and PSI is, thus, highly complex and difficult to tackle, and it becomes 
even worse when both levels are mixed under the same framework. In light of this, Randall 
and Svåsand (2002b) sustain that the best thing to do is to conceptually disconnect these two 
poles and then to verify the conditions under which there is continuity or rupture between 
them. While this debate has had several contributors since the 1960s (e.g. Welfling 1973; 
Levitsky 1998; Levitsky 2009), it is remains crucial, for it frames our choice for a systemic 
approach. A systemic approach of institutionalization is one that goes beyond the individual 
political parties per se and takes into account patterns of behavior or interactions that allow 
certain rules of the game to become routinized or entrenched (Levitsky 1998; Levitsky 2009). 
In Mair and Bardi’s (2008) words, this implies moving from the set of parties approach, 
which is linked to the traditional numerical classification of party systems, to the system of 
parties approach, which is «[...] less evidently concerned with the number of parties as such 
and more with their patterns of interaction» (Bardi and Mair 2008, 152). This being said, 
where can we search for patterns of behavior or interactions that express the systemic 
crystallization of certain rules of the game? Political parties, it is known, operate across 
different arenas (electoral, parliamentary and governmental) and territorial levels within a 
polity (subnational and national). As a result parties’ interactions can be discovered along the 
different arenas within a polity, with varying degrees of depth (Bardi and Mair 2008). In this 
sense, it is possible that:  
 
a party system as such may not exist in the electoral arena, where the set of parties approach 
would offer a more accurate depiction, such a system may nevertheless exist in the 
parliamentary or governmental arenas, where identifying the pattern of interactions between 
the parties would prove an essential key to understanding (Bardi and Mair 2008, 154). 
 
According to Smith (1989, 349-350), a definition of party system must be based on the kind 
of interaction (cooperation or hostility) taking place between political parties, but also on the 
level of the political system in which it occurs, as patterns of interaction can result in 
subnational or national party systems. Together, these studies suggest that it is not enough to 
clarify whether we opt for an individual or a systemic approach. It is then also necessary to 
define both the territorial levels and the arenas within the polity that shall be observed.  
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The number of dimensions and indicators. The majority of studies reviewed in Chapter I tend 
to follow a multidimensional approach of PSI. This is, in our opinion, the most appropriate 
approach to study a multilayered concept such as this one. What seems to be missing, 
however, in some studies, especially in those focusing on African party systems, is the 
observation of certain arenas of institutionalization. For instance, competition for government 
has never been measured in this region, despite being considered one of the most fundamental 
arenas of interparty competition (Sartori 1976; Mair 1996; Mair 1997; Casal Bértoa 2009; 
Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2010). The same can be said about the organizational component. It 
is, in fact, considered in Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) original framework, but Kuenzi and 
Lambright (2001) exclude it from their analysis, under the argument that it was linked with 
party – instead of party system – institutionalization. Basedau (2007) also left this dimension 
out of his study not because he identified a conflict between levels, but because of the lack of 
data available (e.g. concerning the number of card-carrying members, funds, (paid) full-time 
party officials). Given the theoretical and empirical difficulties to approach this dimension, 
we found Janda’s (1970) seminal conceptualization of organizational continuity (measured by 
the number of splits and mergers) and Welfling’s (1973) revision and application of these 
indicators to African party systems extremely relevant and valid. Based upon their proposals, 
we have included the organizational component as well as the governmental arena in our 
study, the latter also considered in Mair’s (1996) approach.  
 
The elements. The choice between structural institutionalization, attitudinal 
institutionalization or both has also proven critical. The great majority of studies focus either 
on the structural element alone (e.g. Mair 1996; Mair 1997; Casal Bértoa 2009; Enyedi and 
Casal Bértoa 2010; Lindberg 2007) or lump the two together (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully 
1995; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Basedau 2007). The attitudinal element has never been 
analyzed autonomously and, in fact, it has been measured more ambiguously. For example, 
Mainwaring and Scully (1995) suggest indicators such as sympathy index towards parties, 
whether respondents approved of dissolution of parties and parliaments, or whether they 
believed democracy could exist without political parties (see Table 1.3). Kuenzi and 
Lambright (2001) and Riedl (2008) take into consideration whether elections were free and 
fair, if parties accepted the results, or if they boycotted the elections whereas Basedau (2007) 
uses only electoral turnout. Even though we have done the same in past studies (Sanches 
2008; Sanches 2011) we now reckon as these indicators say more about parties’ attitudes 
towards the rules of the democratic regime and mass mobilization than about PSI itself 
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(Wolinetz 2006). As a result, in this study we focus solely on the structural element given that 
the kind of data we have is not sufficient to measure the attitudinal one. We do this bearing in 
mind that these two elements of institutionalization should be measured separately as they 
refer to distinct organizational phenomena (Levitsky 1998; Levitsky 2009; Randall and 
Svåsand 2002b).  
Building upon this debate, we propose a partly new multidimensional framework of PSI 
that measures the structural institutionalization of national party systems across the most 
relevant arenas of competition. Its elaboration is partly based on studies of Welfling (1973), 
Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mair (1996), Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg 
(2007). It is, however, more precise and complete than the preceding ones because (i) it 
addresses some of the dilemmas enclosed in the study of institutionalization; (ii) and it 
observes, for the first time, the governmental, the parliamentary, the electoral and the 
organizational arenas, including a wider range of observations/elections per country. 
Moreover, despite the changes introduced, our measure allows some degree of comparison 
since it includes some of the indicators that have been integrated in previous measures.  
 
3.2 Party system institutionalization: From dimensions to indicators  
 
Indicators are insufficient approximations of a concept and are assumed to be subject to 
several sources of error (systematic or random errors). Such a shortcoming leads many 
scholars, who deal with concept measurement, to adhere to the principle of multiple 
operationalism (Campbell 1969; Welfling 1973; Crano and Brewer 1986). For the present 
study this means that, by adopting multiple indicators, the measurement error is reduced since 
each indicator will have nonoverlapping sources of error, i.e., each will miss the mark to some 
extent but will miss it in different ways (Crano and Brewer 1986, 12). The following parts of 
this section feature the three dimensions – stable patterns of interparty competition; stable 
roots in society; and organizational continuity – and the eleven indicators of our PSI model.  
 
3.2.1 Stable patterns of interparty competition  
 
Stable patterns of interparty competition was the first criterion identified by Mainwaring 
(1999) drawing on Sartori’s (1976) idea that patterns of interaction among political parties 
represented the core attribute of party systems. It stands out as quite consensual to all models 
discussed in Chapter I how far party systems display stable patterns of interparty competition 
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either at the electoral, parliamentary or governmental-levels. We suggest five indicators to 
measure stable patterns of interparty competition – electoral volatility, legislative seats 
volatility, percentage of votes won by new parties, alternation in government and share of 
seats for the most voted party. The first three indicators have already been measured in 
African party systems; they can be traced to Welfling’s (1973) seminal framework, in Kuenzi 
and Lambright’s (2001) adaptation of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and in Lindberg’s 
(2007) recent approach. The two latter indicators are here measured for the first time and 
derive from Mair's (1996) study, which classifies party systems according to whether 
competition for government is open or closed. In this sense, it is the first time that these five 
indicators are combined under the same model and systematically measured until 2011. They 
capture extrasystem interactions, that is, those which ensue from the different arenas – 
electoral, parliamentary and governmental – within which parties operate. PSI is expected to 
be higher where the patterns of interaction are stable, that is, at lower levels of electoral and 
legislative volatility, where there is a small number of votes cast on new political parties, 
where there is wholesale or non alternation and where the most voted party wins a large 
proportion of seats. Now let us explain how each indicator was operationalized.  
Following Pedersen’s (1983) formulation, electoral volatility is computed by adding the 
net change in percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, 
then dividing it by two. For example, in a three-party system, if Party A wins 45% in one 
election and 50% in the next, while Party B sees its share drop from 30% to 20%, and C 
increases its share from 25% to 30, then V = (5+10+5)÷2, or 10. When parties merge, split, or 
run in different alliances between elections, Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) rules of calculation 
are followed
35
. Electoral volatility is widely used (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 
1998; Mainwaring 1999; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Tavits 
2005, inter alia) as an indicator of party system stability; nonetheless it may not be sufficient 
to indicate changes at the legislative level and/ or to capture instability (Wolinetz 2006; 
Lindberg 2007; Robins 2010). This is why legislative seats volatility and percentage of votes 
won by new parties (both measured by Lindberg 2007) are also included as indicators of this 
first dimension. Legislative seats volatility is simply the adaptation of Pederson’s index of 
                                                          
35
 Bartolini and Mair (1990, 311-322): 1) defend that when two or more parties merge to form a new party, or 
when one or more parties merge with an existing party, the relevant electoral volatility is computed by 
subtracting the vote of the new party from the combined vote of the merging parties in the election immediately 
preceding the merger; 2) when a party splits into two or more parties, the relevant electoral volatility is computed 
by subtracting the combined vote of the new parties from that of the original party in the election immediately 
preceding the split, 3) when the name of the party changes, volatility is computed as if it were the same party and 
4) If parties split or merge during war periods, during which elections are suspended, and the new party or 
parties compete in the first post-war election, they are treated as new parties. 
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volatility to seat change between parties in successive elections. Thus, the net change in 
percentage of seats gained or lost by each party, from one election to the next is added, and 
the result obtained is then divided by two. The percentage of votes won by new parties is 
computed by adding the net share of votes obtained by new parties at the legislative level. 
“New” political parties are the ones that did not hold parliamentary seats in previous elections 
but were able to elect candidates in the most recent election. For example, in election 1 party 
A wins 50 seats; party B 30 seats, and party C fails to elect candidates; and in election 2 Party 
A wins 45 seats, Party B gets 25 seats and party C 10 seats; then Party C is considered a 
“new” party in the legislature and its share of votes is scored as the percentage of votes won 
by new parties.  
The two remaining indicators – alternation in government and share of seats for the 
most voted party – are an approximation to Mair’s (1996) conceptualization of open and 
closed structures of competition in which party systems are considered to be closed or 
institutionalized if (1) alternations of governments are either total or none, (2) governing 
alternatives are familiar, and (3) access to government by new parties is limited. In a number 
of studies, Mair (1996; 1997), Casal Bértoa and Mair (2010) and Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 
(2010) have revised and refined this conceptual framework around three operational 
indicators of PSI – Index of Government Alternation (IGA), Index of Familiar Alternation 
(IFA) and Index of Closure (IC). These indicators have been tested in the analysis of new 
democracies in East Central Europe, but cannot be replicated in this study since we lack 
comprehensive information about cabinet’s composition. For the total of 102 elections here 
covered, we managed to assemble data (cabinet composition with all ministers per party) for 
only about 50% of cases. As a result, we opted for alternative indicators. Alternation in 
government is measured dichotomously (1 = wholesale alternation, either total or none; 0 = 
partial alternation) as suggested by Mair’s (1996) original framework, while access to 
government is measured by the share of seats for the most voted party. This indicator has also 
been used by Lindberg (2007), and it expresses the extent to which new parties have access to 
government: the higher the proportion of seats of the largest party, the lower the chances for 
newcomers
36
.  
 
                                                          
36
 Lacking data prevented us from measuring whether or not there was a shift in the governing formula. Other 
indicators namely presidential volatility (also considered by Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring 1999 and Kuenzi 
and Lambright 2001) were not included, as they could not be measured in parliamentary regimes (e.g. Botswana, 
Mauritius, Lesotho, and South Africa).  
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3.2.2 Stable roots in society  
 
For Mainwaring and Scully (1995), even though stable roots in society and stable patterns of 
interparty competition are analytically distinct, they are closely related for, where parties are 
deeply rooted in society; most voters support the same party over time and across different 
kinds of elections. In this sense, both criteria are likely to exhibit continuity. To measure this 
dimension two indicators are employed: share of seats for parties founded until 1960, 1970, 
and 1980, and share of seats for independent candidates. 
Share of seats for parties founded until 1960, 1970, and 1980 is a revised version of 
Mainwaring and Scully’s (1995) indicator percent of recent lower-chamber vote for parties 
founded until 1950 and builds upon the changes introduced by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), 
which put the threshold in 1970 due to the late formation of political parties in Africa. There 
are, however, important changes in the way we have created this indicator, which have to do 
both with the years of observation and the process of calculation. Firstly, instead of summing 
the seat share for all parties founded until a particular year (1950 or 1970), we take into 
account the proportion of seats in three different periods until 1980. This allows us to (i) 
include more political parties, given that in certain countries some of the main political parties 
were formed in mid or late 1970s
37
; and (ii) to account for the dramatic political changes the 
continent underwent since the end of the Second World War. According to Johnston and Lee 
(2003), it is possible to differentiate three waves of African governance from the 1950s to the 
1990s. The first phase occurred between the 1950s and the 1960s when the majority of 
countries achieved independence and was characterized by one party rule, intolerance of 
opposition and by charismatic leaders who fought for independence. The second wave started 
in the 1970s when brutal dictatorships collapsed in some countries (Uganda, Central African 
Republic and Equatorial Guinea), while others experienced parliamentary elections (Senegal, 
Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Botswana and Mauritius) or regressed into authoritarianism after 
brief experimentation with democracy (Nigeria and Ghana). The Third Wave began between 
the late 1980s and early 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which marked the end of 
the Cold War and acclaimed multiparty democracy in many African countries (Johnston and 
Lee 2003). The period differentiation is hence important, because these sequences of change 
                                                          
37
 To mention a few examples in Mozambique the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) was formed 
in 1976, in Sao Tome and Principe the Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP) was formed 
in 1972, in Tanzania the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) was founded in 1977 and in Senegal the Parti 
Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) was formed in 1974. All these political parties are strong competitors within the 
current party systems; they hold considerable shares of votes and seats in lower house elections (for instance the 
CCM is Tanzania’s ruling party in since 1995).  
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have had an important impact on the process of party formation in Africa. Furthermore, the 
way this indicator is calculated allows weighting the antiquity of political parties differently; 
for instance, party systems in which political parties formed until 1960 gain the largest 
proportion of seats are, in principle, more institutionalized than the ones in which the largest 
share of seats is assembled by parties formed until 1970 or 1980.The second indicator is share 
of seats for independent candidates. According to Mainwaring (1998), where citizens are 
attached to a party, independent candidates rarely win high office. In new democracies with 
inchoate party systems independent office-seekers are likely to succeed, however 
(Mainwaring 1998, 74). Even though already suggested in 1973 by Welfling, only recently 
have scholars started to systematically use share of seats of independent candidates as an 
indicator of institutionalization (Moser 1999; Protsyk and Wilson 2003; Thames 2007). 
Following from the above, we posit that the lower the share of seats for independent 
candidates, the higher the level of PSI. 
 
3.2.3 Organizational continuity  
 
The last dimension is organizational continuity, a name borrowed from Janda
38
 (1970), who 
developed this concept – as the number of mergers and splits – to measure how far political 
parties had endured as stable organizations. Departing from this conceptualization, Welfling 
(1973) developed a version of these indicators that applies to party systems, which basically 
weighs mergers and splits in terms of seat share. This operationalization is the basis for the 
one we use, even though some minor changes have been introduced. The first change is that 
we also calculate the electoral strength of merging/splitting groups; given that these groups 
can be weak at the electoral level but strong at the legislative level (for instance due to the 
mechanical effects of electoral systems). The second change is related to the fact that we 
calculate these scores annually while Welfling considers the legislative strength two elections 
away or before the split/merge. We included all parties that, in between elections, have been 
involved in mergers and splits and created the indicators as follows: when one or two minor 
parties merge with a major party, the indicator equals the combined electoral or legislative 
strength (percentage of votes and seats) the parties held before the merger. For instance, in 
election 1 Party A runs alone and gets 10 % of votes and 0,1% of seats and in election 2 Party 
A is dissolved to join Party B who wins 60% of votes and 0,6% of seats in that election. The 
                                                          
38
 The author is deeply grateful to Professor Kenneth Janda who kindly replied to all enquiries about the way this 
indicator was computed in his seminal work of 1970.  
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indicator will be equal to the strength of Party A before the merger that is 0,1% legislative 
strength and 10% of electoral strength. As far as splits are concerned, the reasoning is the 
same, the legislative and electoral strength of the party after the split are scored. For example, 
if Party B breaks away from Party A, the proportion of votes and seats obtained by Party B in 
the following election, is scored as the legislative and electoral strength of splitting political 
parties. When two or more fairly equal parties merge to create a new entity, all individual 
votes and seats are combined into the same score.  
 
3.2.4 Building a composite index of party system institutionalization 
  
Table 3.1 displays the dimensions and the indicators of our PSI index. Moreover, it features 
how the original values of each indicator – mostly measured in terms of vote or seat share – 
are standardized into dichotomous or continuous scores.  
 
Table 3.1 – Scoring and indexing PSI 
Dimensions Indicators  Measurement  
(i) stable patterns of 
interparty competition 
1. Electoral volatility 
2. Legislative seats volatility 
3. Total percentage of votes won by new 
parties  
3.0 = 0-10  
2.5 = 11-20 
2.0 = 21-30 
1.5 = 31-40 
1.0 = > 41 
4. Alternation in government 
1 = Wholesale (total or none) 
0 = Partial 
5. Share of seats for the most voted party 
3.0 = > 61 
2.5 = 51-60 
2.0 = 41-50 
1.5 = 31-40 
1.0 = > 41 
(ii) stable roots in society  
6. Share of seats for parties founded by 
1960, 1970 and 1980 
3.0 = 80-100 
2.5 = 60-79 
2.0 = 40-59 
1.5 = 20-39 
1.0 = <19 
7. Share of seats for independent 
candidates 
(a)
 
3.0 = 0-10  
2.5 = 11-20 
2.0 = 21-30 
1.5 = 31-40 
1.0 = > 41 
(iii) organizational continuity 
8. Electoral strength of merging groups 
9. Electoral strength of splitting groups 
10. Legislative strength of merging groups 
11. Legislative strength of splitting groups 
3.0 = 0-10  
2.5 = 11-20 
2.0 = 21-30 
1.5 = 31-40 
1.0 = > 41 
Notes: 
(a)
 Coded "3" if independents are not allowed to compete in lower house elections. 
Sources: Welfling (1973), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mair (1996), Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg (2007). 
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This measurement is similar to the one developed by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) which 
was later applied to African countries by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001). With the exception of 
alternation in government, which is dichotomous, the measurement process basically consists 
in applying an ordinal scale ranging from 1 (low institutionalization) to 3 (high 
institutionalization) to intervals of values of each indicator. Taking electoral volatility as an 
example, values ranging between 0-10 are scored 3 (high institutionalization), whereas values 
higher than 41 are scored 1 (low institutionalization). This double measurement makes it 
possible to compare the countries using either the original values of each indicator, or the 
standardized scores from 1 to 3. Furthermore, it allows the creation of an additive index of 
PSI. In the next section the results for all individual indicators of PSI and for the additive 
index are presented. 
 
3.3 Party system institutionalization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Main Results  
 
3.3.1 Electoral volatility 
 
While in long-established democracies episodes of high volatility are rare or brief, among 
Third Wave democracies, these tend to persist over time (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). This 
being said, there is also a great variation in the levels of electoral volatility among regions 
spanned by the Third Wave of democratization. Robert and Wibbels (1999) found a value of 
21,4 of electoral volatility in 16 countries of Latin America, whereas the corresponding value 
among 15 Eastern European democracies reaches 25,6, according to Tavits (2005). In the 19 
African countries, included in the present study, the average volatility is 25,1, but the 
variation between countries is large. As Figure 1 shows, eleven countries score below this 
average, while eight present higher values of electoral volatility. The lowest scores are found 
in Cape Verde (10,1), where the PAICV has won the last three legislative elections (2001, 
2006, 2011) with a majority of votes cast; Botswana (10,2), where the BDP has systematically 
won all elections since 1966; and in Namibia (13,1) and South Africa (13,2), where SWAPO 
and ANC, respectively, have been able to secure more than 60% of seats since the first 
multiparty election.  
Overall, more stable patterns of interaction are observed in countries where only a small 
number of parties are able to structure electoral choices. In addition to the countries 
mentioned above, this is also the case of Mozambique and Tanzania, ruled by Frelimo since 
1994 and CCM since 1995, respectively. The most interesting case within this pool of 
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countries is Mauritius with an average electoral volatility of 15,8. Mauritius is a multiparty 
system with four relevant parties, since 1976: MMM, PT, PMSD and MSM. These political 
parties have run together and against each other on several occasions, and have alternatively 
taken part in minority coalition governments. For instance, after running in separate alliances 
in 1995, the MSM and the MMM combined strengths and competed together for the 2000 and 
2005 elections. Nevertheless, this alliance did not hold for the 2010 election as both parties 
integrated different alliances. In this fluid scenario, electoral volatility is lower than expected 
because, despite changes in the governing formula, shifts at the electoral level are small as the 
major parties are aligned in two broad electoral alliances. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Average electoral volatility 
 
 
Countries with the highest levels of electoral volatility are Benin (49,4), Zambia (46,6), 
Guinea-Bissau (41,3), Lesotho (36,5), The Gambia (35,2), Malawi (31,6), Senegal (30,1) and 
Sao Tome and Principe (25,4). In Benin, an average of 12 political parties and/or alliances 
gets parliamentary representation after national elections. Most voted parties are PRD, RB, 
FARD-Alafia and, more recently (since 2007), the coalition Force Cauris pour un Bénin 
Émergent (FCBE)
39
. In the case of Zambia, volatility is higher than expected given that the 
MMD has won all elections between 1991 and 2001. In the general elections of 1991 and 
1996, MMD’s domination was overwhelming (the party won over 80% of parliamentary 
seats). In 2001, however, MMD was seriously challenged, as internal contestation increased 
                                                          
39
 Is a coalition of about twenty small political parties, which support President Yayi Boni; it was formed in the 
background of the 2007 elections: http://www.afrique-express.com/afrique/benin/politique/benin-assemblee-
nationale.html (accessed 22-04-14).  
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and opposition political parties, namely UPND, UNIP and PF, which was the most voted 
party in the general elections of 2011, gained visibility. 
In the multiparty system of Guinea-Bissau, PAIGC, PRS and RGB-MB share nearly the 
totality of the 100 seats of the National Assembly since the first multiparty election in 1994. 
Apart from the 1999 election, which was won by the PRS, the PAIGC has been the most 
voted party in all legislative elections held in the country, having reached more than 50% of 
seats in 2009. Lesotho’s party system underwent major changes in more recent years. The 
1993 and 1998 elections presented the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) as a party without 
rivals, since it won 100% and 99% of seats, respectively. Notwithstanding, after experiencing 
a major break – which led to the emergence of the LCD –, the equilibrium of power changed. 
Even though the LCD has won all elections since 1998, the parliament has become more 
fragmented for at least nine parties managed to elect parliamentarians in the 2002 and 2007 
polls. In Malawi, as well as in Sao Tome e Principe, the party system has been competitive 
from the onset of multipartism, no party has attained a majoritarian status and there have been 
sizeable transfers of votes between political parties.  
 
3.3.2 Legislative seats volatility  
 
This indicator is likely to be influenced by other factors rather than just the patterned 
relationships between political parties. In fact, the type of electoral formula and the changes in 
the electoral law can also play an important role. In majoritarian systems differences between 
electoral volatility and legislative seat volatility are expected to be higher since the degree of 
disproportionality in the way votes are converted into parliamentary seats is higher than in 
proportional representation systems (Lijphart 1994). Furthermore, changes in the electoral 
laws (e.g. electoral formula or district size) or in the configuration of certain political 
institutions (e.g. assembly size) may influence the allocation of seats. For example, in 
Lesotho, a complete substitution of the electoral formula occurred in 2002 (from majoritarian 
to mixed) and in Mozambique the 5% election threshold was abolished in 2004. Regarding 
the assembly size, five countries have kept it unchanged since the onset of multipartism – 
Mozambique (200 seats), Namibia (72 seats), Sao Tome and Principe (55 seats), South 
Africa, (400 seats) and Zambia (150 seats); whereas six countries (Cape Verde, Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Seychelles) have seen no changes to assembly size 
after the second multiparty election. In the eight remaining countries changes in the size of the 
assembly have been frequent, even if minimal – e.g. Botswana, The Gambia and Mauritius.  
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Figure 3.2 presents the average seats volatility, per country, since the first multiparty 
election. The majority of countries (N = 11) are below the average observed in the sample (25 
seats). As expected, on the one hand, the dominant party systems of Botswana (5 seats), 
Seychelles (6 seats), Cape Verde (7 seats) and Namibia (10 seats) record the lowest values in 
number of seat changes. On the other hand, and proving that indicators of legislative and 
electoral volatility capture different types of change within the party system is the case of The 
Gambia that combines high values of electoral volatility (35,2) and low values of seat 
volatility (10 seats). Between 1966 and 1992, the PPP was the most voted party in The 
Gambia, occupying more than half of parliamentary seats; major electoral shifts principally 
involved the opposition parties – the National Convention Party (NCP) and the United Party 
(UP). In 1997 a new party system was voted out of the election and three new political parties 
– the APRC, the United Democratic Party (UDP) and the National Reconciliation Party 
(NRP) – were chosen by 96% of the voters. From 1997 and until the latest election (2007), the 
APRC emerged as the new dominant party wining at least 70% of seats in every election. 
Despite the changes taking place from 1997 onwards, The Gambia’s party system retained its 
main defining characteristic – one major party coexists with several minor parties that hardly 
get parliamentary representation. The seats volatility is smaller than expected because only a 
residual number of seats is actually changing. The rules of the electoral system can also play a 
role here. The Gambia’s majority formula generates important differences in the process of 
converting votes into parliamentary seats. For instance, in 2007 the APRC got 59,8% of the 
votes and 87,5% (42 seats) of the seats, while the UDP elected 4 candidates after being voted 
by 21,9% of the electorate.  
On the opposite side, the highest values of seats volatility are found in Nigeria (72 
seats), Malawi (67 seats), South Africa (51 seats), Zambia (51 seats), Ghana and Lesotho 
(both with 39 seats). The most interesting case in this pool of countries is South Africa, where 
the ANC maintains a more or less stable share of seats across elections, consecutively 
winning at least 60% of the 400-National Assembly seats, while a sizeable group of smaller 
parties (of which the Democratic Party – DP and the Inkatha Freedom Party – IFP are the 
most relevant ones) try to get the remaining 35% to 40% of the seats.  
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Figure 3.2 – Average legislative seats volatility 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Percentage of votes won by new parties  
 
This indicator provides information on whether new political parties entered the parliament 
after the last election and scores their total share of votes. New political parties may either be 
newly formed parties, or more or less established parties that after being left out of the 
parliament in a previous election achieved parliamentary representation in a subsequent one. 
Figure 3.3 reveals that, in more than half of the countries (N = 10) new parliamentary parties 
receive less than 12,2% of the votes cast. Indeed, competition is structured by stable and 
familiar competitors, whereas opposition parties barely achieve representation. In these party 
systems, newcomers find it hard to break through and parliamentary representation seems 
only virtually possible. This is the scenario in the Seychelles (0%), Tanzania (0,8%), 
Mozambique (1,3%), Botswana (3,6%) and Cape Verde (3,6%). In the Seychelles, which 
present the most difficult context for new political parties, the SPPF – PL since 2009 – is the 
strongest political party, wining all elections by qualified majority of votes and seats from the 
onset of multipartism. The few remaining seats have so far been divided between two familiar 
competitors; the Parti Démocratique Seychellois (PDS)
40
 and the SNP. Apart from these, no 
other party has been able to gain parliamentary representation. In Tanzania, the CCM has 
formed one-party cabinets after each election, while three other minor parties are voted for 
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parliamentary opposition – the National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-
Mageuzi), Chadema and the CUF - Chama cha Wananchi. In Mozambique, competition is 
mostly between Frelimo, the dominant party, and Renamo, the major opposition party. Since 
1994, only one third party reached parliament without taking part in a coalition – the 
Movimento Democrático de Mozambique (MDM)
41
. This party emerged as a breakaway from 
Renamo, only a few months before the 2009 national elections and was voted by 3,9% of the 
electorate. Closed patterns of competition are also found in Botswana and Cape Verde, where 
electoral outcomes are frankly stable from one election to the next. In this group of countries, 
parties are long-lasting, and citizens know what parties stand for. Opportunities for new 
parties are restricted, not legally, but rather as a result of the turnover.  
 
Figure 3.3 – Average percentage of votes won by new parties 
 
 
On the contrary, the electoral market is more open and unpredictable in eight countries: 
Nigeria (13,0%), Burkina Faso (13,8%), Guinea-Bissau (15,7%), Malawi (20,9%), The 
Gambia (25,8%), Lesotho (26,7%), Benin (28,1%) and Zambia (29,2%). In these polities, 
major parties can suffer big losses, while new or more established opposition parties can score 
large gains. A perfect example of this is Lesotho where in the 1993 elections the BCP won all 
parliamentary seats and in 1998 got none. In fact, in these elections, the LCD – formed in 
1997 after a split within the BCP – won 79 of the 80 parliamentary seats and the BNP won the 
remaining seat. Both BCP and BNP were elected in the following election (2002) while seven 
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other parties – including the BCP – managed to elect a minimum of one and a maximum of 
five candidates
42
.  
  
3.3.4 Alternation in government 
 
Figure 3.4 presents the patterns of alternation in government per country and election. The 
results are broken down into three categories: non alternation, partial alternation and 
wholesale alternation.  
 
Figure 3.4 – Patterns of alternation in government  
 
 
The overall figures are very telling insofar as they show that structures of competition 
for government are relatively closed: 56 of the 83 elections observed have not produced any 
alternation in power, while wholesale alternation has happened only eight times and partial 
alternation 19 times. As mentioned before in this chapter, there has never been alternation in 
power in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa or Tanzania. 
Indeed, the same party has systematically won all elections since the founding multiparty 
elections, with sufficient margin to form one-party cabinets. Wholesale alternation has 
occurred once in the history of Cape Verde (1996/2001), The Gambia (1987/1992), Senegal 
                                                          
42
 The other parliamentary parties are: Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC), National Independent Party (NIP), 
Basutoland African Congress (BAC), Basotho Congress Party (BCP), Lesotho Workers Party (LWP), 
Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) and National Progressive Party (NPP). 
3 3 3
4 4
2
3
4
3
1 1
2
1
2
7
3
2
8
3
6
1
1
2
1 5
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
wholesale alternation partial alternation non alternation
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
88 
 
(1998/2001) and Zambia (2006/2011) and twice in Ghana (1996/2000 and 2000/2004). These 
twelve countries are obvious examples of closed structures of competition having been 
persistently characterized by none or wholesale alternation. 
In contrast, the remaining cases display more open structures of competition. Benin has 
the most open party system, with partial alternation in government, in all elections since 1991. 
In Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritius, the majority of elections have also 
resulted in the formation of cabinets that combine both new and incumbent parties. In Lesotho 
and Burkina Faso, partial alternation in government has happened once, but the overall picture 
is of non alternation. Finally, Malawi has experienced non alternation (1994/1999), partial 
alternation (1999/2004) and wholesale alternation (2004/2009).  
 
3.3.5 Share of seats for the most voted party 
 
On average, the most voted party in lower house elections in our sample wins about 67% of 
the seats at stake. This share is more than sufficient to sustain a one-party cabinet with 
substantial parliamentary support. In this context, political parties other than the wining party 
have very limited chances of breaking through the threshold of government. The question of 
which party governs is, thus, far from being open both for political parties and for voters as 
these tend to massively cast their votes on one single party. Previous sections have already 
shown this is usually the historically established party, which granted enough votes and seats, 
can safely exclude other political parties from national government. This broad description 
applies to the overwhelming majority of countries. As Figure 3.5 reveals, in eight countries 
the most voted party assembles more than 67% of seats with the most obvious cases of 
closure being Seychelles, The Gambia, Botswana, and Tanzania, where the most voted party 
wins, on average, at least 80% of the seats. Similarly, above the aggregate average are South 
Africa (67,4%), Burkina Faso (69,4%), Mauritius (70,6%), Namibia (75,4%), Senegal 
(75,9%) and Lesotho (77,9%).  
Below the aggregate average but still winning a considerable proportion of seats are the 
most voted parties of Mozambique and Nigeria (64% of seats on average), and to a lesser 
extent Guinea-Bissau, Zambia, Cape Verde and Ghana (with at least 50% of seats). 
Competition for government appears to be more open only in three countries which are, in 
descending order, Benin, Malawi and Sao Tome and Principe, where the most voted party 
receives 37%, 45% and 49% of the seats respectively, on average.  
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Figure 3.5 – Average seat share for the most voted party 
 
 
According to Mair (1996) what is new about party systems emerging after the Third 
Wave of democratization, namely those in post-Communist Europe:  
 
is their lack of closure and hence their lack of systemness [...]. Not only is the format of these 
new systems highly unstable, in that the parties as organizations are often inchoate and loosely 
constructed, but so too are the modes of competition and the nature of cross-party alliances and 
coalitions, a feature that also continues to characterize even many of the older party systems of 
Latin America. Seen from this perspective, the long-term process by which party systems may 
eventually become consolidated can also be seen as a long-term process by which the structure 
of competition becomes increasingly closed and predictable (Mair 1996, 96). 
 
The majority of countries here analyzed could not diverge more from this description as they 
have been characterized by long term stability and great predictability in the patterns of 
competition for government.  
 
3.3.6 Share of seats for parties founded until 1960, 1970 and 1980 
 
On average, parties founded until 1960 win about 20% of the seats in the last lower house 
election, whereas more recently formed political parties, that is, those founded until 1970 and 
1980 collect, respectively, 11% and 17% of the parliamentary seats. Thus, despite the fact that 
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multiparty elections opened a window of opportunities for the establishment and development 
of new political parties, a large part of political competition is still structured by political 
parties formed before the introduction of the major political reforms towards multipartism, 
between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. This being said, there is also a great variability 
across and within countries. As Figure 3.6 displays, Botswana, Mozambique, Seychelles, 
Senegal and Namibia, are the most extreme cases of electoral closure. In Botswana, one of the 
oldest democracies in Africa, nine parliamentary multiparty elections have taken place since 
the country gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1966. The BDP, formed in 
1962, has won all parliamentary elections by a landslide (gaining, on average, 82% of the 
parliamentary seats) leaving only a small fraction of seats to be distributed between the other 
competitors. Among these one finds the BNF, founded in 1962 (elected representatives in all 
nine elections. The best electoral result was in 1994 when the party got 13 seats), the 
Botswana People’s Party (BPP) founded in 1960, (elected representatives in 1969, 1974, 1979 
and 1984) and finally the Botswana Independence Party (BIP), founded in 1964 (elected one 
representative in 1969, 1974 and 1989). In Mozambique, Frelimo (founded in 1962) and 
Renamo (founded in 1976) win on average 98% of the seats in lower house elections. 
Nevertheless, this share is not equally distributed between these two competitors. In fact, 
since 1994, party politics in Mozambique has been marked by an increasing dominance of 
Frelimo and continuous shrinking of the opposition parties, especially of Renamo. After a 
relative equilibrium in the 1994 and 1999 general elections, Renamo began losing its 
relevance both in the electoral and in the legislative arenas, suffering in addition two internal 
crises which led to the birth of the Partido para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento 
(PDD)
43
 and the MDM.  
This combination of old political parties with one-party dominance is also observed in 
the Seychelles, Namibia and Tanzania, where ruler parties SPPF/PL (founded in 1978), 
SWAPO (founded in 1958) and CCM (f. 1977) win, on average, respectively, 81%
44
, 72%
45
 
and 82% of the seats In Senegal, the two most relevant parties are the PS and the PDS, 
founded in 1949 and 1974, accordingly. The PS was the most voted party in the elections of 
1983, 1988, 1993 and 1998, whereas the PDS, leader of the Coalition Sopi
46
, won the 2001 
and the 2007 elections. The presence of parties founded until 1960, 1970 and 1980 is also 
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 Party for Peace, Democracy and Development  
44
 The DP (founded in 1964) receives most of the remaining seats either alone or in coalition with the SNP 
(founded in 1994). 
45
 The other parties winning parliamentary representation are the DTA (f. 1977), the National Unity Democratic 
Organization of Namibia (NUDO) and the Republican Party (RP) founded in 1964 and 1977, respectively.  
46
 SOPI “Wolof for Change” Coalition aggregates over 40 smaller parties.  
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
91 
 
considerable (average seats gains higher than 46%) in the parliaments of Mauritius (68%), 
The Gambia (64%), South Africa (62%) and Cape Verde (46%).  
 
Figure 3.6 – Average percentage of seats obtained by parties founded until 1960, 1970 and 1980 
 
Note: average percentage of seats gained by parties founded until 1960 = 21%, for parties founded until 1970 = 11% and for 
parties founded until 1980 = 17%.  
 
 Ghana and Nigeria are the only cases of complete absence of historical political parties 
in the electoral and parliamentary arena. In the case of Ghana, President Jerry Rawlings, 
announced, less than a year before the 1992 elections that the ban on political parties47, which 
had been imposed in 1981 would be lifted on 18th May 1992. This measure was part of his 
plans towards a return to civilian rule and included several measures of political liberalization: 
such as holding a referendum on 28th April to adopt a new Constitution and holding 
presidential and parliamentary elections (see IPU Parline country sheet
48
). In the 1992 
elections, Rawlings and his NDC remained in power having been replaced in 2000 by the 
opposition leader John Kufuor and the NPP. The Nigerian party system, in turn, had been 
suspended after the military takeover led by General Sani Abacha in November 1993. In 
October 1995, a three-year transitional program to restore civilian rule was announced and, in 
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September 1996, the party system which had been suspended was re-established by the 
Armed Forces Provisional Revolutionary Council. Yet, only parties approved by the 
government were entitled to nominate candidates to public office. In the 1999 parliamentary 
poll, three parties, namely the PDP, the AD and the APP, fielded candidates for the 360 
House of Representatives seats and 109 Senate seats.  
In Benin, the Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin (PRPB) was the only legally 
recognized political organization until 1990, when Mathiéu Kérékou convened the National 
Conference of Active Forces to start the process of democratic transition. The PRPB was 
dissolved before the first parliamentary election in 1991 but the Parti Communiste du Bénin 
(PCB)
49
 a clandestine party, active since 1977, was able to stand for elections and to win 1,2% 
and 7,2% of the seats in 1991 and 1995, respectively. Finally, the party systems of Guinea-
Bissau, Malawi and Sao Tome and Principe are the ones offering wider possibilities for 
political parties founded after 1980. In fact, in these parliaments more than half of the seats 
are secured by political parties formed in the 1990s.  
 
3.3.7 Share of seats for independent candidates  
 
As displayed in Table 3.2, the election of independent candidates is rather sporadic in the 19 
African countries here considered. In fact, although independents are allowed to run in 
legislative elections, in the great majority of countries – Botswana, Burkina Faso, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, and 
Zambia – they hardly ever get elected. Malawi (13,5%), The Gambia (4,6%), Zambia (2,9%), 
Ghana (0,6%) and Botswana (0,2%) are the sole cases in which independent office seekers 
were ever elected; yet only in the case of Malawi, were they able to conquer a sizeable share 
of seats.  
Table 3.2 – Election of independent candidates 
Country # of elections  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Malawi 3 2,1 21,4 13,5 10,1 
Gambia, The 8 0 14,3 4,6 4,8 
Zambia 4 0,7 6,7 2,9 2,6 
Ghana 4 0 2 0,6 1,0 
Botswana 8 0 1,8 0,2 0,6 
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Malawian independent candidates received 2,1% (N = 4) of the seats in 1999, 21,4% (N 
= 40) in 2004 and 17,1% (N = 33) in 2009. In The Gambia, with the exception of the 1977 
and 1987 elections, independents are regularly elected. Their seat gains range between 14,3% 
(in 1982) and 2,1% (in 2007). On the opposite side, independent candidates are not allowed to 
compete in legislative elections in nine countries, namely Benin, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania. Overall, the results 
seem to contradict Mainwaring’s expectations that independent office-seekers would be likely 
to succeed in new democracies (Mainwaring 1998, 74). This premise derived mostly from the 
analysis of Latin American party systems in which populism and personalism seemed to 
weaken the institutional features of party systems allowing more independent candidates to 
proliferate. In this sample of 19 countries, however, the structures of competition are far more 
closed and electoral competition is dominated by firmly rooted political parties.  
 
3.3.8 Mergers 
 
Mergers are an important aspect both of interparty and intraparty competition as they result 
from the decision of one party to dissolve itself and join a different party (of equal or different 
size) or to create a completely new entity. Thus, an accord between the merging parts is 
required. In the majority of countries displayed in Figure 3.7 episodes of merger
50
 usually 
happen in a situation in which a small party – both electorally and parliamentary – is absorbed 
into a stronger political party, but there also cases in which small parties of more or less 
equivalent size merge to create a new entity. In Mauritius [e.g. Renouveau Militant Mauricien 
(RMM) was absorbed into MSM in 1994, Kamahuru and Chama Cha Wananchi merged to 
form CUF in 1992)], Nigeria [e.g. AC formed in 2006 via the merger of the AD, the Justice 
Party (JP), the Advance Congress of Democrats (ACD), and several other minor political 
parties] and South Africa [e.g. Freedom Front Plus (FF+) results from a merger between 
Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB), the Freedom Front (FF) and the Conservative Party (CP) 
in late 2003, and has absorbed several other minor parties] political parties that dissolved and 
joined an existing party or combined with other parties to create a new entity, were already so 
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 As detailed in Section 2.4 of Chapter II (Methodology), a series of written and online sources were consulted 
to count the number of mergers and splits. Even though the collection of data resulted from intensive qualitative 
research, we acknowledge that information for some countries/parties might be missing. However we are 
confident in our results given that all splits or mergers affecting the relevant parties, that received considerable 
votes or that attained parliamentary representation were covered. Thus, even if the number of mergers and splits 
is not 100% right the weighting of these events at the systemic level is largely acceptable.  
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weak that the fact that they ceased to exist meant little change at the parliamentary and 
electoral levels.  
The several mergers which have occurred in Botswana also fit into this description: in 
1994, the BIP merged with the Botswana Freedom Party (BFP) to form the Independence 
Freedom Party (IFP); in 1999, the IFP merged with the United Action Party (UAP) to form 
the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) and finally, in 2004, the New Democratic Front 
(NDF) merged with the Botswana Congress Party (BCP). These events represented little 
change at the systemic level since, before the merger, the BIP and the BFP had only 2,5% and 
0,5% of the votes and did not have parliamentary representation and the IFP and the UAP 
combined about 3% of the votes. Thus, regardless of the number of mergers these party 
systems are more characterized by the continuity in the patterns of interparty competition.  
 
Figure 3.7 – Mergers: total and average share of votes and seats 
 
 
Burkina Faso is almost an outlier when approaching this indicator. Here merging groups 
seem to have had significant share of votes and seats before deciding to combine strengths. 
The emergence of the CDP in 1996 is illustrative of this situation. This party resulted from a 
merger between the previous ruling party the Congrès Organisation pour la Démocratie 
Populaire - Mouvement du Travail (OPD-MT)
51
 and several other minor parties. Before the 
merger, they gathered about 60% of overall votes, with the OPD-MT alone gathering 49% of 
these. This was a major merger involving the disappearance of 13 political parties and the 
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emergence of a new political party – the CDP –, which has won all elections between 1997 
and 2007. 
 
3.3.9 Splits 
 
Postcolonial politics in Africa was characterized by one-partyism. Therefore, it is common to 
find several opposition parties that are either splinter groups or have been formed by ex-
members of the former ruling party. Notwithstanding, it is hard to argue, for instance, that the 
MpD from Cape Verde is a split from the PAICV simply because some of the members that 
have joined the MpD in 1991 had also served in the PAICV one-party cabinets between 1975 
and 1990; or that the PCD-GR from Sao Tome and Principe is a split from MLSTP because it 
integrates some of its former members. In this sense, when counting the number of splits we 
considered those episodes that resulted from factionalism (involving the main party cadres) 
rather than the ones resulting from individual defections. 
As Figure 3.8 shows, splits are more widespread across countries than mergers. This 
being said, there are also cases in which splits have occurred but encompassed little change at 
the electoral and legislative levels.  
 
Figure 3.8 – Splits: total and average share of votes and seats  
 
 
In this sense, the fate of splinter groups largely depends on the degree of openness or 
closure of the party system. For instance, on the one hand, Botswana and Burkina Faso record 
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four and five party splits, respectively, but their systemic impact is rather modest if not null 
(average percentage of seats gained is 1,6% and 0,6%, respectively). On the other hand, 
Namibia and Lesotho recorded major splits which have had an important impact in their party 
system. In Namibia, the splits occurred in 1999 (Congress of Democrats - CoD split from 
SWAPO), in 2004 (Republican Party – RP split from Democratic Turnhalle Alliance – DTA) 
and in 2009 (Rally for Democracy and Progress – RDP split from SWAPO) and represented 
average earnings of 5% either at the electoral or at the legislative level. In Lesotho, the splits 
of 1998 (BCP split in two, one was LCD) and 2002 (Basutoland African Congress – BAC 
split from BCP, and Lesotho People’s Congress – LPC split from LCD), represented average 
gains of 34,1% at the electoral level and 21 seats at the parliamentary level.  
It is a sign of higher institutionalization if stable patterns of interaction occur between 
political parties that have firmly established structures. The same is to say that PSI implies a 
commitment to an organization and to some minimal collective goals (especially winning 
elections). If the parties within the system are organizationally and ideologically instable, 
their ability to change or otherwise to promote the entrenchment of certain rules of 
competition is limited. This analysis has shown that despite the number of mergers and splits 
there is a certain level of organizational continuity in African party systems. Merging and 
splitting political parties are, for the most part, unable to change the systemic constraints 
imposed on them by stable competitors.  
 
3.4 Varieties of party system institutionalization: Countries, time and quality  
 
This section analyzes the results of PSI in three ways. Firstly, it displays aggregate values of 
PSI since the first multiparty elections per country. This will outline which countries are more 
or less institutionalized until 2011. Secondly, it reveals how PSI has evolved across time. The 
analysis provides aggregate averages for the sample observed in each electoral period. 
Thirdly, it conducts a cluster analysis to test Huntington’s (1965; 1968) and Ben-Dor's (1975) 
models about the different interplays between institutionalization, political mobilization and 
change in society.  
Figure 3.9 features average values of PSI per country, since the first multiparty election; 
they vary between 23.2 (Benin) and 31.0 (Botswana). As suggested by the analysis of 
individual indicators, higher levels of institutionalization are found in party systems in which 
fewer political parties (one or two major parties) dominate the electoral, the legislative and the 
governmental arenas. This is the case of Botswana (31.0), Namibia (30.7), Cape Verde (30.1), 
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Seychelles (29.9), Mozambique (29.6), South Africa (29.2), The Gambia (28.8), Tanzania 
(28.6) and Senegal (28.4). Aggregate differences between these countries are rather minimal 
given that they are characterized by stable and very well established political parties which 
have been successful competitors across the different arenas within which they operate, and 
that have been systematically able to create stable and closed patterns of competition, thus 
narrowing the chances of new competitors. Moreover, we find rootedness in society and 
organizational continuity in these party systems with merging and splitting political parties 
delivering minimal systemic impact.  
At the opposite end, the lowest institutionalization levels in the sample are found in the 
party systems of Benin (23.1), Zambia (24.4), Malawi (24.5), Lesotho (25.3), Burkina Faso 
(25.5), Guinea-Bissau (25.8), Nigeria (26.7), Sao Tome and Principe (27.1), Ghana (27.1) and 
Mauritius (27.7). In these ten countries, party systems are more open to new challengers. 
Independent office seekers and smaller political parties have higher chances to gain 
parliamentary representation and political parties that eventually decide to merge with or to 
split from other political parties have more systemic relevance. Furthermore, there has been 
alternation in government in all these countries and, in some cases, changes in the governing 
formula. 
 
Figure 3.9 – PSI average scores per country  
 
Note: Cronbach's Alpha = 0,734 
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Figure 3.10 reveals that PSI scores have unfolded irregularly across time. Until year 3 
(mid 1980s), PSI reaches its highest values but it should be noted that only three countries are 
observed at that stage: Botswana, The Gambia and Mauritius. From the 1990s (year 5) 
onwards, as new countries introduce competitive and regular elections, the levels of PSI 
follow a decreasing trend with slight oscillations. This superficial look at the data – at the 
aggregate level – seems to support what previous studies have suggested about the 
relationship between time and PSI in Africa: that there is no general trend towards party 
system stabilization (Lindberg 2007; Bogaards 2008). This finding raises an interesting 
hypothesis which we will take into account in the analysis of the sources of PSI. 
 
Figure 3.10 – PSI average scores per year of observation 
 
 
Apart from differences across country and time, it is also important to unpack the 
concept of institutionalization, in light of its relationship with other contemporary political 
phenomena, namely mass mobilization and democratization. Huntington (1965, 1968) and 
Ben-Dor (1975) foresaw four possible outcomes resulting from the relationship between these 
processes: no-institutionalization, inadequate institutionalization, adequate institutionalization 
and overinstitutionalization. To empirically test this typology we have conducted a 
Hierarchical Cluster Analysis
52
 with three variables: PSI Index, percentage of turnout in lower 
house elections (as a measure of mass mobilization) and Freedom House (FH) scores (as a 
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measure of overall status of democracy). We have calculated averages for each of these three 
variables basically resuming our dataset to 19 observations. The results display three different 
clusters (Tables 3.3 and 3.4). 
The first cluster assembles cases that record the lowest degrees of PSI (mean = 24.6) 
along with intermediate levels of both turnout (mean = 68,8%) and democratic performance 
(mean = 3.3). Five countries are grouped here: Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi and 
Zambia. They exemplify cases of inadequate institutionalization, as the party system is not 
able to sustain and promote change in society while encouraging mass mobilization. In other 
words, since political participation is not accompanied by concomitant expansion in the 
strength of political institutions, there is political decay and, in some cases, political disorder. 
In Guinea-Bissau, for example, the weakness of formal political institutions may have 
contributed to the capture of the political arena by nonpolitical institutions, namely the army. 
Since 1994, several attempted or successful coups have occurred, endangering the stability of 
state agents and the lives of hundreds of civilians. In 1999 and 2002, two coups were led by 
General Asumane Mane. In 2001, many former military officers and paramilitary officers 
were detained in connection with the reported coup plot (namely deputy chief of army staff 
Almane Alam Camara and ex-navy chief Mohamed Lamine) and in 2003 another coup – led 
by General Verissimo Correira Seabra – took place. More recently (2004, 2005 and 2012), 
several armed actions have threatened the stability of the regime leading, among others to the 
ousting of the Head of State, as for example President Kumba Yalá in 2005 (Sangreman et al. 
2006; Azevedo 2009).  
The second cluster is composed of eight countries four of which have experienced 
alternation in government at least once (Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauritius and Sao Tome and 
Principe) and four, which have been ruled by the same political party since the first lower 
house election (Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa). This latter group 
challenges Pridham's (1990) premise that democratic consolidation implies transfer of power 
between parties in government and opposition, while at the same time raising issues about 
vertical accountability (Doorenspleet 2003; Diamond and Morlino 2004; Bogaards and 
Boucek 2010). Nevertheless, these four cases differ substantially from other dominant party 
systems here analyzed – e.g. Nigeria, Mozambique, or Burkina Faso – in the extent to which, 
Botswana Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa have a better combination of levels of 
institutionalization, political freedom and mobilization. These countries can be categorized as 
of adequate institutionalization since the highest levels of institutionalization are coupled with 
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the highest levels of mass mobilization and the best FH ratings, vis-à-vis the other two 
clusters. 
 
Table 3.3 – Results of the Hierarchical Cluster Analysis: PSI, Electoral Participation and Democratization  
Cluster N 
PSI Index Turnout (%) FH scores 
Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation Mean Std. Deviation 
1 5 24,6 1,0 68,8 6,6 3,3 0,7 
2 8 29,1 1,6 73,8 7,5 2,2 0,5 
3 6 27,9 1,5 55,8 6,9 3,8 0,3 
Total 19 27,6 2,3 66,8 10,4 3,0 0,9 
 
Table 3.4 – Qualities of institutionalization  
Countries 
Inadequate 
institutionalization 
Adequate 
institutionalization 
Overinstitutionalization 
Benin  X 
 
  
Botswana    X   
Burkina Faso    
 
X 
Cape Verde    X   
Gambia, The    
 
X 
Ghana    X   
Guinea-Bissau  X 
 
  
Lesotho  X 
 
  
Malawi  X 
 
  
Mauritius    X   
Mozambique    
 
X 
Namibia    X   
Nigeria    
 
X 
Sao Tome and Principe    X   
Senegal    
 
X 
Seychelles    X   
South Africa    X   
Tanzania    
 
X 
Zambia  X     
Total 5 8 6 
 
Finally, the third cluster assembles those countries, which are also highly 
institutionalized (27.9), but that at the same time exhibit the lowest rates of turnout (57,2%) 
and the highest FH scores (means less free) (3.7): Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania. These six countries face the critical problem of creating stable 
party systems while increasing their scope and promoting change in society. These are 
overinstitutionalized party systems, in which institutionalization outstrips mobilization and 
political change, thus bringing about a problem of inertia as political institutions are 
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autonomous and strong, but not sufficiently adaptable (Ben-Dor 1975). Apart from Senegal, 
which is probably less well represented in this cluster, all other countries have dominant party 
systems headed by an asymmetrically strong political party that has proved unable to further 
the process of democratization in its several arenas, particularly in what regards political 
participation.  
 
3.5 Balance: comparing measures of party system institutionalization  
 
In this chapter, a partly new framework for analysis is proposed in order to measure the 
institutionalization of African party systems. To what extent has it arrived to similar or 
different conclusions vis-à-vis other models of institutionalization? Despite emphasizing 
distinct dimensions and indicators and covering different sets of countries and electoral years, 
it is possible to find certain commonalities between previous models proposed in the literature 
to measure PSI in Africa and this one. Table 3.5 features the ranking of PSI of the most 
popular studies to date. Starting with the countries that have been analyzed in all models there 
is a group of five, which is consistently ranked as stable or highly institutionalized – 
Botswana, Cape Verde, Namibia, and South Africa – while two – Zambia and Benin – usually 
figure amidst the weakly institutionalized. At the same time, there is a great variance in the 
way countries like Senegal, Seychelles, Malawi or Nigeria, among others, are placed across 
models. Certainly, some of this variance can be explained by the different time frames and 
indicators covered for each country; there remain, however, some important differences 
between them. Taking the steady case of Seychelles as an example we make our point clearer.  
The Seychelles is highly ranked in our PSI index, but it is less well classified by Kuenzi 
and Lambright (2001) and it stands out as fluid in Lindberg’s model (2007). We have seen 
throughout this chapter, however, that in the Seychelles one single political party (SPPF/PL) 
wins, on average, 80% of the parliamentary seats at stake since the first lower house election 
in 1993, making this one of the least favorable settings for new political parties, merging and 
splinter groups. Based upon these structural indicators we argued that Seychelles is a clear 
case institutionalized party system. This assumption was supported by the analysis of eleven 
indicators that solely measured the patterns of interparty competition across several arenas 
within the polity – electoral, organizational, legislative and governmental. Because of its 
scope our measure is better at depicting what is going on in African party systems, and 
because there is not confusion between levels and elements, the outcomes are easier to 
interpret and straightforwardly indicate what the structural features of PSI are. Lindberg 
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(2007) has only focused on legislative stability, while Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), Basedau 
(2007) and Riedl (2008) have combined different levels and elements of institutionalization in 
their models, hence equating party institutionalization, voter turnout and attitudes towards 
democracy with the institutionalization of party systems. In this sense, even though we have 
kept some of the indicators proposed in these models (for example electoral and legislative 
volatility), we have eliminated those we found conceptually problematic (party age, 
legitimacy of party and elections), and added others that have never been measured in African 
countries (alternation in government, legislative and electoral strength of merging and 
splitting parties).  
 
Table 3.5 – PSI in Africa: comparing models  
Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) 
PSI rank (N = 30) 
Lindberg (2007) 
LS rank (N = 21) 
Basedau (2007) 
TIS rank ( N = 28) 
Riedl (2008) 
PSI Rank (N=23) 
Sanches (2011) 
PSI Rank (N = 19) 
1. Botswana 
2. Gambia, The 
3. Namibia 
4. Senegal 
5. South Africa 
6. Zimbabwe 
7. Cape Verde 
8. Malawi  
9. Côte d'Ivoire 
10. Mauritius 
11. Central African Rep. 
12. Seychelles 
13. Sao Tome and Principe 
14. Burkina Faso 
15. Congo 
16. Kenya 
17. Madagascar 
18. Benin 
19. Eq. Guinea 
20. Gabon 
21. Ghana 
22. Mauritania 
23. Zambia 
24. Djibouti 
25. Togo 
26. Cameroon 
27. Lesotho 
28. Mali 
29. Niger 
30. Comoros 
Stable party (*) 
Botswana 
Cape Verde 
Djibouti 
Ghana 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia  
Nigeria 
South Africa 
Tanzania 
De-stabilized 
Kenya 
Senegal  
Fluid  
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Lesotho 
Madagascar 
Mali 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Seychelles 
Zambia 
 
(*) countries are 
ordered 
alphabetically 
within each 
category.  
High  
1. Botswana  
2. Cape Verde  
3. Mauritius  
4. Namibia 
5. South Africa  
6. Cameroon 
Medium  
7. Sao Tome and 
Principe  
8. Gabon  
9. Sierra Leone 
10. Ethiopia 
11. Central African 
Rep  
12. Eq. Guinea 
13. Guinea  
14. Togo 
Low  
15. Benin 
16. Mali  
17. Burkina Faso 
18. Comoros  
19. Congo 
20. Djibouti  
21. Gambia, The 
22. Niger 
23. Nigeria 
24. Zambia 
25. Chad 
26. Côte d’Ivoire  
27. Mauritania 
28. Zimbabwe 
1. South Africa 
2. Botswana 
3. Namibia 
4. Senegal 
5. Mozambique 
6. Cape Verde 
7. Ghana 
8. Tanzania 
9. Sierra Leone 
10. Mauritius 
11. Sao Tome 
12. Kenya 
13. Niger 
14. Guinea Bissau 
15. Malawi 
16. Burkina Faso 
17. Gambia 
18. Lesotho 
19. Zambia 
20. Nigeria 
21. Benin 
22. Madagascar 
23. Mali 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Botswana 
2. Namibia 
3. Cape Verde 
4. Seychelles 
5. Mozambique 
6. South Africa 
7. Gambia, The 
8. Tanzania 
9. Senegal 
10. Mauritius 
11. Ghana 
12. Sao Tome and 
Principe 
13. Nigeria 
14. Guinea-Bissau 
15. Burkina Faso 
16. Lesotho 
17. Malawi 
18. Zambia 
19. Benin 
 
 
 
Another advantage of our measure vis-à-vis predecessors is that it clearly detaches the 
processes of institutionalization, mass mobilization and political change as recommended by 
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Huntington (1965, 393). He argued that only by separating these processes, would it be 
possible to analyze the reciprocal interactions between the on-going processes of 
modernization, on the one hand and the strength, stability, or weakness of political structures, 
on the other hand. This reciprocal interaction, in turn, resulted in different qualities of 
institutionalization (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968; Ben-Dor 1975) as the Cluster 
Analysis has helped us to demonstrate in the African sample. In this sense, our analysis has 
revealed that party systems vary not only in level but also in quality of institutionalization.  
In the following chapter we use our measurement of PSI as a dependent variable in a 
regression analysis, by means of which the main explanations of party system development in 
Third Wave democracies are tested.  
104 
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CHAPTER IV – SOURCES OF PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION  
 
In the previous chapter the level of PSI was defined and measured in 19 Sub-Saharan African 
countries for lower house elections held between 1966 and 2011. The descriptive analysis showed that 
party systems varied both at levels of institutionalization and across different formats of party system. 
Thus, if we were only to compare party systems on the basis of the number of parties, we would be 
assembling under the same label party systems – either dominant, two-party or multiparty – with 
varying degrees of institutionalization. An additional finding revealed that party systems could be 
distinguished not only in terms of level but also in terms of the quality of institutionalization for while 
some party systems were adequately institutionalized others were inadequately institutionalized or 
overinstitutionalized. Building upon these results, this chapter focuses on the following question: “why 
do levels of PSI vary across countries and time?” Since Mainwaring and Scully (1995), scholars have 
become increasingly interested in the topic of institutionalization, especially in its operational 
measurement. Yet, less attention has been devoted to the analysis of its sources and mechanisms. This 
chapter contributes to bridging this gap with the help of a pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) 
regression analysis of the sources of PSI. It is organized in five sections. Section 4.1 starts from 
literature on party system development to test six explanations of PSI which unfold in nine 
hypotheses: social structure (H1), institutionalization over time (H2 and H3), institutional design (H4 
and H5), party and party systems characteristics (H6 and H7), economic performance (H8) and 
electoral participation (H9). Section 4.2 indicates the variables that will be used to test each hypothesis 
while referring to measurement and sources. In Section 4.3 a descriptive analysis of all variables is 
conducted and, finally, in Section 4.4 the results of the TSCS regression analysis are discussed. This 
analysis has innovative aspects, in that it includes a new hypothesis, namely party funding/finance and 
suggests an alternative way to model the effect of more mainstream explanations (for example, time 
and ethnicity), while controlling for rival explanations (for example president turnover and type of 
electoral system). Finally, Section 4.5 summarizes what has been achieved by this chapter.  
 
4.1 Explaining party system institutionalization 
 
While institutionalization has emerged as one of the most interesting political questions since 
the inception of the Third Wave of democratization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; 
Mainwaring 1998, 1999), the systematic analysis of its causes has attracted less interest. In 
fact, when assessing the causes of party system change or stability, whether from a regional or 
cross-regional perspective, scholars tend to rely on one indicator (electoral volatility) or 
dimension (stability) rather than on institutionalization as a unitary concept. Some examples 
that have been extensively referred to throughout this dissertation are related to the works of 
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Roberts and Wibbels (1999), Tavits (2005), Mainwaring and Torcal (2005), Mainwaring and 
Zoco (2007) and Ferree (2010). In most of these studies, a great effort has been made to 
identify the sources of party system stabilization across countries and time while testing the 
applicability of Western-based hypotheses, which seem to establish a linkage between social 
cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), contingent factors (e.g. policy distances, the number of 
parties competing, electoral participation, short-term economic performance) and the varying 
degrees of electoral volatility/ party system stabilization (Bartolini and Mair 1990). This 
chapter builds on the findings produced within this field of literature to study the sources of 
PSI in Africa. Despite focusing on one indicator of institutionalization (namely stability) these 
studies, and several others we refer to in the subsequent parts of this section, propose an 
interesting research agenda that is far from being fully assessed in the case of African 
countries and which we will carry out. Using our PSI index as a dependent variable we test 
six explanations of PSI, partly as Mainwaring and Zoco (2007). Thus, we propose social 
structure, institutionalization over time, institutional design, party and party system 
characteristics, economic performance and electoral participation as predictors of PSI. 
The next six parts of this section address each one of these explanations along with the 
hypotheses that derive from them. Within institutional design a new hypothesis is tested for 
the first time in the African sample: the extent of regulated party funding/finance. This is done 
while other hypotheses (for example fragmentation, ethnicity and economic performance) and 
competing explanations (president turnover and electoral system) are also considered. 
Moreover, the way the relationship between certain variables and PSI is modeled is 
innovative. Particularly in what regards institutionalization over time, the model includes time 
as the passing of years since the first multiparty election and time as the number of years a 
polity has lasted unchanged. The analysis carried out about ethnicity is also original in the 
sense that it includes a combined index of ethnic fractionalization while also controlling for 
the individual effects of linguistic, religious and ethnic fractionalization. In this sense, this 
analysis provides for a new approach to old hypotheses while including a new hypothesis and 
controlling for a quite distinct and comprehensive set of alternative variables. 
 
4.1.1 Social structure  
 
African societies are characterized by different layers of linguistic, religious and ethnic 
fragmentation. According to Erdmann (2007a; 2007b), this is the most essential social 
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cleavage in Africa, when it comes to explain party formation and voting behavior. Thus, its 
inclusion in this study is more than natural.  
«There are roughly 1000 tribes across Sub-Saharan Africa, most with their own distinct 
language and customs» (Moyo 2009, 32). They have persisted since pre-colonial periods, 
despite undergoing changes that have to do, for instance, with a new spatial distribution 
during the colonial and immediate postcolonial period (Migdal 1988; Thomson 2004). 
Furthermore, they played a leading role in the process of national and state building and 
continued doing so in the new multiparty framework. In light of this, several studies have 
discussed how the African party systems – unlike Western European countries where party 
systems were mainly structured along the functional dimension
53
 – were largely influenced by 
territorial dimension, from which the ethnic and regional divides emerge (Hodgkin 1961; 
Randall and Svåsand 2002b; Manning 2005). Hodgkin’s (1961) seminal study classified the 
earliest party formations in Africa in four groups: 1) inter-territorial parties, which 
transcended the frontiers of single states; 2) territorial parties which take as their field of 
operation a given colonial or independent territory and the population contained within its 
frontiers; 3) regional, ethnic, or tribal parties with limited range of influence to a particular 
region or a particular community based on ties of history, culture, religion or kinship and 
finally 4) “dwarf” parties that were restricted to the inhabitants of a particular locality. From 
the 153 major political parties operating in Africa between 1945 and 1960, more than 60% 
were territorial political parties, while 15% were ethnically or regionally-based parties. The 
ethnic and territorial sources of Africa’s contemporary parties and party systems can thus be 
traced to the first wave of party formation and mass mobilization in the continent (1945-
1960).  
In line with Hodgkin, Manning (2005) argues that new parties and party systems 
emerged mainly from already crystallized territorial and ethnic cleavages, and out of the 
elites’ urgent need to compete in the new multiparty setting. The introduction of multiparty 
elections, however, brought some limitations, albeit formal, and to some extent cosmetic, to 
the mobilization of these type of cleavages in party competition. In fact, several countries 
included legal bans on particularistic, regional and ethnic-based political parties (Bogaards 
                                                          
53
 The functional dimension results from the industrial revolution and expresses two types of conflict: (i) the 
conflict between land interest and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs and (ii) the conflict between owners 
and employers on the one hand and tenants, and workers on the other hand. The functional oppositions can only 
develop after some initial consolidation of the national territory. Therefore, it is required that the nation building 
process is completed, according to Lipset and Rokkan (1990, 99). 
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2007; Bogaards, Basedau, and Hartmann 2010)
54
 in their constitutions or party regulations, 
even if, in practice, only few countries actually used these provisions and denied registration 
or banned existing parties (Hartmann and Kemmerzell 2010). Regardless of the extent to 
which these bans are actually being implemented, their simple formal existence has 
implications for political competition. Salih (2003) makes a point that these provisions could 
have led many political parties to strategically adopt names that reflect some ideological 
orientation – e.g. liberal, democratic, social, socialist, or conservative – instead of a territorial 
or ethnic preference, despite the fact that their true political offer is anchored in ethnic and 
territorial issues and ideology plays a limited role in party politics (Salih 2003, 27-28).  
In the same vein, Norris and Mattes (2003) conducted a comparative quantitative study 
on 12 African states
55
 using Afrobarometer data and found out that ethnicity strongly 
influenced party identification and voting behavior. Using a different methodology, in the 
sense that the study is based upon a range of country-specific case-studies (Sudan, Sierra 
Leone, Nigeria and Ethiopia), Salih (2001) reaches similar conclusions. More specifically, the 
backing of an ethnic group – the dominant ethnicity – plays an important part in the electoral 
victory of certain political parties. While highlighting the role of ethnicity, these studies also 
point to other relevant factors, namely political parties’ ability to enact strategic alliances in 
constituencies of smaller ethnic groups (Salih 2001), the rural-urban cleavage, the role of age 
and the impact of education (Norris and Mattes 2003). Elsewhere, the presence of such social 
cleavages has been considered relevant for the stabilization of political systems as they 
solidify the ties between parties and the public, thus increasing the predictability of political 
outcomes (Tavits 2005, 287). This line of argument follows the seminal study by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967) about the basis for the stability of West European party systems. Nonetheless, 
in the African continent, cleavages are not primarily functional but territorial instead; and 
higher levels of ethnic fractionalization have been associated with higher levels of political 
instability and to the weakness of political institutions (Horowitz 1985; Noyoo 2000;  Alesina 
et al. 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007). Salih and Nordlund (2007, 26) defend that «ethnic 
mobilization, whether for political party formation, electoral campaigns or patronage, is 
commonplace and, when combined with economic disparity and inequitable access to 
                                                          
54
 Bogaards, Basedau and Hartmann’s (2010, 611) study tells us that « [...] it is the group of less democratic 
regimes that actually ban political parties, at least partially as a strategy to control the opposition. Or, in countries 
which have witnessed an alternation of authoritarian and (more) democratic periods, such as Nigeria, [...] that 
ethnic party bans are implemented by outgoing military regimes and much less so in the new democratic 
dispensations».  
55 
The twelve states are: South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Zambia, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi and Mali. 
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political power, could (and has actually) become a source of long-drawn-out conflicts, with 
far reaching destabilization effects». Lastly, Ferree’s (2010) study is also revealing in that it 
shows that «African countries with a single majority ethnic group have systematically lower 
volatility levels than countries with no majority ethnic group or countries with multiple nested 
majority groups» (Ferree 2010, 779). Taken together, these studies lead us to H1: PSI will be 
lower where levels of ethnic fractionalization are higher.  
 
4.1.2 Institutionalization over time  
 
The relationship between time and institutionalization has proved challenging in numerous 
analyses of Third Wave party systems. While some analysts (Converse 1969; Bartolini and 
Mair 1990) argue that party systems will become more stable over time as voters come to 
identify with certain parties, more recent research shows that party systems in less-developed 
countries rarely experience a linear pattern of development (Bielasiak 2002; Mainwaring and 
Torcal 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Mainwaring and Zoco’s (2007) broad comparison 
between new and old democracies in Europe and Latin America, did not confirm the 
hypothesis of gradual strengthening of party identification (Converse 1969) or of stabilization 
of the electoral competition over time (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). It 
is true that their analysis did not include African countries, yet the descriptive remarks made 
so far tend to highlight a pattern of non-linearity (Bogaards 2008) and in some cases of non-
institutionalization (Lindberg 2007) from a longitudinal perspective. Adding to this 
discussion, Ferree (2010) has sustained that the time of birth of the democratic polity «cannot 
explain variations amongst new democracies as all of these have come into being at the end of 
the twentieth century» (Ferree 2010, 772). Although sustaining that «the institutionalization 
of a party system is a process that takes time», Rose and Mishler (2010, 802) also 
acknowledged that «institutionalized party systems can become ‘protected by mechanisms 
that restrict and moderate the impact of new parties’, including such cartel mechanisms as 
state funding» (Ibid.). For post-Communist countries Tavits (2005) found that, rather than 
being linear, the relationship between time and stability was positive during the first few years 
of democratic experience and turned to negative in more recent years. All these studies 
suggest multifaceted relationships between time and institutionalization (or stabilization).In 
the African case, however, the two studies here mentioned (Lindberg 2007; Bogaards 2008) 
suggest that time plays a limited role on the institutionalization of party systems given the 
non-linear patterns of development found. In this sense we expect that H2: Time (as the 
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number of years since the first multiparty election) has no significant effect on 
institutionalization and that there is a decreasing trend in the more recent years. 
A second “time” perspective is the number of years a polity has stayed unchanged. 
Indeed, while the majority of countries here analyzed may have introduced multiparty 
elections in the beginning of the 1990s, some have experienced important reversals in more 
recent years and/or have altered the nature of the regime
56
. Other studies reveal that changes 
in the political institutions of a given society impact the long term stabilization of Latin 
America (Roberts and Wibbels 1999) and Western European party systems (Bartolini and 
Mair 1990). All this leads us to H3: institutionalization will increase if the polity is durable.  
 
4.1.3 Institutional design  
 
Neopatrimonialism and its web of informal networks – personalism, clientelism and tribalism 
– are usually associated with politics in Africa. On the one hand, numerous studies have 
underlined neopatrimonialism as the foremost institutional legacy from the pretransition 
authoritarian regimes in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Lindberg 2001; van de Walle 
2003; Riedl 2008; Young 2012). On the other hand, research about formal political 
institutions is more modest, and particularly recent. In this context, the works of van 
Cranenburgh (2003, 2008, 2011) are very relevant and telling in so far as she shows how the 
institutional context, namely the choice for presidential, semipresidential or parliamentary 
forms of government may affect the survival, but also the quality and the performance of 
democratic regimes. Notwithstanding, several other studies have contributed to map the 
institutional landscape of African polities. For example, Posner and Young (2007), Prempeh 
(2008), Lobo and Neto (2009) and Neto and Lobo (2012) focused on the form of government 
and on the length of presidential powers, while Lindberg (2005) and several contributors of 
the book Votes, Money and Violence Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Basedau, Erdmann, and Mehler 2007) focused on the electoral institutions and party systems.  
This section follows in the steps of these studies, therefore suggesting that the 
institutionalization of party systems can be determined by the institutional context within 
                                                          
56
 Just to mention a few examples: Lesotho experienced serious political violence in the wake of the 1998 
elections. The events required the establishment of The Interim Political Authority (IPA) which became 
something of a parallel Parliament until 2002 when fresh elections took place. In Guinea-Bissau, alleged or de 
facto coup d’état led by the military constantly undermine the development of stable and durable political 
institutions from the onset of mulipartism. For instance, in 2003, President Yala was overthrown in a bloodless 
coup led by General Verussuni Correia and, in 2009 and 2008; members of cabinet were killed or exiled for 
suspicion of staging a coup (See Polity IV country reports of Lesotho and Guinea-Bissau) 
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which it develops. Even though, at this point, we are mainly thinking about formal political 
institutions, we acknowledge that political institutions are bound both by formality and 
informality (Hall and Taylor 1996). Thus, later in this dissertation when we focus on the 
mechanisms of PSI, we will seek to encompass the informal dimension of institutionalization 
in our analysis. For now we focus on the design of formal institutions at the central level 
considering regulated party funding/finance and form of government.  
The issue of party funding has been debated for a long time in Political Science 
covering several countries from all continents (van Biezen 2000; van Biezen 2004; van 
Biezen and Kopecký 2007; Austin and Tjernström 2003; Bermann and Daintith 2006; Ohman 
2012), including Africa (Pottie 2003; Bryan and Baer 2005). In the context of new 
democracies, particularly, it is believed that financial resources are determinant to sustain a 
democratic party system, as political parties need resources to be able to physically exist (e.g. 
office, staff, recruitment of officials) and to develop their activities (e.g. socialization and 
mobilization of voters) (Randall and Svåsand 2002b; Salih and Nordlund 2007). Yet, this is 
not consensual. In fact, in a much wider discussion it is possible to find different points of 
view on whether public or private funding should be made legal and on when whether it 
should be given in a particular moment (election campaigns) or as a means to sustain political 
parties’ activities outside the electoral period (Salih and Nordlund 2007, 89-90).  
Proponents of public funding usually defend that political parties should be treated as 
public utilities, subjected to wide regulations and endowed with funds, given that funding 
provides a living space to the opposition political parties and enables the representation of 
minority groups – women and youth – in the political sphere. Those who disfavor public 
funding think that grassroots participation should be encouraged and that political parties’ 
sustainability should result from their ability to mobilize their members (about this debate see 
among several, Fambom 2003; Saffu 2003; Austin and Tjernström 2003; Salih and Nordlund 
2007). In new African democracies, however, the majority of the citizens are poor; hence 
mobilizing mass membership on the basis of income may prove useless. Moreover, because 
political parties are shaped from above, resulting from factionalism and personalism 
(Manning 2005), they lack societal and territorial implantation and face several difficulties to 
become financially self-sufficient, principally where state funding is lacking or is poorly 
regulated. As result, in most African countries, political parties (especially those in 
opposition) end up relying «on a small core group of individuals, businessmen and women, 
and foreign donors, party-to-party networks and fraternal organizations for funding their 
activities» (Salih and Nordlund 2007, 91). This can have far reaching effects on the nature of 
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linkage between parties and their constituencies, which may be furthermore framed by 
personalistic and clientelistic relationships. In the context of post-Communist European 
countries, Booth and Robbins (2010) confirmed that campaign finance and donation 
restrictions can effectively thwart PSI. In this sense H4: PSI will be higher where provisions 
for party funding/finance are more extensive. 
The effects of the form of government in the way a given political system functions are 
quite established known. For instance, Stepan and Skach (1993, 17) argued that parliamentary 
systems are more virtuous for democracy, as they support single-party coalition majorities, 
minimize legislative impasses, and discourage political society’s support for military coups; 
whereas presidential regimes are more prone to conflicts, discourage the formation of durable 
coalitions, maximize legislative impasses, and stimulate political society to call periodically 
for a military coup. Lijphart (2004) equally disfavors presidentialism as it inherently limits 
possibilities for power sharing, whilst van Cranenburgh (2011, 444-445) calls attention to the 
risks of high levels of presidential power for the survival of democracy. Differently, Shugart 
(1999, 53) has argued that the assumption that parliamentarism is a superior form of 
government for purposes of “consolidating” new democracies, is erroneous by the simple fact 
that «parliamentary democracies are located in the most-developed regions of the world and 
most presidential democracies are located in Latin America or other less-developed regions» 
which: 
 
tend to be especially large and complex societies, highly unequal in their income distribution, 
and with great regional disparities. These are countries that may be expected to have difficulty 
sustaining democracy, whatever its constitutional form, but presidentialism may actually be 
more suitable for most of them (Shugart 1999, 53).  
 
As far as semipresidential regimes, the findings are mixed as well. While some authors such 
as Pasquino (1997) argue that it is positive to democratization, others sustain that it must be 
avoided in new democracies as the inherent potential for conflict between the president and 
the prime minister may damage the prospects for successful democratization ( Lijphart 2004; 
Valenzuela 2004). With a different nuance Elgie (2005) and later Elgie and Moestrup (2007) 
defend that the problem might actually reside on the nature of presidential power; as 
countries:  
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with both a highly personalized presidential-like system and countries where there was a very 
clear balance of power between the president and prime minister would be worse than that of 
countries with a system in which the prime minister was the main actor. Highly presidentialized 
semi-presidential systems are likely to encourage political croneyism and arbitrary presidential 
action. Countries with a balance of presidential and prime ministerial powers may experience 
gridlock, especially during periods of cohabitation. By contrast, semi-presidential countries in 
which the prime minister is the dominant actor in the executive might be expected to operate 
more efficiently, with the president acting as a figurehead and/or as someone who intervenes at 
times of crisis as a way of trying to stabilize the situation (Elgie and Moestrup 2007, 243-244). 
 
This position has also been sustained by Lobo and Neto (2009) and Neto and Lobo (2012) in 
their analysis of semipresidentialism in Portuguese speaking countries. In what concerns the 
effects on party systems, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) argue that presidential forms of 
government bring more harm to institutionalization vis-à-vis the other variants, because of the 
personalizing vote for the head of government. In fact, they are found to be more vulnerable:  
 
to political outsiders with anti-party proclivities. The incentives to develop party organizations 
and to build enduring ties between parties and voters might be weaker, leading to higher 
electoral volatility. In contrast, in parliamentary systems the assembly elects the head of 
government, making parties the gateway to controlling executive power. Presumably, the 
incentives to building strong linkages between parties and voters should be stronger in 
parliamentary systems, leading to lower electoral volatility (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 162).  
 
Based on this study, Ferree (2010) also controlled for the effect of presidentialism in her study 
of electoral volatility in African countries. She found no significant effects (but a negative 
association) when analyzing the data from a pooled time-series cross-sectional perspective. 
Yet, when she used average values of volatility per country (thus only cross-sectional) 
presidentialism proved a strong correlate (with positive association). To the extent to which 
these studies can be applicable to the study of electoral volatility and of PSI in new 
democracies, they seem to suggest that: H5: levels of institutionalization will be lower in 
presidential regimes. 
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4.1.4 Party and party system characteristics  
 
This section considers endogenous factors, namely fragmentation (number of competing 
political parties) and party institutionalization (average age of political parties)
57
. The number 
of political parties alone (Duverger 1959), or accompanied by other criteria (Dahl 1966; 
Blondel 1968; Sartori 1976), has been a universal element to classify party systems and to 
establish differences across countries. It has profound impacts on the political system as a 
whole (representation, nature of public policies, government stability, inter alia) and it 
strongly influences the kind of rules of competition which will emerge and the likelihood they 
will endure in the future. According to Pedersen (1983) and Bartolini and Mair (1990), 
electoral volatility is influenced by the number of parties in competition, as « [...] the 
probability that each individual voter will vote for the same party in two consecutive elections 
will decline as the number of different available options increases», hence limited political 
offer is expected to diminish the level of volatility, therefore increasing the level of 
institutionalization and stabilization. This proposition remains uncontested as several studies 
confirm the positive relationship between volatility and the number of political parties [see, 
among several: Crewe (1985) for Western European countries; Remmer (1991) and Roberts 
and Wibbels (1999) for Latin American countries; Birch (2001) and Tavits (2005) for post-
Communist European countries; and Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Ferree
58
 (2010) for 
African countries]. Building upon these findings we expect that, H6: PSI will decrease as the 
number of parties in the political system increase. 
Also commonly associated with party system development is party age, which is often 
used as an indicator for the institutionalization of individual parties (Randall and Svåsand 
2002b; Tavits 2005). This association makes sense as according to Huntington’s (1965, 395) 
original conceptualization, «the longer an organization or procedure has been in existence the 
higher the level of institutionalization». In the same line Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and 
Mainwaring (1998; 1999) argue that the older the age of political parties, the stronger their 
                                                          
57
 Other properties of party systems are the degree of polarization and the cleavage structure. It is, however, 
extremely difficult to make a reasonable measure of these concepts with the existing data (party documents such 
as statuses, programs and electoral manifestoes are often unavailable). Moreover, political parties in Africa 
hardly use labels such as right or left to define themselves; being mainly defined by a territorial and ethnic 
dimension as Manning (2005) and Erdmann (2007) demonstrate. In some cases, they adopt labels like socialist, 
democrat, liberal, conservative, workers in their names, even if party politics is not based in those ideologies 
(Salih 2003).  
58
 Ferree (2010) finds a strong correlation between the Effective Number of Political Parties and volatility 
although she argues «it is unlikely that the standard explanation for this relationship (policy polarization) 
explains the correlation in Africa» (2010, 778). 
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roots in society and the level of systemic institutionalization
59
. The inclusion of party age is, 
therefore, relevant because it allows testing whether the institutionalization of individual 
parties reinforces that of party systems. As several authors point out (Randall and Svåsand 
2002b; Wolinetz 2006), the relation between the system and its parts is far from being 
equivalent. In fact, a party system may consist of individual parties at drastically different 
levels of institutionalization but it may also be the case that the systemic and the individual 
elements strengthen mutually in the course of time. This last premise has proven to be right in 
several studies: Tavits (2005) found a positive linearity between the average age of political 
parties and the level of PSI in post-Communist Europe, whereas Meleshevich (2007) and 
Roberts and Wibbels (1999) also confirm this hypothesis in their model of party system 
development in Post-Soviet and Latin American countries, respectively. As for the African 
countries, there seems to be a puzzling scenario in which historical parties coexist with more 
temporary party formations (that appear and disappear from one election to another) that are 
often weakly organized and lack internal democracy (Lynch and Crawford 2011; Kuenzi and 
Lambright 2001; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Salih and Nordlund 2007). In this sense, we 
expect more stable patterns of interaction to emerge where parties have endured, therefore 
H7: PSI will increase with increased average age of parties. 
 
4.1.5 Economic performance  
 
Observing the developing societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America, during the 1960s 
Huntington (1965, 1968) noted that despite their levels of modernization (e.g. rapid 
urbanization, Gross National Product (GDP) growth, mass media circulation and electoral 
participation) they had made little progress towards many of the goals identified with political 
development at that time (e.g. democracy, stability, structural differentiation, achievement 
patterns, national integration). In fact, «instead of a trend toward competitiveness and 
democracy» there had been «an ‘erosion of democracy’ and a tendency to autocratic military 
regimes and one-party regimes» (Huntington 1965, 391). He therefore, concluded that rapid 
modernization produced political decay and recommended political scientists to assess 
modernization and political development separately.  
This debate about the economic sources of political development arose in the 1960s and 
amplified as the wave of democratization spread throughout other regions of world, during the 
                                                          
59
 We note however that Mainwaring and Scully (1995) use this indicator as a measurement of systemic 
institutionalization while we use it as a measure of party institutionalization, as Tavits (2005) and Roberts and 
Wibbels (1999). 
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1990s. Indeed in several studies mentioned in the previous sections, indicators of economic 
development (such as GDP, inflation, urbanization, unemployment) were incorporated in the 
analysis of party system development. According to Bartolini and Mair (1990) short-term 
factors such as voters’ perception of the economy influence vote shifts, thus increasing party 
system instability. As hypothesized on the basis of the literature on economic voting, poor 
economic performance can have negative effects on governing parties (Remmer 1991; 
Roberts and Wibbels 1999) and enhance electoral volatility together with democratic 
accountability (Bellucci, Lobo, and Lewis-Beck 2012). This proposition is applicable to the 
cluster of consolidated or advanced democracies, but it reaches beyond these as economic 
variables (GDP and inflation) are found to be strong statistical correlates of stabilization in 
new democracies of Eastern Europe (Tavits 2005) and Latin America (Roberts and Wibbels 
1999). In the sample of African countries, however, Ferree (2010) found a similar association, 
but the effect found was not statistically significant. Based on these studies, we formulate that 
H8: The better the economic performance the higher the level of institutionalization.  
 
4.1.6 Electoral participation  
 
Recent analyses of electoral participation in Africa have mainly focused on finding the 
driving factors of voter turnout, or on identifying what is behind citizen’s choice for 
incumbent or opposition parties. It is known, for instance, that institutional variables such as 
the type of electoral formula and the concurrency of presidential and legislative elections have 
significant effects on electoral turnout (Kuenzi and Lambright 2007). Furthermore, it is also 
generally accepted that individual and demographic variables such as party identification, 
support for democracy and age (Kuenzi and Lambright 2010), influence individuals’ 
propensity to vote. Additional explanations have highlighted the relevance of ethnicity to 
explain citizens’ support for the governing party and overall voting behavior in Africa (Salih 
2001; Norris and Mattes 2003; Erdmann 2007a; Erdmann 2007b), whereas more sophisticated 
arguments have suggested that citizens’ evaluations of the state of the national economy and 
of the government’s policies are relevant in their decision to cast their votes on the incumbent 
or on the opposition party (Lindberg 2013). Within this emerging literature, little is known 
about the effects of turnout in party system development, even though this has been found to 
play a key role in its long term stabilization (Bartolini and Mair 1990).  
According to Bartolini and Mair (1990), changes in the level of electoral participation 
(measured by voter turnout) constitute an important component of any explanation of 
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differentials in party system stability (measured by electoral volatility) in Western 
democracies. In their view, the relationship between these two measures is far from being a 
«[...] simple linear relationship in which each percentage increase in turnout is associated with 
a given percentage increase in volatility [...]» (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 175). In fact, their 
findings suggest three possible associations: (i) between the «[...] enfranchisement of major 
blocks of new voters [...]» and high volatility; (ii) beyond a certain threshold of changes in 
turnout – either of increases or decreases – and volatility and (iii) and between the incidence 
of elections characterized by high levels of turnout and variance in volatility levels across the 
different countries in the different phases. While some exceptions to these patterns were 
found, […] the bulk of cases demonstrate the existence of a clear relationship in which high 
incidence of change in levels of participation is associated with a high mean of level of 
volatility» (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 185). In this sense, H9: The higher the changes in voter 
turnout – both an increase or a decrease – the lower the degree of PSI. 
 
Having outlined the main hypotheses that will be tested in this study the following section 
proceeds with the description of how each variable was measured. The sources used will be 
also indicated.  
 
4.2 Independent and control variables: Measurement and data  
 
The hypotheses listed above will be examined with the help of a regression analysis of PSI in 
83 lower house elections of 19 Sub-Saharan African countries
60
. Thus, apart from PSI scores, 
our dataset includes a series of indicators to measure each independent and control variables. 
In this section we will present the precise way in which these variables were constructed. The 
full list of variables is presented in Table 4.1.  
Social structure is measured by Alesina et al. (2003) ethnic fractionalization index 
(http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1). The advantage of using this 
dataset is that it includes individual scores for ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization. 
Thus, it allows testing the combined and individual effect of the components of ethnic 
fractionalization. Other interesting complements to ethnicity could be the urban vs. rural 
divide (Tavits 2005), the union’s density or the size of the informal sector (Roberts and 
Wibbels 1999); yet, lacking comprehensive data prevents us from replicating these variables.  
                                                          
60
 102 elections were observed in total, but one electoral year is lost in the calculation of the indicators of PSI. 
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To test the explanation of institutionalization over time we use two variables: time 
measured as the years since the first multiparty elections and polity durability measured as 
Polity IV “durable” variable, which indicates «the number of years since the last substantive 
change in authority characteristics»
61
 (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). This 
differentiation matters since according to Roberts and Wibbels (1999) and Bartolini and Mair 
(1990), changes in the nature of political institutions can potentially affect the level of party 
system stabilization. Contrary to the first “time” variable, we expect this second one to have a 
more substantial effect on institutionalization, for where the contours of the polity are more 
stable political parties are likely to establish more stable patterns of interaction since they 
know the rules of competition and what they stand for.  
Institutional design is measured with two variables. The first accounts for provisions 
guaranteeing and regulating party access to funding and is measured by an additive index that 
varies between 0= weakly regulated party funding/finance and 11= highly regulated party 
funding/finance. To create this index we used IDEA’s Political Finance Database 
(http://www.idea.int/political-finance/index.cfm), which has global data on party funding. The 
data is not temporal, but it is very rich since it covers more than 40 items. From this pool we 
have selected 11 items
62
, which are clustered in three dimensions, namely party 
funding/finance, regulations of spending; and reporting, oversight and sanctions. Since all 
items are coded “yes” or “no”, what we did was merely assigning the score “1” when the 
answer to the item was “yes” and the added all scores into an additive index.  
The second is the country’s form of government, which is measured with a dummy 
variable for presidentialism. To create this variable, we first classified the countries according 
to their forms of government. The definition of presidential and parliamentarian regimes is 
quite consensual and straightforward «if the cabinet depends exclusively on the confidence of 
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 Polity IV codebook describes DURABLE as follows: Regime Durability: The number of years since the most 
recent regime change (defined by a three point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) 
or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized 
authority score). In calculating the DURABLE value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is 
established is coded as the baseline “year zero” (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the 
DURABLE variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs. Values are entered for 
all years beginning with the first regime change since 1800 or the date of independence if that event occurred 
after 1800(http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2012.pdf). 
62
 The 11 items/questions are: 1. Are there provisions for direct party funding/finance to political parties? 2. Are 
there provisions for free or subsidized access to media for political parties? 3. Are there provisions for free or 
subsidized access to media for candidates? 4. Is there a ban on vote buying? 5. Are there bans on state resources 
being used in favor or against a political party or candidate? 6. Are there limits on the amount a political party 
can spend? 7. Are there limits on the amount a candidate can spend? 8. Do political parties have to report 
regularly on their finances? 9. Do political parties have to report on their finances in relation to election 
campaigns? 10. Do candidates have to report on their campaigns finances? 11. Is information in reports from 
political parties and/or candidates to be made public? 
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the majority of the assembly», we have a «system of parliamentary cabinets»; «if cabinets are 
accountable to the president – who, therefore, may dismiss them or individual ministers for 
strictly political reasons – we have a system of presidential cabinets [...]» (Shugart 1999, 56-
57). Nonetheless, the most hybrid variant, semipresidentialism, has been defined variously. 
Some use both normative and constitutional dispositions do define it (Duverger 1990), 
whereas others focus on the length of presidential powers and on the analysis of different 
subtypes of semipresidentialism, therefore discussing the relevance of the presidential, 
parliamentary and semipresidential trichotomy (Shugart and Carey 1992; Siaroff 2003; 
Lijphart 1997). To deal with the ambiguity of the existing definitions of semipresidentialism, 
Elgie (2004) proposes a new definition based on two constitutional dispositions: (i) a 
popularly elected fixed-term president and (ii) a prime minister and cabinet that are 
collectively responsible to the legislature. This conceptualization is more operative than the 
previous ones because it is minimal and purely constitutional. In this sense it minimizes the 
variance that occurs when more subjective criteria (notably the length of the presidential 
powers) are also considered in the definition of the regime.  
Regarding party and party system properties, fragmentation is measured as Laakso’s 
and Taagepera’s (1979) Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) in terms of vote 
share
63
. This is probably the most popular measure of party system fragmentation and it has 
been used in numerous studies about party system development in Third Wave democracies 
(Tavits 2005; Ferree 2010). Party institutionalization is measured by party age, which is 
calculated as the average age of political parties with 10% of the votes in the last lower house 
elections
64
. Imagine the following vote distribution for an election taking place in 1999: Party 
A wins 50% of votes; Party B 20%; Party C 15%; Party D 5% and other parties receive the 
remaining 10% of votes. To compute this indicator only Party A, B and C would be 
considered, since they won at least 10% of the votes. If party A was founded in 1950, party B 
in 1960 and party C in 1970 then, the average age of political parties with 10% of votes in 
1999 would be = (49+39+29)÷3 = 39 years. This formula has been suggested by Mainwaring 
and Scully (1995) and has already been applied to African countries by Kuenzi and Lambright 
(2001) and, more recently, by Riedl (2008) who lowered the threshold to 5% of the votes.  
                                                          
63
 For party system fragmentation Roberts and Wibbels (1999) use Remmer’s (1991) indicator which is 
computed as follows: take the percentage of the vote obtained by the top two parties in the previous election, and 
subtract it from 100, so that higher scoring will be associated with greater fragmentation. 
64
 Due to the majoritarian nature of African political institutions and the resulting low party system 
fragmentation the 10% thresholds allows to include the main competitors of the political arena.  
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
120 
 
To test the effect of economic performance on PSI, we consider GDP annual growth 
(%) using World Bank data (available online at http://data.worldbank.org/; accessed 05-08-
2011), and inflation, consumer prices (annual %); using the International Monetary Fund, 
World Economic Outlook data (available online at http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm; 
accessed 30-01-2013)
 65
. Electoral participation is measured as change in voter turnout, which 
expresses the differences in turnout in two consecutive lower house elections. 
 
Table 4.1 – Independent and control variables: measurement and data 
Explanation  Variable: Indicator (data source) 
1. Social Structure  
Ethnicity: ethnic fractionalization index; 0 = homogeneity, 1 = heterogeneity (Alesina et al. 
2003) 
2. Institutionalization 
over time  
Time: years since the first multiparty election  
Polity durability: years since last change in the authority/regime characteristics (Polity IV 
Database) 
3. Institutional design  
  
Party funding/finance: 0 = weakly regulated party funding/finance, 11 = highly regulated 
party funding/finance (IDEA Political Finance Database) 
Presidentialism: 1 = if presidential, 0 = otherwise (categorized as Shugart 1999; Elgie 2004) 
4. Party and party 
system characteristics  
Fragmentation: ENEP (author’s own calculation as Laakso and Taagepera 1979)  
Party institutionalization: party age (author’s own calculation as Mainwaring and Scully 
1995; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001) 
5. Economic 
performance 
Short-term economic performance 
GDP annual growth (%)(World Bank)  
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) (International Monetary Fund – IMF) 
6. Electoral 
participation  
Turnout change: change in voter turnout (IDEA Voter Turnout Database)  
Controls 
Lagged dependent variable of PSI (calculated in STATA) 
Number of Presidents  
Dummy for majoritarian electoral system/ 1 = majoritarian electoral system, 0 = otherwise 
(Norris 1997; Nohlen, Thibaut, and Krennerich 1999; IPU PARLINE Database on National 
Parliaments and ACE Electoral Network) 
Individual components of ethnic fractionalization: ethnic, linguistic and religious 
fractionalization; 0 = homogeneity, 1 = heterogeneity (Alesina et al. 2003) 
Dummy for quality of PSI: 1 = adequate institutionalization, 0 = inadequate 
institutionalization and overinstitutionalization 
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 Alternative indicators are unemployment rates, consumers’ confidence in the economy, purchase power, but 
these are not available for the entire period of analysis.  
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In addition to these independent variables, we have incorporated several control 
variables in our analysis as suggested by the literature. As Table 4.1 also shows, we control 
for (i) the type of electoral system, (ii) the number of presidents elected during the election 
period covered, (ii) the individual effect of the components of ethnic fractionalization and, 
finally (iii), the different qualities or types of PSI (adequate, inadequate and 
overinstitutionalization). The general hypothesis about the role of electoral systems is that 
majoritarian systems are good for government effectiveness and accountability, while 
proportional systems promote greater fairness to minority parties and more diversity in social 
representation. This assumption stems from studies that focused on Western countries 
(Lijphart 1994; Blais and Massicotte 1996; inter alia), but also in African countries (Lindberg 
2005). Despite this general proposition, several other studies have shown that especially in 
new democracies, and divided societies such as the Africans ones, the effects of electoral 
systems (namely conflict resolution, representation, fragmentation and stability) are largely 
contingent or context-dependent. For example, according to Reilly and Reynolds (1999): 
 
where ethnicity represents a fundamental political cleavage, particular electoral systems can 
reward candidates and parties who either act in a cooperative, accommodatory manner to rival 
groups; or they can punish these candidates and instead reward those who appeal only to their 
own ethnic group. However, the “spin” which an electoral system fives to the system is 
ultimately contextual and will depend on the specific cleavages and divisions within any given 
society (Reilly and Reynolds 1999, 6-7). 
 
In similar ways, Bogaards (2007) has argued that the old controversy around proportional or 
plurality elections loses most of its relevance in ethnically divided societies because of the 
territorial concentration of ethnic groups. Ferree (2010), however, found no significant effect 
of the electoral rules, namely of district magnitude over the degree of party system stability in 
Africa. Since there is not a consensual hypothesis about the role of electoral systems we 
include it as a control rather than as an independent variable.  
Considering the number of presidents a country has had since the first multiparty 
election also seems relevant to us, since the interruption of president tenure by death, 
impeachment, resignation or unlawful removal from office, can potentially entail party system 
instability. This is more evident in presidential regimes – and to lesser extent semi-
presidential regimes – since the president holds powers of cabinet formation and dismissal 
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and competition for government is primarily determined by the results of the presidential 
elections.  
Following Posner’s (2001; 2005) cautionary notes regarding the use of ethnicity as a 
unitary concept exclusively, without considering its different layers, we control for the 
components of ethnic fractionalization individually
66
. Finally, in light of the findings 
presented in the previous chapter, we control for whether the association between the main 
independent variables and the dependent variable holds when we contrast adequate to 
inadequate and overinstitutionalized party systems.  
Finally, we introduced a lagged dependent
67
 variable which apart from delivering a 
temporal dynamics over the data, allows us to control some of the shortcomings usually 
associated with TSCS data, namely the independence of observations and serial correlation. 
Several approaches were used to treat this kind of data
68
 , but the one introduced by Beck and 
Katz (1995) and Beck (2001), namely the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Panel 
Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs), is considered as the “de-facto-standard” approach 
precisely because it allows dealing with both homoscedasticity and serial correlation:  
 
In particular, for OLS to be optimal it is necessary to assume that all the error processes have 
the same variance (homoscedasticity) and that all of the error processes are independent of each 
other. The latter assumption can be broken down into the assumption that errors for a particular 
unit at one time are unrelated to errors for that unit at all other times (no serial correlation) and 
that errors for one unit are unrelated to the errors for every other unit (no spatial correlation) 
(Beck and Katz 1995, 634). 
 
With Beck and Katz’s (1995) PCSEs, the assumption of equal variance of errors is not 
violated and it is also possible to deal with serial correlation by fitting lagged values into the 
model. In our data serial correlation could occur if the current level of PSI is strongly 
influenced by its past value. Thus, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable allows for 
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 Posner (2001, 2) argued that «[...] under the umbrella term ‘ethnic’, communal conflict can take many forms. 
Sometimes competition takes place along religious lines. At other times competing groups are distinguished 
from one another by language. At still other times in-group/out-group distinctions are made on the basis of tribal 
affiliation, clan membership, geographic region of origin, or race. Within a single country, each of these 
distinctions may serve, in different situations, as a potential axis of social differentiation and conflict». This 
“fluidity” particularly applied to the Zambian case where the author found out that the relevant ethnic axis at the 
local level was the tribe while at national level language (Posner 2005).  
67
 With the creation of a lagged variable we include not only the current level of PSI but the past (lag) level of 
PSI as an independent variable.  
68
 Namely OLS regression with cluster-robust standard errors, first differencing, random effects and fixed effects 
(for a comprehensive discussion see Wooldridge 2000; Allison 2009; Cameron and Trivedi 2009).  
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controlling this effect. Even though there are some problems with the use of lagged variables, 
they remain, for the most part, highly recommended. Achen (2001), one of the supporters of 
Beck and Katz’s approach, sustains that the specification with the lagged variable is always 
preferred even if the values and the direction of the coefficients change drastically. Similarly, 
Keele and Kelly (2006) note that, although «the lagged dependent variable is inappropriate in 
some circumstances, it remains an appropriate model for the dynamic theories often tested by 
applied analysts». Beck and Katz OLS with PCSEs can be estimated in STATA with the 
command xtpcse, while the lagged dependent variable must be computed manually and enter 
the model along with the other independent variables
69
.  
 
4.3 Independent and control variables: Descriptive analysis  
 
In this section, descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables are featured. We 
start by displaying the results of basic univariate statistics (mean and frequencies) and 
continue with the analysis of bivariate associations between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3). 
Beginning with social structure, the average ethnic fractionalization is 0.6 (this index 
varies from 0-1), with more layered societies being the former British colonies of Nigeria, 
South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country, is composed of 
more than 250 ethnic groups (among which Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo 18%, 
Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3,5%, Tiv 2,5%). The dominant religious views are Muslim 
(50%) and Christian (40%) and the official language is English (but there are over 500 
indigenous languages; e.g. Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and Fulani) (see Nigeria CIA Factbook 
sheet). Zambia’s population is mainly constituted by Africans (99,5%) (73 ethnic groups 
including Bemba, Tonga, Chewa, Lozi, Nsenga, Tumbuka, Ngoni, Lala, Kaonde, Lunda, and 
other African groups); between 50%-75%, of the population is Christian and 24%-49% is 
Muslim and Hindu. There are eight official languages (Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi, Lunda, 
Kaonde, Luvale and English) and several other dialects (see Zambia CIA Factbook sheet). On 
the opposite side, the Creole societies of Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde and Seychelles 
are the least fragmented ones. Sao Tome and Principe is mostly constituted by mestiços, 
forros (descendants of freed slaves), tongas (children of serviçais born in the islands), and 
Europeans (primarily Portuguese) and the overwhelming majority of the population is 
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 To create the lagged dependent variable from the original variable named PSIindex we used the following 
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Catholic (70%) and speaks Portuguese (official language) (see Sao Tome and Principe CIA 
Factbook sheet). The Cape Verdean population is mainly Creole (71%) and African (28%), 
pertains to Roman Catholic religion, and speaks Creolo (a blend of Portuguese and West 
African words) and Portuguese (official language) (see Cape Verde CIA Factbook sheet). The 
Seychellois people are a mixture of French, African, Indian, Chinese, and Arab. They are 
mostly Roman Catholic (82,3%), and 91,8% speak Creole and English (official language) (see 
Seychelles CIA Factbook sheet)
70
.  
On average, the number of years since the introduction of multiparty elections is 14 
years, whereas the durability of polities is 12 years (see Table 4.2). While for some countries 
these values are identical, in several others they vary and this variance has two sources. In the 
first place, we find differences which result from the way time and polity durability were 
calculated. For instance, Botswana and Mauritius are the two longest lasting democracies in 
Africa. They introduced multiparty elections in the aftermath of independence and remain 
uninterrupted democracies hitherto, thus both polities are durable. Yet, there is a difference in 
the number of years of the two variables. This happens because, while “time” counts the years 
from the onset of multipartism, “durable” starts counting from the first year after 
independence (1967 for Botswana and 1969 for Mauritius). Secondly, and most importantly, 
we find differences which result from a discontinuity in the rules of the polity; namely in 
Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia. 
We next provide two examples.  
In Guinea-Bissau, elections and democratic tasks have been interrupted by several 
episodes of intense political conflict between the Head of State and the military junta, and 
peace has been threatened on several occasions (Sangreman et al. 2006; Azevedo 2009). In 
the wake of the first multiparty elections in 1994, civil war broke out after the army chief of 
staff, General Ansumane Mané, was dismissed by President Joao Bernardo Vieira in June 
1998. The Abuja peace accord signed on 1 November 1998 put an end to five months of 
rebellion and presidential and legislative elections were scheduled for March 1999. In 
February 1999, a temporary government of national unity headed by Prime Minister 
Francisco Fadul took office and three months later another action led by General Mane, 
ousted President Vieira. The military junta named National Assembly Speaker Maladan Bacai 
Sanhá Interim President and established a timetable for the return of democratic governance. 
In the 1999/2000 elections, Kumba Yala was declared Head of State (in the second round) 
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only to be overthrown in a bloodless coup led by General Verussuni Correia Seabra on 14 
September 2003. Guinea-Bissau’s return to constitutional rule was completed in July 2005 
with the holding of presidential elections won by Joao Bernardo “Nino” Vieira. Rivalry 
between President Nino Vieira and the head of the Armed Forces, General Baptista Tagme Na 
Wai, resulted, however, in the assassinations of both men on consecutive days (see 
Sangreman et al. 2006; Azevedo 2009; Guinea-Bissau IPU Parline and Polity IV Country 
Report 2010
71
.). More recently, a military conflict (in 2010) and two coups, one attempted 
and another effective (in 2011 and 2012, respectively) have occurred.  
In Lesotho, political order has also been destabilized by several violent revolts since the 
first general election between 27 and 29 March 1993. The post electoral crisis in 1993-94, as 
well as in 1998, resulted from discontentment of the opposition parties in face of the 
government’s general fraud and electoral malpractice. In both contexts a more violent form of 
contestation took place, namely disgruntled army factions also joined opposition parties in 
military actions. Unlike what happened in 1993-94, in 1998 the King did not take an active 
role in the opposition campaign, and violence was only effectively controlled with the 
intervention of troops from Botswana and South Africa and with the LCD’s compromise to 
organize a new poll within 18 months. In order to pave the way for these elections, an Interim 
Political Authority (IPA) was established in December 1998. It consisted of two members 
from each of the country’s twelve main political parties, and it was empowered to make 
significant reforms in the political system by functioning as a parallel government. The 
elections of 2002 were again won by the LCD, only this time without violent reaction to the 
results (see Lesotho IPU Parline and Polity IV Country Report 2010
72
). Conversely, countries 
like Namibia, Seychelles, Cape Verde and Mozambique have been characterized by stable 
polities from the onset of multipartism. It should be noted, though, that stable does not mean 
absence of political conflict, but simply that the political conflict did not result in changes in 
authority patterns, which is what Polity IV “durable” measures.  
Considering the institutional variables; semipresidential regimes are the most frequent 
form of government (N = 9), followed by the presidential (N = 6) and the parliamentary forms 
(N = 4)
73
. This distribution largely reflects the regional situation, as more than half of the 
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 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/GuineaBissau2010.pdf (accessed on 09-02-2013). 
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 http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Lesotho2010.pdf (accessed on 09-02-2013). 
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 In Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia, elections for the presidency and the 
parliament were always held in concurrency. During shorter periods this was also the case of The Gambia (until 
1996), Guinea-Bissau (until 2004), Senegal (until 1988) and Seychelles (until 1998). In all other cases – except 
for Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius and South Africa which are parliamentarian – the two elections are held 
separately.  
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states in Sub-Saharan Africa are semipresidential (Elgie 2007). This institutional landscape 
has been linked with the colonial background of the countries. In fact, van Cranenburgh 
(2003) has shown that countries with British background tended to follow, in most cases, the 
Westminster parliamentary model; while those with French background were mostly inspired 
by the prototype of the French Fifth Republic, consequently adopting semipresidential 
regimes with strong presidents. An institutional resemblance is also found among former 
Portuguese colonies that adopted semipresidential regimes (Lobo and Neto 2009; Neto and 
Lobo 2014).  
In the majority of countries (for instance Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mozambique, Sao 
Tome and Principe and Tanzania) the forms of government have been largely stable since 
they were introduced. In a few cases, however, there have been attempts to amend certain 
dispositions. The case of Senegal is one of complete change. The country had a presidential 
regime until 7 January 2001 when it adopted a semipresidential constitutional framework. In 
other countries, changes (attempted or successful) have mostly aimed at extending the 
presidential mandate (Vencovsky 2007). For example, Presidents Blaise Compaoré of 
Burkina Faso and Sam Nujoma of Namibia were able to secure constitutional amendments 
that allowed them to stand for a third term in office, and they eventually won the subsequent 
election (Vencovsky 2007, 17), while the Presidents of Nigeria (Olusegun Obasanjo), Malawi 
(Elson Bakili Muluzi) and Zambia (Frederick Chiluba) were less fortunate since they saw 
their attempts of constitutional amendment blocked by the parliament and they also faced 
contestation from civil society (Vencovsky 2007, 18-19). In Sao Tome and Principe, the 
National Assembly started a process of constitutional amendment aimed at reducing the 
powers of the president and at strengthening the powers of the government and the parliament 
in 2001 (Seibert 2009). Part of the revised Constitution was approved in 2003 in the aftermath 
of long political crisis between the incumbent President Fradique Menezes, who wanted to 
hold a popular referendum on the new constitutional text, and the political parties represented 
at the parliament, which considered that there was no need of submitting constitutional 
amendments to referendum (Ibid.).  
Laws regulating parties’ access to funding/finance are more or less widespread in the 
sample. As Table 4.2 displays, Benin (11) and Cape Verde (10) are the countries where 
dispositions for public funding, regulations of spending; and reporting, oversight and 
sanctions are more detailed. Countries with no public funding at all – Botswana, Guinea-
Bissau, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia – still have minimal provisions regarding free 
or subsidized access to media for political parties, bans on vote buying and on state resources 
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being used in favor or against a political party or candidate. The section in which regulation 
seems to be missing is on reporting spending as, in almost half of the countries, there are no 
provisions demanding the periodical report of finances – some examples are Botswana, Cape 
Verde, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles and Zambia. 
Regarding party system fragmentation, the average number of electoral parties (ENEP) 
for the 19 countries analyzed is 3, which is a strikingly low number, especially when 
compared to other recently-democratized countries. In the case of post-Communist Europe, 
there are, on average, 28 effective parties competing in parliamentary elections (Tavits 2005). 
Thus, this aggregate indicator alone seems to confirm the distinctive nature of African party 
systems in what concerns its low levels of fragmentation (e.g. Salih 2003; Salih and Nordlund 
2007; Carbone 2005). Yet there is some cross-country variation. The overwhelming majority 
of the countries (N = 14) are below the observed average, with more extreme cases being 
Seychelles and The Gambia, where the mean ENEP is approximately 2. Only five countries 
score above this figure. These are the following, in ascendant order of fragmentation: Sao 
Tome and Principe, Malawi, Zambia, Guinea-Bissau and Benin. The latter has the most 
fragmented party system with average ENEP of 9.  
Concerning party age, the results indicate that African political parties are fairly old 
(mean = 24 years) when compared with the ones competing in post-Communist elections 
(mean = 7 years) (Tavits 2005). Older political parties are found in the Seychelles (25 years), 
Cape Verde (30 years), Malawi (30 years), Senegal (32 years), Namibia (35 years), 
Mozambique (36 years), Mauritius (41 years) and South Africa (50 years). The latter’s, ANC 
is the oldest political party in Africa. Founded in 1912, it was the major contributor to the end 
of the apartheid regime and, since 1994 it is the country’s dominant party. In Mauritius, the 
major political parties are also the oldest ones, namely the PT, the PMSD and the MMM 
founded, respectively in 1936, 1955 and 1969. These parties have been able to elect 
representatives in nearly all elections since 1976 and had the opportunity to lead the country, 
by turns and in coalition governments as well. In the remaining 11 countries, the age of 
political parties ranges between three years (Burkina Faso) and 24 years (Lesotho). Burkina 
Faso is the country with the youngest political parties in the parliament with the CDP and the 
ADF-RDA, having been founded in 1996 and 1998, respectively.  
Economic performance is operationalized by variables that portray the state of the 
economy at the time of election (GDP and inflation). The interpretation of the results must, 
however, be inserted in the long term. It is known that in most African countries the «[...] 
policy focus of the post-independence years» was «[...] state control of the ‘commanding 
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heights’: to ensure balanced growth and income equality» (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1999, 275). 
Notwithstanding, the failure of this model and the economic crisis of the 1970s led many 
countries to adopt structural adjustment policies in the early 1980s, which in many cases 
signified wide privatization of state owned companies and the contraction of public spending 
(Ibid.). After this period, and with the democratic opening, the economies of Sub-Saharan 
Africa have done much better in several indicators that measure human welfare (infant 
mortality, literacy, school enrollment etc.) and economic development (GDP per capita, 
annual growth) (Sender 1999). Despite the fact that the poorest countries in the world are 
situated in this continent, World Bank data shows that the economy is performing better than 
in the first years of independence and, generally, resisting the 2008 world crisis. In fact, 
between 1995 and 2012, GDP averaged 5% in Sub-Saharan African countries (Kaberuka et al. 
2011, 17).  
The 19 countries in our sample also record an annual GDP growth of 5%. Performing 
better than this average are the economies of Senegal (5,1%), Sao Tome and Principe (5,3%), 
Malawi (5,4%), Namibia (5,6%), Ghana (5,6%), Seychelles (5,8%), Zambia (6,1%), 
Botswana (6,5%), Cape Verde (6,8%), Tanzania (6,8%), Mozambique (7,5%) and Nigeria 
(7,9%). In the remaining seven countries, the GDP average growth per year is lower than 5%. 
South Africa, the continent’s biggest economy74, has the lowest GDP growth rates (mean = 
1.7%), when compared to other economies in the southern region of Africa (e.g. Tanzania and 
Mozambique), even though this situation has improved since 1994. According to du Plessis 
and Smit (2007): 
 
South Africa’s real economic growth rate averaged 3,1 percent (1,1 percent in per capita terms) 
during the period 1995-2004 [...]. This represented a substantial improvement on the 0,8 percent 
average growth rate (- 1.3 percent in per capita terms) registered in the decade from 1985-1994. 
Although this was a welcome improvement, South Africa’s growth performance remained 
relatively low by world standards [...] (du Plessis and Smit 2007, 3).  
 
Neighbor Nigeria, in turn, has the fastest GDP growth, being also one most developed 
economies in Africa (average GDP per capita is 1046.414 US$). The GDP increased from 
1,1%, in 1999 to nearly 7% in 2011 and reached its peak in 2003 (10%). The main booster of 
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 The average GPD per capita in the period covered is 4512,042 US$. In 2010 South Africa was invited by the 
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the economy is the oil industry; the country was rated the 12
th
 largest producer of petroleum 
products in the world in 2012.  
Regarding inflation rates, the mean value is 10% annual change. Fourteen countries 
have lower percentages while five have higher ones. Within the first group, rates are inferior 
to 4% in four countries (Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Seychelles) whilst in the 
remaining cases inflation ranges between 4,1% (Benin) and 9,7% (Lesotho). Rates above 10% 
are found in Nigeria (10,1%), Zambia (20,5%), Malawi (21,5%), Ghana (24,7%) and Sao 
Tome and Principe (28,0).  
Electoral participation, as the percentage of voter turnout, has been mentioned before in 
this dissertation. In Chapter II we saw that countries like Burkina Faso, Mozambique and 
Senegal had the lowest turnout averages (below 60%) in lower house elections, while 
electorates of Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa, figured amid the most participative 
ones (above 80%). In Chapter III, we coupled levels of institutionalization, democratic 
performance and turnout in a Hierarchical Cluster Analysis that delivered three outcomes of 
institutionalization: adequate, inadequate and overinstitutionalization. In this chapter, we 
focus on turnout changes from one election to the next. Table 4.2 shows that five countries – 
Mauritius (2,2%), Seychelles (3,9%), South Africa (5,2%), Lesotho (7,8%) and Benin (8,6%) 
– have a relatively stable share of voters across elections (less than 10% change), whereas 
nine countries exhibit changes from 11% to 16%. These are, in ascending order, Botswana, 
Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria 
and Zambia. Finally, five countries register more than 16% of change in voter turnout – 
Guinea-Bissau (16,1%), Senegal (16,2%), Namibia (18,1%), Mozambique (19,9%) and 
Ghana (20,1%).  
Table 4.2 also includes data for the number of presidents, the type of electoral system 
and the quality of PSI, which are the control variables. Since the latter has already been 
extensively analyzed in the previous chapter (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4) we will focus solely on 
the first two variables. Starting with the number of presidents, we find that in some countries 
there is limited turnover – Burkina Faso (1), The Gambia (2), Mozambique (2), Namibia (2), 
Seychelles (2) and Tanzania (2) – while in others there has been more alternation in the 
position of the Head of State – Ghana (4), Lesotho (4), South Africa (4), Zambia (4), Guinea-
Bissau, (6) and Mauritius (6). In Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré has been the country sole 
Head of State since December 1991 after successfully changing the Constitution to be able to 
run for a third mandate. Blaise Compaoré seized power in 1987 after a coup d’état in which 
Captain Thomas Sankara, who had established a Marxist–Leninist regime in 1983, was killed 
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(Grotz 1999), thus he has been in power for more than 20 years now. In Mozambique 
Frelimo’s leaders Joaquim Chissano (1994-2005) and Armando Guebuza (2005- to present) 
were elected for two consecutive terms each. In Namibia Sam Nujoma (1990-2005) and 
Hifikepunye Pohamba (2005 -to present) have succeeded in presidency. As his counterpart in 
Burkina Faso, Sam Nujoma was also able to change the Constitution so as to be allowed to 
compete in the subsequent election.  
In Sao Tome and Principe the relationship between the president and the cabinet has 
been hostile from the outset of the first multiparty elections in 1991 (Seibert 2009). In fact, 
between 1991 and 2004 five political conflicts resulted in the dismissal of the prime minister 
– these occurred in 1992, 1994, 2001, 2002 and 2004 (Ibid.). The presidents’ position has also 
been threatened. Since 1991, the country has known three Heads of State, Miguel Trovoada 
(1991-1995; 1995-2001), Fradique Menezes (2001-2003; 2011) and Manuel Pinto da Costa 
(since 2011) who have occasionally been challenged by the military (in 1996 and in 2003).  
 Zambia’ context is rather different as, unlike in Sao Tome and Principe; there has never 
been a situation of cohabitation between president and cabinet, since the same party controls 
both the presidency and the parliament. The first democratically elected president was 
Frederick Chiluba (1991-2002). When his attempt to run for a third mandate failed, he backed 
Levy Mwanawasa who had been his Vice-President until 1994 and had lost the run to party 
presidency in 1996. Levy Mwanawasa was elected in the 2001 election and his tenure lasted 
until his death in 2008. Subsequently, Rupiah Banda served his first term as acting president 
(29 June 2008 – 2 November 2008) and his second term as popularly elected president after 
the 30 October 2008 election. In the following general elections, held in 2011, Michael Sata 
was elected president, in a contest that also marked the first alternation in power in 20 years.  
In Malawi, one president also died in office, Bingu wa Mutharika, who had been 
nominated by previous president Elson Bakili Muluzi (in office between 1994-2004) as his 
successor. Mutharika’s first term in office was between 2004 and 2008 and the second 
between 2008 and 2012. When he died, Joyce Banda, who had served alongside Mutharika as 
Vice-President for DPP, was sworn president, following constitutional provisions that 
stipulated that when the president dies the Vice-President must automatically assume power. 
This was not a pacific succession as Joyce Banda seized power as the leader of the People’s 
Party; a party she formed after having been expelled from DPP in 2011. 
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Table 4.2 – Summary statistics for the independent variables  
  
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES CONTROL VARIABLES 
Time 
(years) 
Polity 
durability 
(years) 
Turnout 
change 
(average, %) 
Ethnicity 
(0-1) 
Form of 
Gov. 
ENEP 
(average) 
Party Age 
(average, 
years) 
Party funding/ 
finance (0-11) 
GDP growth 
(average, %) 
Inflation 
(average, %) 
No. 
Presidents 
Electoral 
system 
Quality of 
PSI 
Benin 20 20 8,6 0,7 PR 9 9 11 4,1 4,1 3 PR Inad. 
Botswana 40 43 11,2 0,5 PAR 2 23 6 6,5 9,6 4 MAJ Adeq. 
Burkina Faso 15 17 12,7 0,7 SPRE 3 6 7 3,9 1,7 1 PR Over 
Cape Verde 20 20 11,4 0,2 SPRE 2 30 10 6,8 5,3 3 PR Adeq. 
Gambia, The 41 27 14,5 0,6 PR 2 14 4 1,9 9,7 2 MAJ Over 
Ghana 16 7 20,1 0,7 SPRE 2 10 7 5,6 24,7 4 MAJ Inad. 
Guinea-Bissau 14 4 16,1 0,7 SPRE 4 21 8 3,9 3,1 6 PR Inad. 
Lesotho 14 5 7,8 0,4 PAR 3 24 6 3,7 9,7 4 MAJ & MIX Inad. 
Malawi 15 15 15 0,7 PR 4 30 3 5,4 21,5 3 MAJ Inad. 
Mauritius 34 42 2,2 0,5 PAR 2 41 5 4,7 6,6 6 MAJ Adeq. 
Mozambique 15 15 19,9 0,7 SPRE 2 36 8 7,5 6,3 2 PR Over 
Namibia 20 19 18,1 0,7 SPRE 2 35 3 5,6 8,1 2 PR Adeq. 
Nigeria 19 12 15,7 0,8 PR 3 12 8 7,9 10,1 3 MAJ Over 
Sao Tome and Principe 19 19 12,2 0,1 SPRE 3 19 5 5,3 28 3 PR Inad. 
Senegal 14 20 16,2 0,5 SPRE 3 32 5 5,1 3,3 3 MIX Over 
Seychelles 18 18 3,9 0,2 PR 2 25 7 5,8 2,7 2 MIX Adeq. 
South Africa 15 15 5,2 0,8 PAR 2 50 4 1,7 4,6 4 PR Adeq. 
Tanzania 15 15 12,3 0,8 SPRE 2 24 9 6,8 6,5 2 MAJ Over 
Zambia 20 10 15,7 0,8 PR 4 20 4 6,1 20,5 4 MAJ Inad. 
Notes: Acronym for form of government: PAR = Parliamentary, SPRE = Semipresidential and PR = Presidential; Acronym for electoral system: PR = Proportional, MAJ = Majoritarian and MIX = 
Mixed; abbreviation for quality of PSI: Inad. = Inadequate institutionalization, Adeq. = adequate institutionalization, Over. = overinstitutionalization. 
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Regarding the electoral system for the lower house elections, the great majority of 
countries employ either majoritarian (N = 8) or proportional (N = 8) electoral formulas, while 
three countries only – Senegal, Seychelles and Lesotho – adopted mixed electoral formulas. In 
Lesotho, the only country that presents a complete change in electoral laws in the period 
analyzed, a mixed formula was adopted in 2002, substituting the first-past-the-post plurality 
formula, introduced in the 1965 elections. A combination of majoritarian institutions is found 
in The Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia, where presidentialism is accompanied by 
majoritarian electoral formula, thus creating an incentive for the centralization of political 
power (van Cranenburgh 2003).  
We close this section with the results of the bivariate analysis between the dependent 
and independent variables and the lagged dependent variable. They are presented in Table 
4.3. Although the correlation matrix simply gives an association between two variables, 
without controlling the effect of other variables, it can provide a preliminary reading about 
our data. The strongest correlations are found between PSI and polity durability (corr. coef. = 
0.3681), PSI lagged (corr. coef = 0.4638) and ENEP (corr. coef. = -0.5786). The correlation 
coefficients indicate that PSI increases when polities are stable for longer periods, and when 
its past value is also positive (PSI lagged). Conversely, lower levels of PSI are strongly 
associated with higher levels of fragmentation (ENEP). Moderate-to-low correlations are 
found between PSI and ethnic fractionalization (corr. coef = -0.2748), party age (corr. coef = 
0.2311) and presidentialism (corr. coef = -0.2374). The association between PSI and the 
remaining independent variables – time, turnout change, party funding/finance, GDP and 
inflation – is low. 
The results also display the bivariate correlations between the independent variables. 
Naturally, there is a strong correlation between time and polity durability (corr. coef = 0. 
6541), since in some countries time and polity durability are the same while in others there is 
a difference between the two mainly due to changes in the nature of the polity. This is not 
problematic, however, as the individual effect of each variable is controlled in the regression 
analysis. Moreover, polity durability is associated with party age (corr. coef = 0.4192), party 
funding/finance with ENEP (corr. coef = 0.3788) and ENEP with the lagged dependent 
variable (corr. coef = -0.4865). This indicates that more durable polities are linked with older 
parties and that party funding/finance is more detailed in more fragmented party systems, 
what can make sense as competition for resources is higher in those contexts.  
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Table 4.3 – Correlation matrix: bivariate associations between dependent and independent variables 
  PSI Time 
Polity 
dur. 
Turnout 
change Ethnicity  Presi. ENEP 
Party 
age 
Party 
fund. GDP Inflation 
PSI 
lagged 
PSI 1                       
Time 0.1768 1                     
Polity durability 0.3681 0.6541 1                   
Turnout change -0.0925 -0.1508 -0.3419 1                 
Ethnicity  -0.2748 -0.0509 -0.2010 0.1691 1               
Presidentialism -0.2374 0.1075 -0.1400 -0.0071 0.1639 1             
ENEP -0.5786 -0.0493 -0.1180 -0.0249 0.2311 0.2935 1           
Party age 0.2311 0.1061 0.4192 -0.2361 -0.0452 -0.3125 -0.2360 1         
Party 
funding/finance -0.1020 -0.1296 -0.0741 -0.0503 -0.0485 -0.0803 0.3788 -0.2426 1       
GDP 0.0618 -0.1889 -0.0824 0.1568 -0.0465 -0.1429 -0.0721 -0.0409 0.1825 1     
Inflation -0.0132 -0.2611 -0.1908 0.2232 -0.0894 0.1433 -0.1247 -0.1788 -0.2740 -0.1766 1   
PSI lagged 0.4638 0.1735 0.3130 0.1975 -0.1571 -0.1416 -0.4865 0.2375 -0.1656 0.1540 -0.0649 1 
 
 
4.4 Sources of party system institutionalization: Analysis and results  
 
Table 4.4 presents the results of three linear regressions with PCSEs (see full models in 
Appendix E). Model 1 includes all main independent variables and Models 2 and 3 add the 
lagged dependent variable to deal with serial correlation in the data and the control variables. 
All models provide some support for the theoretical explanations tested (R square = 46,2%, 
52,1% and 55,9%, respectively). Model 1 features three statistically significant correlates of 
PSI. More stable polities are significantly related to highest levels of PSI (coef. = 0,103; p = 
0,026), time, however, does not strongly increment the levels of PSI (the coefficient is 
negative, yet not significant). Also positively associated to institutionalization is party 
funding/finance (coef. = 0,152; p = 0,010), being that countries with more extensive 
provisions regulating party finances are associated to higher levels of PSI. The ENEP (coef. = 
-0,870, p = 0,000), conversely, is significantly associated to lowest levels of PSI indicating 
that more fragmented party systems are likely to be weakly institutionalized. Ethnicity and the 
remaining institutional and economic variables are not significantly related with PSI in this 
first specification.  
With the introduction of the lagged dependent variable and the control variables – 
number of presidents, dummy variable for majoritarian electoral system and the separate 
index of religious fractionalization (Model 2) – one year of observation is lost, as previously 
mentioned (Section 4.2). Some changes in the size of the effects are evident but, overall, the 
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regression coefficients of ENEP, party funding/finance and polity durability remain 
statistically significant. There are also some interesting novelties which are worth pointing 
out.  
Table 4.4 – Sources of PSI: Results of the linear regression with PCSEs (I) 
  MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
Ethnicity  -1,206 2,390* 5,396** 
Time -0,0260 -0,00414 -0,00443 
Polity durability 0,103** 0,109** 0,0936* 
Party funding/finance 0,152*** 0,0949* 0,130** 
Presidentialism 0,00678 -0,401 -0,0949 
ENEP -0,870**** -0,999**** -0,924**** 
Party age -0,00238 -0,00770 -0,00462 
GDP 0,00814 0,0770 0,0704 
Inflation -0,00106 0,0159 0,0151 
Change in voter turnout 0,00795 -0,0187 -0,0157 
PSI lagged 
 
0,0806 0,0422 
Number of Presidents  
 
-0,0934 -0,196 
Electoral system (1= majoritarian) 
 
-1,144** -1,014* 
Religious fractionalization 
 
-2,271** -3,836** 
Adequate institutionalization (=1) 
  
1,815** 
_cons 29,15**** 27,30**** 26,48**** 
Observations 83 82 82 
R square 0,4623 0,5213 0,5599 
Notes: PCSE = Panel Corrected Standard Errors. Values correspond to regression coefficients. 
Significant at *p<0,10, ** p<0,05, *** p<0,01, **** p<0,001 
 
The type of electoral system is, after all, a strong predictor of differentials in PSI in the 
sample, with countries with majoritarian formulas being significantly associated to lower 
levels of PSI (coef. = -1,144; p = 0,023). Ethnicity (composite index of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious fractionalization) also bears a relevant influence (coef. = 2,390; p = 0.086) when we 
control for the individual effect of religious fractionalization (coef. = -2,271; p = 0,047). 
Nevertheless, while the first changes into having a positive effect on PSI from Model 1 to 
Model 2, religious fractionalization on its own has a negative effect upon it. This apparent 
contradiction remains even when we repeat the analysis without the lagged dependent 
variable, which can sometimes be responsible for unclear changes in the size and direction of 
association between independent and dependent variables (Achen 2001; Keele and Kelly 
2006).  
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To clarify this puzzle, we ran two additional models (Model 4 and 5 in Table 4.5) with 
individual indexes for ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation, which revealed that while 
the two former have a positive effect on PSI the latter bears a negative effect upon it.  
 
Table 4.5 – Sources of PSI: Results of the linear regression with PCSEs (II) 
 
Notes: PCSE = Panel Corrected Standard Errors. Values correspond to regression coefficients. 
Significant at *p<0,10, ** p<0,05, *** p<0,01, **** p<0,001 
 
Besides this, the results also reveals that religion is the only component of ethnicity 
holding a statistically significant effect on all models estimated, and this occurred without 
major shifts in the main independent variables as Table 4.5 shows. These results support 
Posner’s (2001; 2005) viewpoint that it can be deceptive to measure all components of 
ethnicity under the same umbrella for it is possible that one dimension of the ethnic cleavage 
can emerge as politically salient instead of another, in different contexts within and across 
countries. This can be an indication that the religious divide is more harmful to the 
institutionalization of party system than the linguistic and the ethnic divides in contemporary 
Africa.  
Going back to the models presented in Table 4.4, we now discuss the results of Model 3 
in which we controlled for the quality of PSI by introducing a dummy variable for adequate 
institutionalization having inadequate and overinstitutionalized party systems as omitted 
variables. Briefly reviewing these categories, which have been examined in Chapter III 
(Section 3.3), adequate institutionalization labels cases in which party systems adequately 
  MODEL 4 MODEL 5  
Ethnic fractionalization 1,044 0,817  
Linguistic fractionalization 0,443 0,517  
Religious fractionalization -2,749**** -2,359**  
Time -0,0299 -0,0218  
Polity durability 0,107** 0,0908  
Party funding/finance 0,126* 0,140**  
Presidentialism -0,666 -0,605  
ENEP -0,822**** -0,914**** 
Party age 0,00241 0,0000776  
GDP 0,0622 0,0446  
Inflation 0,00936 0,00883  
Change in voter turnout -0,00646 -0,0170  
PSI lagged   0,107  
_cons 28,94**** 26,32**** 
Observations 82 82 
R square  0,4974  0,4934 
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accommodated increased participation and political change. In our sample this description fits 
the countries with the highest levels of voter turnout, democratic performance and 
institutionalization (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South 
Africa). Overinstitutionalization, the opposite category, labels cases in which participation 
and political change are silenced by a strong party system. Countries under this label combine 
the lowest levels of voter turnout and democratic performance with high levels of PSI 
(Burkina, The Gambia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania). Finally, the 
intermediate category – inadequate institutionalization – defines party systems that are too 
weak to encourage mass mobilization and promote political change. Thus, the lowest levels of 
PSI are combined with medium levels of voter turnout and democratic performance (Benin, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe and Zambia). 
The results of Model 3, which control for the quality of PSI, leave things basically the 
same, except for minor changes in the level of significances. Adequate institutionalized party 
systems have a positive correlation with highest levels of institutionalization vis-à-vis 
inadequate and overinstitutionalized party systems (coef. = 1,815; p=0,019). This may sound 
tautological, but it is not, for our analysis in Chapter III revealed cases of overinstitutionalized 
party systems coupled with elevate scores of PSI (e.g. The Gambia, Mozambique and 
Tanzania). Given these results, let us summarize the main findings.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter we sought to explain the sources of PSI variance across countries and time, 
testing six major explanations: social structure (H1), institutionalization over time (H2 and 
H3), institutional design (H4 and H5), party and party systems characteristics (H6 and H7), 
economic performance (H8) and electoral participation (H9). The results of the linear 
regressions with PCSEs (which explain between 46% and 56% of the variance found in the 
sample) provide some support for the theoretical explanations based on social structure, 
endurance of the polity and institutional design. In fact, countries with more durable polities, 
with the lowest levels of party system fragmentation, with extensive regulations for party 
funding/finance and with higher levels of ethnicity are associated to higher levels of PSI. The 
results also indicate, however, that the religious divide is the most prominent feature within 
ethnicity affecting the levels of PSI; with higher levels of religious fractionalization 
decreasing the level of PSI. Therefore, religion emerges as the cleavage with a larger potential 
of social differentiation and conflict in the sample. This makes sense if we consider that 
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religion is a singular social cleavage insofar as it is associated with differences among 
civilizations (hence implying different ways of understanding the world and social 
relationships) and it requires exclusivity (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2002). 
Models 4 and 5 clearly show that, while the linguistic and the ethnic divides have a 
positive, even if not statistically significant, effect on PSI the religious divide has a negative 
and strong effect on PSI. Recent studies, which have explored the relationship between 
ethnicity and economic development in Africa, have also arrived to similar conclusions. 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002)
75
 found that religious polarization was better at 
explaining slow economic growth than ethnolinguistic fragmentation. Moreover, when both 
indexes entered the model together, ethnolinguistic fragmentation became insignificant, while 
the religious polarization remained a statistically significant predictor of poor economic 
performance. More recently, Kodila-Tedika and Agbor (2013) partly corroborated this result 
by finding out that religion had important effects on the development process through its 
effects on economic investment.  
The fact that the religious divide emerges as crucial in our analysis, but also in the 
studies here quoted is particularly relevant since African societies are mostly known for their 
ethnic diversity, while religion, class and language tend to be more salient in the Western 
world (Horowitz 1985). Its relevance in our analysis opens this debate into considering the 
particular context within which these social cleavages are activated as well as their 
momentary and strategic mobilization by political actors. Macro-level changes also play a role 
here. Using time-series data from the World Christian Data base Kodila-Tedika and Agbor 
(2013, 2) insightfully note that Sub-Saharan Africa’s religious landscape «has undergone 
profound changes from a monolithic African traditional religious society to an increasingly 
polarized religious society». More precisely, since the 1950s Christian and Muslim population 
have shown a dramatic increase from about 50% to 85% (combined) while traditional 
religions lost their followers (down from about 60% to 13% within the same period). This is a 
significant change that can also account for the saliency of the religious divide in relation to 
the others, in contemporary African societies.  
Overall, the models displayed in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 reveal that, ENEP, party 
funding/finance and polity durability are strong predictors of PSI as they exhibit consistently 
strong correlations with PSI, even when we control for the quality of the model (fitting a 
lagged dependent variable) or for alternative explanations, such as the type of electoral 
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 Also in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) 
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system, president turnover and quality of institutionalization or when we run additional 
estimations with individual indexes for ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization (Table 
4.5). In this sense H1, H3, H4 and H6 are confirmed. 
In the group of the control variables we find that the type of electoral system is also 
relevant in explaining variance in PSI, with majoritarian formulas being more correlated to 
lower levels of institutionalization than proportional representation and mixed formulas. This 
is a general finding for the total of 83 elections*countries observed in this study, but as usual 
there are outliers. For instance, in the case of Botswana the finding does not apply, however if 
we consider elections held in Zambia, Lesotho (until 2002) and Malawi it does make sense. 
This result relevance is two-fold. Firstly, it indicates that the type of electoral system matters 
for PSI in Africa. Secondly, it encloses an interesting puzzle since majoritarian formulas are 
usually associated with higher levels of stability, at least at the government level
76
. Therefore, 
it will be interesting to explore the effects of electoral institutions in our two case studies 
since Zambia’s first-past-the-post elections create higher levels of fragmentation and weaker 
levels of institutionalization than Mozambique’s proportional representation system. This 
analysis will take place in Chapter VI where we additionally show that the structure of the 
party system and the salience and/or activation of territorial cleavages (ethnic, religious, 
linguistic and regional) are important to understand how the mechanical effects of the 
electoral institutions (proportionality and fragmentation) actually work; but before that, the 
next chapter presents the framework for the comparison of the case studies.  
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 As Norris (1997) clearly puts it: «The aim of plurality systems is to create a “manufactured majority”, that is, 
to exaggerate the share of seats for the leading party in order to produce an effective working parliamentary 
majority for the government, while simultaneously penalizing minor parties, especially those whose support is 
spatially dispersed. In “winner take all”, the leading party boosts its legislative base, while the trailing parties get 
meager rewards. The focus is effective governance, not representation of all minority views. 
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CHAPTER V – THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PARTY SYSTEM 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA: MECHANISMS AND 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
 
Chapter IV tested key theoretical explanations in the analysis of the sources of PSI in African 
countries that held competitive and regular lower house elections until 2011. The results of the 
regression analysis consistently indicated polity durability, party system fragmentation, party 
funding/finance, religious fractionalization and electoral system as the foremost determinants of PSI. 
Economic variables, however, proved to bear a limited effect on the variance found in the sample. To 
the extent to which PSI has been measured and broadly explained, the two first research questions of 
this dissertation have been answered. Thus, following the scheme of the mixed method design here 
employed – explanatory sequential design – it is time to move forward to the qualitative strand in 
which the last research question – what mechanisms underlie variance in PSI? – is analyzed. As 
described in Chapter II, the main objective of this phase is to discuss the results delivered by the 
quantitative strand, carrying out a comparative analysis of two case studies – Mozambique and 
Zambia –, taking into consideration two types of mechanisms: environmental and relational ones. To 
set off and frame this part of the thesis, this chapter is organized around three main sections, which 
will facilitate the in-depth qualitative analysis in the following chapter. Section 5.1 displays the whole 
comparative scheme for the study of the mechanisms of PSI. In Section 5.2 Mozambique and Zambia 
are placed in the broad political context and the main highlights of party politics before and after 
multipartism are featured. Finally, Section 5.3 presents the main conclusions drawn from the analysis 
presented in this chapter.  
 
5.1 Mechanisms of party system institutionalization  
 
Providing answers to the question «what mechanisms underlie variance in PSI?» is the third 
goal of this dissertation. After an initial quantitative strand in which PSI was measured along 
three structural dimensions and explained in a medium-size sample, the study of this 
multilayered phenomenon is sealed with a qualitative strand by means of which the 
mechanisms of PSI are analyzed in two countries: Mozambique and Zambia.  
This stage of the research is anchored in an all new set of methodological tools – case 
study methods –, whose purpose is to understand a larger class of units through the in-depth 
analysis of few units (Gerring 2004; Seawright and Gerring 2008). Case study methods are 
best known for their «orientation toward comprehensive examination of historically defined 
cases and phenomena» and for addressing «one of the central goals of comparative social 
science, that is to explain and interpret the diverse experiences of societies, nations, cultures 
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and other significant macrosocial units» (Ragin 1987, 53). In the context of an explanatory 
sequential design, case studies allow discussing the main results of the quantitative strand by 
telling the story behind the data. This is mainly done through the intensive collection and 
thorough analysis of various types of data (bibliographical, documental and archival sources 
and semi-structured interviews) covering the more prominent variables and dimensions 
observed in the previous strand; but it goes further than that. In fact, unobserved or new 
variables and dimensions can be included in order to refine the findings or the gaps left open 
by the quantitative analysis. We are, particularly, thinking on the critical junctures (Hogan 
2006), during which major institutional changes are possible (e.g. path to democratic 
transition) and on relational features (e.g. clientelism, patronage, ideological or programmatic 
linkages between political parties and their constituencies), which are suggested by the 
literature as relevant both theoretically and empirically (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; van 
de Walle 2003; Gyimah-Boadi 2007; Riedl 2008). These variables did not enter the 
quantitative analysis, because the elements we wanted to highlight regarding these – 
strategies, negotiations and informal networks – are better assessed qualitatively than 
quantitatively. Yet, this does not seem to be problematic, for Ragin (1987) has argued that 
theory can be used «to aid historical interpretation and to conduct the identification of 
important causal factors» (Ragin 1987, 54-55). Therefore, not all variables need to be 
suggested by or included in the quantitative strand. 
This section features the mechanisms of PSI that will be comparatively analyzed in 
Mozambique and Zambia. They are of two types; environmental and relational. 
Environmental mechanisms are the model or schema of resources that embody the 
interactions and the lines of action of self- reflective strategic actors (Clemens and Cook 
1999; Tilly 2001). As such, they regard the informational, structural and institutional context 
within which a party system develops. The relational mechanisms, however, concern political 
actors and their interpersonal networks (Tilly 2001). The same is to say that they regard the 
interactions (e.g. of cooperation, coercion, strategic coalition, patronage, clientelism and 
personalism) that unfold between the individuals or the collective actors within a particular 
arena on the basis of their resources.  
The focus on environmental and relational mechanisms is justified by the type of data 
collected for this strand of the analysis (documental and archival sources and semi-structured 
interviews), but mostly by their theoretical and empirical value. In fact, these are meaningful 
dimensions of African politics, which is frequently assumed to be bound by contextual 
features and informal networks (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Salih and Nordlund 2007). 
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We focus on three environmental mechanisms, partly suggested by the quantitative analysis – 
path to democratic transition, electoral system and party funding/finance – and consider the 
relational mechanisms that shape the interactions: (i) between the political parties inside the 
system (party coalitions); and (ii) between the political parties and their constituencies. 
Drawing on scholarly work about the nature of the State, consensually qualified as 
neopatrimonial (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; van de Walle 2003), the origins and the 
elements of intra-party competition, namely territorial cleavages, factionalism and lack of 
programmatic or ideological differentiation (Salih 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Erdmann 
2007a; Gyimah-Boadi 2007) as well as party-citizen linkages in Africa (Osei 2012; Tobolka 
2014), we expect that patron-client relationships will compose a large part of intra and extra 
party networks.  
To research these mechanisms, we selected cases using Seawright and Gerring's (2008) 
diverse case method. This method is appropriate when the primary objective is the 
achievement of maximum variance along relevant dimensions that explain a certain political 
outcome. Mozambique and Zambia are ideal for this analysis and their choice is supported by, 
at least, three reasons. In the first place, they are different in the level and quality of PSI. On 
the one hand, we have Mozambique which has a highly but overinstitutionalized party 
system, in such ways that the party system cannot reinvent itself and promote change in 
society, while encouraging political participation. On the other hand, there is Zambia that is 
weakly and inadequately institutionalized and faces the problem of having weak political 
institutions, which are unable to channel higher levels of political participation into the 
political arena (detailed in Section 3.3, Chapter III). In the second place, they differ in several 
environmental features: Mozambique is semipresidential (not a consensual categorization
77
), 
with proportional representation (PR) formula for parliament and a two-round majority for 
presidency, and it adopted provisions regulating party finances and public funding from the 
onset of multipartism; whereas Zambia is one of the strongest presidential systems in Africa, 
being that the majority formula, first-past-the-post (FPTP) is used both for presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Moreover, Zambia is one of the few countries in Africa that does not 
have regulated public funding or any legal framework for party finance whatsoever. The 
variation across these institutional devices, which are partly inherited from the previous 
                                                          
77
 Because of its strong presidential powers (the president is, simultaneously, the Head of State and Head of 
Government) Mozambique’s form of government has been categorized variously. It has been classified as 
presidential (van Cranenburgh 2003; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005), president-parliamentary (Shugart 2005), but 
also as semipresidential, with strong presidential powers (Macuane 2009; Manning 2007; Elgie and Moestrup 
2007b; Neto and Lobo 2014).  
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colonial regimes (Portuguese and British), is relevant as previously indicated by the 
quantitative analysis. Thus, the third reason that supports this choice of cases is that it allows 
discussing the results of the previous strand of analysis in what regards two of the most 
relevant institutional features in the African sample – the party funding/finance and the 
electoral system.  
Indeed, converging with the scholarly work about the value added of resources and 
funding for party and party system development, our analysis has shown that levels of 
institutionalization are higher in countries where public funding is granted and rules of party 
finance are widely regulated (Fambom 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Booth and Robbins 
2010). This is particularly relevant in contemporary Africa where political parties mainly 
originate from above, out of factionalism and personalism, and therefore lack mass 
membership and territorial implantation and opposition parties face huge difficulties to ride a 
campaign and to “stay alive” outside the electoral period (Salih and Nordlund 2007, 83-84). 
The analysis of Mozambique and Zambia allows discussing the value of party funding/finance 
in the process of PSI, going beyond the mere legal framework, which was the emphasis of the 
previous chapter.  
Regarding the influence of electoral institutions in African party systems, the studies are 
less conclusive. As previously noted, although electoral institutions may have similar 
mechanical effects to other places in the world (Lindberg 2005), they are found to be rather 
secondary in what regards delivering more or less stable party systems (Ferree 2010). As the 
relationship between electoral institutions and party systems is unclear, and sometimes 
considered secondary, the former was included in the regression model merely as a control 
variable. Surprisingly enough, the results showed that party systems with majoritarian 
electoral formula are less institutionalized. Yet these formulas are known for creating lower 
levels of parliamentary fragmentation and higher levels of stability at the government level. 
This finding created an interesting puzzle which, once again, can be satisfactorily researched 
in the two case studies, insofar as Mozambique’s PR elections have produced a more stable 
party system than Zambia’s FPTP system.  
The path to democratic transition is also relevant for this analysis. Although not 
included in the quantitative strand, it is relevant in light of the transitology literature, which 
presents it as a critical moment of institutional crafting around which political cleavages (old 
vs. new elites, old vs. new political parties, old vs. new ideologies) are formed. Thus, the 
strategies developed and the choices made during this period are relevant for the institutional 
outlook of the upcoming regime. As previously argued, it is not problematic to include new 
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variables at this stage of the analysis. In fact, one of the advantages of conducting a mixed 
methods study is the possibility of collecting and adding new sources of information to 
discuss or ameliorate the gaps left either by the quantitative or the qualitative method. Once 
again, because Mozambique and Zambia differ in this dimension, the analysis of PSI benefits. 
Indeed, while the first had a two-fold war-to-democracy transition in which only the former 
belligerents took place, the latter experienced a transition to democracy with large input from 
civil society. We argue that these different modes of transition and the political decisions 
made during this period had important consequences for the nature of interparty competition 
in the upcoming political systems. In Mozambique, the political scenario remained polarized 
around the formerly warring political parties, even if an asymmetry eventually arose between 
them. Conversely, in Zambia, the broad-based nature of the contestation against the outgoing 
authoritarian regime – with inputs from civil society organizations, intellectuals, and students 
inter alia – resulted in a more pulverized party system, in which parties are frequently 
challenged by relational issues that often take the form of defections and splits.  
Relational mechanisms, however, are not as divergent across cases as environmental 
ones. In fact, there is a consensual assumption that informality and personalism tend to 
influence intra and extraparty networks in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Salih and 
Nordlund 2007). Thus, our point in including relational mechanisms is not so much to 
establish great differences across the cases, but to analyze the web of informal networks that 
underlie the process of institutionalization in each case, while trying to access which relations 
are more prominent.  
 
5.1.1 Environmental and relational mechanisms in review  
 
As mentioned above, the path to democratic transition (structural), the electoral system, and 
the party funding (institutional) are the three environmental mechanisms that will be 
compared in Mozambique and Zambia. We now provide a brief literature review of each of 
them. 
 
Path to democratic transition. The 1990s were fertile in studies about the nature and the 
agents of the Third Wave of democratization
78
. One underlying assumption of these studies 
was that the mode of transition – either pacted or revolutionary, with pressure from below or 
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 About Latin America, Eastern and Southern Europe see Mainwaring, Valenzuela, and O’Donnell (1992); 
Przeworski (1991); Linz, Stepan, and Gunther (1995); and Munck and Leff (1997). For a revision of some of 
these studies, see Munck (1994) and Epstein et al. (2006) for a cross-regional comparison see Anderson (1999) 
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conducted by the elite – influenced the probability that a more stable democracy would 
emerge (McFaul 2002, 213). Yet, this literature has also been inconclusive, due to the high 
variability of context-dependent factors, which have to do with how political actors calculate 
their odds at each point of the negotiation process
79
. It is not our purpose to review the entire 
body of literature addressing this topic, but simply to single out the most relevant studies from 
a cross-regional perspective so that we can apply the right categories to the study of 
Mozambique and Zambia.  
Typologies for the mode of transition are numerous. Centering in Latin American and in 
new European democracies, Mainwaring (1989) distinguished scenarios of transition through 
transaction, in which the authoritarian regime chooses to continue opening the political 
system due to the high cost of staying in power or as a means to momentarily address a crisis; 
transition through regime defeat, in which the regime simply collapses and transition through 
extrication, in which the «authoritarian regime is weakened, but remains strong enough to 
dictate important terms of the transition» (Mainwaring 1989, 21-28). In the same pool of 
countries, Linz and Stepan (1996) distinguished four main different paths to democracy
80
: 
reforma pactada/ ruptura pactada (negotiated reform/negotiated rupture), defeat in war (or 
war-related collapse), interim government regime after regime termination not initiated by 
regime (coup by nonhierarchical military, armed insurgents, or mass uprising and regime 
collapse) and extrication from rule by hierarchically led military (Linz and Stepan 1996, 57-
60). In the African context, Bratton and Van de Valle (1997) employed three criteria – if 
protest occurred, if there was political liberalization, and if the country completed a 
democratic election – to identify five basic transition paths: liberalization following political 
protests, liberalization without democratization, democratization without protest, failure to 
democratize and precluded transition (when neither protest or liberalization had occurred) 
(Bratton and Van de Valle 1997, 119). Their analysis showed that, even though the majority 
of the African states (28 of the 42 considered) experienced a transition sparked by popular 
protest and embarked in liberalization reforms, few completed the process of democratic 
transition (16 of 42). The different outcomes and paths towards democratization resulted from 
the nature of pretransition regime, with more competitive and participative regimes 
experiencing smoother and more successful transitions.  
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 For instance Bermeo (1999) shows that in many transitions processes including Portugal and Spain, the elites’ 
calculations of the strength of the radical protesters proved to be more relevant for the course of the events than 
the actual pressure they put in at the negotiation table.  
80
 Linz and Stepan (1996) identify seven variants in total. The three missing variants are labeled “regime specific 
paths” (57-60). 
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Focusing on a single type of transition, Jarstad and Sisk (2008a) edited a book entirely 
dedicated to war-to-democracy transitions, in which several African countries, including 
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo are included. For 
Jarstad (2008), four dilemmas arise in this type of transition: horizontal (the relationship 
between the elites of warring parties and democratic political parties are placed in a trade-off 
between inclusion and exclusion); vertical (entails the choice between efficacy and 
legitimacy; for the sake of legitimacy, involvement of the people in all phases of the peace 
process is desirable, but for the sake of efficacy, certain negotiations need to be held in 
secret); systemic (refers to the issue of ownership; local versus international control of the 
processes of democratization and peacebuilding) and, finally, temporal (trade-offs between 
short-term and long-term effects on democratization and peacebuilding) (Jarstad and Sisk 
2008b, 11; Jarstad 2008).  
Even though Carothers (2002) has argued that the “transitions paradigm” is no longer a 
useful framework to understand political developments in contemporary World
81
, we build on 
Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and van de Walle (2002) to argue that, at least in Africa, 
what happened during the transition period is highly relevant to understand the nature of the 
incoming political system. This assumption goes beyond the mode of the transition per se. In 
fact, it encompasses several aspects, which are difficult to encapsulate in the categories 
enumerated above. Since the moment of transition opens a window of opportunities for 
institutional crafting, negotiations held at that point and, more specifically, the main actors 
who initiated and controlled the different phases of the process are both of great significance 
(Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995). Mozambique had a double transition from war to peace and 
to democracy, which was sealed with the Acordo Geral de Paz/ General Peace Agreement 
signed in Rome on 4th October 1992, between the former belligerents (thus, a war-to-
democracy or war-related transition). Zambia, in turn had a negotiated transition, with the 
input coming from below. The incumbent authoritarian regime enjoyed some leeway in the 
beginning, but eventually acquiesced to negotiate a reforming agenda with the opposition 
movement (thus, negotiated reform). In the first case, the nature of transition polarized the 
political space around the warring past; and in the second, it created a challenge for the ruling 
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 Carothers (2002, 6) argues that: «The transition paradigm has been somewhat useful during a time of 
momentous and often surprising political upheaval in the world. But it is increasingly clear that reality is no 
longer conforming to the model. Many countries that policy makers and aid practitioners persist in calling 
“transitional” are not in transition to democracy, and of the democratic transitions that are under way, more than 
a few are not following the model». 
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party to appease the different social movements and groups that had contributed to oust the 
authoritarian regime.  
 
Electoral system. According to Duverger (1959), electoral institutions exert both mechanical 
and psychological effects on the party system. The mechanical effects are the ones associated 
with the set of rules that dictate how votes are translated into mandates; with devices such as 
the election threshold, electoral formula and size of district being able to generate higher or 
lower levels of party system fragmentation and disproportionality. The psychological effects 
express how the rules of the electoral system influence not only voters’ but also political 
parties’ behaviors. Aspects such as strategic voting and political parties enacting coalitions or 
targeting specific campaign issues express psychological mechanisms. This model has been 
elsewhere discussed and reassessed (Grofman and Lijphart 2003; Benoit 2004; Colomer 
2005). Sartori (2003), for instance, argued that the mechanical and the psychological effects 
of the electoral institutions are only indirect, for they are modeled by the structure of the party 
system. Thus, more or less structured party systems would be more or less capable of using 
the devices of the electoral system to gain a majority. From a different angle, Benoit (2004, 
366-367) sustained that, because «electoral laws are quintessentially distributive institutions, 
improving the share of one group at the direct expense of another», an approach on their 
origins rather than on their consequences is crucial. Therefore, considering whether or not 
each party participating in the choice of the electoral system emphasized a more individual or 
general interest or whether the consequences and alternatives were considered at all, is 
relevant to understand the electoral system’s change or persistence over the years. Similarly, 
Colomer (2005) had sustained that Duverger’s laws might be actually upside down as 
political actors will tend to choose or to keep the electoral systems that are more advantageous 
for them. For instance, while smaller parties are likely to prefer proportional systems and 
higher-size electoral districts, major parties will tend to favor majoritarian formula and small 
district magnitudes, as each of these combinations maximizes their chances of winning 
elections (Colomer 2005). Or else, dominant and large parties are more inclined to choose 
plurality formulas and concurrent elections than small parties (Negretto 2006). Chapter VI 
will show that the structure of the party system and the extent to which political competition 
is dispersed or otherwise concentrated at the constituency level mediates the direct effects of 
electoral institutions in Mozambique and Zambia.  
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Party funding/finance. The analysis of party funding/finance is anchored in the quantitative 
phase of this study which demonstrated that countries with regulated public funding and with 
wider provisions for finance disclosure were associated to higher levels of PSI. For the sake 
of redundancy, we recover only the main points of that discussion. First, institutionalization is 
hampered by the lack of resources and funding, especially on the side of opposition political 
parties, which face tremendous difficulties to raise the necessary funding to pay for office, 
staff, communication facilities and all the other requirements for their performance. Second, 
ruling parties from the pretransition regime or parties that emerged in the new democratic 
setting are in a privileged position to build on state resources to create and expand their 
patrimony and achieve some financial self-sufficiency. Third, even though funding has 
several advantages – leveling the playing field, favoring the representation of more 
disadvantaged groups, enabling political parties to regularly present themselves in elections 
times and to put down roots in society, not only organizationally, but also socially –, its 
effects can be skewed by the nature of political competition (Randall and Svåsand 2002; 
Pottie 2003; Bryan and Baer 2005; Salih and Nordlund 2007).  
Indeed, the case study analysis will show that where there is a strong asymmetry 
between incumbent and opposition parties (Mozambique), relational and institutional 
mechanisms will eventually result in a “cartelization of resources” that favors the former vis-
à-vis the latter. Therefore, high and overinstitutionalization will be reinforced by public 
funding. In less structured party systems (Zambia) in which the political market is more open 
and susceptible to the short-term mobilization of political issues or resources in campaigns, 
the absence of funding leaves political parties more vulnerable to personalism and influence 
peddling. Thus, weaker and inadequate institutionalization is also reinforced.  
 
Relational mechanisms have to do with interpersonal or intercollective networks (Tilly 2001). 
Networks can be defined as «a set of relationships between individuals, groups, or 
organizations», which can take the form of cooperative exchange, friendship or mutual 
obligation, for example (Ansell 1998, 76). According to the “network institutionalism”, 
networks «mobilize information, social influence, resources, and social capital in highly 
differentiated ways» and «provide variegated access to resources, information, and support» 
(Ansell 1998, 76). Their study is, hence, fruitful to identify patterns of connection behind 
political outcomes.  
Two realms are considered as far as relational mechanisms are concerned: interparty, 
that is, between the parties in the system, and extraparty that is between the parties and their 
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constituencies. In the first case, we focus on party coalitions; which are relational mechanisms 
based upon a combination of individual resources that can potentially alter the crystallized 
patterns of competition at the systemic level; and, in the second, we focus on the linkage 
between the parties and the citizens relying on a very recent, but compelling literature on this 
theme (Osei 2012; Tobolka 2014).  
In both situations (intra and extra-party), the purpose is to identify the most common 
patterns of interaction between the elements of the political system. Scholarly work about the 
African context indicates that beyond the process of democratization, neopatrimonial 
practices such as tribalism, clientelism and patronage, inherited from the pretransition period, 
constitute the general framework within which African political institutions have evolved (for 
a thorough discussion see among several already mentioned: Bayart 1989; Bratton and van de 
Valle 1997; van de Walle 2003; Le Vine 2000; Lindberg 2001; Diamond 2008)
82
. This 
network of practices has been utilized to describe the nature of political authority in Africa as 
one essentially «based on giving and granting of favors, in a endless series of dyadic 
exchanges that go from the village level to the highest reaches of the central state» (van de 
Walle 2001, 51). This institutional legacy in combination with territorial cleavages (ethnic, 
religious, linguistic and regional divides) have contributed to the emergence of party systems 
from above, to the ethnicization of politics in varying degrees, and to an underlying lack of 
politicization, in which party systems are “invaded” by numerous ideologically weak and 
personalized political parties which short existence (changing labels, dissolving or merging 
with other parties) create higher levels of systemic instability (Manning 2005; Mozaffar and 
Scarritt 2005a; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003; van de Walle 2003). Moreover, because 
political parties often «perceive state capture for the control of the resources and personnel of 
the state as a source of elite enrichment»; politics itself becomes a means to an end, devoid of 
any idea of protecting public interests vis-à-vis private gains (Salih and Nordlund 2007, 21). 
Therefore, patron-client relationships based upon reward and exchanged favors are expected 
to prevail in these contexts, while programmatic linkages will be less dominant [see: Tobolka 
(2014), for the cases of Zambia, Togo and Burundi; Osei (2012) for the cases of Ghana and 
Senegal].  
                                                          
82
 In neopatrimonial regimes, the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than 
through ideology or law. The relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and 
administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire 
personal wealth and status. The distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred. The essence 
of neopatrimonialism is the award given by public officials for personal favors, both within the state (notably 
public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, contracts, and projects) (Bratton and Van de Valle 1994, 
458; Lindberg 2001, 185-186).  
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We end this section with Table 5.1 that summarizes the mechanisms that will be 
compared across the cases.  
 
Table 5.1 – Mechanisms of PSI  
Environmental Relational 
Structural Path to democratic transition Interparty: party coalitions 
Clientelistic or 
Ideological/programmatic  Institutional 
Electoral system 
Extraparty: party-citizen  
Party funding/finance  
 
As detailed in Chapter II, in this analysis we combine multiple sources of data, namely 
detailed electoral results, party laws, Afrobarometer data (for example on individuals’ 
attitudes towards political parties) and finally, semi-structured interviews. In the next section, 
more layers are added to this analysis as the historical contextualization of each case takes off. 
 
5.2 Mozambique and Zambia in the broad historical context  
 
Early party formations in Africa, such as fronts, congresses and similar movements, 
developed in the context of the independence struggles that took place in the continent during 
the 1950s and 1960s (Hodgkin 1961). In many countries, such as Mozambique and Zambia, 
the movements that headed the resistance against colonialism and eventually took part in the 
independence negotiations with the metropolis, were also the ones gaining control over, and 
later fusing with, the state in the post-independence era. Yet, their role does not end there. In 
fact, countless studies (Doorenspleet 2003; Salih 2003; Bogaards 2004; Bogaards 2008; 
Carbone 2007; Bogaards and Boucek 2010) indicate that competitive elections throughout the 
1990s have mainly originated party systems in which the former ruling party remains 
dominant. This is precisely the case of Mozambique but not that of Zambia, where the former 
anti-colonial movement was replaced in the elections that marked the transition to democracy 
and virtually disappeared from competition thereafter.  
Despite the changes towards multipartism, the majority of African countries did not 
experience a decisive break with the authoritarian past. In fact, most cases have “hybrid” 
regimes «trapped in the twilight of democracy and dictatorship» (Basedau 2007, 107) or 
might be otherwise labeled as neopatrimonial hybrid regimes due to the pervasiveness of 
informal rules in the political realm (Erdmann and Engel 2006). Patterns of electoral 
competition are also influenced by the pretransition institutional framework. For instance, the 
nature of Zambia’s dominant party system until 2011, with an interaction between 
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predominance and fragmentation as well as the ethnic-regional pattern of vote, is a 
continuation of the party system that emerged during the First Republic (1964-1972). In 
Mozambique, 15 of the 19 years of one-partyism, were lived under a civil war between the 
government and the guerrilla group; and the truth is that this polarization remains visible 
hitherto.  
In this sense, we build on the principles of the historical institutionalism to argue that 
the choices and decisions made when political institutions were formed have enduring effects 
(Peters 1999, 210) and influence their possibilities of change even during critical junctures 
notably the transition moment), when major changes are more likely to occur (Hogan 2006). 
Because only through History it is possible to demarcate and contextualize political parties, 
institutional choices and continuities or ruptures between regimes, this section is entirely 
devoted to the historical contextualization of Mozambique and Zambia. To this end, the 
section is organized diachronically in two parts: the first part will look upon the nature of 
politics in the pretransition period and the second one will focus on the multiparty period.  
 
5.2.1 Independence and one-party rule 
 
In 1951, when Mozambique became an overseas Province of Portugal
83
, anti-colonial 
movements were being formed almost everywhere in the then British and Francophone 
colonies and leading their countries to independence throughout the 1960s. Left out of this 
wave of independencies the then Portuguese colonies – Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe – would experience a late process of decolonization 
due to the resistance of the Portuguese dictatorial regime – Estado Novo/ New State – to 
concede self-determination to the colonies. Therefore, while the majority of countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa were building the foundations of an independent state, the former Portuguese 
colonies were just in the beginning of their struggle. In the case of Mozambique, although 
proto-nationalist clandestine groups, mostly composed of intellectuals, were secretly 
assembling inside and outside the country
84
, effective struggle only started in 1962, when 
Eduardo Mondlane brought together three nationalist groups
85
 in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to 
                                                          
83
 Law no. 2048 11 June 1951, stipulated that the then Portuguese colonies in Africa, were to be treated as 
overseas provinces, and thus as an extension of the national territory.  
84
 José Luís Cabaço, who took part in these clandestine meetings, reported to us that the Portuguese 
administration was very repressive, reason why the party was founded outside of the Mozambican territories.  
85
 The União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique/ National Democratic Union of Mozambique (Udenamo); 
the União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente/ National African Union of Independent 
Mozambique (Unami) and the União Nacional Africana de Moçambique/ Mozambique African National Union 
(Manu). 
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form the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique/ Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), the 
first concerted Mozambican opposition to indirect rule (Florêncio 2008). In 1964, similarly to 
its counterparts in Angola (MPLA) and Guinea-Bissau (PAICG
86
), the Frelimo launched an 
armed struggle against the colonial regime, which ended in 1974 in the aftermath of the 
Revolução dos Cravos/ Revolution of Carnations in Lisbon, which overthrew the New State 
on 24th April and precipitated the end of colonialism. 
In September of the same year, the Portuguese transitional government and the Frelimo 
(under Samora Machel’s leadership) joined to sign the Lusaka Accords. The Frelimo was the 
only Mozambican political group taking part in these negotiations
87
. No public consultation or 
polls were organized (Krennerich 1999a; Brito 2009). After nine months, Frelimo’s 
transitional government appointed Joaquim Chissano as Prime Minister, the independence 
Constitution was proclaimed by the party’s Central Committee on 25th June 1975, and 
Samora Machel became the first President of the People’s Republic of Mozambique. 
Thereafter, the Frelimo installed a single-party socialist regime in which the president of the 
party was automatically declared President of the Republic and the supreme legislative body – 
the Assembleia Nacional Popular/ People’s National Assembly – was indirectly elected 
through mass meetings organized throughout the country (Krennerich 1999a, 648).  
In the Third Congress held in February 1977, the Frelimo refashioned itself as a 
Marxist-Leninist vanguard party with the mission to lead, organize, and educate the masses 
and emerged as a powerful instrument for the destruction of capitalism. This phase also 
marked Frelimo’s evolution from “liberation front” 88 to political party, and the development 
of mass democratic organizations to ensure the party’s control over the territory and the 
society
89
. These measures eventually meant the slow disappearance of the Grupos 
                                                          
86
 MPLA = Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola/ Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola; 
PAIGC = Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde/ African Party for the Independence of 
Guinea and Cape Verde.  
87
 It is worth nothing that Frelimo was the only anti-colonial movement recognized as legitimate both by the then 
Organization of African Unity (today African Union) and the United Nations. After the 25th of April, Portugal 
naturally recognized Frelimo as the country’s governing party. 
88
 Frelimo’s first congress was held between 23rd-28th September 1962, and structured the front under the 
principles of democratic centralism (Frelimos’ Statuses 1962). In the Statuses of 1977 the front presents itself for 
the first time as a vanguard party.  
89
 Mass organizations were or reformulated: Organização da Mulher Moçambicana/ Organization of the 
Mozambican Woman (OMM), founded in 1973; the Organização da Juventude Moçambicana/ Mozambique’s 
Youth Organization (OJM), founded in 1977 and the Organização dos Trabalhadores Moçambicanos/ 
Organization of Mozambican Workers (OTM), created in 1983. In the same line, representative groups of key 
sectors of the social life were created, namely the Organização Nacional dos Professores/ Teacher’s National 
Organization (ONP) e the Organização Nacional dos Jornalistas/ Journalists’ National Organization (ONJ). 
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Dinamizadores/ Dynamizing Committees (GD), which were the former grassroots structures 
of the party
90
 (Rupiya 1998; Brito 2009; Krennerich 1999b; Carbone 2005).  
Complementarily, the Frelimo government set into motion ambitious reforms, which 
involved nationalization, “villagization”91 and policies to reduce the influence of the church 
and to restrict political opposition (Carbone 2005, 424). Indeed, Frelimo’s project for the 
construction of a modern independent state meant the dissolution of regional, religious and 
ethnic differentiation, its legitimation as the sole legitimate party, the exclusion of rural 
inhabitants and traditional chiefs (régulos) and the dismantlement of traditional systems of 
power, which were seen as compromised with Portugal’s indirect rule (Granjo 2007; 
Florêncio 2007)
92
.  
Despite the centralization of power, Frelimo’s government faced several sources of 
destabilization that partly originated from the pre-independence years. In fact, during the 
1960s, Mozambique had been a major player in the liberation struggle of the Front Line 
States
93
 and hosted insurgency movements which posed a threat to Ian Smith’s rule in 
Rhodesia and to the Apartheid regime in South Africa. This position led white Rhodesians, 
South African Special Forces and Malawians to form and back a guerrilla movement, the 
Resistência Nacional Moçambicana/ Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo). which 
launched a civil war against Frelimo’s government in 1977 (Morgan 1990; Manning 1998; 
Weinstein 2002; Hirsch 2009; Emerson 2014). Though externally formed, the Renamo was 
able to gain internal legitimacy during the war years by calling for the support of traditional 
leaders and rural inhabitants, which had been marginalized by Frelimo’s modernization 
policies (Carbone 2003; Manning 2008). Country-wide divisions between government-
controlled (Southern Provinces mainly Maputo and Gaza) and Renamo-controlled areas 
(Central Provinces of Manica, Sofala, Zambezia, Tete and the Northern Province of Nampula) 
emerged and crystallized during the 15 years of war whose upshot was largely influenced by a 
                                                          
90
 The GD were composed of party militants and sympathizers and they were hierarchically dependent of the 
district level of the party; as grass roots structures of the party they performed a series of political and 
administrative functions (Brito 2009). 
91
 Frelimo’s set an ambitious program of compulsory villagization of the country side which basically consisted 
in the creation of aldeias comunais. This meant the forced dislocation of large sectors of the population away 
from their homesteads. This has been mainly interpreted as an attempt of the regime to exert political control 
over the territory than to actually foster collective agriculture, as it claimed (Manning 2002, 59-62; Seibert 2003, 
266-268).  
92
 Several studies show, however, that religious organizations as well as the population of rural zones were key 
political actors in the post colonial history of the country in what regards the rituals of healing and social 
reintegration in the aftermath of the war (Florêncio 2008; Granjo 2007).  
93 
Which included Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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combination of both external (international and regional) and internal factors in the late 1980s 
(Rupiya 1998; Hirsch 2009).  
Externally, the end of the Cold War meant the withdrawal of international support to the 
belligerents as during the years of civil war the Frelimo relied on military and financial aid 
from the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Communist countries, while the Renamo was 
supported by the Reagan Administration (Rupiya 1998, 22). Support at the regional level also 
shifted once Zimbabwe, one of the strongest allies of the Mozambican government
94
, 
achieved its independence in 1980 and the Nkomati Accords were signed with South Africa in 
1984. These accords formalized both a non-aggression pact between the two countries, and 
South Africa’s withdrawal of support to Renamo’s guerrilla activities95. Internally, natural 
causes, namely the drought and the famine from the early 1980s (around ten thousand 
Mozambicans were estimated dead in 1983); the exhaustion of the troops; the severe 
economic conditions, which led the United Nations to raise US $330 million for assistance to 
the country in 1987 (Armon, Hendrickson, and Vines 1998, 83-84), and church leaders’ 
public calls
96
 for a negotiated end to the war, were determinant for the beginning of peace 
negotiations. In the same period, the Renamo held its First Congress which took place in 
Gorongosa between the 7th-9th June, 1989. In the course of this Congress Dhlakama 
presented himself as ready to effectively negotiate «with Frelimo and with potential external 
supporters». In addition, during the Congress he consolidated his control over the movement’s 
external representation and reaffirmed its commitment to multiparty democracy and a market 
economy, which had been introduced in the 1981 Program and Manifesto (Manning 1998, 
180).  
The Nairobi Talks between the government and the Renamo were held in 1989 and 
inaugurated a round of meetings, initially facilitated by the church but in which various 
mediators took part
97
. These Talks would eventually result in the signature of the General 
                                                          
94
 Quoting Gonçalves (1998): «Although the first Zimbabwean troops were officially deployed in the Beira 
Corridor’ in 1982, guerrillas of Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwean National Liberation Army (ZANLA) had 
operated out of Mozambique since the early 1970s and there is evidence that some never left. This arrangement 
stemmed from an alleged agreement between Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and 
Mozambique’s Frelimo government reached prior to Zimbabwean independence» (Gonçalves 1998, 20). 
95
 South Africa’s withdrawal, however, was not immediate, since it continued supporting the Renamo for a while 
(Rupiya 1998). 
96
 The Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) and the Catholic Church had key role in the Mozambican peace 
process. In 1984 the CCM created a Peace and Reconciliation Commission and began to explore ways for 
dialogue. From 1988 onwards the CMM and the Catholic Church combined strengths to seek dialogue with both 
the Government and the Renamo (Armon, Hendrickson, and Vines 1998).  
97
 The Catholic Archbishop Dom Jaime Gonçalves played a key role in contacting the Sant’ Egidio community 
in Rome. Additional mediators/ observers were: the United Nations and the Governments of the United States of 
America, Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Portugal.  
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Peace Agreement (GPA) between the two former belligerents on 4th October 1992. Along its 
seven protocols, the GPA included several resolutions allowing for a United Nations 
Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ
98
) and for the inclusion of the Renamo as a legal 
political party with full rights to participate in the political life of the country. The first 
multiparty elections were initially scheduled for October 1993, but due to several technical 
problems, the actual date of the elections was postponed to 27th-29th October 1994.  
The post-independence history of Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, had different 
highlights. To start with, there was no pre-or-postcolonial armed conflict. Much of the protest 
against the British direct rule (Rasmussen 1974) was largely non-violent, despite recurrent 
episodes of social unrest – e.g. the villagers’ resistance to colonial administration in the 
Gwembe Valley in 1958 and the serious outbreaks of indiscipline among the students in 1960 
and among the rural inhabitants between July and August 1961 (Rasmussen 1974, 41-43; 
Scarritt 1979, 23; Musambachime 1987). Unlike what happened in Mozambique, where the 
Frelimo was the main anti-colonial force and it negotiated alone the process of independence 
as well as its position as the post-independence ruling party, in Zambia two main movements 
– the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the African National Congress (ANC) 
– gathered the popular protest against British direct rule and participated in the pre-
independence elections along with other contestants (Bull 1968; Rasmussen 1969; Rasmussen 
1974; Tordoff 1988; Momba 1989).  
The ANC (formerly African Congress – AC) was the first nationalist movement in 
Northern Rhodesia. It was founded in the end of 1940s at a time when the first trade unions 
were also emerging in the Copperbelt Province (Mulenga 2012). The ANC was «itself 
something of a coalition of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, the working class, and the rich 
peasants» or “kulaks” from Southern Province, home of the Tonga ethnic group (Momba 
1989). The ANC established «the aim of gaining recognition and acceptance of the African 
people by the settler/colonial Establishment of the day, and for the right of Africans to 
become part of that Establishment» (Bull 1968, 495). It suffered its first break in 1958, when 
a number of opponents of President Harry Nkumbula left the party to found the Zambia 
African National Congress (ZANC), in turn banned in 1959 (Rasmussen 1969, 408; 
Rasmussen 1974, 42). A second break led Kenneth Kaunda to found the UNIP in 1959, which 
was mainly composed of people from the Northern, Luapula and Eastern provinces (Bemba-
speaking areas). Its socialist rhetoric contrasted with the ANC’s defense of the rich peasants’ 
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 ONUMOZ’s mandate started on 16th December 1994 and formally came to an end on 9th December 1994 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozM.htm.  
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interests. In the pre-independence period, the UNIP «quickly became the dominant political 
party, in large part because of the attractiveness of its program (immediate self-government 
and elections based on universal suffrage), its organizational effectiveness, and the quality of 
its leadership» (Rasmussen 1969, 409). As a result of the political effervescence lived during 
this period – via party and popular protest – three political parties competed in the pre-
independence Legislative Council Election of 20th-21st January 1964 – the UNIP, the ANC 
and the National Progressive Party (NPP). The results showed an overwhelming dominance 
of the UNIP, which won 69% of the vote cast and 55 of the 75 seats at stake.  
The independence also required the national territory’s unification in face of the 
separatist ambitions of the Barotseland (Western Province). The Barotseland, home of the 
Lozi ethnic group, had always enjoyed a semi-autonomous status provided with own political 
structures – the Litunga, the paramount chief of the Lozi being the highest in hierarchy –, and 
even a prototype of a national flag. As a separate British protectorate, the Western Province 
only became part of Zambia with the signing of The Barotseland Agreement on 19th May 
1964 which safeguarded limited self-governance rights to the Barotseland people
99
. Six 
months after the signature of this Act (between the Zambian government, the Litunga and the 
British representative of the Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies), Zambia was 
recognized as an independent state by means of the United Kingdom parliament act of 24th 
October 1964. Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the UNIP, who had been named Prime Minister of 
Northern Rhodesia after the 1964 elections, became the first President of Zambia. Ever since, 
direct parliamentary and presidential elections have taken place every five years (1968, 1973, 
1978, 1983 and 1988). The parliamentarians were elected under a plurality system, FPTP in 
single-member-constituencies (SMC)
100
 and, from 1973 onward, the UNIP leader would 
automatically become the sole presidential candidate (Krennerich 1999b, 942). Although the 
UNIP was the main dominant party in the post-independence period, Zambia had three 
Republics since independence (First: 1964-1972; Second: 1973-1991; Third: 1991-onward), 
each with a different profile
101
. 
The First Republic (1964-1972) endowed with an independent Constitution, 
encompassed significant departures from the British Westminster model since it established a 
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 Thanks to this agreement the Litunga enjoys far reaching powers over the province when compared with 
chiefs in other zones (Mwiinga 1994). 
100
 For a short definition: The FPTP system is the simplest form of plurality/majority system, using single 
member districts and candidate-centered voting. The voter is presented with the names of the nominated 
candidates and votes by choosing one, and only one, of them. The winning candidate is simply the person who 
wins the most votes; in theory he or she could be elected with two votes, if every other candidate only secured a 
single vote (retrieved from: http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esd/esd01/esd01a).  
101
 About the dynamics of the one- party state see also Pettman (1974) and Gertzel, Baylies, and Szeftel (1984). 
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predominantly presidential system (Krennerich 1999b, 939). In April 1967, President Kenneth 
Kaunda adopted Humanism
102
 (combination of human values and leftist views) as the formal 
ideology to be spread throughout the country and he even created the Ministry of National 
Guidance in March 1969 to that end (Tordoff and Scott 1974, 145-146). During the First 
Republic, the ANC was UNIP’s main rival but, as described above, its appeal was rather 
sectional instead of national and there was never a prospect of alternation in power as 
revealed by the 1968 general elections (Tordoff and Scott 1974; Krennerich 1999b). After this 
election, competition was severely restricted. In fact, the UNIP government banned the United 
Party (UP) - established by Lozi-speakers after breaking away from the UNIP in 1967; in 
August 1968, it prohibited the organization of the ANC and it banned the United Progressive 
Party (UPP) in February 1972103. Soon after, President Kenneth Kaunda announced that 
Zambia would become a “one-party participatory democracy” (Tordoff and Scott 1974, 108-
109) and on 13th December 1972, he inaugurated the Second Republic with a new 
Constitution for the country and the party, both promulgated in 1973. These laws «[...] 
transformed the political system by giving UNIP the sole right to organize and to act as a 
political party and by stipulating the supremacy of the party over the government» 
(Krennerich 1999b, 940). The following general elections (1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988) were 
held in a one-party framework.  
Through legal restrictions, the UNIP was able to get rid of its main opponents, but 
political antagonism within the ruling party remained as the party seemed unable to carry out 
successful economic policies at the national level, thus raising complaints from all quadrants 
– from party veterans to mineworkers (Rasmussen 1974; Larmer 2006)104. Moreover, the 
government never «managed to bring the Christian churches, trade unions and various other 
civil society organizations [...], such as the Law Association or the Economic Association of 
                                                          
102«Zambia Humanism is another brand of African socialism. (…) The essence of Zambian Humanism revolves 
around the importance of humankind, the restoration and the preservation of people’s dignity and self-respect 
(…).The main characteristics of Zambian Humanism include the principle of “inclusiveness,” which means that 
in the political, economic, and social relationships among people, nobody is neglected. (…) Communalism is 
also basic to Humanism. This is manifested in ownership of land and property. The traditional African restraints 
enjoined by the norms of hospitality, self-reliance, and respect for human dignity combine to produce an 
egalitarian society in which people are valued for their own sake (for their own personal qualities?). Zambian 
Humanism rejects capitalism, since it entails an exploitative economic system based on individualism and 
competition; a social system characterized by class conflict; and a political system based on several parties 
representing different class interest». (Idoye 1988, 72) 
103
 This party had been founded by Simon Kapwepwe, former Vice-President of both the UNIP and the country. 
104
 There were also some sources of destabilization coming from the neighboring countries. Between the mid-
1970s and the early 1980s, Adamson Mushala led the only significant internal armed rebellion against the 
postcolonial Zambian state, supported by South Africa. While making no substantial military gains, Mushala 
succeeded in destabilizing the North-Western Province, the site of his insurgency, and in creating an atmosphere 
of fear and paranoia among local and national leaders of the ruling party (Larmer and Macola 2007). (quote one 
Zambia many stories larmer e macola). 
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Zambia (EAZ)» and the students under complete control (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 6). 
Despite having little autonomy, these social groups were able to challenge the regime on 
specific issues such as education and labor policies, particularly in face of the economic 
decline experienced since the mid-1970s (Rakner 2003, 12). According to Erdmann and 
Simutanyi (2003), the socio-economic decline combined with the failed attempts to 
implement FMI’s structural adjustment program (1985-87), caused serious legitimacy 
problems for the ruling party, which faced strong contestation from the trade union leadership 
of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 10; 
Momba 2003, 45). It is worth nothing that the trade union movement represented the major 
force of civil society comprising 80% of the total formal work force. Given the depressed 
economy, they almost naturally clashed with the government, which was in direct control of 
the mining industry. In late December 1989, ZCTU Chairman Frederick Chiluba came 
forward with the challenge of multipartism and democracy (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 6-
10). 
Under strong social protest, President Kenneth Kaunda finally announced that a 
referendum on whether to continue the one-party system would be held. Further pressure, 
however, led Kaunda to call off the referendum and to appoint a commission to draft a new 
multiparty Constitution (Krennerich 1999b, 941). The new Constitution became effective on 
24th August 1991, it opened Zambia’s Third Republic and it reintroduced multiparty 
elections, which were held for the last time in 1968. Elections for both the presidency and the 
National Assembly were held on 31st October 1991.  
 
5.2.2 Regime change: The multiparty framework 
 
Mozambique and Zambia record continuous, concurrent elections for presidency and 
parliament from the outset of multipartism in 1994 and 1991, respectively. This section 
presents the main national trends, as displayed by the electoral results, while describing the 
overall context within which the elections were carried out in both countries (from Tables 5.2 
to Table 5.6). Relevant testimonies of political and social elites interviewed during fieldwork 
are also used to enrich the contextual description. As in the previous section, Mozambique is 
featured first and Zambia afterwards.  
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
158 
 
Mozambique’s transition to multipartism started in 1990 with the amendment of the 
Constitution
105
 paving the way for a semipresidential regime with direct and competitive 
elections for presidency and parliament. Alternative political parties were, for the first time, 
allowed to register and compete in elections, while a series of political and civil rights (e.g. 
freedoms of strike, association, speech and press) guaranteed a freer environment for citizen’s 
participation in the political life of the country. These provisions were again reinforced in the 
GPA protocols which also incorporated a package of peacebuilding measures to minimize the 
risks of a double transition from war-to-peace-and-to-democracy. Regarding institutional 
features, the GPA had slight departures from the 1990 Constitution, particularly in what 
concerned the nature of the electoral system. It became established that the 250-seats
106
 of the 
National Assembly – now renamed Assembleia da Repúbica – would be elected under a 
proportional formula (D’Hondt), with closed list ballot (with 5% entry threshold) and the 
president would be elected under a two-round majority system
107
.  
The first elections for parliament and presidency were held between 27th and 29th 
October 1994, after having been delayed one year due to technical problems. Since then, three 
additional polls occurred in 1999, 2004 and 2009, when for the first time citizens were also 
asked to choose the members of the Provincial Assemblies. Although in a multiparty 
framework, the Frelimo and the Renamo continued to be the most important competitors; 
even if with unequal levels of electoral support. Indeed, since 1994, the bipolar scenario that 
emerged in the years of civil war has been challenged by an increasing predominance of the 
Frelimo, which won all elections conducted in the country both at the national and sub-
national level. Furthermore, only a third political party was able to elect members of 
parliament (MPs) without ever taking part in a broad electoral alliance, the Movimento 
Democrático de Moçambique/ Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM).  
Globally speaking, the political parties that contested these elections fell into two 
broad categories: parties linked to the liberation struggle – the Frelimo and the Renamo; and 
parties relying on the mobilization of regional factors for their political subsistence (Pereira 
                                                          
105
 The Constitution came into force on 30th November 1990 and the GPA was ratified by the National 
Assembly Law No. 13/92 of 14th October 1992. In between this period several documents were issued, namely: 
the Joint Communiqué of 10th July 1990 in which the Government and the Renamo declared mutual 
commitment/goodwill to start peace talks, the agreement of 1st December 1990, which arranged for a partial 
cease fire and the Party Law of 1991 (Law No. 7/91, 23rd January), which established the first provisions for the 
formation and actuation of political parties.  
106
 11 constituencies (one for each Province and two for Maputo – city and province) elected 248 MPs and two 
additional constituencies - for Expatriates in Europe and Africa - elected 1 MP each; for a combined 250 seats.  
107
 The Frelimo-led 1990 Constitution defined a majoritarian electoral system, but this changed during the GPA’s 
negotiations with the PR system defended by the Renamo being established as the electoral formula for the 
parliamentary elections (Brito 2010). 
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and Shenga 2005, 53). The MDM can be included in this latter category, since it has an urban 
and regional appeal (Provinces of Maputo and Sofala). In what regards ideology, the MDM 
seems to express rightist ideals, even though it is difficult for its leaders to find a consensual 
label for the party
108
. During this period, other political parties gained seats in parliament 
under electoral coalitions, as, for example, the União Democrática/ Democratic Union (UD) 
and the Renamo-led União Eleitoral/ Electoral Union (UE). Individually, however, the 
political parties entering these alliances tend to be weak and to strongly gravitate around the 
leader’s charisma, the most visible face of the party. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 display the results for 
all parliamentary and presidential elections held between 1994 and 2009; and these are 
analyzed in more detail next.  
The 1994 elections meant more than the mere choice for the government party and the 
president for all those involved in its preparation. For the first time ever, the two former 
belligerents were confronting each other in the polls and the Mozambicans were given the 
opportunity to choose their political leaders for the five upcoming years. Cahen (1998) 
labeled these elections as the “Elections of Silence”, as they were imbued with the «desire for 
reconciliation and the tremendous will to revive the society», which pretty much led people 
«to vote for both parties in order that the two would get along» (Cahen 1998, 3). Regardless 
of the uncertainty that surrounded these elections, the levels of participation were remarkable, 
for altogether 12 political parties, two coalitions and 2637 candidates participated in the polls 
and about 88% of the electorate cast votes. The results, as presented in Table 5.2, gave a 
narrow, but sufficient majority to the Frelimo, which gathered 44% of the votes and 129 of 
the 250 parliamentary seats. The Renamo came a close second with 38% of the votes and 112 
seats. Finally, the coalition UD received 18% of the votes and nine seats. In terms of electoral 
geography, the Frelimo gained a majority in six Provinces; three located in the South 
(Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo – city and province) and two in the North (Cabo Delgado and 
Niassa), whereas the Renamo was the most voted in the remaining four Provinces – Manica, 
Sofala and Zambezia in the Center, and Nampula in the North. These results reflected war-
time regional and ethnic divisions, which were strategically activated by Dhlakama in these 
elections (Chichava 2008). For instance, the dissatisfaction felt by the Zambezians and the 
Macua-Lomé (largest ethnic group in this province and in the country) against the Southern 
                                                          
108
 Lutero Simango (MDM Parliamentary Caucus Leader) and Ismael Mussa (current member of MDM) had 
very personal views about the ideological field of the party. For Lutero Simango, the party would be better 
situated at the centre of the political spectrum as it defends social economy; for Ismael Mussa the party is 
definitely liberal (it draws support from urban workers, namely civil servants, professors, liberal professions) and 
should join the International Liberal. The party, however, eventually joined the International Democratic 
Christian Association. 
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provinces, where the Changana, a subgroup of the Tsongas, are the most representative group 
and where the main leaders of the country were from, was mobilized by Dhlakama to gain 
support in the Zambezia Province (Chichava 2008a). In Nampula, the electoral behavior of 
the people from coastal villages of Angoche, Ilha de Moçambique and Nacala Porto also 
mirrored their perceptions of exclusion during one-partyism (Rosário 2009). Overall, these 
were elections in which ethnicity and regionalism were strategically activated by the Renamo 
to show how Southern provinces and ethnic groups were advantaged vis-à-vis the others 
Provinces and ethnic groups (Chichava 2008b).  
As Table 5.3 reveals, the presidential elections were also positive for the Frelimo as its 
candidate, Joaquim Chissano, defeated the longtime leader of the Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama 
by a comfortable margin (53% against 34% of the votes). In the aftermath of these elections, 
the Renamo «issued demands for power sharing in the form of some sort of ‘unity 
government’ at national level», but president Chissano was unwilling to share power since his 
party had popular legitimacy (Manning 2008, 58). 
In what concerns the quality of these elections, among the political and social actors 
interviewed during fieldwork, there is a consensual opinion that these were the fairest 
elections organized in the country. Even if this was partly due to the massive presence of the 
ONUMOZ officials as well as that of international election monitors in the country, these are 
probably the only elections that can actually be considered transparent and fair. With a very 
different opinion, Renamo’s leaders Fernando Mazanga (Renamo, Spokesman) and António 
Muchanga (Renamo, member of the State Council), considered that elections in Mozambique 
have never been free and fair. They are rather marked by several irregularities and sources of 
tension, especially in the Southern Province of Gaza, where the party has never been able to 
elect a candidate since 1994. Moreover, vote rigging in the party’s strongest constituencies – 
the Central and Northern Provinces – and police intimidation of the voters have been 
commonplace as this quotes illustrates:  
 
Elections have been held but not with normality. I have been in places where there have been 
constant outbreaks of tension since 1994. For instance in Gaza and here in the Maputo Province 
there are zones where election campaigns never went well. There have always been aggressions. 
I mean, there is an attempt to prohibit people to freely assemble and manifest their ideas. 
(António Muchanga, Renamo, member of State Council)
109
 
                                                          
109
 Translated from the original: «As eleições têm decorrido mas não com normalidade. Eu tive a sorte de 
trabalhar em locais onde sempre houve focos de confusões desde 1994. Por exemplo em Gaza e aqui na 
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The general elections of 1999, held between 3rd and 5th December, were more competitive 
than the previous, but they eventually produced identical outcomes, as the Frelimo maintained 
its majoritarian status in the parliament (49% votes and 133 seats) and Joaquim Chissano 
(52%) was reelected for a second term. The Renamo-led coalition with ten additional minor 
parties, Renamo-UE, came very close in second, increasing its representation from 112 to 117 
seats, whereas the presidential candidate Afonso Dhlakama’s stood four percentage points 
below (48%) the winning candidate. Although the results were substantively the same, these 
elections had different highlights.  
In first place, there was a considerable drop in levels of turnout (down from 88% to 
70%). In second place, the Renamo changed its strategy of competition by assembling a wide 
group of smaller political parties under its umbrella. In third place, this alliance managed to 
win the majority of votes in six of the country’s 11 Provinces, including all Central Provinces 
and two Northern Provinces – Zambezia and Nampula, which are the country’s most 
populated ones. The fact that Renamo-UE won the majority of Provinces, but eventually lost 
the elections, triggered a series of petitions about the nature of the electoral system, further 
aggravated by accusations of fraud, vote rigging and maladministration of the process by the 
Comissão Nacional de Eleições/ National Electoral Commission (CNE)
 110
. The Renamo 
contested the results in the Supreme Court and threatened to boycott the new parliament. Yet, 
pressured to return to parliament by its coalition partners in the UE, it then sponsored a 
resolution to create a parliamentary commission of inquiry into the election results, which was 
voted down by the Frelimo majority. The Renamo then announced that it no longer 
recognized the Frelimo government and it insisted on talks between Dhlakama and Chissano 
as a condition for the party’s further cooperation. Eventually, President Chissano agreed to set 
up a dialogue with Dhlakama (Manning 2008, 58; Brito 2008, 6-7; Chichava 2008, 23-25), 
but the negotiations were held with Raul Domingos
111
, at the time leader of Renamo’s 
parliamentary caucus.  
Once again, the Renamo wanted guarantees of power-sharing, notably the right to 
nominate the Governors in the Provinces where it had won the majority, as an exchange for 
the acceptance of the results. In an interview, Raul Domingos, currently leader of the Partido 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Província de Maputo houve zonas onde a campanha nunca correu bem! Sempre houve agressões. Quer dizer, há 
uma tentativa de proibir que as pessoas tenham liberdade de reunião e de manifestação das suas ideias». 
110
 The majority of social and political actors interviewed – e.g. journalists from newspapers Savana, O País, and 
Magazine Independente and Renamo’s leaders – shared the conviction that the Renamo was actually the winner 
of the 1999 polls.  
111
 Raul Domingos begun his political life as a member of the Renamo and headed the Renamo delegation in the 
negotiation of the GPA.  
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para Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento/ Party for Peace, Democracy, and Development 
(PDD), recalled the controversy that surrounded the meetings with President Chissano and the 
dramatic closure of the post-election period. In his view, allegations of lack of transparency 
and legitimacy from both sides and the general ambience of mistrust shed a lot of suspicion 
on what was really going on in those meetings and these eventually resulted in the loss of the 
election on the negotiation table by the Renamo and in his expulsion from the Renamo, under 
allegations of receiving bribes. For Raul Domingos, these groundless episodes served rather 
as an excuse used by Afonso Dhlakama to withdraw his support from him as he had gained a 
lot of visibility while leader of Renamo’s parliamentary caucus, between 1994 and 1999.  
The general elections of 2004 had four different nuances vis-à-vis its predecessors. 
Firstly, while the results of the 1994 and 1999 polls expressed a relative balance between the 
Frelimo and the Renamo, the 2004 polls exposed a significant gap between them, with the 
Frelimo winning the qualified majority of votes and seats (62% of votes and 64% of seats 
against Renamo’s 29% of votes and 36% of seats) and its candidate, Armando Guebuza, 
strikingly defeating Afonso Dhlakama, who lost his third presidential race with the highest 
vote difference ever (64%against 32%).Secondly, the results of these elections were marked 
by an important shift in Frelimo’s leadership. Coming from a close defeat in the run up for his 
second and last presidential mandate in 1999, Joaquim Chissano announced that he would not 
stand for reelection (as party leader) in 2004. The Central Committee of the party then chose 
Armando Guebuza, Secretary-General since 2002, as presidential candidate. His election as 
President of Republic in 2004 and as party leader in 2005 was a novelty given that it was the 
first time the leader came from a Northern Province, more concretely from Nampula; all 
predecessors were from Gaza. This could also be interpreted as part of the party strategy to 
react to accusations of being dominated by the southern elites (Chichava 2008b). Thirdly, in 
terms of electoral geography Frelimo’s dominance was now country-wide. The party won 
nine Provinces in total: as in the past it got the majority of votes and seats in the Central 
Provinces but it was able to surpass the Renamo in its traditional strongholds, namely 
Nampula and Niassa in the North and Manica and Tete in the Center. With these results, the 
Renamo scored an historical defeat losing its supremacy in the Central and Northern 
territories of the country. Fourthly, these elections were marked by another dramatic drop in 
the turnout rates, which went down from 70% to 36%. According to Brito (2010), the causes 
of such high rates of abstention (which remained high in 2009) cannot be exclusively 
attributed to technical problems in voters’ registration; rather the declining trends of electoral 
participation may be a sign of a structural problem of growing detachment of the electorate in 
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relation to the political process. This is particularly visible in the city of Maputo where the 
better educated and the more informed population resides and where despite the growth of the 
population, the number of registered voters has decreased (in 1999 it had declined by 2% 
compared to 1994) (Brito 2010, 4-5).  
The fieldwork interviews suggested several hypotheses concerning this topic. On the 
one hand, there is the perception (e.g. of Raul Domingos) that the aftermath of the 1999 
elections marked the beginning of Renamo’s fall and of citizen’s disengagement from the 
party. In fact, the Renamo had inexplicably lost the elections and its charismatic caucus leader 
went to create its own political party – the PDD –, which came in third in the 2004 polls. On 
the other hand, there is the opinion
112
 that practices such as widespread fraud in voter 
registration, pro-government conduct of state agents that are responsible for monitoring the 
elections – e.g. the police, the CNE and the STAE113 –, and finally Frelimo’s inappropriate 
use of state resources during elections (e.g. vehicles, printing machines, stationary items, 
human resources, communications) contribute greatly to explain why the Frelimo 
systematically wins the elections. With a different opinion, some of the Frelimo’s cadres 
interviewed
114
 are confident that the elections have been accompanied by important 
improvements in the electoral laws, which have been systematically amended to improve the 
transparency of the technical procedures. Therefore, even if minor problems have occurred 
they did not strongly influence the final results. To these factors, Chichava (2008) adds 
Renamo’s overconfidence and several operational issues, such as the delays in the opening of 
the polling stations and the lower levels of voter registration in the rural areas, where Renamo 
is stronger.  
In the general elections of October 2009, Frelimo repeated its triumph by even larger 
margins, conquering the qualified majority of votes (75% of votes) and seats (N = 191) and 
reelecting Armando Guebuza (75% of votes), party leader since early 2005, for a second 
presidential term. The Renamo (20% of votes and 51 seats) and its eternal presidential 
candidate Afonso Dhlakama (16% of the votes) were again defeated by expressive numbers. 
                                                          
112
 This view is expressed by the generality of opposition political parties/elites interviewed. Just to mention a 
few examples: Fernando Mazanga and António Muchanga from the Renamo; André Balate from Partido da 
Reconciliação Nacional/ National Reconciliation Party (Parena); Magalhães Abramugy from Partido 
Independente de Moçambique/ Independent Party of Mozambique (Pimo); Francisco Campira from the Partido 
de Ampliação Social de Moçambique Social/ Broadening Party of Mozambique/ (Pasomo) and Paulino Nicopola 
from the Partido Liberal de Moçambique/ Liberal Party of Mozambique (Palmo).  
113
 Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral/ Technical Secretariat for the Administration of Elections 
(STAE) 
114
 Leonardo Simão former cabinet Minister, Manuel Tomé current MP and Morais Mabyeka, party secretary for 
organization.  
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These elections were furthermore marked by a slight increase in turnout levels (from 36% to 
44%) and by the emergence of a new parliamentary party – the MDM – which elected eight 
representatives in Sofala and Maputo, benefiting from an efficient campaign in the urban 
areas that mainly targeted young people, and from the removal of the 5% election threshold in 
2006.  
Yet, the MDM had to face another legal barrier, in order to constitute an effective 
opposition in parliament, since it did not have enough seats to form a parliamentary caucus
115
 
(Hanlon and Nuvunga 2009a). This barrier was overcome with the intervention of the 
international community, in particular the donors of the G-19, which finance about 50% of the 
state budget. This group pressured the Frelimo to accept the revision of the National 
Assembly regiment to allow the MDM to form a parliamentary caucus (Chichava 2010a, 18).  
Beyond this, MDM’s results were meaningful in several ways. In the first place, a new 
political party interfered in the bipolar scenario dominated by the Frelimo and the Renamo, 
and could potentially threaten Renamo’s solitary position as the main opposition party inside 
and outside the parliament. In the second place, the MDM had only six months of existence 
when it ran for elections. In fact, the party had been created in March 2009, in Beira, capital 
of Sofala, after Afonso Dhlakama’s decision to support the candidacy of Manuel Pereira, one 
of the historical leaders of the Renamo, in the local elections of that municipality, instead of 
that of Daviz Simango, incumbent Mayor since 2003. Daviz Simango then decided to run for 
election as an independent candidate, but he ended up being expelled by Afonso Dhlakama 
and by an intellectual ala of the Renamo that was mainly operating in the urban areas 
(Chichava 2010a; Chichava 2010b; Nuvunga and Adalima 2011).  
Finally, the MDM was barred by the CNE from competing in seven of the eleven 
constituencies, on the grounds that their applications were full of irregularities. As a result, the 
MDM was only allowed to run in Maputo, Inhambane, Sofala and Niassa (Chichava 2010a; 
Chichava 2010b). Moreover, these elections were marked by the exclusion of several political 
parties; nearly twenty political parties were, partly or fully, excluded from competing in these 
polls under pleas of irregularities in the candidates’ registration processes116. In face of this, 
nineteen opposition parties, that had been partly or totally excluded, gave their support to the 
MDM presidential candidate – Daviz Simango (Jornal de Notícias, 15 October 2009). 
                                                          
115
 In 1994 nine seats were required for the formation of a parliamentary group; this figure was raised to 11 in 
2001.  
116
 See Portal do Governo de Moçambique “Eleições 2009: CNE Exclui MDM Em Nove Círculos Eleitorais” 
(2009); and Hanlon and Nuvunga (2009b; 2009c).  
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
165 
 
Table 5.2 – Mozambique’s Parliamentary Elections (1994-2009): Votes (%) and seats (total) per party and province 
  1994 1999 2004 2009 
  Frelimo Renamo UD Frelimo Renamo - UE Frelimo Renamo - UE Frelimo Renamo MDM 
  Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats 
Northern 
                    
Cabo Delgado 57,8 15 22,7 6 5,8 1 61,0 16 26,6 6 73,7 18 16,9 4 80,8 19 14,9 3 0,0 
 
Nampula 30,6 20 48,4 32 4,5 2 39,1 24 43,9 26 47,4 27 39,2 23 65,7 32 28,4 13 0,0 
 
Niassa 46,3 7 32,8 4 6,0 
 
39,8 6 45,8 7 64,8 9 26,4 3 81,3 12 13,1 2 3,4 
 
Central 
                    
Manica 27,1 4 57,9 9 4,0 
 
31,7 5 56,9 10 45,2 7 44,7 7 71,0 12 25,0 4 0,0 
 
Sofala 14,2 3 76,0 18 1,4 
 
19,3 4 70,4 17 25,1 6 63,8 16 50,8 10 23,1 5 23,4 5 
Tete 31,0 5 49,1 9 5,9 1 37,1 8 49,2 10 73,1 14 20,8 4 87,2 18 10,3 2 0,0 
 
Zambezia 31,4 18 52,0 29 4,5 2 25,9 15 59,1 34 35,5 19 51,5 29 53,6 26 40,8 19 0,0 
 
Southern 
                    
Gaza 81,4 15 2,7 
 
6,9 1 86,9 16 3,5 
 
93,4 17 1,7 
 
96,9 16 1,4 
 
0,0 
 
Inhambane 59,5 13 12,9 3 11,8 2 61,9 13 20,6 4 76,0 15 9,7 1 83,7 15 6,9 1 4,5 
 
Maputo City 78,8 17 9,0 1 2,8 
 
82,6 14 13,6 2 81,5 14 13,5 2 76,6 14 5,4 1 16,5 3 
Maputo Province 77,6 12 7,0 1 5,9 
 
84,7 12 9,5 1 84,8 12 8,7 1 88,4 15 7,8 1 3,9 
 
Africa 
          
90,7 1 7,1 
 
95,4 1 3,5 
 
0,0 
 
Rest of the World 
          
70,5 1 26,3 
 
84,8 1 8,5 
 
0,0 
 
Total 44,3 129 37,8 112 5,5 9 48,6 133 38,8 117 61,5 160 29,0 90 74,7 191 17,7 51 3,9 8 
Tunout % 87,9 67,9 36,3 44,4 
Source: Elaborated with data from the National Electoral Commission (CNE) – http://www.stae.org.mz/(retrieved on 30-09-2010). 
Notes: The UD is a coalition of three political parties – Partido Liberal Democrático de Moçambique/ Liberal Democratic Party of Mozambique (Palmo); Partido Nacional Democrático/ National Democratic Party 
(Panade) and Partido Nacionalista de Moçambique/ Nationalist Party of Mozambique (Panamo).  
The Renamo-UE is a coalition led by the RENAMO, which includes – Aliança Independente de Moçambique/ Independent Alliance of Mozambique (Alimo); Frente de Accão Patriótica/ Patriotic Action Front (FAP); 
Frente Unida de Moçambique - Partido de Convergência Democrática/ Mozambique United Front-Democratic Convergence Party (Fumo-PCD); Movimento Nacionalista Moçambicano - Partido Social Democrata 
/Mozambican National Democratic Movement-Social Democratic Party (Monamo-PMSD); Partido da Convenção Nacional/ National Convention Party (PCN); Partido do Progresso do Povo de Moçambique/ 
Mozambique People’s Progress Party (PPPM); Partido Renovador Democrático/ Democratic Renewal Party (PRD); Partido da Unidade Nacional /National Unity Party (PUN); Frente Democrática Unida/ United 
Democratic Front (UDF) and União Nacional Moçambicana/ Mozambique National Union (Unamo).  
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Table 5.3 – Mozambique’s Presidential Elections (1994-2009): Most voted candidates (%) 
Candidate (Party) 1994 1999 2004 2009 
Joaquim Chissano (Frelimo) 53,3 52,3     
Afonso Dhlakama (Renamo) 33,7 47,7 31,7 16,7 
Armando Guebuza (Frelimo)   
 
63,7 75,0 
Daviz Simango (MDM)       6,6 
Turnout 87,9 69,5 36,4 44,6 
Source: Elaborated with data from the National Electoral Commission (CNE) – http://www.stae.org.mz/ (retrieved on 30-
09-2010). 
 
According to Salomão Moyana, from the newspaper Magazine Independente, the 
Frelimo and the Renamo combined strengths to restrict the participation of extra-
parliamentary parties in these elections, particularly the MDM, which was perceived by both 
as a serious competitor. As result of this, and no differently from preceding ones, these 
elections were considered irregular by the main opposition parties and Frelimo seized power 
amidst contestation.  
Although this descriptive analysis has focused on national election results (Tables 5.1 
and 5.2), it is worth noting that Frelimo has also proven unbeatable at the sub-national level. 
In the local elections of 1998, Frelimo ran unopposed and won all municipalities (33), 
whereas Renamo boycotted the polls and a mere 15% of the registered electorate cast votes. 
In 2003, Frelimo won 28 municipalities and Renamo five
117
, and finally in 2008 Frelimo 
won 41 of the then 43 municipalities (the number of municipalities is 53 since 2013). In the 
first Provincial Assembly elections ever (in 2009), Frelimo won 703 (or 87%) of the 812 
seats in competition. In this sense, there seems to exist similar patterns of party support 
across the different territorial levels of the polity. 
Let us now shift to the Zambian electoral context. Since the democratic opening 
elections of 31st October 1991, Zambia has held four parliamentary elections (1996, 2001, 
2006 and 2011) and five presidential elections (1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 and 2011). The first 
local government elections were held in November 1992, the following on 30th December 
1998 and since then they have been organized simultaneously with the presidential and the 
parliamentary polls in 2001, 2006 and 2011. According to the 24th August 1991 
Constitution, the plurality system, FPTP in SMC
118
, is kept for the election of the 150 seats 
of the National Assembly of Zambia, and it is also applied to the presidential election. 
                                                          
117
 These were Nacala-Porto, Ilha de Moçambique and Angoche in Nampula and Beira and Marromeu in Sofala. 
118
 From the countries with plurality formula all have SMC, the exception is Mauritius, which has Multi-
member-constituencies (MMC).  
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The main political competitors, that have been able to systematically elect 
representatives throughout this period are the Movement for Multiparty Democracy – MMD 
(ruling party between 1991 and 2006), the Patriotic Front – PF (ruling party from 2011-to 
present) and the United Party for National Development – UPND (with sizeable 
parliamentary representation since 2001). In terms of ideological content the majority of the 
party leaders finds it difficult to use a single label to describe the core ideals of their political 
offer and tend to generally anchor their positions on the “development cause”. Despite this, 
the MMD defines itself as a liberal or pro-capitalist party (Chembe Nyangu, MMD, Deputy 
National Secretary); the UPND is in the same political spectrum (Winstone Chibwe, UNPD, 
Secretary-General)
119
 and the PF tends to devalue ideology in detriment of a pro-poor and 
pro-workers discourse (Chanda Mfula, PF, Media and Publicity Director). 
Among the opposition, three minor political parties have been able to elect 
representatives in more than one occasion: the UNIP (1991, 2001 and 2006 – under the 
UDA alliance
120
), the Forum for Democracy and Development – FDD (2001, 2006 – under 
the UDA alliance – and 2001) and the Zambian Republican Party – ZRP (2001 and 2006 – 
under the National Democratic Focus alliance). Other parties had brief stints in parliament: 
for example, the Agenda for Zambia – AZ the National Party – NP and the Zambia 
Development Conference – ZDC elected representatives in the 1996 polls; while the 
Heritage Party – HP and the Alliance for Democracy and Development – ADD elected 
representatives in 2011.
121
 One highlight of Zambian politics it that most of these parties – 
namely the ZDC, the FDD, and the HP – were off-shoots of the MMD, based on various 
personalized factions, which differed from the mainstream (or the Chiluba) faction of the 
MMD, only because they refused to accept the envisaged constitutional change on the 
presidential terms. According to Erdmann and Simutanyi (2003, 32-33) they are «‘one-issue 
parties’ which differ «from the MMD only because of the ‘third term’ issue – and, of course, 
on leadership». Another interesting feature of Zambian’s polls is the election of independent 
candidates from 1996 onward. Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 present the results of the 
                                                          
119
 For Erdmann and Simutanyi (2003, 33) it is difficult to find major political differences between the MMD 
and the strongest opposition party, the UPND. 
120 
UDA = United Democratic Alliance.  
121
 The ideological core of these parties is again difficult to capture, since most of them do not have a website or 
available documents to help us discriminate. Some members of these parties were interviewed during the 
fieldwork, namely the ZRP president, Wright Musoma, who stated «we are in favor of capitalism... capitalism 
and a bit of socialism... so I wouldn’t say we are capitalist, but we favor that [...] we definitely we are in favor of 
any ideology that is there to empower to change Zambia as well as to empower the Zambians», and the ADD 
Secretary-General, Lizu Kahoma that stated: «[...] we are kind of conservatives actually; we are a national party 
[...] there is a bit of capitalism for example and just a little bit of socialism … and communism not anywhere 
near yeah; but there is a bit of capitalism and socialism [...] kind of a mix set up».  
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parliamentary and presidential polls held between 1991 and 2011, which are next described 
in more detail.  
The 1991 elections were held after 17 years of single-party rule in the country. The 
Zambians were again given the opportunity of choosing parliamentary candidates from two 
major (UNIP and MMD) and three minor political parties (NADA, NPD and DP
122
), to hand a 
sweeping victory to the MMD, whose leader, trade unionist Frederick Chiluba, became 
president with a spectacular 76% of the vote, while MMD’s parliamentary candidates 
captured 125 of 150 National Assembly seats. Contrary to the first Mozambican elections that 
were highly participated (87%), Zambia’s founding elections registered only 44% of turnout. 
Following this trend, a mere 14% of the registered voters participated in the November 1992 
local government elections, while an average of 21% took part in the parliamentary by-
elections held between 1991 and 1994 (Bratton 1999, 555). These rates are particularly 
surprising if one considers that the Zambian transition to democracy was anchored in social 
and popular protest, while the Mozambican was an elite-led process in which only the two 
former belligerents participated. According to Bratton (1999)
123
, the low levels of turnout in 
Zambia’s founding elections may result from citizens being more attached to the local than to 
the national level of politics and more inclined to establish direct personal links with the 
political parties than to cast their votes in election times.  
By 1996, voter turnout had risen to 79%. Nevertheless, the background of these 
elections was more challenging for the MMD, which was brought to public as a profoundly 
divided party. In fact, between 1991 and 1996, the party had lost several prominent MPs and 
cabinet ministers who left to create the NP, the ZDC and the AZ in 1993, 1995 and 1996, 
respectively. Amidst in-fighting almost from the start of its formation, the MMD government 
«orchestrated a constitutional amendment» to bar the strongest challengers to compete in the 
elections (NDI and FODEP 2003, 6). Since the party held more than two-thirds of the seats in 
the National Assembly, it took advantage of the fact to introduce changes in the Constitution 
to restrict other political parties’ as well as traditional chiefs’ participation:  
 
One of the changes required ‘anyone aspiring to the presidency to prove that their parents were 
Zambians’. This was a rule perceived by many to be intended to prevent the candidacy of 
                                                          
122
 NADA= National Democratic Alliance, founded in 1991; NDP = National Democratic Party, founded by 
losers of the MMD convention in 1991, and DP = Democratic Party, founded in 1991. 
123
 These conclusions result from a national survey to 421 eligible adult voters in June 1993. The research sites 
were Choma District (Southern Province), Kitwe Urban District (Copperbelt Province), Lusaka Urban District 
(Lusaka Province), Mumbwa District (Central Province), Petauke District (Eastern Province), and Solwezi 
District (North-Western Province) Bratton (1999, 556).  
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Kaunda, whose father was born in Malawi. Furthermore, no one was allowed to stand if they 
had not lived in Zambia for at least 20 years. This stipulation targeted the Zambia Democratic 
Congress (ZDC) leader, Dean Mung’omba (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004, 6). 
 
Despite in-fighting, Frederick Chiluba was again elected president (73% of the vote cast) and 
the MMD increased its share of seats from 125 to 131. Breakaway parties, namely the NP, the 
ZDC and the AZ, assembled nine parliamentary seats in total, while independent candidates 
reached 10 seats. Yet, as Tables 5.4 and 5.5 indicate, this proved to be a sporadic event as the 
number of independent candidates elected dropped dramatically in the following elections. In 
what regards the overall quality of these polls, they were considered seriously flawed by both 
national and international observers; while several opposition parties unsuccessfully 
petitioned the results in the Courts (Bratton 1998; Burnell 2002; Simutanyi 2005). 
The 2001 elections were the most competitive ever. A total of seven political parties 
won parliamentary representation, but none enjoyed a majoritarian status. The MMD, the 
most penalized party in these elections, was for the first time in a minority position
124
, 
dropping from 131 to 69 seats and seeing its presidential candidate, Levy Mwanawasa (with 
29% of the votes), elected by a narrow margin to the runner up party, the UPND, which won 
49 parliamentary seats and saw its presidential candidate, founder and party leader Anderson 
Mazoka, being voted by 27% of the electorate. After having boycotted the 1996 polls, the 
UNIP, now headed by Tilyenji Kaunda, was the third political force in the parliament with 13 
seats, while the FDD, founded by Zambia’s former Vice-President Christon Tembo, was 
awarded 12 seats in these elections. The remaining seats went to the HP (4), the ZRP and the 
PF (one MP each); and an independent candidate was also elected.  
MMD’s fall in these elections partly reflect a troubled pre-electoral scenario that was 
marked by a lot of controversy and popular contestation after Frederick Chiluba’s 
announcement of his desire to change the Constitution to be able to run for a third mandate. 
Among other aspects, this episode led to two splits inside the MMD and to the creation of 
political parties that performed fairly well in the 2001 polls (NDI and FODEP 2003; 
Simutanyi 2005; Momba and Madimutsa 2009). The first break originated when a total of 22 
MMD’s parliamentarians, which included Christon Tembo and five cabinet ministers, openly 
opposed Chiluba’s third-term bid and were subsequently expelled. They later founded the 
FDD (Simutanyi 2005, 6; Momba and Madimutsa 2009, 10). A second break originated the 
                                                          
124
 Even after nominating eight MPs, the opposition outnumbered the MMD MPs 81 against 77. Through co-
optation a total of seven opposition MPs were re-elected to Parliament after joining the MMD. The state of 
affairs changed with the MMD now commanding 84 seats against the opposition’s 74 seats (Simutanyi 2005, 7). 
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PF, which was created by Michael Sata, popularly known as “King Cobra”, after his 
resignation from his position as Minister without Portfolio and MMD’s National Secretary. 
His exit occurred when Frederick Chiluba proposed Levy Mwanawasa as the party 
presidential candidate, despite the fact that he had left the MMD in 1995 after losing the 
convention for party presidency (Kabimba and Simbyakula 2011).  
In the 2006 polls, MMD’s performance improved slightly; its parliamentary 
representation rose from 69 to 74 seats, but it was not enough to provide for a majoritarian 
status. Levy Mwanawasa was reelected for a second term and beat his two most direct 
competitors, Michael Sata (PF) and Hakainde Hichilema (new UNPD leader), by a 
comfortable margin; the vote distribution was 43%, 29% and 25%, respectively. The UPND, 
the UNIP and the FDD ran under the UDA coalition and elected 27 seats, whereas the PF rose 
from one MP in 2001 to an impressive 46 seats, becoming the second political force in the 
parliament. The remaining seats went to the NDF and to an independent candidate. According 
to Kabimba and Simbyakula (2011), PF’s inspiring results in these polls resulted from a well 
planned strategy to establish the party as a regular and nation-wide competitor. For this 
purpose, the party set out to participate in all by-elections conducted between 2001 and 2006 
and developed efforts to grow beyond its regional stronghold in Northern, Luapula, 
Copperbelt and Lusaka Provinces as a means to erode the perception that it was a regionally 
and ethnically based political organization. In addition, Michael Sata brought representatives 
of the other Provinces to the party’s Central Committee (Kabimba and Simbyakula 2011, 7-
8). In what regards the quality of the elections, transparent ballot boxes and a voter’s card 
with photo and bio-data were used for the first time to reduce electoral fraud (see Zambia IPU 
Parline report). International observers considered that elections were largely well-organized 
and transparent, despite some «shortcomings regarding the new voter’s cards which may have 
prevented some young people from casting their ballots» (Ibid.).  
The background of the 2011 elections was marked by the failure of an electoral pact – 
known as the Reedbuck Protocol
125
 – between the UPND and the PF due to disagreements on 
several core questions notably, (i) leadership over their platform, the Joint National Council 
(JNC), (ii) candidate selection for the Luena parliamentary by-election in August 2010 and 
(iii) overall strategy for the presidential and the parliamentary elections of 2011
126
 (Kabimba 
and Simbyakula 2011, 15-20). The UPND pulled out of the pact and consequently the PF 
                                                          
125
 The parties signed a joint communiqué on 4
th
 June 2009, at the Reedbuck Hotel in Lusaka.  
126
 It is worth nothing this was the second time that the two parties failed to concretize a pact. Before the 2006 
polls, the UPND had approached the PF to form a alliance, but the PF eventually allied with the ULP ,while the 
UPND headed the UDA coalition together with the FDD and the UNIP (Kabimba and Simbyakula 2011, 13-20) 
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started an «aggressive campaign» to win countrywide support as well as to engage the 
diplomatic community. The party strategy also implied seeking coverage in private media and 
being able to control the voting process in the polling stations. All these actions eventually 
paid off, as, in 2011, Michael Sata, finally succeeded and ousted the incumbent President 
Rupiah Banda, who had been elected in the 2008 by-elections following the death of Levy 
Mwanawasa, by 43% against 36% of the vote cast. In the parliamentary elections, the PF won 
61 seats with the MMD still coming a close second with 55 seats. This time the UPND, the 
FDD and the UNIP contested the polls separately, but only the former two were able to elect 
candidates (29 and one, respectively). Moreover, three independent candidates and one 
candidate of the ADD were elected.  
In explaining the first alternation in the country’s history since 1991, Chembe Nyangu, 
Deputy National Secretary of the MMD, pointed out two main reasons. Firstly, «people 
wanted the change for the sake of change»; secondly, the party faced internal problems and 
«had a claim in leadership» and «could not articulate this decision properly». As a result, the 
campaign was «not very effective» and people eventually felt it. Other politicians interviewed 
during fieldwork highlighted PF’s appealing campaign, which particularly targeted the youth 
under the slogan “For lower taxes, more jobs and more money in your pockets” and Zambian 
voters’ disenchantment with the MMD, as the main anchors of Michael Sata’s victory. Here 
are some exemplificative quotes:  
 
The people were looking at the party that could easily take out MMD. [...] they wanted the 
change yes. We all wanted the MMD to fall but we were thinking that good policies would 
come, but they are not coming [...]. (Winstone Chibwe, UNPD Secretary-General)  
 
He [Sata] was a minister in so many ministries here in Zambia, he was also a MP; and in all 
these ministries he delivered. So people had confidence in him. [...] that is why they called him 
man of action. [...] the new voters, the girls and boys from schools who were expecting jobs 
voted [...]. [...] you know young people always want to change. (Charles Zulu, independent 
candidate elected in 2011) 
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Table 5.4 – Zambia’s Parliamentary Elections (1991-2001): Votes (%) and seats (total) per party and province 
 
1991 1996 2001 
  MMD UNIP MMD INDEP NP AZ ZDC MMD UPND HP FDD UNIP ZRP INDEP PF 
  Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
Central  72,9 14 26,9 
 
48,0 12 23,0 2 3,9 
   
9,3 
 
30,4 7 26,4 5 12,3 2 11,1 
 
8,7 
 
5,2 
 
1,4 
 
1,3 
 
Copperbelt  89,1 22 10,4 
 
67,5 22 7,1 
 
5,1 
   
9,0 
 
34,6 20 10,7 
 
16,6 1 11,3 
 
7,3 1 6,8 
 
1,6 
 
5,1 
 
Eastern  23,9 
 
74,1 19 58,9 19 2,2 
 
6,1 
   
23,2 
 
17,0 1 4,7 
 
6,2 1 26,2 5 34,5 12 3,6 
 
3,0 
 
0,9 
 
Luapula  86,1 13 13,9 1 68,3 14 10,2 
 
2,3 
   
10,3 
 
49,8 13 4,1 
 
2,1 
 
9,2 
 
6,1 
 
14,0 
 
6,6 1 3,3 
 
Lusaka  75,8 10 22,6 2 61,2 10 9,5 1 4,2 1 0,2 
 
14,8 
 
15,4 1 24,3 4 8,0 
 
28,8 6 7,5 
 
4,0 1 2,1 
 
2,8 
 
Northern  83,7 20 15,8 1 60,7 18 17,0 3 3,4 
   
12,5 
 
37,8 20 5,7 
 
5,0 
 
14,2 
 
12,0 
 
9,3 
 
4,6 
 
6,2 1 
North-Western  66,0 10 30,9 2 43,9 10 8,1 2 34,7 
   
7,5 
 
31,5 3 38,8 9 5,7 
 
9,1 
 
4,2 
 
1,8 
 
6,0 
 
0,5 
 
Southern  83,7 19 15,5 
 
54,0 19 5,6 
 
3,4 
 
1,2 
 
18,5 
 
15,6 1 62,4 18 1,4 
 
8,7 
 
2,9 
 
2,2 
 
4,1 
 
0,4 
 
Western  79,7 17 19,6 
 
47,8 7 7,1 2 9,6 4 14,4 2 15,7 2 27,3 3 41,4 13 1,5 
 
11,1 1 6,5 
 
2,5 
 
3,5 
 
2,1 
 
Total 74,0 125 25,0 25 60,9 131 10 10 7,1 5 1,5 2 14 2 28,0 69 23,8 49 7,6 4 15,6 12 10,6 13 5,5 1 3,4 
 
2,8 1 
Turnout 44,4 78,5 68,6 
Source: Elaborated with data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) – http://www.elections.org.zm/ (retrieved on 30-09-2010). 
Notes: INDEP = Independents  
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Table 5.5 – Zambia’s Parliamentary Elections (2006-2011): Votes (%) and seats (total) per party and province 
 
2006 2011 
  MMD 
UPND FDD 
UNIP (UDA) 
PF INDEP NDF MMD UPND PF INDEP ADD FDD 
  Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats 
Central  43,2 12 18,8 2 29,0 0 4,8 0 0,5 0 44,4 9 21,6 2 26,6 3 6,0 
 
0,2 
 
0,3 
 
Copperbelt  41,7 4 15,7 0 27,3 18 10,1 0 0,4 0 28,3 4 5,8 
 
61,6 18 3,3 
 
0,4 
 
0,1 
 
Eastern  40,5 15 35,4 4 5,2 0 11,6 0 0,9 0 55,7 15 5,6 
 
18,9 1 13,0 2 0,4 
 
4,2 1 
Luapula  37,5 4 5,1 0 42,1 9 6,8 0 7,6 1 26,6 1 0,8 
 
61,6 13 8,8 
 
0,9 
 
0,1 
 
Lusaka  29,7 5 19,1 0 40,1 7 6,5 0 0,2 0 27,8 4 11,8 
 
55,4 8 2,0 
 
0,3 
 
0,3 
 
Northern  44,3 10 8,0 1 33,5 10 10,8 0 1,5 0 32,4 4 1,6 
 
53,2 16 10,9 1 0,5 
 
0,8 
 
North-Western  54,8 10 28,2 2 0,1 0 14,4 0 0,7 0 44,7 9 34,4 3 10,1 
 
7,8 
 
0,1 
 
0,6 
 
Southern  21,8 0 58,5 17 1,4 1 13,4 1 0,3 0 20,6 1 57,7 18 3,2 
 
15,3 
 
0,5 
 
0,0 
 
Western  53,8 14 11,7 1 0,1 1 13,3 1 0,1 0 34,4 8 28,0 6 20,2 2 4,4 
 
11,4 1 0,1 
 
Total  39,1 74 22,7 27 22,7 46 9,5 2 1,0 1 33,6 55 17,0 29 38,2 61 7,8 3 1,2 1 0,7 1 
Turnout  70,7 54,0 
Source: Elaborated with data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) – http://www.elections.org.zm/ (retrieved on 30-09-2010; and 14-10-2011). 
Notes about 2006 polls: elections were postponed in Lupososhi (Northern Province) and Kabompo East (North-Western Province) due to the deaths of two candidates. The two seats 
were won by the MMD. The FDD ran alone in the Bwacha constituency in the Central Province.  
Notes about the 2011 polls: Two by-elections – in Nakonde in the Northern Province and in Magoye in the Southern Province decided the allocation of the two remaining seats. The 
PF won Nakonde and the UPND retained the Magoye constituency. 
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Table 5.6 – Zambia’s Presidential Elections (1991-2011): Most voted candidates (%) 
Candidate (Party) 1991 1996 2001 2006 2008 2011 
Frederick Chiluba (MMD) 75,8 72,6 
    
Kenneth Kaunda (UNIP) 24,2 
     
Dean Mung'omba (ZDC) 
 
12,7 
    
Levy Mwanawasa (MMD) 
  
29,2 43,0 
  
Anderson Mazoka (UPND) 
  
27,2 
   
Christon Tembo (FDD) 
  
13,2 
   
Tilyenji Kaunda (UNIP) 
  
10,1 
   
Michael Sata (PF) 
  
3,4 29,4 38,6 42,9 
Hakainde Hichilema (UPND) [UDA] 
   
25,3 20,0 18,5 
Rupiah Banda (MMD) 
    
40,6 36,2 
Godfrey Miyanda (HP) 
    
0,8 
 
Turnout 45,0 58,4 67,8 70,8 45,4 54,0 
Source: Elaborated with data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) – http://www.elections.org.zm/ (retrieved on 
30-09-2010; and 14-10-2011). 
Notes: other presidential candidate per election; 1996: Dean Mung'omba (ZDC), Humphrey Mulemba (NP), Akashambatwa 
Mbikusita Lewanika (AZ) and Chama Chakomboka (MDP) – combined 27,4 % of the votes. 2001: Nevers Mumba (NCC), 
Gwendoline Konie (SDP), Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika (AZ), Yobert Shamapande (NLD), Godfrey Miyanda (HP) and Benjamin 
Mwila (ZRP) – combined 17% of the votes. 2006: Godfrey Miyanda (HP) and Winright Ngondo (APC) – combined 2,3 % of 
the votes. 2011: Charles Milupi (ADD), Elias Chipimo (NAREP), Tilyenji Kaunda (UNIP), Edith Nawakwi (FDD), Ng'andu 
Magande (NMP), Godfrey Miyanda (HP) and Fredrick Mutesa (ZED) – combined 2,4 % of the votes.  
 
Before ending this section we make a brief note on the impressive number of by-
elections the country has held to elect vacant seats at the parliament. According to the 
Constitution, ministers are drawn from the National Assembly, and any time parliamentarians 
move, die, resign or shift to a different party, fresh elections for that seat in the National 
Assembly are conducted
127
.  
Because factionalism, primarily motivated by personalism and ethnicity than by 
political or ideological orientations, is a mark of party politics in Zambia and electoral results 
are frequently petitioned, by-elections have become a routine rather than an exception from 
the onset of multipartism. Soon after the 1991elections, a political crisis within the MMD 
created a gap between Frederick Chiluba’s cabinet and parliamentarians around the agenda of 
economic reforms. This crisis eventually led to major ministerial reshuffles in 1993, resulting 
in the departure of several key ministers – the Minister of Finance Emmanuel Kasonde, the 
                                                          
127
 This is completely different from Mozambique, where MPs are not allowed to simultaneously serve in the 
parliament and as members of cabinet. Moreover, when a sitting MP ceases functions (motivated by death, 
illness or other reasons) he/she is immediately substituted by the next candidate in the party list for that 
constituency. By-elections have been held but only at the subnational level (articles 155 and 163 of the Electoral 
Law No. 7/2007, 26th February 2007).  
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Minister of Agriculture, Guy Scott, the Minister of Mines, Humphrey Mulemba, and the 
Minister of Education, Arthur Wina – who had participated in the founding of the party. Some 
of these individuals joined to form the NP in 1993. To fill in the vacant places left in the 
parliament during this period, the government announced the realization of by-elections 
(Rakner 2003, 106). These were, however, the first of the many challenges faced by the new 
ruling party. Factionalism originated two additional splitting parties – the ZDC (founded in 
1995) and the AZ (founded in 1996) – and the need for further by-elections. As a result, 
between 1991 and 1996, 48 by-elections took place in Zambia, following defections from the 
various parties and deaths of several MPs. «Eight parties contested these elections, but only 
the MMD, the UNIP and the NP succeeded in winning seats» (Rakner 2003, 108).  
The general elections of 2001 were also followed by several by-elections. The first was 
motivated by the death of an MP from the ruling MMD. Three additional by-elections took 
place in Kabwe (Central province) as a result of two newly elected MPs defecting from the 
opposition HP to join the MMD and a third was held in Sesheke (Western Province), where a 
newly elected MP was dismissed by the UPND after voting against the party’s position on the 
election of the speaker of Parliament (Carter Center 2002, 54). Between 2006 and 2011, 
another 15 parliamentary by-elections were held according to the Electoral Commission of 
Zambia’s (ECZ) website. These were won by the PF (6), the MMD (5), the UPND (3) and the 
ADD (1). While some by-elections were caused by death (e.g. Solwezi), the majority resulted 
from MPs swinging from the opposition to the ruling party. Finally, since the PF won the 
elections of September 2011, a total of 31 by-elections have been conducted. Eleven of the 31 
resulted of defections to the ruling party, three were due to the death of sitting MPs and seven 
because of court nullifications petitioned by losing PF candidates (Motsamai and Chipenzi 
2013).  
While by-elections are in accordance with Zambia’s electoral laws, their frequency 
entails important consequences for the way the political system works. In fact, beyond the 
economic impact on the country’s coffers, the multiplication of by-elections can provoke 
citizens’ fatigue, since they are constantly called to cast votes outside the regular electoral 
period and political parties are in a permanent “election mood”. Moreover, elections become 
more polarized and personalized given that what is in stake is the election of a particular seat 
in a particular constituency.  
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5.3 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has had the two-fold objective of providing a framework for the comparative 
analysis of the mechanisms of PSI and describing the main characteristics of party politics in 
Mozambique and Zambia since the early days of independence.  
Bearing these two objectives in mind, we started by featuring the environmental and the 
relational mechanisms of PSI that will be compared across the case studies. Environmental 
mechanisms – path to democratic transition, electoral system and party funding/finance – are 
inherently connected with the background conditions within which party systems operate. 
These conditions simultaneously provide for a schema of resources and for the possible lines 
of actions for all the engaging parts. Relational mechanisms, complementarily, focus on the 
political actors and on their networks. In this context, relevance is given to the patterns of 
connection ensued between the parties in the system and between parties and citizens. 
Regarding the second objective, a brief contextualization was provided for both 
Mozambique and Zambia. The main highlights showed two different political profiles before 
and after multipartism. While Mozambique had one major anti-colonial movement (Frelimo) 
which negotiated its own position as ruling party with the former colonial power, Zambia’s 
decolonization struggle was led by two main political parties (ANC and UNIP), which 
aggregated the popular protest against the colony. Unlike what happened in Mozambique, in 
Zambia elections were held before independence was granted and since that moment direct 
elections were maintained throughout the entire period of one-partyism (1973-1991) and the 
brief experience of multipartism (1964-72). Kenneth Kaunda’s Humanism was different from 
Samora Machel’s Marxist-Leninism but, in practice, both ideologies allowed the citizens’ 
indoctrination into a socialist paradigm in which the party and the state were indistinguishable 
structures and opposition activity was legally restricted.  
The analysis of the multiparty elections brought more differences to the fore. In 
Mozambique, the Frelimo continued to be the dominant party in the new democratic 
dispensation, especially after the 1999 elections; while the UNIP lost the first multiparty 
elections in 1991 and it is today a secondary party in the Zambian political arena. As a matter 
of fact, it did not elect representatives in the latest parliamentary election in 2011. UNIP’s 
unsuccessful career since 1991 can be owed to several aspects. It can certainly be argued that 
the party was heavily anchored on the state resources and infrastructures and that it had lost 
popular support in the latest years of one-partyism. Yet, moving beyond that argument, it is 
important to bring other factors into the equation. Firstly, the MMD was a very competent 
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contender that, through its own credits, legal engineering and strategic co-optation (through 
patronage) of MPs, was able to nullify the former ruling party. For instance, in 1993 and early 
1996, Chiluba declared the state of emergency under allegations that the UNIP was engaging 
in violent practices to destabilize the country
128
. Those events suspended almost all 
fundamental political and civil rights, and made the arbitrary detention of opposition UNIP 
politicians possible (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 14-15). Secondly, the UNIP has 
experienced serious leadership problems since the exit of Kenneth Kaunda in 1992, with 
internal squabbling and factionalism leading to leadership turnover, suspensions and 
sometimes expulsions. In this sense, the influence of the party’s founder and former President 
Kenneth Kaunda may have had a negative impact on party organization and membership 
morale, as the party seems to be divided between two camps; on the one side the supporters of 
the former president, and on the other side those who want fresh leadership without formal 
ties to Kaunda (NDI and FODEP 2003, 10). 
Finally, a sort of path-dependency explanation can be put forward building on van de 
Walle's (2003, 301) analysis of the factors that drive political parties’ success in new 
democracies. He argues that in a good number of African countries, the party’s performance 
in the first legislative and particularly the first presidential election «turns out to be critical to 
its long-term fortunes». Furthermore, the: 
 
outcome of the transition election also largely determined whether a new party or the old single 
party would emerge in power. Whichever was able to control the chief executive’s office, and 
attain a winning legislative majority following the first election, was then able to consolidate 
power. If the ex-single party managed to survive the move to multiparty politics with its hold on 
power intact, it was able to use all its resources to marginalize the opposition and re-consolidate 
power in the second and third multiparty elections (van de Walle 2003, 301).  
  
This argument clearly applies to Mozambique where the Frelimo won the first election, 
therefore closing the transition process with a golden key, while in Zambia the MMD was the 
ultimate winner of the transition process and used its resources to minimize the role of the 
former ruling party, which eventually lost visibility after having boycotted the 1996 polls.  
In addition to what has been already mentioned, the descriptive analysis of the election 
results helped us shed light on our previous findings about the nature of Mozambique’s and 
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 The most controversial of these alleged conspiracy acts were the “Zero Option” and “Black Mamba” “plots” 
that resulted in a number of UNIP leaders being detained. 
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Zambia’s party system. Chapter III portrayed Mozambique as highly and overinstitutionalized 
and Zambia as weakly and inadequately institutionalized. While, in the first case, the process 
of institutionalization outstrips political participation and innovation, in the second, the party 
system is not strong enough to promote change in society, while encouraging the political 
participation of citizens and social groups. The election results give support to this description 
as in Mozambique, especially since 1999, electoral acts have been marked by high levels of 
abstention at the same time as the Frelimo increased its electoral and parliamentary 
dominance as well as its organizational proficiency. In Zambia turnout levels reached the 
lowest values in 1991 (44%), and have varied between 54% and 79% ever since. Although the 
MMD won all elections between 1991 and 2006, only in two occasions was it able to form a 
majoritarian cabinet (1991 and 1996) without needing to co-opt opposition MPs (offering 
cabinet positions). Even though, since 2001, the ruling party has been able to engineer a 
majoritarian status in the parliament (since 2001) thanks to successful incursions into 
opposition parties, the high number of by-elections has had financial and political costs, the 
most important of which is the undermining of the living space and the fragmentation of the 
parliamentary opposition.  
Ethnicity and regionalism often emerge in elections times and echo early cleavages 
formed in the processes of state formation and nation-building. After independence the 
Frelimo and the UNIP both had the purpose of unifying the country beyond ethnic, linguistic, 
religious and regional differences. That was the goal of their modernization project
129
. Yet 
this project created resistance and antagonism since it was imposed in an authoritarian fashion 
by the elite that took over the state
130
.  
With the introduction of multiparty elections, a ban on regional, religious and ethnic 
parties was introduced in the Mozambican Constitution of 1990 and in the GPA, but still the 
Renamo and more minor parties held to these territorial cleavages to mobilize voters (Pereira 
and Shenga 2005). On its side the Frelimo, sought to overcome any connotation with 
tribalism, notably by seeking support in areas of the country where it was less popular 
(Northern and Central Provinces). It did so by recognizing their political and social relevance 
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 Slogans like “Um só povo, uma só Nação, do Rovuma ao Maputo” from Samora Machel and “One Zambia, 
One Nation” from Kenneth Kaunda, clearly expressed this idea.  
130
 Cahen (1994) explains that the North vs. South cleavage within the Frelimo basically expressed the failure of 
the nation-building process, which had excluded large portions of the territory from political and social power 
(namely rural inhabitants, Northern and Central provinces and traditional leaders). In Zambia in the First 
Republic the ANC was seen as Tonga, the UP as Lozi and the UPP and the UNIP as Bemba (Posner 2005, 54-
55). In the Second Republic when Kenneth Kaunda banned all opposition the UNIP became the realm of ethnic 
dispute as the Bemba ethnic group, mainly concentrated in the Northern, Luapula and Copperbelt Provinces, has 
also been considered privileged vis-à-vis the others.  
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(Florêncio 2008; Lourenço 2009)
131
 and in 2004 by nominating a North born party leader. 
With this, territorial cleavages lost some strength and the 2004 elections show that. 
Otherwise, in Zambia there are no legal provisions banning regional or ethnic parties 
(Hartmann and Kemmerzell 2010, 653); therefore as in the First Republic these types of 
parties continue to proliferate even when they distance themselves from such labels. For 
instance the AZ has been seen as Lozi, the UPND as Tonga and all the parties that have ever 
been in power – UNIP, MMD and PF – have been supported by the Bemba (the largest ethnic 
group) but still collected votes across other ethnic groups. In explaining varying patterns of 
party support, Posner (2005) advances that there is an association between the ethnic 
affiliation of the party leader and individuals’ sympathies as:  
 
Zambians simply assume that if the party president is a member of a particular ethnic group 
then, in directing the functions and setting the agenda of the party, he will put the interests of 
that group first. Even when the president surrounds himself with deputies from other groups (as 
party presidents invariably do), the overwhelming tendency is for voters to ignore the vice 
presidents, secretaries general, and party chairpersons from other groups and to draw their 
inferences about the party’s patronage orientation from the ethnic background of its top leader 
(Posner 2005, 55). 
 
Beyond distinctive features mentioned so far, a common ground of electoral processes in 
these countries is that elections are always highly contested and petitioned by the main 
political parties. In fact, allegations of electoral fraud, vote rigging, intimidation of opposition 
parties by state agents, uneven media coverage and unlawful use of state resources by the 
incumbent party are recurrent in election times.  
Having set out the overall context for the analysis of the mechanisms of PSI and 
described the historical and political profile of Mozambique and Zambia, the next chapter 
moves one step forward to actually conduct the analysis of the environmental and relational 
mechanisms of PSI. As previously indicated, in this part of the research the goal is to discuss 
the main findings delivered by the quantitative strand and to seek mechanisms of causality in 
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 Until 1999 this recognition was far from linear. For instance, Law No. 3/94 (about the Institutional 
Framework) stated that the local government should take into account the opinion of the traditional leaders as 
means to coordinate local activities that address the needs of the community. However, this prerogative was 
considerably diminished in Law no. 2/97. Later, Law no. 19/97 (about the Land) gave traditional leaders the 
responsibility to manage and allocate the land fund of the community yet, the big turn happened after the 1999 
elections when the party finally recognized the role of the traditional leaders (partly motivated by the electoral 
results) and published the Decree-law no. 15 of 20
th
 of June 2000 which defined the framework of the relations 
between local government and traditional leaders.  
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the relations identified between the dependent variable and the independent variables. 
Furthermore, new variables which have not been observed previously will be added to the 
analysis to a more comprehensive study of the different processes of PSI.  
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CHAPTER VI – MECHANISMS OF PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION: 
MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA COMPARED  
 
In the previous chapter, we presented the scheme for the analysis of the mechanisms of PSI and 
featured the main political actors, institutions and political developments both in Mozambique and in 
Zambia, since independence. To that end, we started by displaying a brief theoretical overview of each 
mechanism and then combined bibliographical and documental sources, raw electoral data and semi-
structured interviews to contextualize the case studies and to introduce this new strand of analysis. The 
descriptive analysis carried out highlighted two different profiles: in the Mozambican case, regime 
change is vertically enacted as a means of conflict resolution and elections produce majoritarian 
results; whereas in the Zambian case, political change is achieved via popular and societal input and 
elections result in more fragmented parliaments. Nevertheless, in the latter case, the participation of 
different social groups in the political arena has represented a challenge to the creation of an 
institutionalized national party system. Bearing this description in mind, this chapter examines the 
environmental and relational mechanisms of PSI and it is organized in five sections. Section 6.1 
focuses on the path to democratic transition and highlights the mode of transition, the negotiation 
process and the political cleavages formed at this point. Section 6.2 addresses the mechanical effects 
of Mozambique’s PR system and Zambia’s FPTP system and discusses their unconventional results. 
Section 6.3 emphasizes the relevance and the limits of funding/finance in interparty competition. 
Section 6.4 evinces the prominent networks developed between the parties in the system (party 
coalitions) and between the parties and their constituencies (party-citizen linkages). A mix of 
clientelism and localism seem to pattern these relations. There is, however, also room for 
programmatic linkages, at least in Zambia. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes the issues approached 
throughout the chapter by arguing that environmental and relational mechanisms are relevant in 
shaping different outcomes of PSI. Yet, to the extent to which the competition is more or less 
structured, the causal effects of these mechanisms will eventually be moderated.  
 
6.1 Path to democratic transition  
 
In the late 1980s, dramatic changes in the internal (economic decline, draught and famine, 
exhaustion of the troops) and external (fall of communist states and the end of the Cold War) 
scenes led civil war protagonists in Mozambique – the Frelimo and the Renamo – to finally 
acquiesce to the appeals of the church and those of the international community for a 
negotiated end to the war and for democratic opening. Despite international mediation, 
Mozambique’s double transition from war to peace and to democracy was a locally owned 
process in which the former belligerents, sole negotiators of the transition process, had great 
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leeway to bargain and minimize the risks of sharing political power with other political parties 
in direct and competitive multiparty elections. Zambia’s political opening, in turn, was 
anchored in the dissatisfaction of large sectors of the population – especially trade unionists, 
students and intellectuals –, which came together under a political movement that preceded 
the formation of the MMD. Although the incumbent party (UNIP) had some leverage over the 
negotiation process, what was achieved, in terms of institutional outlook and agenda of 
liberalization, ultimately resulted from the intensive pressure put on by the pro-democratic 
groups.  
Through a narrative rooted in the principles of the historical institutionalism
132
, this 
section argues that what happened during the transition moment matters for party system 
development. In fact, this is a moment when old and new political parties (re)emerge and 
when the institutional shape of the upcoming regime is crafted. In this sense, the mode of 
transition and who initiates and controls the process are aspects of great relevance (Linz, 
Stepan, and Gunther 1995). Another important feature with formative influence on party 
development has to do with the way in which political parties react to the previous 
authoritarian experience and find new identitarian references. In the case of Mozambique this 
question principally relates to how both the Frelimo and the Renamo were able to break with 
the legacies of the warring past and adapt their structures and ideologies to the new multiparty 
framework. In the case of Zambia, however, two sensitive issues may be determinant in 
shaping intra and interparty competition. The first is the extent to which the UNIP was able to 
refashion itself as a democratic political player (similar to other cases of departure from one-
partyism); the second regards the ability of the MMD to overcome its grassroots origin and be 
a cohesive political force. In fact, having emerged from a broad social alliance, the main 
challenge for the MMD is to appease conflictive and/or competing agendas, hence providing a 
coherent political offer. The descriptive analysis will show that bipolarization in Mozambique 
and fragmentation in Zambia trace back to the transition moment.  
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 Four distinctive marks are attributed to this paradigm: «First, historical institutionalists tend to conceptualize 
the relationship between institutions and individual behavior in relatively broad terms. Second, they emphasize 
the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions. Third, they tend to have 
a view of institutional development that emphasizes path dependence and unintended consequences. Fourth, they 
are especially concerned to integrate institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors, such 
as ideas, can make to political outcomes» (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938). 
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6.1.1 Modes of transition, political actors and cleavages  
 
In Mozambique the processes of democratization and peacebuilding were simultaneously 
developed. Under the instrumental play of international actors that brokered a peace 
agreement between the warring parties and supported the post-conflict peace-building and 
recovery process, the country found itself in a situation that required both (i) the introduction 
of liberalization reforms that would allow its rupture with the previous authoritarian regime 
and (ii) the implementation of a peace agreement that would end a civil war that had shattered 
the country’s human and material resources for over a decade. A similar juxtaposition of 
peace and democracy agenda can be found in several other contemporary polities in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Some examples are: Angola (Bicesse Accords: 1992; Luena Memorandum of 
Understanding: 2002), Burundi (Arusha Accords: 2000-2003), Chad (various peace and 
reconciliation processes between 1989-2006), Republic of Congo (National Dialogue Process: 
1999-2001), Democratic Republic of Congo (Inter-Congolese Dialogue process: 1999–2003) 
and Guinea-Bissau (Abuja Peace Agreement: 1998) (Jarstad 2008, 33-34). However, what 
differentiates Mozambique from the generality of these countries is the fact that the first post-
war elections clearly played a vital role in making a decisive break with the past (Benjamin 
Reilly 2008a, 181). This does not mean that the formerly warring parties «decided to forgive 
and forget» (Manning 2002, 25), but simply that there was no return to war; the results were 
peacefully accepted and a new political order was inaugurated even if the war cleavage 
remained salient in party politics. 
Zambia shifted from a one-party competitive system – variant of neopatrimonialism in 
which regular elections are held and some degree of opposition is allowed (Bratton and van de 
Valle 1997) –, to multipartism through popular and social protest (Erdmann and Simutanyi 
2003). In fact, since the mid-80s, the socio-economic decline caused serious legitimacy 
problems for the ruling party. On the one hand, the party was limited in its patronage capacity, 
thus it became more difficult to contain internal dissidence (Tordoff 1988, 23-25)
133
. On the 
other hand, it was facing increasing contestation from various civil society organizations, with 
Frederick Chiluba, the Chairman of the leading trade union in the country (ZCTU), arising as 
the most visible face of the movement towards democracy and multipartism (Erdmann and 
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 According to Tordoff (1988, 23-24) competition for patronage was not between UNIP and the opposition, but 
between the various factions inside UNIP. Most of these factions originated from ethnic or regional divides and 
each aimed at gaining more political power. Given the ongoing in-fight, patronage allowed the establishment of 
coalitions or consensus across different ethnic groups. Yet, with the economic downturn the party could no 
longer provide extensive patronage as it did before, thus it increasingly relied on other institutions, namely state 
bureaucracy to sustain underpinning regime.  
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Simutanyi 2003 9-10). Amidst persisting and growing social unrest, and after initial 
reluctance to open the regime, President Kenneth Kaunda eventually changed his tactics to 
regain initiative and control over the liberalization process. The UNIP MPs amended the 
Constitution to allow for the formation of political parties in December 1990.Yet, the newly 
formed MMD, as well as most of the other smaller parties, did not accept a number of 
proposals contained in the new Constitution and so they gathered in a conference and 
proposed 68 alterations to it. This meeting paved the way to the first free and fair elections 
(Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003,13).  
These two processes were significant in different ways. Mozambique set a successful 
example for war-to-democracy transitions, which has been praised by many (Reilly 2008b, 
18; Manning 2008). Indeed, the country had succeeded where other countries had failed: 
namely in what regards the attainment of a stable peace process, of multiparty elections and 
the transformation of the armed opposition into a civil political party (Ostheimer 2001). 
Bordering Zambia became the first Anglophone country to peacefully replace the longtime 
ruling party in competitive polls that represented the “icing on the cake” for a competent 
negotiation reform conducted by the main opposition political forces (Ihonvbere 1995). 
Erdmann and Simutanyi (2003) suggest a number of contributing factors to this comparatively 
quick and peaceful transition, including: the relatively “open” character of the authoritarian 
regime, which never managed to control all dissidence; the political unity and relative 
strength of the opposition movement, which included a crucial and well organized political 
force; the trade union movement; and, in particular, the mineworkers who could have brought 
the country’s economy to a halt (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 12). Still, these exemplar 
modes of democratic transition also enclosed challenges for the actors involved.  
Using Jarstad's (2008) four dilemmas – horizontal, vertical, systemic and temporal – it 
is possible to provide a more systematic reading of Mozambique’s process. Democratic and 
peace negotiations were mostly characterized by verticality instead of horizontality. In fact, 
apart from the church, which had a facilitating role, no other civil society organization or 
political group at the national level took part in the various talks and meetings held. Not only 
did the Frelimo and the Renamo monopolize the entire process, but they both held to very 
strategic and immediate interests which they were not willing to concede (Brito 2009, 24) 
until positive incentives (e.g. funding) became more concrete throughout the ongoing 
negotiations (Manning 2002). Thus, it can be sustained that the local agents had ownership 
over the process (systemic), even though the international agents were called to resolve 
several deadlocks, namely delays in the demilitarization and in the implementation of 
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electoral procedures, which eventually postponed the realization of elections (temporal). It is 
also important to take into consideration that these negotiations were held in a changing 
paradigm of international intervention in which Mozambique set a precedent for the financial 
and staff support (Manning and Malbrough 2009, 83). In fact, financial incentives for the 
demobilization and the reintegration of troops, the establishment of a trust fund to aid in 
Renamo’s transformation into a political party, and the assurance of the participation of other 
political parties in the first competitive polls were a significant part of the international 
intervention in Mozambique (Nuvunga 2007; Manning and Malbrough 2009).  
The bipolarization of the negotiation process was relevant in two ways. In the first 
place, the Frelimo and the Renamo were able to negotiate the most advantageous conditions 
in exchange for their commitment to adopt peace and democratization measures. For example, 
the definition of an election threshold between 5% and 20% and the definition of a trust fund 
to finance political parties’ activities clearly benefited the local negotiators agenda134. The 
international community provided a US$17 million trust fund to convert the Renamo from a 
rebel group into a political party (Kumar and Zeeuw 2008, 274), while seventeen other parties 
were given a much lower budget, of US$ 150 thousands each, to register and finance their 
activities (Manning and Malbrough 2009, 90). Moreover, with the approach of the 1994 
elections , and despite having been granted much more financial support than other political 
parties, the Renamo continued asking for more financial support as a means to conduct a 
successful election campaign (Manning 2002, 110).  
Secondly, the electorate remained polarized around the wartime political cleavage 
(Manning 2008, 8), which partly explains its behavior in the 1994 and 1999 elections. 
Electoral support for the Frelimo and the Renamo in these two elections mirrored their 
respective wartime patterns of support: the Renamo exhibiting its strongest social base in the 
country’s five Central provinces and in rural areas, while the Frelimo strongholds were 
mainly in the South where the majority of the party cadres came from
135
. In this sense, the 
patterns of vote in several regions of the country can be read as a reaction to Frelimo’s 
“authoritarian modernization”, namely villagization and the denial of traditional systems of 
power [for the Province of Zambezia, see Chichava (2008), for the Province Nampula, see 
Rosário (2009)].  
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 As shown later, the Renamo defended the highest threshold (20%) and negotiated higher levels of financial 
support vis-à-vis the other political parties, whereas the Frelimo preferred the lower threshold (5%).  
135
 All leaders of the Frelimo, Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano were born in Gaza. 
The exception is Armando Guebuza, elected in 2005, who is from Nampula (in the North). 
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The conference Peace Consolidation and Democracy in Mozambique: the role of 
political parties
136
 held in 2012 in Maputo, was very clear in showing that political parties 
remain attached to the warring past, even though 20 years have passed since the signature of 
the GPA. In this meeting, representatives of the Renamo argued that the Frelimo had not 
fulfilled the terms of the GPA and still governed as if it was in a one-party setting. The lack of 
dialogue on the side of the Frelimo was pointed out as the main factor leading the party 
leader, Afonso Dhlakama, to engage in more effective actions, namely to set up a camp in the 
bush again (in Gorongosa, Renamo’s former headquarters). This was also backed by 
fieldwork interviews as this extract indicates:  
 
We have a serious problem that is the problem of the military. After the GPA, which ended the 
war it was agreed that the Renamo would have 1500 men and the Frelimo 1500 men [in the 
Armed Forces of Mozambique]. That was not possible [...] today; the party in power went on 
dismissing all those from Renamo; that is a rising conflict. There is also the problem of the 
police force. It was defined that the Police of the Republic of Mozambique would also be 
formed by Renamo’s demobilized members, but that never happened. Therefore, there is a 
serious problem with the enforcement of the GPA. [...] and presently we have the president in 
the bush. (Maria Angelina Enoque, Renamo, Parliamentary caucus leader)
137
  
 
In a similar tone, MDM leaders stated that peace was rather absent from politics since 
violence and intimidation during election times persisted, whereas Salomão Moyana 
(Magazine Independente, journalist) and Raul Domingos (PDD, President) concurred that the 
country had simply experienced the minimum required for peace, that is, ‘the silencing of the 
weapons” and Sheik Abdul Carimo (Electoral Observatory, director138) recommended 
political parties to abandon the bellicose discourse.  
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 Translated from the original: A consolidação da Paz e Democracia em Moçambique: o papel dos partidos 
políticos. The conference was held between 23rd-24th October 2012 under the organization of Associação de 
Parlamentares Europeus com África/Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA) and 
Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD); over twenty political parties participated. I was also 
able to participate in this meeting since it took place during my fieldwork mission.  
137
 Translated from the original: «[...] nós temos um problema sério que é um problema dos militares. Depois do 
AGP que fez com que a guerra terminasse ficou definido que a Renamo teria 15 mil homens a Frelimo 15 mil 
homens [Nas Forças Armadas de Moçambique]. Isso não foi possível [...] hoje o partido no poder foi tirando 
todos aqueles que vieram da parte da Renamo; é um conflito que está a surgir. Por outro lado há um problema 
da polícia [...]. Ficou definido, que a Polícia da República de Moçambique seria composta também por 
membros que viessem do partido Renamo, entre os quais os desmobilizados e isso não aconteceu. Portanto é 
uma lacuna do cumprimento do AGP. [...] e hoje nós temos o presidente na mata.» 
138
 Also the General Secretary of Conselho Islâmico de Moçambique/ Islamic Council of Mozambique 
(Cislamo).  
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Beyond interparty competition, the legacies of the war and the salience given to these 
by political parties also influence citizens’ engagement in the country’s political life. 
According to Pereira (2008), in new democracies that emerged after a long period of civil 
war, people’s main concerns is with political stability (Pereira 2008, 432). Therefore, in 
Mozambique more than political, economic and social divides, it was the fear of a return to 
war and the desire of reconciliation that shaped the background and the outcome of the first 
elections held in the country. This view can be traced back to the studies of Cahen (1998) who 
label the first election as the “election of silence” and of Heimer and Silva (2002) who, based 
on exploratory open ended interviews conducted in Luanda and Maputo in 2001, found out 
that political culture in these two countries was framed by values of safety (related both to 
military actions and violent urban criminality), common goals and solidarity (instead of 
individual or intergroup competiveness) and good governance (transparency and 
accountability of the state institutions).  
Yet, this narrative does not tell the full story, particularly if we take into consideration 
the results of the 2004 and the 2009 elections in which the Frelimo clearly became a dominant 
party. In fact, to better understand these results two other factors must be considered. Firstly, 
how political parties have evolved over the years (Manning 2008; Pereira 2008). Particularly 
since 1999 the Frelimo was able to modernize itself as a pragmatist party and successfully 
occupied Renamo’s agenda (Pereira 2008, 434) while Renamo remained «largely 
underdeveloped and connected with the war cleavage» and highly «personalized and 
centralized around the figure of Afonso Dhlakama» (Manning 2008 151-152). Secondly, that 
the Frelimo has been in control of the state since 1975. Indeed, by controlling the parliament, 
the presidency, the majority of municipalities and province assemblies it enjoys a 
considerable leeway to access and distribute state resources, without proper checks and 
balances. This in turn increases the party’s ability to sustain its neopatrimonial networks.  
Zambia’s transition through negotiated reform was comparatively milder. There was no 
violent past to be dealt with and, as in previous periods of the country’s history (independence 
struggle), a broad-based opposition movement was again pressuring the outgoing regime 
towards change. Even if the MMD took the lead during this period, it represented several 
organizations and movements from civil society: the labor movement (under the umbrella of 
the ZCTU); professional associations, notably the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) and the 
Press Association of Zambia (PAZA); the Economic Association of Zambia (EAZ) and the 
University of Zambia Students Union (Momba and Madimutsa 2009, 2). In this context, the 
weakness of the old elites and their eventual compliance with the process allowed the 
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establishment of a new institutional framework without the problematic constraints that are 
associated with more controlled transitions (Ibid.). Inside the UNIP this process would be 
marked by some internal resistance from the hard-liners of the party, but Kaunda still assented 
to the opposition’s demands for a referendum on multipartism, competitive elections, 
international observers and constitutional limits on executive power. His acquiescence to the 
process might have resulted from overconfidence and underestimation of his personal 
popularity and that of his party (Bratton 1992, 92), but it eventually contributed for a 
smoother transition to democracy in which institutional changes were, after all, minimum. 
Indeed, the following sections will show that there was not a total break with the institutional 
past. In fact, the electoral system (FPTP) and the form of government (presidential) are 
inherited from the pretransition period and party funding/finance remains unregulated as it 
was both in the First and in the Second Republics.  
Now, returning to the nature of the transition, apart from the MMD, a number of newly 
emerged political parties (e.g. the NADA and the DP) also participated in the process of 
constitutional amendment that eventually laid down the rules of the new democratic 
settlement. Nevertheless, the MMD, as ruling party, had to deal with far-reaching challenges 
namely to contain the internal and external opposition and to keep the support of its 
constituencies (Ihonvbere 1995). An additional challenge regarding the MMD as a political 
organization had to do with how it would depart from its social basis and reconcile the 
interests of the various groups that had adhered to the movement (Momba and Madimutsa 
2009). According to Rakner and Svåsand (2004), the development of political parties in 
Zambia, between 1991 and 2001, had two sources:  
 
first, there were the political entrepreneurs motivated by running for office and taking advantage 
of the possibility to form new parties. They had two options, either to seek nomination within an 
existing party or to form their own party. Second, since the MMD was formed as a broad anti-
UNIP alliance, it was likely to fragment over time (Rakner and Svåsand 2004, 53).  
 
While the first way of party formation is more or less common, in new democracies of Latin 
America, Asia and Africa (Salih and Nordlund 2007; Randall and Svåsand 2002b), the latter 
is deeply rooted in the revolutionary and broad-based nature of the Zambian transition. 
Indeed, as Chapter V has shown, the MMD was challenged with splits and factionalism from 
the onset of its formation; with several political parties, including the current party in 
government, the PF, resulting from breaks inside the MMD. The truth is that, with a far more 
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open party system, Zambia has witnessed several political parties and individuals 
(independent candidates, party leaders, former cabinet ministers) contesting and winning 
parliamentary seats.  
This section has discussed the mode of democratic transition, highlighting its effects on 
PSI, taken as a structural expression of stable patterns of interparty competition, rootedness in 
society and organizational continuity. To conclude it, we need to recover the main arguments 
on how different transition paths underscore different profiles of institutionalization. Frelimo 
and Renamo emerged as the main beneficiaries of the transition process in Mozambique. 
They were given special conditions to negotiate the terms of their commitment to a new 
peaceful and democratic order, under a new international community model of financial 
support for peacebuilding missions. Due to the bipolarization of the negotiations, an already 
existing war cleavage crystallized in the choice of political institutions, which became the 
new battlefield for the former belligerents. At the citizen level, the fear of a return to war still 
influenced the way the electorate voted in the first polls and remained salient as the Renamo 
still holds to it – not only discursively, but through localized military actions – and mobilizes 
it as a trade-off for political legitimacy, from time to time. The Frelimo, in turn, has modified 
itself into a pragmatic political party and has been able to increase its electoral support over 
the years, not just through organizational development but also through its ability to surpass 
the Renamo in its traditional constituencies (rural areas and traditional leaderships). 
Furthermore, the rivalry between the Renamo and the Frelimo remains visible because no 
other party has been able to break the bipolar status quo, which is polarized to the extent that 
there are no episodes of former Renamo officials defecting to the Frelimo, or of «aisle 
crossings» between the two parties in parliament (Manning 2008, 51).  
Differently, Zambia’s transition was led by a social movement, later transformed into a 
political party, but that ultimately did not overcome its fragmented social basis
139
. In fact, 
during the first democratically elected legislature, Frederick Chiluba’s MMD suffered three 
major splits which led to the exit of several founding members of the party and to the 
formation of three new political parties; the NP, the ZDC and the AZ in 1993, 1995 and 1996, 
respectively (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 30). These three splits were mainly triggered by 
political divergences with the way Chiluba was running the government with a mix of 
personal and collective policies (Ibid.). Yet, factionalism motivated by tribalism also led to 
the formation of an additional group, the Caucus for National Unity (CNU), in 1992. The 
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 In fact, signs of fragmentation started short after the MMD was formed on 4th January 1991. The first came 
in March 1991 when the losers of the first MMD convention decided to found the NDP. 
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group was created by leaders from a number of ethnic groups (principally Lozi-speakers) who 
complained that all key positions in the Chiluba government were held by members of the 
president’s own group (the Bemba-speaking group) (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 13). 
These events, also described in Chapter V, continue to mark Zambia’s weakly 
institutionalized party system.  
As far as the actors who conducted the negotiations in Mozambique are concerned, 
there was a two-level playing field, first between local and international agents and then 
between the belligerents. The Frelimo and the Renamo were able to own the process despite 
international interference and then were contented – without other political parties involved – 
to define the institutional outlook of the upcoming regime. In Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, 
UNIP’s leader since 1959, lost the negotiations and was surpassed by the opposition, which 
effectively conducted the negotiations. Finally, as far as political cleavages were concerned, 
in Mozambique the transition process, because it was led, by the former belligerents, 
encapsulated the regime’s main cleavage around the war. In Zambia, however, the 
horizontality of the transition process echoed past processes of regime change (independence) 
and resulted in a party system characterized by a dominant party (more evident between 1991-
1996 than between 2001-2011), fragmentation and ethnoregionalism. Since we are 
highlighting continuities, it is also important to acknowledge that this puzzling combination 
of dominance, fragmentation and ethnoregionalism, has been a mark of Zambia’s political 
history. In fact, during the First Republic, the UNIP was the dominant political force but faced 
active antagonism from other political forces – the ANC resilient in the Southern Province, 
the UP established by the Lozi-speakers as breakaway within the UNIP (active in the Western 
Province) and the UPP, which competed in the Bemba-speaking areas (Burnell 2001, 245; 
Larmer 2006).  
 
6.2 The Electoral system: Unconventional effects  
 
In the previous chapter, we saw that electoral institutions exert both mechanical (e.g. 
fragmentation and disproportionality) and psychological (e.g. strategic vote and electoral 
coalitions) effects on party systems (Duverger 1959). Yet, these effects can be modeled by the 
structure of the party system itself (Sartori 2003). Further contributions led us to also consider 
the motivations regarding political parties’ choices over one or another electoral formula; for 
they might be willing to keep or change the provisions that are (or will be) more beneficial to 
them in the future (Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005). This section builds upon this discussion to 
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analyze the relationship between electoral system and PSI in Mozambique and Zambia. The 
quantitative strand of this study has already indicated the electoral system as a relevant factor 
of higher levels of institutionalization, with PR and mixed formulas being more favorable to 
this political outcome than majoritarian formulas. What makes this approach even more 
interesting is that Mozambique’s PR and Zambia’s FPTP formula produce different outcomes 
from what is conventionally expected. In fact, while FPTP elections are better known for 
promoting a party system with relatively few parties, PR is said to facilitate the representation 
of various social groups (Horowitz 2006, 9). This will be addressed again in the final part of 
this section; but first the origins and the consequences of electoral institutions will be 
addressed.  
In Mozambique the choice over the electoral institutions was made during the war-to-
democracy transition and was sealed with the GPA and later with the Electoral Law No. 4/93 
of 28th December 1993. Like the major transitional elections conducted under UN auspices 
(Reilly 2008a, 173) and similar to other Lusophone countries (see country case studies in 
Lobo and Neto 2009), the parties agreed on a PR system, with the least proportional formula – 
D’Hondt –, closed list ballot and 5% threshold for representation in parliament. This threshold 
prevented smaller parties from gaining a place in national political institutions and had the 
vigorous support of the Renamo up until 2006, when it was abolished (Manning 2008, 50; 
Brito 2009, 23). Legislative and presidential elections were to be held simultaneously, a 
situation which can be also perceived as more advantageous for larger than smaller parties, 
particularly in presidential systems or systems in which the president is constitutionally strong 
(Shugart and Carey 1992; Cox 1997). This is to be expected because (i) large and statewide 
parties are likely to win the presidential elections (Cox 1997) and (ii) the president’s 
popularity carries his/her party in the legislature (Shugart and Carey 1992). Therefore, when 
presidential and legislative elections are concurrent, the party that wins the presidency tends 
to win a majority in the national legislature, which has been the case in Mozambique.  
According to Brito (2009), during the peace negotiations, the Renamo defended a PR 
system with maximum threshold of 20%, whereas the Frelimo had a preference for the 
majoritarian formula and for a lower election threshold. In this sense, the Renamo was mainly 
interested in limiting participation to the new parties but also in guaranteeing a fairer 
representation in parliament, while Frelimo’s strategy was to back the adoption of an electoral 
system that would reinforce its dominant position and diminish the possibility of cohabitation 
or power-sharing. Furthermore, the inclusion of a low election threshold would allow other 
political parties to weaken Renamo’s position as the main opposition party. Until the most 
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recent election (2009), the electoral laws have been changed every time an election takes 
place. Yet these have been minor changes, mainly targeting the composition of the electoral 
bodies
140
.The most relevant change, however, led to the removal of the 5% threshold, against 
the desire of the Renamo, but as petitioned by a group of smaller political parties supported 
by the Frelimo. In December 2006, it was eliminated by a majority vote in the National 
Assembly (Manning 2008, 50). Nevertheless, among political parties and intellectuals a wide 
discussion remains open on whether Mozambique should adopt a more proportional system, 
like the largest remainder method, which would facilitate the representation of smaller parties 
(Hanlon and Nuvunga 2005; Brito 2011)  
Zambia inherited the plurality formula – FPTP in SMC – as part of the constitutional 
legacy of the departing British colonialist upon independence in 1964. Applied in all direct 
elections throughout the First and Second Republics, FPTP was one of the institutional marks 
from the previous regime that was kept unchanged during transition. Nonetheless, because the 
«[...] transition period was telescoped into just 22 months [...] struggles over both the general 
constitutional framework and particular voting procedures raged until the eleventh hour and 
were a basic feature of the entire campaign» (Bratton 1992, 87). Disagreements related to the 
constitutional commission’s report released in June 1991, which had been unilaterally 
discussed by UNIP’s MPs, without any input from the MMD, civil society organizations or 
other smaller political groups (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 11) .  
The electoral formula was somewhat disregarded in this process, but there has been an 
ongoing debate regarding constitutional and electoral amendment from the outset of the first 
multiparty elections, even though no relevant changes have been introduced. The Mvunga 
Commission of 1990
141
, the Mwanakatwe Commission of 1993
142, the Mung’omba 
Commission of 2003
143
 and the Zaloumis Electoral Reforms Committee established in 
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 The electoral law has been revised three times between 1994-2009: Law No. 13/1999, Law No. 7/2004, Law 
No. 7,8,9, 19 and 18/2007. The main changes regarded the composition of the electoral bodies (CNE and STAE) 
which supervise the election process: since 1994 there has been a trend to decrease the number of parliamentary 
parties, to deny the representation of extra-parliamentary parties and to increase the number of representatives of 
civil society organizations (CSOs). Even though this is perceived as an indicator of non-partisanship, the 
opposition political parties believe that due to their financial precariousness some CSOs are easily co-opted by 
the ruling party and thus are not truly independent (Muendane 2011, 20-23). Another change was the inclusion 
of a provision in which in case of a mismatch between the number of ballot papers cast and the actual number of 
voters in a certain circle, the CNE will take into account the number of ballot papers if it is not higher than the 
number of registered voters (article 85º of Law No. 7/2007).  
141
 The Mvunga Commission was appointed in 1990 to recommend a constitution that could serve a plural 
political system. This resulted in the 1991 Constitution.  
142
 The Mwanakatwe Commission was appointed in 1993; it resulted in the 1996 amendment to the 1991 
Constitution. This Constitution brought in the parental clause for the election of the President. 
143
 Following the submission of the Mung’omba Constitution to the Government, the Government established 
the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) through the National Constitutional Conference Act, No.17 of 
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2003
144
, all attempted to engage the population and civil society agents into the process of 
Constitution and electoral law amendment (Maregere and Mofya 2006). Although there have 
been recommendations, by the Mvunga and Mwanakatwe Commissions, to change the 
electoral formula from plurality to 50%+1, this has not been adopted by the incumbent 
political parties
145
. More recently, the National Constitutional Conference – NCC (which 
includes traditional leaders, politicians and members of civil society organizations) was 
created for the examination, debate and adoption of proposals to alter the Constitution. 
Notwithstanding, interviews collected during fieldwork suggested some skepticism regarding 
the success of this commission to actually change the Constitution. As of March 2014, the 
new Constitution has yet to materialize.  
Shifting the focus from the origins to the consequences of electoral system, if we simply 
look at the mechanical effects of the electoral institutions as displayed by the levels of 
disproportionality (measured as Rae’s D) and fragmentation (measured as the effective 
number of parliamentary parties
146
) additional differences can be discerned across 
Mozambique and Zambia. As Tables 6.1 and 6.2 indicate, Mozambique’s PR system produces 
lower levels of disproportionality (average D = 5.4) and of parliamentary fragmentation 
(average ENPP = 1.9) than Zambia’s FPTP formula (average D = 15.7 and average ENPP = 
2.3). From a longitudinal point of view both indexes are declining in the Mozambican 
context. In what regards the decreasing levels of disproportionality, they can be associated 
with successive changes in the size of the constituencies, which have been systematically 
rescaled before every electoral act due to technical problems in the voter registration 
process
147
:  
- Six changes between 1994 and 1999: Niassa (+2), Nampula (-4), Manica (+2), Tete 
(+3), Inhambane (-1) and Maputo City (-2);  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2007. The NCC submitted its draft constitution in August, 2010. The 2010 draft Constitution was presented to 
Parliament in 2011, but failed the two-third vote. 
144
 See Technical Committee On Drafting The Zambian Constitution http://zambianconstitution.org/terms-of-
reference-.html 
145
 The National Constitutional Conference (NCC) was established under the Act No. 19 of 2007. 
http://www.ncczambia.org/aboutthencc.php.  
146
 ENPP is calculated with the proportion of seats, while the ENEP, used in the previous Chapter, draws on the 
proportion of votes. The first informs about parliamentary fragmentation and the latter about electoral 
fragmentation.  
147
 According to the law, the distribution of mandates per electoral district is proportional to the number of 
registered voters in each electoral district. Since there have been several technical problems with voter 
registration – e.g. obsolete equipment, poorly trained workers (Carter Center 2004, Boletim da República 1999) 
– the number of mandates has varied frequently. Yet, no changes in the law have been effected. For example, the 
CNE alleged lack of means to conduct voter registration abroad in the 1994 and 1999 elections even though the 
first Electoral Law – Law No. 4/93 of 28th December – predicted the existence of three foreign electoral 
districts. For this reason, Mozambican citizens living abroad voted for the first time in 2004.  
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- Eight changes between 1999 and 2004: Niassa (-1), Manica (-1), Sofala (+1), 
Zambezia (-1), Gaza (+1), Inhambane (-1), Africa (+1) and Rest of the World (+1), 
and finally; 
- Nine changes between 2004 and 2009: Nampula (-5), Niassa (+2), Manica (+2), 
Sofala (-2), Tete (-2), Zambezia (-3), Gaza (-1), Maputo City (+2) and Maputo 
Province (+3).  
 
The removal of the 5% election threshold in 2006 might have also contributed to the drop of 
the disportionality levels between 2004 (D = 4.8) and 2009 (D = 2.6). We recall that in these 
elections the MDM gained parliamentary representation (eight seats) after being voted by 
3,9% of the electorate. The evolution of the ENPP basically reflects Frelimo’s increasingly 
dominant status particularly since the 1999 general elections. 
Contrary to Mozambique, Zambia has had a steady electoral system. No major electoral 
reforms have been made in what regards the size of the constituencies or the electoral 
formula, even though as described above, there is an ongoing debate about whether a 50%+1 
formula should be adopted to replace the FPTP. Another distinguishing feature is that 
independent candidates are allowed to run for parliamentary elections on their own; that is, 
without having to integrate a party ticket. The somewhat non-linear values of 
disproportionality across elections mainly result from the mechanical effects of the electoral 
system as it stands and also to the nature of competition in certain constituencies. Moreover, 
because Zambia has held several by-elections there are slight differences between the number 
of votes and the number of seats.  
Zambia’s parliamentary elections also show, as expected for FPTP formula (Horowitz 
2006, 9), that the parties with the highest number of votes are generously rewarded when 
votes are translated into mandates, while the least voted parties are always penalized in that 
process. So, this is also another reading about the levels of proportionality in FPTP systems. 
As Table 6.2 shows, the MMD is the most benefited party. Looking, for example at the 2001 
and 2006 elections, the most hard-fought, the result was very close to a majoritarian status in 
parliament, with the MMD winning 46% and 49% of the seats despite having been voted by 
28% and 39% of the electorate, respectively.  
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Table 6.1 – Mozambique’s Parliamentary Elections: Degrees of disproportionality and fragmentation 
 
Party Votes % Seats % Votes % - Seats % D ENPP 
1994 Frelimo 44 ,3 51 ,6 7 ,3 
  
 
Renamo 37 ,8 44 ,8 7 ,0 
  
 
UD 5 ,2 3 ,6 -1 ,6 7.9 2.1 
1999 Frelimo 48 ,6 53 ,2 4 ,6 
  
 
Renamo - UE 38 ,8 46 ,8 8 ,0 6.3 2.0 
2004 Frelimo 61 ,5 64 ,0 2 ,5 
  
 
Renamo - UE 29 ,0 36 ,0 7 ,0 4.8 1.9 
2009 Frelimo 74 ,7 76 ,4 1 ,7 
  
 
Renamo 17 ,7 20 ,4 2 ,7 
  
 
MDM 3 ,9 3 ,2 -0 ,7 2.6 1.6 
Total (as average) 
   
5 ,4 1.9 
Source: Elaborated with data from the National Electoral Commission (CNE) – http://www.stae.org.mz/ (retrieved on 30-09-
2010). Note: D = Disproportionality and ENPP = Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties. 
 
Table 6.2 – Zambia’s Parliamentary Elections: Degrees of disproportionality and fragmentation 
 
Party Votes % Seats % Votes % - Seats % D ENPP 
1991 MMD 74 ,0 83 ,3 9 ,3 
  
 
UNIP 25 ,0 16 ,7 -8 ,3 8.8 1.4 
1996 MMD 60 ,9 84 ,0 26 ,5 
  
 
Independents 10 ,0 6 ,7 -3 ,3 
  
 
NP 7 ,1 3 ,3 -3 ,8 
  
 
AZ 1 ,5 1 ,3 -0 ,1 
  
 
ZDC 13 ,8 1 ,3 -12 ,5 23.1 1.3 
2001 MMD 28 ,0 46 ,0 18 ,0 
  
 
UPND 23 ,8 32 ,7 8 ,9 
  
 
HP 7 ,6 2 ,7 -4 ,9 
  
 
FDD 15 ,6 8 ,0 -7 ,6 
  
 
UNIP 10 ,6 8 ,7 -1 ,9 
  
 
ZRP 5 ,5 0 ,7 -4 ,9 
  
 
Independents 3 ,4 0 ,7 -2 ,7 
  
 
PF 2 ,8 0 ,7 -2 ,2 25.5 3.0 
2006 MMD 39 ,1 49 ,3 10 ,3 
  
 
UDA* 22 ,7 18 ,0 -4 ,7 
  
 
PF 22 ,7 30 ,7 8 ,0 
  
 
Independents 9 ,5 1 ,3 -8 ,2 
  
 
NDF 1 ,0 0 ,7 -0 ,4 15.7 2.9 
2011 MMD 33 ,6 36 ,7 3 ,1 
  
 
UPND 17 ,0 19 ,3 2 ,4 
  
 
PF 38 ,2 40 ,7 2 ,4 
  
 
Independents 7 ,8 2 ,0 -5 ,8 
  
 
ADD 1 ,2 0 ,7 -0 ,5 
  
 
FDD 0 ,7 0 ,7 -0 ,1 7.1 3.0 
Total (as average) 
   
16 ,0 2.3 
Source: Elaborated with data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) – http://www.elections.org.zm/ 
(retrieved on 30-09-2010; and 14-10-2011). Note: *UDA is a coalition of UPND, FDD and UNIP. D = 
Disproportionality and ENPP = Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties. 
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This descriptive analysis has shown that Mozambique’s PR system is more proportional 
than Zambia’s FPTP system. They produce, however, unconventional outcomes as far as the 
parliamentary fragmentation is concerned: the PR system produces a dominant party system 
with two major competitors and the FPTP system originates a multiparty system and has 
failed to create majoritarian cabinets since 2001
148
. In theory, a PR formula usually facilitates 
the parliamentary representation of various social groups, while FPTP is likely to restrict the 
parliamentary representation of smaller political parties (Duverger 1959; Horowitz 2006; 
Sartori 2003). Yet the case studies confronted us with “unconventional” effects, which will be 
examined in the next section using Sartori’s (2003) typology about the interplays between the 
structure of the party system and the nature of the electoral system. 
 
6.2.1 Beyond the direct effects of electoral systems  
 
According to Sartori (2003), the effects of electoral institutions on party systems are indirect 
and, to a large extent, depend on the structure of the party system itself; with more structured 
party systems being better able to create majoritarian results out of the electoral rules rather 
than less structured ones. Thus, even though we have sustained that electoral institutions 
matter
149
, building on the results of the quantitative analysis and on the literature on the 
political consequences of electoral institutions (Grofman and Lijphart 2003; Diamond and 
Plattner 2006), the descriptive analysis of the case studies led us to consider the reasons why 
in some cases the rules turn out to work the other way around. Addressing this problem is 
relevant not only for the cases here selected, but also for other cases in the sample in which 
plurality formula seem to be associated to higher fragmentation or weaker levels of PSI, when 
compared to PR and mixed formula (e.g. Mauritius, The Gambia and Malawi).  
Sartori’s (2003) model is particularly relevant for the reassessment of the role of 
electoral systems in party systems. He suggests four possible interactions between these two 
institutions: (i) strong electoral system and strong party system, (ii) feeble electoral system 
and strong party system, (iii) strong electoral system and feeble party system, and (iv) feeble 
electoral system and feeble party system (Sartori 2003, 61-63). Strong electoral systems 
include the plurality formula and also the “strongly impure” PR formula and feeble electoral 
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 Like Zambia, Mauritius and Malawi are other cases of FPTP formulas that do not conform to the two-party 
system format; here multiparty systems have also emerged. In the majority of the 19 countries analyzed, 
however, the FPTP has produced dominant party systems (for example Botswana, Tanzania, Nigeria); the only 
exception in the sample is Ghana, which has a classical two-party system.  
149
 See Chapter IV.  
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systems refer to the relatively pure PR formula; strong party systems include two-party 
formats while feeble party systems are more fragmented (Sartori 2003, 61). 
Mozambique falls into combination (i) with a strong electoral system (PR) encountering 
a structured party system (dominant). It seems counterintuitive to label Mozambique’s PR 
system strong, but we explain this further. Sartori (2003, 61) conceives PR systems as both 
strong and feeble institutions depending on their degree of proportionality and on the size of 
the electoral districts. Since in Mozambique the PR formula used is the least proportional one 
(D’ Hondt) and until 2006 there was a 5% election threshold, the electoral system is better 
labeled as strong. Zambia, in turn, falls into combination (iii) with a feeble party system 
(fragmented) paring with a strong electoral system (FPTP). In Mozambique’s case the voter is 
constrained not only by the electoral system, but also by the potency of party channeling. In 
fact, because there is strong systemic structuring (of the party system), the effects of the PR 
(which are notorious for promoting higher fragmentation) are eventually nullified. In the 
Zambia, the electoral system cannot produce reductive effects on a national scale, but merely 
at the constituency level. A two-party format becomes impossible because there is cross-
constituency dispersion of issues which cannot be represented by the two major parties 
(Sartori 2003).  
Mozambique’s overinstitutionalized party system is thus anchored in a strong electoral 
system that favors its reproduction over time. Especially in the first two elections (1994; 
1999), the two main parties seem to have gained from the electoral law as the late appearance 
of the MDM, in 2009, suggests. The removal of the 5% barrier clearly benefited this party, 
which despite receiving just 3,9% of the votes cast, still gained eight parliamentary seats. An 
earlier removal of this barrier could have also benefited the PDD which came third in 2004, 
after the Frelimo and the Renamo-UE. The highlight here is Frelimo’s ability to persist as the 
most voted party through time and regime changes. Indeed, the “Frelimo-State” model, which 
emerged shortly after independence and developed until 1990, remains present as no other 
party has been able to remove it from power. This is also the result of the party’s ability to 
modernize and detach itself from its warring past legacies and to present itself, even if only 
discursively, as a democratic force, but not only. In fact, the Frelimo used its incumbency to 
make incursions into Renamo’s electorate, delivering economic development and patronage 
that the Renamo could not (Manning 2008, 44) and was successful in occupying its agenda
150
. 
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 Interviews with António Muchanga (Renamo, member of the State Council) and José Macuane also 
highlighted this point.  
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With the assistance of good anthropologists, the Frelimo was able to work on Renamo’s 
weaknesses as well as on its own. For example, the Frelimo extinguished the marchas de guia, 
finished with the communal villages and recognized religious confessions and traditional 
authorities. Therefore, it absorbed the four sources of Renamo’s electoral support. [...] The 
Renamo, in turn, was not capable to do the same within Frelimo’s traditional electorate (Ismael 
Mussa, former Renamo, and current MDM)
151
.  
 
Given the increasing dominance of the Frelimo, the Renamo, which came to the political 
arena in 1992 led by individuals with no experience in government, still holding to some of its 
wartime political issues (mentioned above in Ismael Mussa’s interview152), was unable to 
reinvent itself. Afonso Dhlakama, the party leader since 1969, has never been replaced. He 
centralizes the most important decisions and ignores the party senior bodies defined in the 
party law (Manning 2008, 43-44). Having received a good amount of funding throughout the 
years (Nuvunga 2007)
153
, the party showed no concrete investment in organizational 
development and despite having attracted the interest of a new intelligentsia between 1999-
2009, it quickly encapsulated itself around Dhlakama, who demoted or dismissed all those 
that gained too much visibility (e.g. PDD’s President Raul Domingos and MDM’s President 
Daviz Simango) (Nuvunga 2007).  
In Zambia’s inadequately institutionalized party system, FPTP elections have been 
unable to create a two-party system since 1996 and a majoritarian government since 2001. It 
would be expected that more stable patterns of competition, at least at the government level, 
would emerge but the conventional expectation does not apply in this case. The political scene 
has been hallmarked by factionalism and in-fighting, with high cadres breaking away from the 
incumbent party to form alternative political parties. In this sense, major opposition parties in 
parliament have been formed within the ruling party. This has been one of the major causes of 
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 Translated from the original: «A Frelimo; e de certa maneira também com assessoria de bons antropólogos 
também trabalhou os pontos fortes da Renamo e soube trabalhar os seus pontos fracos. Por exemplo a Frelimo 
[...] extinguiu as guias de marcha; acabou com as aldeias comunais, reconheceu as confissões religiosas e 
reconheceu e valorizou as autoridades tradicionais. Portanto as quatro bases [eleitorais] [...] da Renamo foram 
absorvidas pela Frelimo [...]. A própria Renamo não teve e mesma capacidade de o fazer dentro daquilo que 
era o eleitorado tradicional da Frelimo.»  
152
 This opinion was also conveyed by José Jaime Macuane and João Pereira professors at the Department of 
Political Science and Public Administration/University Eduardo Mondlane. 
153
 In June 1982, the Lonrho (British/German Company) subsidiary signed a secret protection agreement with the 
Renamo leaders covering the Beira oil pipeline. The agreement stipulated payments of US$500.000, which 
continued up to the signing of the GPA and amounted to some US$5 million. From October 1992 to February 
1993, the government of Mozambique declared that US$307.000 were spent on Renamo’s needs, basically on 
food, transport, domestic air travel and house furnishing. In the first legislature, the Renamo was entitled to 
US$85.000 per month from the state budget, amount which Dhlakama said was only two thirds of the party’s 
running costs and allowed nothing for (economic) investment (Nuvunga 2007, 10-14).  
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fragmentation together with the periodic ethnicization of electoral campaigns in certain 
constituencies (Levinson 1998; Habasonda 2009; Erdmann 2007a; Cheembe 2013). Among 
the main political parties, the UPND is most often associated with more parochial approaches. 
The party’s strongest supporters are to be found in the Southern Province, where the Tonga 
are the largest ethnic group. Since its foundation in 2001, it has won the majority of seats in 
this Province, which is also the homeland of Anderson Mazoka, the founding leader of the 
party. His death opened a succession dispute between Sakwiba Sikota, highest in the party 
hierarchy, and Hakainde Hichilema, a businessman that belonged to the same tribal line of the 
late leader (Tonga). Hakainde Hichilema was eventually elected party leader and Sakwiba 
Sikota went on to establish his own party – the United Liberal Party (ULP) (Habasonda 2009, 
16).  
Regarding the other political parties, it is very difficult to find clear tribal lines in the 
sense that there is some volatility in the patterns of support across different Provinces 
(Habasonda 2009). The UNIP seemed to have a stronghold in the Eastern Province (home of 
the Nsenga and the Tumbuka) having won the 19 seats in competition in 1991 and 12 of 19 
seats in 2001. Yet, the electorate shifted alliances in the following elections and granted a 
majority to the MMD in the 2006 and in the 2011 polls. PF’s success in the Bemba (largest 
ethnic group) Provinces – Northern, Luapula and Copperbelt – has been relevant, for more 
than half of the seats gained in 2006 and 2011 came from these Provinces. 
According to Simutanyi (2010, 10), the fact that «Michael Sata has been unable to 
obtain electoral support from the Lozi of Western Province, the Lunda, Luvale and Kaonde of 
North-Western, the Nyanja-speaking people of Eastern and the Tonga of Southern province, 
just as Hakainde Hichilema’s appeal has failed to resonate outside his home region of 
Southern Province» suggest that no «ethnic group can hope to capture power on its own, 
without forging a kind of ethnic coalition (Simutanyi 2010, 10). Therefore, more instrumental 
approaches to certain constituencies and ethnic groups can prove crucial in election times 
(Osei-Hwedie 1998; Erdmann 2007a; Erdmann 2007b). The case of Zambia exemplifies a 
context in which the dispersion/concentration of ethnic and linguistic divisions across 
constituencies is “above-plurality”, which means that because there is not a major ethnic 
group, the patterns of competition tend to be centrifugal rather than centripetal and this, in 
turn, undermines the formation of a nationwide two-party system
154
. Moreover, factionalism – 
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 Already in the late 1960s Rae (1967) criticized Duverger laws to consider different patterns of two-party 
competition in different regions, for where regional parties were strong, like in Canada, the FPTP failed to create 
a classical two-party system.  
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mostly motivated by personalism and tribalism instead of ideological and programmatic 
differences – contribute to higher levels of instability in the party system.  
 
6.3 Party funding/finance  
 
Particularly in the context of new democracies, it is believed that financial resources are 
determinant to sustain a democratic party system, as political parties need resources to have 
territorially comprehensible organizations and to develop their activities (from campaigning 
through ongoing socialization and mobilization of voters) (Randall and Svåsand 2002; Salih 
and Nordlund 2007). In the majority of African countries, however, these provisions are 
rather absent, and when they exist they are poorly enforced into political practices, which 
overall tends to blur the question of how much money parties actually have and what are its 
sources (Fambom 2003; Saffu 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Sokomani et al. 2010). 
Building on the results of the quantitative strand of analysis, this section argues that the 
existence of provisions for public funding and of wider rules of finance disclosure contributes 
to the institutionalization of party system. Principally in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa 
where economies are weaker, political parties are young and lack mass membership. 
Moreover, there is a huge gap between incumbent and opposition parties, and public funding 
is necessary not only to level the playing field but also to help support smaller parties 
activities. The disclosure of finances, in turn, enables some degree of transparency and 
accountability even if minimal. That said, funding is necessary but not sufficient, for as Salih 
and Nordlund (2007) note, the ability of political parties to seek resources and mobilize 
sympathizers is also relevant for their autonomy vis-à-vis state resources. Later on, we present 
extracts of interviews conducted during the fieldwork, to support this point.  
As in the previous section, the present analysis takes into consideration how the cases’ 
characteristics (party dominance in Mozambique, and party dominance, factionalism and 
ethnoregionalism in Zambia) influence the effects of party funding/finance in the party 
system.  
Mozambique’s Party Law (PL) No. 7/91 23rd January lays out the rules of party 
formation and registration as well as the conditions of funding in the new multiparty setting. 
These were later reinforced in the GPA’s Protocol II “Criteria and arrangements for the 
formation and recognition of political parties”. Political parties were granted equal rights with 
respect to their access to the mass media and to sources of public funding and public facilities, 
on the basis of criteria of parliamentary representativeness (article 20 of the PL). Modalities 
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of funding – membership fees, donations, public subsidies and other forms or finance (not 
specified) – and duties related to the annual disclosure of their accounts and sources of 
funding were also stipulated (article 17 of the PL). The finance of electoral campaigns is 
subject to the Law No. 7/2004 17th July 2004. The law allows contributions of candidates 
themselves and parties/or alliances, voluntary contributions of national or foreign citizens, 
“friendly parties” and non-governmental organizations and funding coming from campaign 
activities and the State. It prohibits government and public entities financing (articles 33 to 
40). Despite highly regulated party funding/finance, provisions are poorly implemented in 
practice, notably in what regards the public disclosure of finances and the supervision on the 
side of the CNE and the Administrative Court (Nuvunga 2010; Sokomani et al. 2010). 
Despite malpractices, a meeting organized by the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy (NIMD), in the run-up to the 2009 election, in which several political parties and 
civil society organizations
155
 took part, reinforced the relevance of funding for Mozambican 
political parties. Among major constraints it was emphasized that the «lack of funding 
reduces the parties’ visibility by limiting their actions; creates constraints in strategy design 
and the registration of party members; weakens the internal communication networking of 
parties, especially at the territorial level; and weakens parties’ capacity building and civic 
education programs» (Mulhovo 2010). A note was also made to the four possibilities in terms 
of political party funding, namely: members’ contributions, donations and gifts, funds from 
the state budget and other sources; as well as to the parties’ disagreement over funding 
through the state budget, as it is allocated according to a party’s representation in the 
parliament. «In general, political parties with representation in parliament accept the criteria 
as fair, while extra-parliamentarian political parties find the criteria endanger their survival» 
(Mulhovo 2010).  
Members of political parties interviewed during fieldwork conveyed two types of 
positions regarding public funding. On the one hand, there seems to be a deficit in the process 
of implementation of legal provisions: funding is not provided within schedule, and the lack 
of proper supervision allows the unlawful use of public funds by the incumbent party. On the 
other hand, the existing criteria of public funding, based upon the number of seating MPs, is 
rather insufficient to level the playing field. Extra-parliamentary parties (over 40 parties now), 
only receive funds at elections times. The majority does not have a physical address and some 
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 The meeting aimed at discussing the results of a study conducted by the Electoral Institute for Sustainable 
Democracy in Africa (EISA). Several organizations were present, notably the Observatório Eleitoral/ Electoral 
Observatory (OE), which is a consortium of Mozambican civil society organizations created to promote the 
transparency and the fairness of the electoral processes. 
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engage in “out of the box” solutions, such as sharing their office with another political party 
to remain active
156
. But there are also those who argue that public funding is not relevant, as 
political parties need to develop more effective means to fund their activities in-and-out of the 
electoral period. In what regards the capacity of funding to actually level the playing field 
some argue that it can actually undermine the competition by downplaying the actual weight 
and relevance of the political parties. Here are some interview extracts that express some of 
these views:  
  
We are not able to start the campaign all in the same day and at the same time because the 
electoral bodies do not deliver the money on time … sometimes they give us the money with 
only 15 days [of campaign] left … (André Balate, Parena, President)157  
 
some people sustain that state funding for political parties during election campaigns should be 
equal, I do not agree with that criterion. There are parties AND parties. There are parties 
centered on the president [...] and there are mass parties; how can we equalize different things? 
[...] I could agree with what happens in certain countries, where at the end of each electoral act, 
some parties are banned if they fail to reach a certain electoral mark. Because we have over 50 
parties in Mozambique now. (Benedito Marime, founder of PCN, currently on MDM)
158
  
 
they [the funds] are essential but not determinant. The MDM reached the parliament with few 
resources, it all depends on the strategy used by the party to get votes out of the abstention. 
(Ismael Mussa, former Renamo, and currently on MDM)
159  
 
We develop some economic activities that help us be self sustainable. For instance, we can 
define that 2% of the militants’ salary will contribute to fund big events like the Party Congress. 
The party has shops with campaign material for sale, in informal meetings everyone including 
the president, uses the [party] t-shirt, but they have to buy it. Can you imagine? In the Congress 
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 For example the Palmo and the Pasomo share the same office (as of May 2013). 
157
 Translated from the original: «[...] o que faz com que não iniciemos a campanha no mesmo dia, na mesma 
hora, são os órgão eleitorais, porque não disponibilizam o financiamento na hora … às vezes dão dinheiro 
enquanto só faltam 15 dias, faltam 15 dias … e com esses 15 dias tu pões material ali… material acolá… sei lá 
o quê.» 
158
 Translated from the original: «[...] há quem advogue que o financiamento do estado, portanto aos partidos 
aquando das campanhas eleitorais deve ser por igual, eu não concordo com este critério. Ate porque há 
partidos e há partidos. Há partidos reduzidos ao seu presidente; [...] e há partidos de massas; como é que nos 
vamos igualar coisas diferentes. [...] eu era capaz de aprovar aquilo que acontece em determinados países, em 
que no final de cada processo eleitoral há partidos que são extintos, quando não atingem uma certa fasquia 
eleitoral, porque nós temos agora em Moçambique para cima de 50 partidos.» 
159
 Translated from the original: «são essenciais mas não são determinantes. Porque o MDM com poucos 
recursos conseguiu chegar ao parlamento. Tudo depende da estratégia que for adotada para ir buscar o voto à 
abstenção.» 
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we were about 2000 delegates all dressed up. Imagine that during the Congress people would 
change ... and use another t-shirt; from various designs and colors. Additionally, those militants 
of the party that own companies give some donations to the party. (Morais Mabyeka, Frelimo, 
Secretary for Organization)
160
 
 
In the majority of extra-parliamentary parties, the money ends up going to the pockets of the 
party leaders, who in turn have never been elected. This happens because they do not invest the 
money in the campaign. My personal opinion about this matter, not the official opinion of the 
party, is that we need to somehow limit the number of times a party can run without electing an 
MP and then make a decision about whether it should be financed or not. (António Muchanga, 
Renamo, member of the State Council)
161
  
 
Zambia’s 1991 Constitution outlawed the one-party system and opened the way for a 
multiparty framework with political parties being allowed to register and take part in the 
country’s political life. Under the one-party rule, the UNIP received grants and was funded by 
the government for the purposes of conducting election campaigns (Mbewe 2009, 4). Yet, the 
1991 constitutional text did not address the issue of financing political parties and election 
campaigns. The «only piece of legislation that relates to party finance is the Societies Act 
which regulates all legal entities from political parties to any civil society organization. 
According to the Societies Act (Article 16), the Registrar of Societies, is the only state 
institution mandated to ask for and receive annual reports from political parties and requires 
them to file annual returns in a prescribed format and defined timeframe» (Sokomani et al. 
2010, 33-34). In 2003, legislation to provide for the funding of political parties with 
parliamentary seat, the Political Parties Fund Bill, was unanimously voted in the National 
Assembly; however «President Mwanawasa condemned his MPs for having voted and 
referred to the action as ‘irresponsible,’ given that the government had no money. He vowed 
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 Translated from the original: «Nós temos algumas atividades económicas que em algum momento podem 
ajudar. Nós por exemplo, nesses grandes eventos que nós temos, que é o congresso determinamos que 2% do 
salário dos militantes vai contribuir só para aqueles eventos. Por exemplo, temos algumas lojas onde temos 
material de campanha. Por exemplo as nossas reuniões, praticamente se é informal incluindo o presidente, 
todos põem a camiseta mas têm que comprar! Estás a imaginar? Por exemplo, no congresso eramos cerca de 
2000 e tal todos equipados. Imagina que durante os congressos as pessoas mudavam … tinham outra camiseta; 
de vários modelos de várias cores. Por exemplo, aqueles militantes do partido que tem posses de empresas, 
nessa altura eles dão umas contribuições para o partido do poder.» 
161
 Translated from the original: «Este dinheiro acaba ficando nos bolsos de dirigentes desses partidos, na maior 
parte dos chamados partidos extraparlamentares, esses que desde que começou [o multipartidarismo] estão a 
concorrer e nunca ganham. É porque não investem esse dinheiro lá na campanha. [...] Eu penso que em relação 
a esse assunto… essa é a minha opinião pessoal não do partido, tinha-se que se estudar uma maneira ou 
limitava-se quantas vezes um partido poderia concorrer sem ganhar e depois tomava-se a decisão deste partido 
não voltar a ser financiado.» 
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that the resolution passed by Parliament would not be implemented as long as he remained 
President» (Simutanyi 2005, 10). With overall lack of transparency and accountability, it is 
not possible to know how much money the political parties and their members receive every 
year in Zambia (Sokomani et al. 2010, 33-34). 
It is known that political parties raise limited money through membership dues. 
Therefore, three forms of finance have allowed political parties to be active groups in society 
(Kabemba and Eiseman 2004, 15-16). The first is through personal wealth of the party 
leadership and candidates. This is the case of some political parties, namely the UPND, since 
its founding father – Anderson Mazoka – and current leader – Hakainde Hichilema – were/are 
both businessmen. The second is through the party’s ownership of economic assets and this is 
particularly the case of the UNIP which was able to accumulate some property during its 
period as ruling party. Finally, the third is through the use of public resources. Even though 
the Electoral Code of Conduct bans the use of government resources for party or campaign 
purposes, the Code does not carry any legal power (Sokomani et al. 2010, 33-34), thus 
allowing the ruling party (the MMD or the PF) to pursue the same practices as the UNIP 
during one-partyism (Kabemba and Eiseman 2005, 15-16). In addition to this, political parties 
are expected to raise funds through campaign activities (such as dinners and luncheons) and 
donations.  
The combined dominance of parties by wealthy members and donors with the absence 
of financial regulations and transparency creates a real threat to the integrity of electoral and 
political processes in Zambia and opens them to corruption (Kabemba and Eiseman 2005, 
16). The current incumbent party, the PF, tends not to support public funding. Also the 
MMD, while in government, refused to pass a law (in 2003) that would allow for public 
funding of political parties. Testimonies collected during fieldwork suggest that funding for 
the main political parties should be allowed, but on equal grounds. Smaller political parties 
tend to support the adoption of public funding; but not under the parliamentary 
representation criterion (expressed by the leaders of the NRP, the NDP, and the APC). Here 
are some interview excerpts:  
 
it is very difficult for me to subscribe to that kind of thinking especially coming from a party 
that had no budget but formed government, so money doesn’t really win you an election if we 
have to go by recent events, you know? Money didn’t win the MMD the elections, they had all 
the money... and unfortunately it is a bit of a fantasy for people in a Third world country like 
Zambia, struggling with a GDP per capita of only about 1500 dollars, wanting the luxury for 
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instance of funding political parties. I find it a little bit funny, that in such a country we can 
have such funding priorities (Chanda Mfula, PF, Media and Publicity Director)  
 
you see parties are supposed to be funded because there are very well meaningful people out 
there who can deliver but the only problem; the only challenge that they have are funds... you 
know... so they lose out... so parties are really supposed to be funded by the government. 
(Charles Zulu, independent candidate elected in 2011) 
 
My view, my personal view is that if political parties are going to be funded you must set 
criteria for them to qualify and the amount of money given to any political party should be the 
same, because they are competing. They are competing. So if they are competing the best is to 
give a fair ground for everybody. If you give the ruling party more than the opposition, how are 
they going to compete? They are not going to compete. That is not competition. That is 
advantaging and disadvantaging the other side. […] So my view myself personally, is that if we 
must decide, we will fund but we are going to give these funds to the three best parties. (Alfred 
Ndhlovu, MMD, Information and Publicity Secretary) 
 
So, I think that in principle it is a very good principle [state funding] we should support it... but 
concretely and in practical terms in Zambia it can prove very difficult unless some other criteria 
would be used for funding. I am totally against the criteria which would be used in Zambia and 
which is used in other countries; that of funding people with seats in the parliament. That would 
mean creating a big gap between disadvantage and the advantaged ones. (Tentani Mwanza, 
NDP, President)  
 
the new Constitution will put in place funding for political parties but again [...] it is unfair 
because it is only the political parties in parliament that will be funded. (Cosmo Mumba, NRP, 
President) 
 
we try to do and we are still trying to do something different; we don’t rely for example on the 
president of the party for funding, currently we are working our ways, in which we can attract 
funding for the party. Because it is essential, because without funding you cannot operate, you 
need to travel around the country ... you need stationery, you need computers. As Secretary-
General of the United Liberal Party you can imagine I rely on my office computer [...]. 
(Inambao Inambao, ULP, Secretary-General)  
 
Apart from political parties, civil society leaders, who have been involved in the most recent 
process of constitutional amendment (started in 2011) argue that there are no mechanisms for 
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the sustainability of political parties (Richwell Mulwani, AVAP President), that political 
parties are owned by the leader and do not spend time in institutional strengthening (Horance 
Chilando, ZCID Director; Juliet Chibuta Women Lobby Director) and that resources are 
among their main challenges (Boniface Cheembe, SACCORD Director; Sombo Chunda, 
Diakonia Country Representative)
162
. Yet, the issue of funding remains controversial and 
unresolved as incumbent parties are still unwilling to adopt the changes suggested by civil 
society organizations and opposition political parties. The several commissions for 
constitutional amendment express this reluctance. The Mvunga Commission «recommended 
that political parties that have secured any number of seats in Parliament should be assisted 
with Government grants through Parliament in equal amounts and that any external assistance 
to parties should be channeled through the Government» (Report of the Constitution Review 
Commission 2005, 567); the Mwanakatwe Commission called for funding of political parties 
by the state, and so did the Mung’omba (2005) and the NCC Draft Constitutions of Zambia 
(2010). Despite systematic recommendations, funding for political parties obeys rules of 
disclosure which are still the same as the ones applied to any other civil organization 
operating in the country.  
This analysis has shown that even though there are provisions regulating public and 
private funding in Mozambique they remain poorly enforced in practice. This narrowness is 
seen to benefit the ruling party vis-à-vis the others, both directly (because finance is 
distributed in accordance with parliamentary representation) and indirectly (because the party 
has somewhat unsupervised access to state resources). The amalgamation between the 
Frelimo and the state since 1975, labeled as “Estado-Frelimo” by several Mozambican 
scholars
163
, skews some of the known attributes of public funding such as, leveling the 
playing field, increasing accountability and transparency. Yet, it contributes to the high and 
overinstitutionalized party system by reinforcing existing rules of interparty competition. At 
the same time, the rules of state funding (based upon parliamentary representation), have 
allowed the Frelimo and the Renamo to have guaranteed sources of money and, for that 
reason, they have tended to defend existing provisions (or more restrictive rules) while 
opposition parties prefer relaxing the rules. Even if poorly supervised, the existing provisions 
favor the reproduction of an overinstitutionalized party system. In Zambia, the absence of 
provisions makes political parties more exposed to influence-peddling and their structures 
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 Opinion collected through fieldwork interviews.  
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 For example, José Jaime Macuane and Domingos do Rosário, both professors at the Department of Political 
Science and Public Administration/University Eduardo Mondlane.  
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more vulnerable to the wealthier elites that sponsor the party. Combined with the existing 
factionalism and personalism, the necessary ingredients are present to reproduce a weakly and 
inadequately institutionalized party system. 
 
6.4 Networks and party system institutionalization  
  
In the previous chapter we relied on Tilly (2001) and Ansell (1998) to argue that relational 
mechanisms are about networks and that networks are a set of relations within and across 
individuals or collectivities in which resources, information, influence and capital are 
exchanged to create patterns of mutual cooperation or coercion, inter alia. The analysis of the 
relational mechanisms is relevant for the purposes of our study since they will allows us to 
identify the most common networks behind different processes of PSI.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, neopatrimonialism is the most relevant informal 
feature in African politics encompassing practices such as tribalism, clientelism and 
patronage, in turn inherited from the pretransition authoritarian regime (Bayart 1989; Bratton 
and van de Walle 1997; Lindberg 2001; Chabal 2002; van de Walle 2001; van de Walle 2002; 
van de Walle 2003). In modern political systems, neopatrimonial behaviors occurs in a 
institutional frameworks in which presidents are endowed with strong constitutional powers 
(van Cranenburgh 2008, 952) and are circled by a small ruling elite that uses the state’s 
resources to keep the support of large networks of political clients (van de Walle 2002, 69).  
According to van de Walle (2003), presidentialism and pervasive clientelism crucially 
shape party system development in Africa. In the majority of countries, he states, the 
presidency is the key arena for decision-making and because of such centralization the 
clientelistic access to state resources in Africa is also highly concentrated in the presidency. 
This institutional design affects the party system by underplaying both the role of legislative 
elections and of the political parties.  
Clientelism, even when it is largely symbolic, implies a patron and client linkage, it has 
been associated to parochial ways of doing politics, as a way of rewarding loyal 
constituencies (ethnic, regional or politically based), but it is also a means of forging 
«alliances across different social elites, often in the form of overt power-sharing 
arrangements» (van de Walle 2003, 312).  
As far as patronage is concerned, van de Walle (2003) notes that it is not as pervasive 
since «African state structures are woefully small, compared with those in other, richer 
states». For example, «the entire civil service in Africa represents on average only 2% of the 
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population, compared with 6,9 % in Eastern Europe, for example, or 7,7% in the OECD 
countries» (van de Walle 2003, 312). Additionally, rather than «individually excludable goods 
such as jobs, there is much more potential to influence voting with promises of community 
goods, notably in the form of social services, in this sense, perhaps the most common 
electoral promise made by African politicians, particularly as they venture out of the capital, 
is that they will provide better roads and social services to populations who vote for them» 
(van de Walle 2003, 312).  
Therefore, the most common form of linkage between political parties and their 
constituents seems to be a mixed form of clientelism and local collective goods (local 
development). Ethnicity is also relevant in this equation since individuals are likely to vote for 
individuals of their own ethnic group, particularly in ethnically divided societies, such as 
Mozambique and Zambia, even if there is not a clear device or system of reward (Ibid.).  
Building upon this literature, two sorts of networks are of interest here: interparty, i.e. 
between the parties in the system, and extraparty i.e. between the parties and their 
constituencies. Focusing on party coalitions, we show that despite the fact that they have been 
largely unsuccessful in defeating the incumbent party in both Mozambique and Zambia, in the 
former’s case there is a national approach to the way coalitions are structured, while in the 
latter formal pre-electoral alliances for national elections are unusual, due to the salience of 
other relational patterns such as factionalism and personalism. In this sense, the study of 
relational mechanisms is relevant to shed light on the informal ways through which political 
parties change or crystallize the rules of interparty competition.  
 
6.4.1 Party coalitions  
 
In one of the few studies about party coalitions in Africa, Kadima (2006a, 2-8) argues that 
multipartism created an opportunity for parties to combine strengths either to win 
parliamentary representation or the possibility to form government. Given this, coalitions 
would be more likely to occur in an FPTP system than in a PR system, since the first entails 
more wasting of votes and thus encourages political parties to establish alliances to minimize 
losses (Kadima 2006b). 
Moving from likelihood of occurrence to actual results, a study of Resnick (2011) 
covering 17 electoral democracies in Africa reveals that coalitions rarely result in incumbent 
defeat». In fact, the possibility of coalitions to actually break the status quo and alter 
established patterns and rules of competition is held back by several key features of African 
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politics as both these studies show (Kadima 2006a; Resnick 2011). Some of these features 
have been previously mentioned in this dissertation and are made clear in this quote:  
 
pervasiveness of ethnoregionalist politics within political parties and coalitions combined with 
the dominance of identity-based voting behavior over issue-based choices; the presidentialist 
deviation of presidential regimes, which tends to endow the presidency with excessive executive 
powers, to the detriment of Parliament; the prevailing unstable party systems; and the limited 
opportunities outside the state, which often lead to the prevalence of opportunistic coalitions. 
Moreover, party coalitions in Africa are likely to be affected by factors such as the inadequate 
institutionalization of democracy on the continent and the dominance of founding leaders over 
the party as well as the structural and organizational weaknesses of the parties themselves 
(Kadima 2006a, 10). 
 
With the 5% election threshold, smaller political parties in Mozambique were incentivized to 
enact alliances from the onset of the 1994 elections, as can be seen in Table 6.3. The number 
of alliances has increased up until the 2009 polls. Yet, they have never been able to defeat the 
incumbent party – the Frelimo. Pre-electoral coalitions where the majority of parties are 
equally small, barely achieved parliamentary representation. In fact, only the UD was able to 
surpass the 5% threshold and elect candidates; even though this might have been caused by 
the party’s symbol (the cashew nut, well known especially in rural areas) and its position at 
the bottom of the ballot paper (Brito 1996; Kadima and Matsimbe 2006). Apart from this, 
smaller political parties – namely their President or Secretary-General164 – were able to gain 
seats in parliament after the 1999 and 2004 elections under the Renamo-UE coalition, in 
which the Renamo was the leading force (it collected about 85% of the seats won by the 
alliance in both elections). 
Another interesting feature is that party-coalitions change from one election to the other. 
We find cases like the UD, which ran in three different elections always with a different 
composition and the Renamo-UE that won more partners between 1999 and 2004 and 
eventually dissolved before the 2009 polls. Then there are also parties which have integrated 
several different alliances (e.g. the Monamo-PMSD and the FAP first formed the UD and 
after that joined the Renamo-UE) and cases of more short-lived alliances as the ones 
contesting in 2004. In 2009, only Renamo’s and Frelimo’s candidacies were approved in all 
11 provinces; about 10 political parties and coalitions were completely disqualified from 
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 Renamo’s cadres António Muchanga and Fernando Mazanga stated that usually the party leaders would 
negotiate their position in parliament as an exchange for taking part in the coalition.  
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participating in the polls, while several others were partly excluded (e.g. MDM). As a result, 
only two pre-electoral coalitions participated in these parliamentary elections (UE and 
ADACD) to gather less than 0,7% of the votes cast.  
 
Table 6.3 – Party Coalitions in Mozambique (1994 – 2009) 
General Election  Coalition**  Affiliated Parties 
Votes%  
(Seats) 
1994 
UD Panade, Palmo, Panamo 
5,1 
(9 seats) 
AP Monamo-PMSD, FAP 2,3 
1999 
UD Pademo, Pacode, Pamomo 
1,5 
* 
Renamo-UE 
 
Renamo, PPPM, PRD, FAP, Alimo, 
PUN, PCN, Monamo-PMSD, FDU, 
Fumo-PCD, 
Unamo 
38,8 
(117 seats) 
 
2004 
Renamo-UE 
Renamo, Alimo, FAP, PRD, PUN, 
PPPM, PCN, Fumo-PCD, Monamo-
PSD, FDU, Pemo 
29,0 
(90 seats) 
 
MBG Unamo, Partonamo 
0,4 
* 
FAO LF, PAC 
0,3 
* 
UD Panade, PLDM 
0,3 
* 
Usamo Padres, PSM, PSDM, UM 
0,2 
* 
2009 
UE Pemo , PUN  
0,2 
* 
ADACD PSM, Pacode, PUR 
0,4 
* 
Source: Kadima and Matsimbe (2006, 157-158); EISA - http://eisa.org.za/WEP/mozparties2004.htm; African Elections 
Database - http://africanelections.tripod.com/; National Electoral Commission (CNE) – http://www.stae.org.mz/.  
Note: * means no seats won; ** see acronym list for full name of parties and alliances.  
 
Several aspects concur to the lack of success and to the ephemeral nature of party 
coalitions in Mozambique, notably the weakness and fragmentation of opposition political 
parties, the lack of resources and the apolitical motivations of party leaders who seem to be 
somewhat more interested in getting jobs than in establishing linkages based on ideological 
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proximity. In addition, because political parties tend not to establish clear political strategies, 
shifting and dissolving alliances, they eventually lack stable patterns of support, as it also 
becomes more difficult for the citizens to perceive what they stand for. This is something 
highlighted by the literature (Kadima 2006b), but it also echoed from fieldwork interviews: 
 
Well the problem is that other political parties do not have ideological positions. I mean; it is 
three or four friends who meet and decide [...] our experience in 1999 [under the Renamo-UE 
coalition] led us to realize that some parties were not parties at all, they were family clans. Some 
were only interested in getting a job. (António Muchanga, Renamo, member of the State 
Council)
165
 
 
We have friendly relationships [...] as far as ideological affinity, the great problem is this: I will 
give you the example of Frelimo and Renamo. Renamo defines itself as a conservative party but 
if you ask how much businessmen it has they won’t tell you; and you will find that its social 
base is mainly of individuals that came from the rural areas, yet it is conservative. [...] if you 
take Frelimo’s case, it proclaims to be leftist ... yet today it has nothing to do, for example, with 
the workers, or the farmers or the employees. (Lutero Simango, MDM, Parliamentary caucus 
leader)
166
 
 
As institutions, political parties develop friendly relationships. In the last five years we have 
been associated to Frelimo [...] but to my knowledge there is nothing formalized. (Magalhães 
Abramugy, Pimo, Secretary-General)
167
 
 
My view is that the opposition should avoid fragmentation. More than ever the opposition 
should try to work things together and maximize their strengths and potentialities to improve 
                                                          
165
 Translated from the original: «Bom o problema é que os outros partidos [...] não têm definição ideológica. 
Quer dizer: são três ou quatro amigos que se encontram e decidem [...] aquela experiência de 99 permitiu-nos 
perceber que alguns ali não eram partidos não eram nada; eram grupos de famílias! Alguns eram pessoas que 
eram aliciadas em nome do emprego e pronto!» 
166
 Translated from the original: «há relações de amizade [...] Em termos de afinidades ideológicas o grande 
problema é este: vou dar-lhe um exemplo concreto da própria Frelimo e da Renamo. A Renamo autoafirma-se 
como um partido conservador, mas se perguntar à Renamo quantos empresários tem não é capaz de mostrar e 
vai verificar que a sua base social, a maior parte são indivíduos que vem das zonas rurais, mas é um partido 
conservador! [...] se pegar no caso da Frelimo, quer dizer proclama de que são esquerdistas … mas hoje nada 
tem a ver, por exemplo, com os operários nem com os camponeses nem os trabalhadores assalariados! Nada!» 
167
 Translated from the original: «[...] Internamente em termos de relações entre partidos, as instituições 
relacionam-se amigavelmente. Não há nada formalizado. É verdade que nos últimos cinco anos o nosso partido 
foi conotado como tendo aliança com a Frelimo, nos últimos cinco anos, mas que eu saiba não existe nada que 
diga que a Frelimo está ligada ao Pimo … aliás que o Pimo está ligado à Frelimo [...]». 
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their chances. I do not think the opposition will perform well any time soon given its current 
situation (João Colaço, MDM, former member of the party secretariat)
168
 
 
Apart from the formal pre-electoral alliances, other political platforms sought to promote a 
joint action of smaller parties. In 2005, the Partido Independente de Moçambique/ 
Independent Party of Mozambique (Pimo) of Ya-qub Sibindy and the PDD of Raul Domingos 
created the Centro de Promoção da Democracia Multipartidária/ Centre for the Promotion of 
Multiparty Democracy to institutionally support extra-parliamentary parties (Mutemba 2011, 
12). Two years after the 2004 elections, the Pimo initiated the Oposição Construtiva/ 
Constructive Opposition (OP)
169
 which initially assembled more than twenty political parties, 
among which the Panamo, the Pacode, the Parede, the PUR, the PE and the PT
170
. This 
grouping was, however, contested from the beginning, both internally and externally. The 
close relationship between Ya-qub Sibindy, the head of the OP, and the Frelimo raised 
suspicions over the financing of the platform and over its actual political independence. The 
participation of Ya-qub Sibindy in the Frelimo Congress between 10th and 15th November 
2006 and his public declarations supporting Frelimo’s policies eventually led to the exit of 
about 18 members of the OP (Mutemba 2011, 17). Only three members, apart from Pimo, 
remained after these events: the PT of João Massango, the PE of Miguel Mabote and the 
Panamo of Marcos Juma. 
In Zambia, pre-electoral coalitions are less frequent, what contradicts Kadima’s (2006b) 
expectations that coalitions are more frequent in FPTP systems than in PR systems. Since 
1991, only the UDA and the PF/ULP have contested the elections (in 2006). The UDA 
coalition assembled two parties with more or less equal strengths, namely the UNIP (former 
ruling party; second in parliament in 1991 and third in 2001) and the UPND (second in 
parliament in 2001); and one smaller party, the FDD (fourth in parliament in 2001).  
The PF/ULP pact had a more “localist” approach; the two parties ran under the alliance 
in certain constituencies and alone in others. In what regards the results, the UDA clearly 
                                                          
168
 Translated from the original: «O que eu acho é que a oposição não devia continuar nesse processo de 
fragmentação. Isso não vai ajudar para a alteração da opinião pública. Mais do que nunca acho que a oposição 
devia tentar um entendimento de modo a que fossem capazes de maximizar as suas forças as suas 
potencialidades, para melhorar o seu próprio desempenho. Não estou a ver a oposição, nas condições atuais em 
que ela se encontra, a conseguir resultados encorajadores».  
169
 See political platform here: http://pimo-construtivo.blogspot.pt/2010/10/proposta-dialectica-e-construtiva-
sobre.html. 
170
 Partido Nacional de Moçambique/National Party of Mozambique (Panamo), Partido do Congresso 
Democrático/ Democratic Congress Party (Pacode), Partido de Reconciliação Democrática/ Democratic 
Reconciliation Party (Parede), Partido de União e Reconciliação/ Union for Reconciliation Party (PUR). Partido 
Trabalhista/ Labour party (PT), Partido Ecologista/ Ecologist Party (PE).  
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failed as a coalition as the UNIP, the UPND and the FDD received less than half of the seats 
they had previously won in the 2001 polls (combined 74 seats in 2001 against 27 seats in 
2006). The PF/ULP pact, conversely, proved determinant in certain constituencies
171
. The 
2006 elections were, however, mostly about the PF, which scored an impressive rise out of 
this coalition, becoming the second party in parliament.  
Differently, the UDA coalition was composed of relevant parties and had a national 
approach. It was created in a moment when the MMD had won three consecutive polls (1991, 
1996 and 2001) and it became increasingly clear for the opposition parties that a different 
strategy needed to be adopted to oust the incumbent MMD. Partners of coalition were also 
encouraged by the results of the 2001 polls in which they, as opposition, combined more seats 
in parliament than the MMD, which found itself in a minoritarian position for the first time 
since 1991. As described in the previous chapter, the UDA emerged after the PF and the 
UPND failed to form a pact to contest the 2006 elections. The PF then entered into a pact with 
the ULP of Sakwiba Sikota who had just left the UPND after losing the party presidency to 
Hakainde Hichilema (Kabimba and Simbyakula 2011, 13-14). It was decided that the ULP 
would field parliamentary candidates in Southern and Western Province, and all those 
standing in Lusaka would be under the PF ticket. For the remaining Provinces the parties ran 
alone.  
In the run-up to the 2011 elections, the UPND approached the PF again. The Reedbuck 
Protocol was signed along the following principles: (i) that the UPND and the PF would cease 
to attack each other in public, in both print and electronic media; (ii) that they would form a 
caucus of PF and UPND members in parliament to vote and work together in parliament, on 
matters of common interest; (iii) that the parties from the date of the communiqué would not 
run against each other; and (iv) that the PF and the UPND would put forward one candidate 
for the presidential elections in 2011. Under the JNC both parties contested parliamentary by-
elections in Luena and Chilanga; and local government by-elections in Kahoma Central. This 
pact never made it to the 2011 polls due to several disagreements over the filling of the 
candidates and the actual strategy for sharing power at the national level. Due to the poor 
results of electoral pacts and alliances, there is a lot of skepticism about their relevance. As 
                                                          
171
 «Speaking after provisional results placed him ahead of other contestants at Kabwata Community Hall [...], 
Lubinda attributed his victory to the influence of the Patriotic Front (PF) and United Liberal Party (ULP) pact. “I 
won’t dare underestimate the influence the pact had in my success and I would not give any certainty as to 
whether I would have performed the same way under UDA”.» Available online at: 
http://business.highbeam.com/3548/article-1G1-152191725/lubinda-links-his-victory-pfulp-pact (accessed 30-
11-2010).  
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we show next, some political parties and civil society leaders think that they might actually be 
bad for party politics.  
In a recent article published in The Post Online, Charles Milupi, the president of the 
ADD, declared that some political parties «[...] want to get into political alliances for the sole 
purpose of riding on others». In the same piece The Post Online’s journalist wrote that:  
 
The issue of pacts is not new [...]. Unfortunately, very little, if not nothing, has come out of 
these pacts. In 2006, the UPND, UNIP and FDD went into an electoral pact and lost - coming 
third behind MMD and PF. In 2009, UPND initiated a pact with PF. That pact failed and the 
reasons for its failure are well known to the Zambian people and need no further disquisition. 
[...] These pacts seem to be brought about by only one desire: the desire to win power. That will 
to win power is the one idea that they hold in common. But with the passage of time, that will 
prove an insubstantial glue. The signs of division start to grow (Post Online 2014).  
 
In a similar tone, MacDonald Chipenzi, executive director of the Foundation for Democratic 
Process (FODEP), stated to the Zambia Daily Mail that «political alliances formed to remove 
a democratically elected government do not work [...] that history has many examples of such 
pacts that have failed to unseat governments». He also stated that «electoral alliances have 
encouraged regionalism as some political parties cannot contest by-elections in certain areas 
where an alliance member is said to be stronger than the other» (Mvula 2014). In the past, 
MacDonald Chipenzi defied leaders of the PF/UPND pact to voice their position regarding 
their future and political objectives (ZANIS 2010). The following interview extracts express 
political elites’ positions about coalitions:  
 
The situation in Zambia is that the political parties do not work together because politics is a 
game of participation so all political parties must stand; but we agree on certain causes. Because 
we are not on the government our biggest enemy, of each political party in the opposition, is the 
ruling party: that is the enemy number one [...]. (Chembe Nyangu, MMD, Deputy National 
Secretary)  
 
We have connected to the PF President, where our agreement is that when they are wrong we 
attack them... but we will not go to the media and shout at them... we will write ... a solution to 
that problem. (Cosmo Mumba, NRP, President) 
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There was an attempt to work together with other parties... and ... I also told you that ZADECO 
works together with the current party in government; but [...] we failed to move together at 
some point. As of now we are working together with the UNPD [...]. I did mention that in 2008 
and 2011 we supported the MMD as a party. [...] we supported them because we felt that we 
wanted them to win [...]. (Langton Sichone, ZDC, President)  
 
We enjoyed the relationship with UNIP which the South African Communist party enjoyed with 
the African National Congress in South Africa. Between 1994 up to I would say up to 2006, so 
our platform has not been divorced from that of UNIP for quite some time [...] Now we don’t 
think ... we are not sure they are socialist as they used to call themselves. (Tentani Mwanza, 
NDP, President) 
 
First of all and foremost we have decided we will never be in alliance with any political party. 
Because those are some of the things that led to the decline [...] in our political party. (Wright 
Musoma, ZRP, President) 
 
I think in 2016, obviously I must stand on a party ticket, in the PF ticket; I will stand on the PF 
ticket. [...] I think I will be a full time member of PF you know? Yes because it is still difficult 
for me to work with the government in power, because they have their own ways of doing 
things, me as a independent MP I have got my own way of doing things so I can see maybe 
conflicts, little conflicts arising... so the best is for me to join the party... so that I am a full time 
member I am free to do anything, because obviously when you are working as an independent 
in the government there are always certain things they don’t want you to know, because it is 
their party you know? But now I want to be full time, next time I want to be in the party full 
time. So that I can participate in everything; I can be provincial chairman of the party or maybe 
I can be in the national executive committee of the party but now as an independent they can’t 
allow me. (Charles Zulu, independent candidate elected in 2011)  
 
Even if not very successful, party coalitions are more common in Mozambique than in 
Zambia. In fact, political parties in Zambia have tended more towards factionalism than 
coalition. Since its foundation in 1991, the MMD have originated a good number off-shoot 
parties that have been able to elect parliamentary seats (see Table 6.4). The most successful of 
the splinter groups is the PF, which defeated the MMD in 2011.  
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Table 6.4 – Splits within MMD (1991 – 2011) 
 
Votes Seats (N) Seats (%) 
1996 
   NP 7,1 5 3,3 
AZ 1,5 2 1,3 
ZDC 13,8 2 1,3 
2001 
   HP 7,6 4 2,7 
FDD 15,6 12 8,0 
PF 2,8 1 0,7 
2006 
   PF 22,7 46 30,7 
FDD (under UDA) 22,7 27 18,0 
2011 
   PF 38,2 61 40,7 
FDD 0,7 1 0,7 
Source: Elaborated with data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ)  
– http://www.elections.org.zm/ (retrieved on 30-09-2010). 
 
Adding to this, party switching, co-optation of opposition by the ruling party, lack of party 
discipline and limited allegiance of politicians to their parties, are frequently found in 
Zambian politics. Even though the Zambian parliament is extremely weak vis-à-vis the 
president
172
 (Momba 2005; Burnell 2003), it has been an arena of intense party competition 
where the different faces of the parties often collide. From time to time there are divergences 
within the party in public office (those in government vs. those in parliament) and between 
the party in public office and the party the central office (those in national party structures) 
(Mair 1994,4). During MMD’s third legislature (2001-2006), 22 of its MPs were expelled 
after opposing to Chiluba’s third term bid; and on several other occasions MMD’s 
backbenchers openly attacked government policies (Simutanyi 2005, 11). In the opposition 
similar divisions between the party in public office and the party in central office have also 
occurred. Just to mention one example, in 2003, three UPND MPs who had voted against the 
party and in favor of the ruling party were expelled (Simutanyi 2005).  
The weak discipline is part of a system in which individual politicians have 
considerable leeway, party organizations are weak and not particularly valued. All these 
aspects are indicative of the weakness of political parties, which are affected not only by few 
                                                          
172
 «The constitution states that cabinet shall formulate the policy of the government [...]. However, the 
constitution also contains the much weaker statement that cabinet shall be responsible for advising the president 
with respect to the policy of the government. Furthermore it says the president is expected to act in his own 
deliberate judgment, and is not bound by advice from his colleagues. So, although the constitution states that 
cabinet ministers and deputy ministers shall be accountable collectively to the National Assembly, the 
president’s prerogative over policy determination weakens this accountability or contains it to advice on policy 
or implementation (Burnell 2003, 52). 
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resources but also by limited discipline and weak loyalties. Moreover, because parties 
exercise comparatively little control over political elites, these elites rather than political 
parties are the principal agents of representation. This does not mean that Mozambique has 
been free of factionalism and floor-crossing. In fact, several interviews conducted during 
fieldwork indicate that one of the major problems facing smaller political parties and even the 
major opposition party is keeping up with party membership since many members give up, 
due to the fact that the only way they can work in the state and or in the private sector is by 
becoming Frelimo’s members.  
 
6.4.2 Party-citizen networks: More than mixed clientelism and local collective goods?  
 
African political parties have been widely described by: (i) thin resources, notably lack of 
mass membership, nation-wide structures, funding base and human resources; (i) dominance 
of informal relationships, as in other Third Wave democracies, parties appear as vehicles for 
the ambitions of individual politicians; (iii) pervasiveness of informal networks; (iv) lack of 
intra-party democracy and poor communication within the party hierarchy; (v) high degree of 
factionalism, lack of party loyalty, circulation of elites and floor-crossing; and finally (vi) 
loose formal links to citizens and lack of strong articulated ideologies (Randall and Svåsand 
2002; Manning 2005; Mozaffar 2005; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Salih and Nordlund 2007). 
These features are commonly pointed out in studies with a narrower or wider comparative 
approach and have been confirmed also for the Mozambican (Pereira and Shenga 2005; 
Pereira 2009) and the Zambian cases (Szeftel 2000; Burnell 2001a; Burnell 2001b; Tobolka 
2014).  
Among the several features mentioned above, the one about the nature of linkages 
between party and citizens has deserved a lot of attention recently, either through more 
qualitative (Tobolka 2014), or quantitative comparative analysis (Osei 2012). Given the 
literature about the nature of state and power in Africa, in which the most salient concept is 
neopatrimonialism – a system of informal networks such as personalism, clientelism, and 
patronage (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Lindberg 2001; van de Walle 2002; van de Walle 
2003) – these studies have analyzed the extent to which more programmatic or ideological 
linkages are found among African parties and their electorate. They have done it inspired in 
typologies of scholars such as Lawson (1980) who identifies participatory linkage, police-
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responsive linkage, linkage by reward and directive linkage
173
, and Kitschelt (2000) who also 
navigates around similar categories – programmatic, clientelistic and charismatic (Kitschelt 
2000, 849- 851). Our goal is not to replicate these studies but simply to use them as the 
conceptual umbrella under which to develop our analysis about PSI’s networks.  
Altogether, these studies tell us that clientelistic linkages or those motivated by a reward 
will be more frequent than the ones that presuppose an ideological or programmatic ground. 
This is expected to flow across countries – Mozambique and Zambia – with more or less 
saliency, as clientelistic linkages are more often the rule than the exception. Different nuances 
may, however, appear due to the different nature of these party systems and their process of 
institutionalization.  
In the previous chapter the data about voter turnout in Mozambique’s and Zambia’s 
elections raised initial questions about the relationship between political parties and their 
citizens. In both countries, but particularly in Mozambique, levels of mobilization are frankly 
low, thus suggesting loose linkages. If we look at indicators such as individuals’ party 
identification and trust in political parties, other dimensions can be added to this discussion. 
Drawing on data from the two more recent surveys of the Afrobarometer – round 4 (rd4), held 
from 2008-2009 and round 5 (rd5) held between 2010-2012 – Figure 6.1 displays data for 
party identification, trust in the ruling party and trust in the opposition
174
. The values are in 
rounded percentages and express positive answers.  
Above the African average in all indicators, Mozambique is the country where more 
citizens express party identification (72% and 71% in rd4 and rd5) and where there is a wider 
gap between the levels of trust in the ruling party (75% and 70% in rd4 and rd5, respectively) 
and the levels of trust in the opposition parties (18% and 31% in rd4 and rd5, respectively). 
More aligned with the African average, but frankly below the Mozambican score, is the 
proportion of Zambian respondents with party identity, which declined from 60% in r4 to 
50% in rd 5.  
                                                          
173
 Participatory linkage: political parties serve as agencies through which citizens can participate in government; 
Policy-responsive linkage: political parties serve as agencies for ensuring that government officials will be 
responsive to the views of rank-and-file voters; Linkage by reward: political parties act primarily as channels for 
the exchange of votes for favors; Directive linkage: Linkage used by political parties that are governments to 
maintain coercive control over their subjects (Lawson 1980). 
174
 Party identification is measured as the percentage of those who answered “yes” to the question «Do you feel 
close to any particular political party?», Trust in the ruling party and in opposition parties are measured by the 
percentage of those who responded “Somewhat or a lot”, to the questions: «How much do you trust each of the 
following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The Ruling Party?» and «How much do you trust 
each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Opposition Political Parties?».  
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The levels of trust for the ruling party are lower despite having strikingly increased 
from 37% (r4) to 58% (r5), whereas trust in opposition parties has decreased from 45% (r4) to 
32% (r5). Although cross-regional comparisons should always be considered carefully, 
looking at the data from Latin America provides an opportunity to put the findings from 
Africa into perspective. In fact, according to the most recent survey of the Latino Barometer 
(2010)
175
 about 53% of the respondents feel close to a political party and only 22% show a lot 
or some trust towards political parties. In this sense, the values found in the African sample 
are not that exceptional despite contextual features
176
.  
Figure 6.1 – Citizens’ attitudes towards political parties: cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons 
 
Source: Afrobarometer round 4 (2008-2009) and round 5 (2010-2012) available online at http://www.afrobarometer.org/.  
 
If we disaggregate the data on party identification it is possible to note that in 
Mozambique the overwhelming majority of respondents identify themselves with the Frelimo 
(65% and 85%, in rd4 and rd5, respectively), while the major opposition party, the Renamo, 
captures about 3% of preferences in both rounds (see Table 6.5). In Zambia the panorama is 
much more fragmented and tends to reflect the balance of power of the day. In r4 ruling 
MMD was the party gathering the largest share of respondent’s preferences (22%), closely 
followed by the PF (18%) and the UPND (13%). In r5, however, the alternation in power was 
also expressed by an alternation in sympathies, for the PF became the preferred party (62%) at 
a wide distance of the UPND (14%) and the MMD (10%).  
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 Latino Barometer (2010) available online at http://www.latinobarometro.org/ 
176
 That said Mozambique’s party identification figures are particularly high and thus an outlier both in Africa 
and in Latin America.  
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Table 6.5 – Party preferences in Mozambique and Zambia  
Mozambique Zambia 
  2008 2012   2008   2012 
Parties N % N % Parties N % N % 
Frelimo 776 65,0 1456 85,0 MMD 268 22,0 62 10,0 
Renamo 40 3,0 57 3,0 PF 219 18,0 378 63,0 
PDD 5 0,0 3 0,0 UPND 157 13,0 82 14,0 
Pimo 1 0,0 2 0,0 UNIP 9 1,0 11 2,0 
MDM   
 
73 4,0 FDD 6 1,0 2 0,0 
        HP 4 0,0 2 0,0 
         ADD     3 1,0 
         NMP     1 0,0 
          NAREP     12 2,0 
Source: Afrobarometer round 4 (2008-2009) and round 5 (2010-2012) available online at http://www.afrobarometer.org/. 
 
Given these results it is important to understand what types of features are behind 
individuals’ attachment to political parties. During fieldwork we asked political about the 
main characteristics of the electorate and also about the political offer of their political parties. 
In what follows, some interview extracts are featured with the aim of describing what 
relevance ideology has both for the parties and for the citizens.  
 
In Mozambique a good part of the politicians downplays the role of ideology: 
 
There is no such thing as parties with ideology in Mozambique. Not even the Frelimo. 
(Magalhães Abramugy, Pimo, Secretary-General)
177
 
 
Those [left, right] are classic international labels and, to some extent, we should try to also 
apply those labels, but I don’t think we got there yet. For instance, theoretically Frelimo would 
be a left-wing party, but it has nothing to do with the leftist views. On the contrary, it is aligned 
with the more reactionary rightist views. [...] Looking to the right side of the spectrum one 
could also ask, if rightist parties exist, and if yes how are they distinguished? Market economy? 
We all defend that. State and Social Justice, we all defend that... But do we really defend these 
values or is it simply a convenient discourse? Thus, I would not distinguish ideologies, despite 
the existing connotations. (Benedito Marime, founder of PCN, currently on MDM)
178
  
                                                          
177
 Translated from the original: «Em Moçambique não há partidos com ideologias. Mesmo a própria Frelimo, 
já não tem ideologia.»  
178
 Translated from the original: «Estes conceitos são clássicos internacionais, e nessa medida em Africa nós 
também utilizamos esses figurinos, mas para mim eu penso que ainda não chegamos a essa caraterização! 
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Still the Renamo clearly positions itself:  
 
The Renamo is a center-right party; it holds conservative views regarding tradition, people, 
communities and family. (António Muchanga, Renamo, member of the State Council)
179
  
 
We are definitely a rightist party. From the center-right. (Fernando Mazanga, Renamo, 
Spokesman)
180
 
 
Finally, for some parties, ideology is a contending field within the party:  
 
I have suggested the change of the Frelimo hymn because it is not coherent with what we 
defend and to what we are actually creating. My suggestion was to change it to “march ahead 
successful businessmen in the exploitation …”. This would say a lot more about the current 
policies of the Frelimo. (Jorge Rebelo, Frelimo, founding member, former cabinet minister)
181
 
 
Under Frelimo’s broad umbrella, there has always been a constant: to enable Mozambican’s to 
develop themselves and to exit poverty and misery; to allow all Mozambicans to participate in 
the development of the country. Therefore we have a sort of democratic socialism [as ideology] 
(Luísa Diogo, Frelimo, former Prime-Minister)
182
 
 
The MDM is from the center-right, aligning however with the conservative European parties 
(João Colaço, MDM, former member of the party secretariat)
183
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Porque o partido Frelimo por exemplo teoricamente seria de esquerda, mas não tem nada de esquerda, antes 
pelo contrário está hoje alinhado com a direita mais reacionária! [...] E se também nos olhamos para a direita 
perguntaríamos então se há partidos de direita o que é distingue portanto esses partidos entre si? Economia de 
mercado? Todos defendemos! Estado; justiça social? Todos defendemos! Mas defendemos mesmo ou esse é o 
discurso conveniente? Portanto eu não iria por aí apesar de haver conotações!»  
179
 Translated from the original: «Renamo é um partido de centro-direita, é um partido da lógica um pouco 
conservadora, conservadora das tradições, das pessoas e das comunidades, e das famílias.» 
180
 Translated from the original: «Sem dúvidas que somos da direita. Do centro-direita.» 
181
 Translated from the original: «Eu podia remetê-la para o hino da Frelimo que diz “avante operários, 
camponeses” [...] “Unidos contra a exploração. Nossa pátria será o túmulo do capitalismo”. [...] Eu numa 
outra reunião não aqui no congresso já sugeri porque não mudar o hino porque não há coerência entre o que 
fazemos e o que defendemos e aquilo que é a situação que nós próprios estamos a criar. Então sugeri vamos 
pôr: avante empresários de sucesso unidos na exploração. Corresponderia muito mais àquilo que é a realidade 
atual; àquilo que são as políticas da Frelimo [...].»  
182
 Translated from the original: «Mas dentro do invólucro que é a Frelimo esteve sempre presente uma coisa 
que tem sido constante; que é fazer com que os Moçambicanos se desenvolvam, fazer com que os Moçambicanos 
saiam da pobreza da miséria. Fazer com que os Moçambicanos todos eles de uma forma inclusiva participem no 
desenvolvimento do país, portanto pode se chamar isso socialismo democrático [...].»  
183
Translated from the original: «O MDM é do centro-direita. Centro direita porém é preciso dizer isso, com 
uma certa inclinação do ponto de vista de relações com partidos conservadores europeus.» 
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We have had several discussions about our ideology: whether it should be left, right, center-
right or center-left. Before answering I should personally say something. When we speak to the 
people they are not interested in knowing what our ideological field is. What they really want to 
know is whether the government of the day is able to satisfy their needs [...]. Trying to answer 
to your question the MMD values the individual, the human being, the basic principles of 
democracy, liberty and human life. It defends a market economy [...] but it does not lean to the 
right; it is at the center. (Lutero Simango, MDM, Parliamentary caucus leader)
184
 
 
In Zambia there is a similar landscape, still some parties position themselves more easily:  
 
We are capitalist; we are a liberal party. (Chembe Nyangu, MMD, Deputy National Secretary)  
 
We are socialist [...] our party’s name is more closed to the people’s problems [...]. We are using 
a socialist kind of approach; we have adopted Kaunda’s, the first President of this country, 
approach. He a was socialist. We must realize that development is not just how much you are 
educated... Development is not capitalism. (Cosmo Mumba, NRP, President) 
 
Others consider ideology labeling pointless, but still provide some clues about their political 
views:  
  
It doesn’t really make sense [to speak about ideology] but as a political party we are liberal 
democrats [...] we also believe in a free market and economy. (Winstone Chibwe, UNPD, 
Secretary-General) 
 
It doesn’t make sense [to speak about ideology]. We actually, subscribe to a lot of policies that 
are pro-poor [...]. We haven’t found a word for our ideology really. It is indescribable because 
it is all about orientation towards the common person and alleviating the problems of the 
common person, providing social security, providing a decent livelihood, providing proper 
health care [...]. (Chanda Mfula, PF, Media and Publicity Director)  
 
                                                          
184
 Translated from the original: «Já tivemos várias discussões sobre o campo ideológico, se temos que estar na 
esquerda ou estar na direita ou no centro-direita ou centro-esquerda. Eu antes de responder eu devo 
pessoalmente dizer o seguinte. Hoje em dia quando falamos com as pessoas, quando tentamos convencer os 
eleitores muitas das vezes eles não estão preocupados em saber qual é o campo ideológico, o que eles querem 
de fato é que a governação consiga satisfazer as suas necessidades básicas [...]. Mas indo à sua pergunta em 
concreto, nós no MDM valorizamos o indivíduo; valorizamos a pessoa humana e acreditamos em valores e 
princípios básicos que são a democracia, o respeito pela liberdade, o respeito pela vida humana, e somos 
defensores de uma economia de mercado [...] mas nós não vamos para a direita queremos ficar no centro.» 
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I mean I can tell you what we believe in: the state should have a minimal role in facilitating 
economic development; so largely it leaves it to the private sector; but always having a strategic 
hand in how it guides the unfolding of economic activity, so that as many people as possible can 
benefit in true opportunity. Where that fits in? I am not really sure. Some might call it you know 
Liberal? [...] But it has elements of liberalism, it has elements of conservatism as well because 
we are trying to bring back the values, the principles, but we do need some radical change to 
take place. In that sense we are not conservative as such but we don’t go as far as promoting the 
kind of rights that full liberalism might entail. You know, so we definitely take quite a strong 
moral and religious position on a lot of issues, which feed in our political outlet. (Elias Chipimo, 
NAREP, President)  
 
Finally, others seem to navigate in between ideologies:  
 
We are in favor of capitalism. Capitalism and a bit of socialism... so I wouldn’t say we are 
capitalist, but we favor that. [...] definitely we are in favor of any ideology that is there to 
empower, to change Zambia as well as to empower the Zambians. (Wright Musoma, ZRP, 
President) 
 
First of all we want to strike a balance in terms of policy formulation, in terms of providing 
policies for people that are pro-poor but promote individual initiative. (Inambao Inambao, ULP, 
Secretary-General)  
 
Actually we are kind of conservatives; actually we are a national party kind of [...] there is a bit 
of capitalism for example, and just a little bit of socialism … and communism not anywhere 
near; but there is a bit of capitalism and socialism [...] kind of a mix set up [...]. In terms of 
inclination we are Zambians and Christian [...] we are ruled by the norms of Christianity [...]. 
(Lizu Kahoma, ADD, Secretary-General)  
 
Politics in Africa is more or less about personalities, and because of that if a particular ideology 
is being upheld and defended by a particular personality it is possible that the content, the 
ideological content can go over to the people. (Tentani Mwanza, NDP, President)  
 
While these quotes have expressed that, to a large extent, ideology is either irrelevant or quite 
a contentious issue within the political parties, it has also shown that in the Zambian context 
the panorama is more diverse in what regards the differences across parties, what relates to 
the very nature of party competition within the country. Different from Mozambique where 
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competition is more centripetal (national and at the center of political spectrum, due to 
Frelimo’s occupation of Renamo’s political space), in Zambia competition tends to be more 
centrifugal due to the higher levels of factionalism and to the dispersion of votes across 
constituencies, shaped, in turn, by ethnic and regional divides. In this sense, it is crucial to ask 
to what extent are individuals’ linkages to political parties heterogeneous, and to what extent 
they express any ideological or programmatic content.  
  To take this exercise further we rely on data from the Afrobarometer and test whether 
individuals with different party identities vary significantly across a selected group of political 
statements. A total of eight statements, in which the respondent is asked to choose the 
sentence closest to its view
185
, are included. They are diverse enough to cover topics such as 
individual rights, preference for family or community linkages and evaluation of economy:  
 
1. Statement 1: Citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders/ Statement 2: 
In our country, citizens should show more respect for authority. 
2. Statement 1: People are like children; the government should take care of them like a parent/ 
Statement 2: Government is like an employee; the people should be the bosses who control the 
government.  
3. Statement 1: Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies 
/Statement 2: We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government 
approves of it. 
4. Statement 1: Government should be able to close newspapers that print stories it does not 
like/Statement 2: The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit without 
fear of being shut down. 
5. Statement 1: Government should not allow the expression of political views that are 
fundamentally different from the views of the majority/ Statement 2: People should be able to 
speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their 
views may be. 
6. Statement 1: Since leaders represent everyone, they should not favor their own family or 
group/Statement 2: Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community. 
7. Statement 1: The costs of reforming the economy are too high; the government should 
therefore abandon its current economic policies/Statement 2: In order for the economy to get 
better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardships now. 
                                                          
185
 Reply codes/options are the following: 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1; 2=Agree with Statement 1; 
3=Agree with Statement 2; 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2; 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don’t know, 
998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data.  
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8. Statement 1: The government’s economic policies have helped most people; only a few have 
suffered/Statement 2: The government’s economic policies have hurt most people and only 
benefited a few. 
 
In the results displayed in Table 6.6, non-responses, missing data and neutral positions were 
excluded. Moreover, some statements were re-coded so that they would vary in the same 
direction; in a scale from 1 (closer to 1
st
 statement) to 4 (closer to 2
nd
 statement). The answers 
to these statements are contrasted across groups, built on the basis of individuals’ party 
identities. For Mozambique there are two major groups one for the Frelimo (=1) and another 
for the Renamo (=2); in Zambia three groups are considered: the MMD (=1), the PF (=2) and 
the UPND (=3). For this analysis we use the results of rd4 of the Afrobarometer, since the 
datasets of rd5 were not available to the public yet. 
Table 6.6 compares the means of each of these political groups across the different 
statements. To assess whether the differences between them are statistically significant, 
ANOVA tests were also run, the full tables are presented in Appendix F. The values 
accompanied by asterisks are the ones in which a statistically significant relation was found. 
Starting with Mozambique, the results indicate that the individuals that are identified with the 
Frelimo tend to agree with more authoritarian stances vis-à-vis those identified with the 
Renamo. The differences between the groups in these statements is not statistically 
significant, meaning that there is not a strong polarization across these themes. Furthermore, 
those identified with the Frelimo tend to agree with a community rather than with a more 
parochial or familiar approach to policy making and that economic policies have tended to 
benefit the majority of the people rather than just a few.  
Renamo’s sympathizers go slightly in the opposite direction, but again the differences 
are not statistically significant between the two groups. The only statement where the 
difference between groups is significant is the one about whether the government should 
abandon its current economic policies or keep them. In this statement, those identified with 
the Frelimo tend to support compliance with harsher economic reforms.  
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Table 6.6 – Matching political positions and party preferences in Mozambique and Zambia  
  
1= support for individual rights; 4 = deference to authority 
1 = equally; 4 = 
community 
1 = withdraw of current 
economic policies; 4 = 
acceptance 
1 = economic policies 
benefited majority; 4 = 
benefited few 
STATEMENTS  
Question actions 
of leaders vs. 
respect authority 
Government like 
a parent vs. an 
employee 
Individuals free to 
join vs. Govt. bans 
organizations 
Newspapers free to 
publish vs. Govt. close 
newspapers 
People speak their 
mind vs. Govt. 
suppress expression  
Leaders treat all 
equally vs. help own 
community 
Abandon economic 
reforms vs. accept 
hardships 
Economic policies 
helped most vs. hurt 
most 
MOZAMBIQUE 
Frelimo 
Mean 2,5185 2,97 2,295 2,03 2,0831 2,3782 2,9538* 2,3958 
N 675 694 634 645 626 661 606 672 
Std. Deviation 1,12730 1,073 1,0738 1,066 1,02893 1,15039 ,97803 1,11801 
Renamo 
Mean 2,4857 2,97 2,029 2,00 1,9706 2,2286 2,6364* 2,5278 
N 35 38 35 35 34 35 33 36 
Std. Deviation 1,19734 1,127 1,0428 1,085 ,96876 1,19030 1,05529 1,02779 
Total 
Mean 2,5169 2,97 2,281 2,03 2,0773 2,3707 2,9374* 2,4025 
N 710 732 669 680 660 696 639 708 
Std. Deviation 1,12998 1,075 1,0731 1,067 1,02552 1,15202 ,98380 1,11330 
ZAMBIA 
MMD 
Mean 2,1929 2,9349 2,2181* 1,7893* 1,8862* 2,3514* 2,4628 3,2362* 
N 254 261 243 242 246 259 242 254 
Std. Deviation 1,15848 1,21828 1,15608 ,99010 ,94505 1,20886 1,19154 1,05543 
PF 
Mean 1,9452 2,7227 1,8952* 1,5229* 1,6758* 2,2364* 2,2899 3,5945* 
N 219 220 210 218 219 220 207 217 
Std. Deviation 1,08226 1,27871 1,00643 ,73235 ,83496 1,25278 1,21601 ,75251 
UPND 
Mean 2,0863 2,8857 2,0315* 1,5909* 1,6154* 2,1135* 2,3769 3,2199* 
N 139 140 127 132 130 141 130 141 
Std. Deviation 1,06650 1,20003 1,09788 ,84668 ,74067 1,15939 1,14976 ,92653 
Total 
Mean 2,0801 2,8486 2,0603* 1,6470* 1,7496* 2,2565* 2,3817 3,3595* 
N 612 621 580 592 595 620 579 612 
Std. Deviation 1,11461 1,23770 1,09866 ,87764 ,87009 1,21529 1,19155 ,94264 
Source: Source: Afrobarometer round 4 (2009) available online at http://www.afrobarometer.org/. Notes: (*) signals statistically significant differences between groups.  
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In Zambia there seems to be a different political landscape. In fact, from the total of 
eight sentences selected for this exercise, five vary in a statistically significant manner across 
the different political groups. Starting with sentences where differences were not strong: PF 
identifiers seem to be more supportive of sentences that enhance individual rights when 
compared to the other groups, particularly the MMD, which has sympathizers who lean 
towards deference of authority. 
As far as the other sentences are concerned, there are statistically significant variances 
in individuals’ stances regarding government interference on civil society (with the PF more 
against it than the UPND and the MMD), media freedom (with the MMD more against it than 
the UPND and the PF), freedom of individual expression (with the UPND more against it than 
the PF and the MMD) and leaders favoring the community (with the UPND more against it 
than the PF and the MMD). Finally, regarding whether the government economic policies 
have benefited only a few or the majority, the different political groups tend to agree that they 
have benefited a minority, particularly the group of PF sympathizers. 
These results hence show that overall individuals’ party identification does encompass 
some kind of programmatic differentiation, particularly in the Zambian political landscape. In 
Mozambique, conversely, sympathizers from Renamo and Frelimo do not diverge 
significantly in their political stances towards the issues here considered. In this sense, these 
results help to complement the analysis started in this section in which we sought to 
understand (i) the extent to which the linkages between parties and citizens in Mozambique 
and Zambia reflected what is already known about this topic in the African context (Osei 
2012; Tobolka 2014) and (ii) the extent to which they underlined different processes of 
institutionalization. The data about party identification and trust in the ruling party and in the 
opposition parties clearly detached Mozambique from Zambia and from the general African 
average but for different reasons.  
In Mozambique, the majority of the respondents reveals a party preference (mainly for 
the Frelimo) and mistrusts the opposition political parties. This thus suggests that the Frelimo 
is strongly anchored in society. Yet, this should not obscure the fact that Frelimo is the party 
of the state and that it has largely developed under its dependency. The following quotes are 
illustrative of this point:  
 
The party in power is the state and the state is the biggest employer. As a civil servant I am 
required to fill in a membership card of the party in power. I have to do it even if I don’t want to 
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in order to guarantee my survival. If I refuse to do that I risk losing my job. (Maria Angelina 
Enoque, Renamo, Parliamentary caucus leader)
186
 
 
Frelimo’s rootedness was facilitated by the fact that it received the independence on a tray. [...] 
the Frelimo was alone in the country and took over the state. Yesterday I heard the Frelimo’s 
president talking about the party’s patrimony; he mentioned over three hundred houses. If you 
ask how the Frelimo got those houses they will never say. They got to the point of expelling 
house owners only to nationalize their houses. Yet, when we tell that a house is nationalized, we 
mean that it is nationalized by the state and not by a party. And certainly not by a party that 
takes control over the houses […]. Thus, Frelimo’s rootedness was facilitated by the way 
independence was declared. (Antonio Muchanga, Renamo, Renamo member of the State 
Council)
187
  
 
The Renamo remains poorly developed and lost its traditional strongholds as well as its ability 
to rely on informal networks such as clientelism to attract membership. At the same time, the 
Frelimo resorts to mix of clientelistic and local collective goods to gain and maintain support 
where the party has fewer sympathizers, particularly in the rural areas:  
 
The Renamo has been losing ground since 1994 because it fails to understand what is wrong 
inside the party. One thing is the lack of internal democracy. It still follows the same military 
mindset. The Renamo was a military movement that opposed the government of Mozambique 
but when it transformed into a civil party it continued to function under the same models. The 
party did not change its behaviors. (Leonardo Simão, Frelimo, former cabinet Minister
)188
 
 
In the countryside, people live dispersed and are less exposed to the media, people’s major 
concern is to survive. For this reason, I would say that today it is highly unlikely that the 
                                                          
186
 Translated from the original: «O partido no poder é o Estado e o Estado é o maior empregador! Mesmo que 
eu não queira como funcionário do Estado se me trazem a ficha é preciso preencher e ter um cartão do partido 
no poder. Eu vou preencher mesmo que eu não queira para poder garantir a minha sobrevivência! Se não o 
fizer eu tenho o meu emprego meio tremido! Então as pessoas fazem-no!» 
187
 Translated from the original: «Bom o que facilitou o enraizamento da Frelimo, foi que o colono entregou a 
independência de bandeja! [...] a Frelimo estava sozinha no país. Assumiu o estado! Ainda ontem ouvi o 
Presidente da Frelimo a falar do património imóvel que a Frelimo tinha, falava de mais de três centenas de 
casas! Se você for a perguntar como é que a Frelimo adquiriu essas casas... Nunca vão dizer. Eles chegaram a 
expulsar os donos das casas e disseram que a casa estava nacionalizada. Só que quando se diz que a casa 
estava nacionalizada é nacionalizada pelo Estado não é nacionalizada por um partido[…]! Portanto o 
enraizamento da Frelimo foi facilitado pela maneira como a independência foi declarada.» 
188
 Translated from the original: «A Renamo tem vindo a perder desde 1994 até agora porque não percebe que 
alguma coisa que não está bem dentro do próprio partido. Uma delas é a falta democracia interna do partido! 
Portanto não conseguiu libertar-se um pouco da mentalidade militar que a caracterizou na sua origem! Era um 
movimento militar, que se opunha ao governo de Moçambique mas quando passou a partido civil continuou 
exatamente com a mesma ideologia. Com a mesma forma de agir.» 
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Frelimo wouldn’t win elections in the rural areas. Unlikely because the effect of a school in a 
rural area is tremendous. You build a school in the city and nothing changes but in the country 
side it makes a lot of difference, the construction of a health center visibly reduces the number 
of fatal births [...]. A health center with a midwife will make a difference for that community. 
(Manuel Tomé, Frelimo, MP)
189
  
 
In this sense, Mozambique’s institutionalization has been more underlined by a mix of 
clientelism and local networks than by ideological or programmatic networks. In the case of 
Zambia, we have seen that factionalism (creating a good number of splits) as well as floor 
crossing (through strategic co-option of cabinet ministers from the opposition) are typical and 
that clientelism and reward politics are momentarily accompanied by the mobilization of 
tribal or regional differences, particularly because of the high number of by-elections, which 
tend to enhance constituency-level differences. Moreover, the analysis of the Afrobarometer 
data revealed that there are fewer individuals with a party identity and who trust the ruling 
party; whereas trust in the opposition parties is higher than the average found in the African 
sample. Additional data on party identification showed that these results partly reflected the 
higher levels of party system fragmentation as well as some balance of power between 
Zambian political parties. These characteristics have been noted elsewhere since the FPTP 
system has failed to deliver majoritarian cabinets since 2011, therefore leading the ruling 
party to rest on strategies such as co-optation (through patronage, offering cabinet positions, 
etc.) to lean the balance of power in its favor.  
Going back to the Afrobarometer data, we first saw that the majority of Zambian 
respondents felt close either to the MMD, the PF or the UPND, and then further descriptive 
and explanatory analysis showed that, unlike in Mozambique, these different party affiliation 
groups correlated to different policy preferences. Indeed, they exhibited statistically different 
political stances about their rights, the role of the leaders towards their community and the 
scope of economic policies. As there is not one sole major political party and the political 
market is more open, with splitting groups and new political parties easily entering the 
parliament (despite varying degrees of success), political polarization is naturally high. The 
following quotes echo some of our reflections:  
                                                          
189
 Translated from the original: «No campo, as pessoas vivem dispersas tem menos influência da comunicação 
social, e o grande objetivo das pessoas é a sua sobrevivência. Por isso hoje é que quase, não digo impossível, 
mas é muito improvável que a Frelimo não ganhe as eleições nas zonas rurais! Improvável! Porque o efeito de 
uma escola, numa zona rural é tremendo! Tu constróis uma escola na cidade não tem efeito nenhum não muda 
nada… a construção de uma escola no campo muda logo, a construção de um posto de saúde reduz visivelmente 
para a população o número de partos fatais [...]. Portanto aquele posto de saúde ali com uma enfermeira 
parteira muda a vida daquela comunidade.»  
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The biggest challenge I will tell you I think in Zambia is to, also in other African countries, is to 
institutionalize political parties. That is the biggest problem. Political parties fail to ... people 
fail to turn political parties into institutions. I don’t know whether it is lack of resources ... of 
course resources play a big part. They fail to institutionalize their operations ... they are centered 
around individuals, believe me all political parties without exception. (Inambao Inambao, ULP, 
Secretary-General)  
 
for you to master good support you must have done a lot of civil work in the communities for 
people to notice that you represent something new [...]. If you do not, then you are in trouble 
you can’t win, because people are very sensitive to what they can see as against what they can’t 
see [...]. (Chembe Nyangu, MMD, Deputy National Secretary)  
  
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter main goal was to describe the mechanisms that underlie the different processes 
of PSI in Mozambique and Zambia. To this end, both environmental – path to democratic 
transition, electoral system and party funding/finance – and relational mechanisms – party 
coalitions and party-citizen linkages – were analyzed. As previously noted, these mechanisms 
are relevant in light of the results of the quantitative strand and are anchored in the theoretical 
approaches of the new institutionalism (historical and network institutionalism) and in the 
scholarly work about the nature of party and party system development in Africa.  
In this sense, the comparative case study analysis has provided a great opportunity to 
refine the findings of the previous strand while adding new dimensions into the research. In 
Mozambique the risky process of transition from war and one-party rule to peace and 
democracy, was handled by the two former belligerents, under the auspices of the 
international community. The verticality of this process contributed to the crystallization of 
the war cleavage beyond its end, and overflowed into shaping political institutions and 
political actions in the new upcoming regime. From time to time the issue of war emerges, 
with former belligerents, particularly the Renamo, evoking the GPA to claim more legitimacy 
and political power. Yet, the structuring of the party system, modeled by Frelimo’s capture of 
the State, largely influences the patterns of interparty competition leaving a narrower margin 
for an actual political change to take place. In turn, this has led the Renamo to engage in more 
violent actions (such as guerrilla actions in the Gorongosa bushes). Moreover, the dominant 
nature of the party system indirectly influences the effect of the electoral system (which is 
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supposed to create more fragmentation) and of party funding (which is expected to level the 
playing field, thus creating more systemic opportunities for parties in the opposition) by 
skewing their known virtuosities. Opposition parties, challenged by the lack of resources and 
basis of social support seem unable to alter this status quo. Apart from the MDM, minor 
political parties enjoyed only brief stints in parliament through party coalitions. Defining the 
ideological core of political parties is difficult even for some of the party leaders interviewed. 
In fact, they rather state their commitment to the well-being of people and to the development 
cause than clearly identifying their political offer, which they tend to underplay.  
At the citizens’ level, the Afrobarometer data showed that there are differences across 
the sympathizers of Frelimo and Renamo, but these are not statistically relevant. This 
suggests that not many things are significantly separating the Frelimo from the Renamo as far 
as the political offer is concerned. A concurrent explanation for this result may be Frelimo’s 
successful incursions into Renamo’s constituencies, mainly since 1999, as referred in Chapter 
V.  
Zambia’s party system, in turn, is composed of parties of more or less equal size. Since 
2001 none has been able to enjoy a majoritarian position in the parliament without needing to 
co-opt opposition MPs. Major opposition parties have originated within the ruling party and 
have been able to secure seats in parliament either alone or in party coalitions. However, 
because episodes of factionalism and lack of discipline are common, coalitions hardly follow 
a nation-wide strategy. In fact, they seem to be a strategic mechanism for parties to win seats 
in particular constituencies. More frequently than in Mozambique, in Zambia splinter groups 
and new political parties enter the parliament more easily also because citizens are not 
polarized around one major cleavage and strongly diverge on a variety of topics which 
address their individual rights, their clientelistic or local ties and their positions towards 
economic policies. Due to parties’ and citizens’ polarization, the FPTP has been unable to 
provide a stable and nationwide two-party system. Since change is more foreseeable, given 
Zambia’s more open electoral market as well as the high number of by-elections, party 
funding/finance makes a bigger difference in party competition than in the Mozambican case, 
where the Frelimo clearly detaches itself from all other parties. 
In sum, this analysis has shown four main aspects. First, different transition paths 
underline different profiles of institutionalization; not only because of the mode of transition 
itself (whether vertical or horizontal, negotiated or war-related) but also because of the stakes 
involved (higher in a two-fold transition to peace and democracy). Mozambique’s 
overinstitutionalized party system builds upon two parties (also former belligerents) which 
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had their power legitimized at the transition moment. Zambia’s transition drew on a broad 
social and popular protest that, under the MMD umbrella, effectively ousted the then 
incumbent party. Yet, the MMD quickly fragmented after the first years of incumbency. 
Minimal changes were enacted just to allow for the arrival of multipartism, but the electoral 
system and the (absence of) rules for party funding/finance remained. Second, electoral 
institutions matter even when their effects are more unconventional. Strong electoral systems 
can lead both to overinstitutionalization (Mozambique) and inadequate institutionalization 
(Zambia). If competition is centripetal and cleavages are vaguer, stronger electoral systems 
will reinforce the party system of the day. If polarization and fragmentation are higher, 
causing competition to be more centrifugal, a strong electoral system fails to create stability. 
If the situation is the opposite, it enhances it. Third, party funding, even if not fully observed 
in practice, can influence the level of institutionalization. In Mozambique the existing criteria 
clearly favor the two major parties in parliament, which tend to defend stricter criteria for 
funding. In Zambia, the absence of state funding enhances further factionalism and 
fragmentation and weakens parties vis-à-vis individuals. Finally, we drew on the 
Afrobarometer data to show that Mozambique’s overinstitutionalization is supported by 
higher levels of trust in the ruling party and party identification, whereas in Zambia levels of 
trust in the opposition are above the African sample and levels of party identification are 
about the same. Further analysis also revealed there seems to exist greater political 
polarization in Zambia than in Mozambique.  
In the following Chapter we systematize the main findings made in this thesis and raise 
implications for future research.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis has carried out a comparative analysis of PSI in Sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on 
three essential questions: “To what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa 
institutionalized?” “Why do levels of PSI vary across countries and time?” and finally, “What 
mechanisms underlie variance in PSI?”  
Following an explanatory sequential design (Creswell 2002; Creswell et al. 2003; 
Creswell 2006a), we started with a quantitative strand in which we measured PSI in 19 
African countries that have held competitive lower house elections up until 2011 and then 
tested the main explanations for PSI with the help of regression analysis. Then, we proceeded 
to a qualitative strand to conduct a comparative analysis of the mechanisms of PSI in two 
cases: Mozambique and Zambia. Now, let us summarize the main findings resulting from this 
research design.  
 
Main findings  
 
To provide answers to the first research question, “To what extent are party systems in Sub-
Saharan Africa institutionalized?” a careful revision of existing measures of PSI was 
conducted. On the basis of that revision, four arguments were made. Firstly, that 
institutionalization is a multidimensional concept, comprising both attitudinal and structural 
behaviors, which are better analyzed separately because they evoke distinct institutional 
phenomena (Levitsky 1998; Randall and Svåsand 2002a). Secondly, that the 
institutionalization of parties is different from that of party systems in the sense that a highly 
(or weakly) institutionalized party system is not always the result of highly (or weakly) 
institutionalized parties, or vice versa (e.g. Welfling 1973a; Randall and Svåsand 2002a). 
Thirdly, that the institutionalization of party systems varies across different territorial levels 
(national and subnational) and different arenas of competition (electoral, parliamentary, 
governmental, and organizational) within a polity (Bardi and Mair 2008). Thus, scholars must 
clearly define the levels and the arenas of analysis to avoid an ecological fallacy in their 
analysis. Finally, inspired by early works that have identified ideal types of 
institutionalization resulting from different ratio with modernization, we have argued that 
institutionalization varies not merely in level but in quality (Huntington 1965; Huntington 
1968; Ben-Dor 1975).  
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Reconciling these four premises, a partly new measure for the institutionalization of 
national party systems was proposed on the basis of three structural dimensions: stable 
patterns of interparty competition, stable roots in society, and organizational continuity. The 
main novelties of this measure is that it includes indicators that express parties’ interactions 
across various arenas (governmental, parliamentary, electoral, and organizational arenas), 
covering a wider range of elections per country, while at the same time focusing on one single 
element, structural. In this sense, it is at once more concise but wider in its scope.  
The results of this analysis revealed that, more than classically diverging in terms of the 
number of parties, African party systems varied in levels and in quality of institutionalization. 
The results ranked Botswana, Namibia, Cape Verde, Seychelles, Mozambique, South Africa, 
The Gambia, Tanzania, and Senegal as the most institutionalized countries and Benin, 
Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria as the least 
institutionalized. In the middle, Sao Tome and Principe, Ghana, and Mauritius presented 
levels of PSI closer to the sample’s average (27.8). If the format of the party system is put in 
the equation, it is possible to see that the majority of dominant party systems are highly 
institutionalized, yet they also appear in the lowest positions (Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and 
Zambia up until 2011), and that multiparty systems (e.g. Mauritius) can be significantly 
institutionalized. Therefore, different levels of PSI seem to be compatible with different 
formats of party systems. 
Further differences emerged once a Cluster Analysis including levels of PSI, turnout 
rates (%), and democratic performance (measured by Freedom House scores) was conducted. 
This exercise was meant to test whether different ratios between institutionalization and 
aspects usually associated to political modernization (political participation and 
democratization) were conducive to adequate institutionalization, inadequate 
institutionalization (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968), or overinstitutionalization (Ben-Dor 
1975). The results of the Cluster Analysis confirmed that these categories were present in the 
sample. In fact, a first cluster assembled adequately institutionalized countries (Botswana, 
Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, and South Africa), where the highest levels of 
PSI, turnout, and democratic performance were found. A second cluster of the 
overinstitutionalized countries assembled party systems characterized by the lowest levels of 
voter turnout and democratic performance but that still had high levels of PSI (Burkina Faso, 
The Gambia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania). In these cases, a strong party 
system limits political participation and the democratic nature of the regime. Finally, a third 
cluster of the inadequately institutionalized countries included party systems that were too 
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weak to encourage mobilization and promote political change in the regime. Countries in this 
cluster had the lowest levels of PSI, combined with medium levels of voter turnout and 
democratic performance (Benin, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi, Sao Tome and 
Principe, and Zambia). These results are relevant to the extent that they do not take for 
granted that high or low levels of institutionalization are inherently good or bad. Instead, they 
highlight that more rigorous research of institutionalization should take into account the 
quality of PSI at work in a given polity.  
Having measured PSI, we then moved forward to the second research question, “Why 
do levels of PSI vary across countries and time?” Relying on studies that focused on the 
causes of party system stability or development in Third Wave countries
190
 we propose the 
test of six main explanations for PSI, which unfolded in nine hypotheses: social structure 
(H1), institutionalization over time (H2 and H3), institutional design (H4 and H5), party and 
party systems characteristics (H6 and H7), economic performance (H8), and electoral 
participation (H9). These explanations were researched with the help of a pooled times series 
cross-sectional regression analysis. 
The results of this analysis (which explained between 46% and 56% of the variance 
found in the sample) gave some support for the theoretical explanations based on 
institutionalization over time, social structure, and institutional design. In fact, countries with 
more durable polities (H3), with the lowest levels of party system fragmentation (H6), and 
with extensive regulations for party funding/finance (H4) were found to be associated to 
higher levels of PSI. Moreover, the results also indicated that although the linguistic and the 
ethnic divides have positive effects, even if not statistically significant, the religious divide 
has a negative and strong effect on PSI (H1). In the group of control variables, the type of 
electoral system also emerges as a relevant factor, with majoritarian formulas being generally 
linked to weakly institutionalized party systems.  
The remaining independent variables, electoral participation (H9), presidentialism (H5), 
party institutionalization (H7), and short-term economic performance (H8), were never 
significant factors to explain PSI variance. However, they are still relevant for more 
descriptive purposes. Electoral participation’s negative regression coefficient indicates that 
Bartolini and Mair’s (1990) hypothesis that higher oscillations in voter turnout are associated 
with higher levels of instability is indeed correct. The fact that presidential regimes were 
                                                          
190
 Among cited works are Tavits (2005; 2006; 2007), Horowitz and Browne (2005), and (Casal Bértoa 2011) for 
post-Communist Europe; Roberts and Wibbels (1999) for Latin America; Croissant and Völkel (2010) for East 
and South Asia; Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) and Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) for cross-regional 
comparisons; and Ferree (2010) and Riedl (2008). 
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
236 
 
associated with weaker levels of PSI also goes in the direction hypothesized by Mainwaring 
and Zoco (2007) and Ferree (2010), among others. As far as party institutionalization is 
concerned, the positive regression coefficient found in the sample opposes the one found in 
Latin America (Roberts and Wibbels 1999) and post-Communist countries (Tavits 2005), 
where the regression coefficient is negative. Even if it is not statistically significant, this result 
points toward a linear and positive association between party institutionalization and PSI in 
Africa. Finally, the minor role of economic performance (measured by GDP and inflation) in 
shaping a more institutionalized party system contradicts some studies about the development 
of stable patterns of support in Western European (Bartolini and Mair 1990) and post-
Communist countries (Tavits 2005). Yet, this result confirms what other studies have said 
about the secondary role of economies in shaping political processes in Africa (van de Walle 
2002; Ferree 2010; Azevedo-Harman 2012, 436).  
From this analysis, three main findings merit highlight. The first is that party 
funding/finance strongly correlates with PSI. This relation was tested in the African sample 
for the first time, even though numerous works (academic or more policy-oriented) have 
defended its inherent virtuosities, particularly in Africa where parties lack mass membership 
and comprehensive territorial structures and a huge gap between incumbent and opposition 
parties exists. Within these works, the existence of funding is seen as a good mechanism to 
level the playing field and which enables political parties to develop their activities and to 
continuously present themselves in elections as stable competitors. Concurrently, provisions 
regulating disclosure of finance and banning or limiting certain practices are seen as 
mechanisms to allow for some degree, even if minimal, of accountability and transparency.  
The second is that mainstream explanations about the impact of time and social 
divisions on party systems are right but must be framed in different ways. More specifically, 
we showed that more than the years since multipartism, it is the years a polity has remained 
unchanged that matters and that more than the ethnic and the linguistic divide, it is the 
religious divide that emerges with larger potential for instability in contemporary Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  
A third main finding is the relevance of the electoral system, whose role has been 
considered less relevant by other studies (Riedl 2008; Ferree 2010). Our analysis has revealed 
that majoritarian formulas weaken PSI and this echoes Riedl's (2008) remark that plurality 
formulas in Africa do not, for the most part, result in less fragmented party systems. 
In the third stage of this study, the final research question, “What mechanisms underlie 
variance in PSI?” was analyzed. To this end, both environmental (path to democratic 
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transition, electoral system, and party funding/finance) and relational mechanisms (party 
coalitions and party-citizen linkages) were investigated. The relevance of these mechanisms 
has different sources. Electoral system and party funding follow from the results of the 
quantitative analysis and enclose an interesting puzzle to the extent that Mozambique’s PR 
elections have produced less fragmented results than Zambia’s FPTP elections and that 
Mozambique has comprehensive regulations for party funding/finance, whereas Zambia is in 
the pool of countries with the fewest provisions of this type (other similar cases are Botswana, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Senegal).  
However, the qualitative strand is not meant to exclusively discuss the findings of the 
quantitative strand; it is also meant to add unobserved dimensions or factors in the analysis to 
account for what remains to be explained by the statistical model. Building upon this idea, 
which is at the core of a mixed methods design, and on the principles of historical 
institutionalism, we focused on one critical juncture, the path to democratic transition, for it is 
said to influence the institutional outlook and the patterns of competition of the upcoming 
political systems (Linz and Stepan 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Yet, we went 
beyond the mere classification of the modes of transition to encompass actors’ choices and 
strategies during this moment. Moreover, relying on the principles of the network 
institutionalism and on the scholarly work about political institutions’ development in Africa, 
which identify informal networks such as personalism and clientelism as underlining features 
of politics, we carried out a study of these networks in the context of party coalitions and 
party-citizen linkages. For that purpose, we combined semi-structured interviews collected 
during fieldwork in Mozambique and Zambia, electoral statistics, and survey data 
(Afrobarometer).  
For Mozambique’s overinstitutionalized party system, our analysis has revealed that the 
two-fold transition to peace and democracy reinforced the bipolarization of the political 
sphere around the two former belligerents, Frelimo (in power since 1975) and Renamo, which 
alone negotiated the most favorable institutional framework for the upcoming regime. 
Moreover, because the two-fold transition was sealed with the signature of a peace accord 
(GPA), there was an overlap between a political and a war cleavage, which remains salient in 
the political sphere. Indeed, more often than not, political parties, particularly the Renamo, 
evoke the infringement of the GPA protocols to engage Frelimo in a dialogue for power 
sharing measures.  
At the same time, the fact that the Frelimo has been in power for as many years as the 
Mozambican independent state has been in existence influences not only the direct effects of 
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political institutions but also the relationship between the parties in the system and the 
linkages between parties and their constituencies. Indeed, the case study analysis showed that 
the structuredness of the party system skews the effects of the electoral institutions and of the 
party funding/finance, notably their ability to increase representation and to level the playing 
field. Opposition parties, challenged by the lack of resources and stable basis of support seem 
rather unable to alter this status quo. Apart from the MDM, minor political parties only had 
brief stints in parliament through party coalitions. However, these coalitions seem to have 
been mostly driven by a perspective of reward (a job or a parliamentary seat) rather than by 
ideological or programmatic linkages. Furthermore, these coalitions have behaved erratically, 
with member parties travelling across different alliances in between elections.  
Generally, ideology is not valued. A large part of the political party members or leaders 
interviewed during fieldwork vaguely highlighted their commitment to the well-being of the 
people and to the development of the country as their main political offer. 
Afrobarometer data about citizens’ levels of support for the ruling party and party 
identity consistently affirmed Mozambique’s high PSI, with the percentages of individuals 
with a party preference and expressing support for the ruling party being frankly higher than 
the ones found in Zambia and in the African sample. As far as political positions are 
concerned, the data suggests that not many things are separating Frelimo’s and Renamo’s 
sympathizers in their perceptions about individual rights, their clientelistic or local ties, and 
their positions towards economy. The literature about politics in Mozambique and the 
fieldwork interviews suggest that this can be a result of Frelimo’s successful incursions into 
Renamo’s constituencies, namely in the Northern and Central provinces.  
In contrast, Zambia’s inadequately institutionalized party system was built upon a 
polarized political transition in which the input came from below. The MMD eventually 
emerged as a broad social alliance and representing a will for change claimed by various 
social groups and sectors of the population. Due to the more horizontal and fragmented nature 
of the transition, a more polarized party system emerged.  
From the outset of multipartism, episodes of splits motivated by tribal or personal 
aspirations within the ruling party (MMD), have led to the emergence of several political 
parties and some of which have performed well in the general elections. A good example is 
the PF, the current party in power. Floor-crossing from the opposition to the incumbent party 
has also been frequent and is a indication that party structures are fragile vis-à-vis their 
political elites. In contrast to Mozambique, where the elections have always declared a clear 
winner with a majority of votes and seats, in Zambia, since 2001, political parties have been 
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unable to form a majoritarian cabinet without needing to co-opt opposition MPs. Major 
opposition parties have originated from within the ruling party and have been able to secure 
seats in parliament either alone or in party coalitions.  
However, because episodes of factionalism and lack of discipline are common, 
coalitions do not follow a nation-wide strategy; rather, they seem to be a strategic mechanism 
for parties to win seats in particular constituencies. New political parties easily enter the 
parliament and are successful at polarizing the electorate. Zambia’s Afrobarometer data 
confirms low PSI, with much lower levels of trust for the incumbent and share of individuals 
expressing party preferences. Nevertheless, here the levels of trust in opposition parties are 
above the African sample. This combined with pervasive factionalism, the high number of by-
elections, and the absence of party funding/finance regulations has contributed to accentuate 
the lower levels of PSI in Zambia over time. Further analysis revealed that sympathizers of 
the MMD, the PF, and the UPND (currently the three most relevant parties) significantly 
diverged on a variety of topics that address their individual rights, their clientelistic or local 
ties, and their positions towards economy, which thus suggests that a more politicized 
environment exists in Zambia.  
All together, this thesis has contributed to the literature not only through a partly new 
measure of PSI, which easily travels across countries with different regimes and that 
cautiously deals with the numerous dilemmas enclosed within this literature, but also by 
providing a new hypothesis (party funding/finance) and new ways to assess the effects of time 
and social structure in the African sample. The case study analysis contrasted countries where 
the effects of political institutions are distorted by the nature of competition and by the 
salience of certain political cleavages. Therefore, through a mixed methods design, we have 
shown that the effects given by the quantitative analysis enclose relevant environmental and 
relational mechanisms that should be taken into account in any analysis or generalization 
about PSI in Africa.  
 
Overall interpretation and implications  
 
In the introductory chapter of this thesis, we presented institutionalization as a paramount 
concept to examine how political institutions develop in contemporary polities. To this extent 
the major problem it addresses is the one inherited from Huntington (1965; 1968) which is of 
explaining why some institutions come to be more stable, autonomous, and valued over time 
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while others eventually decay. In this section, we clarify how this study has contributed to 
address this larger question.  
Firstly, it showed that institutional change results from exogenous factors. In this 
regard, social cleavages (in a wider picture one can also think of political culture), 
institutional designs, and critical junctures all play an important role. Social cleavages define 
the main axis of political competition within a polity. Institutional designs such as electoral 
institutions or party funding/finance can either enforce or modify how party systems operate. 
Critical junctures matter to the extent that they open up opportunities for key political actors 
to alter existing systemic constraints and therefore to redesign the contours of the upcoming 
political system in more beneficial ways (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 1). The path to 
democratic transition is one of those critical junctures where possibilities for change are 
foreseeable but also uncertain. Therefore, focusing on actors’ agencies, choices, and strategies 
becomes crucial for understanding institutions’ trajectories of development.  
Secondly, it revealed that not all changes came from the “outside” or are contingent to 
the opportunities created by the structure. Institutional change also comes from “within”. 
Endogenous factors like party and party system characteristics and networks linking the 
different agents within the system should be also considered to understand why some courses 
of change are more possible than others, despite exogenous constrains. Frelimo’s ability to 
refashion itself as pragmatist party and to deactivate certain lines of cleavage is a clear 
illustration of this point. It has contributed to its development as a dominant party and to the 
structuredness of the party system in ways that favor the development of a highly and 
overinstitutionalized party system. Looking at Zambia, the patterns of fragmentation, 
factionalism, and personalism that characterize the party system also concur to its weaker and 
inadequate institutionalization. In one case, there are signs of institutional development (even 
if there are important challenges in democratization and participation) and in the other there 
are signs of institutional decay, with factionalism and personalism playing a key role in that 
regard. 
Thirdly, it has showed that some new players are emerging even if the contours of the 
system remain, for now, unaltered. In Zambia, the PF has been the incumbent party since 
2011 and in Mozambique the MDM is now beginning to threaten Renamo’s solitary position 
as the main opposition party. In both cases, the bet on the growing urban electorate and 
particularly on the young people paid off and contributed to altering the distribution of 
political power, even if changes at the systemic level are not significant yet. The future will 
tell if this trend is likely to prevail and how political institutions will adapt to new profiles of 
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voters, which have been socialized under a freer political setting and that are becoming 
increasingly concerned with public policies such as employment, education, health, and 
housing.  
Lastly, it emphasized that African party systems are distinguishable not only in terms of 
their variance in the degree of institutionalization but also in the quality of institutionalization, 
with each variant encompassing different challenges in terms of democratic development and 
political participation. More than twenty years after the arrival of democratization in Africa, it 
matters to consider not only the extent to which party systems are institutionalized (at a 
certain degree in time) but also the extent to which party systems are able to perform 
democratic tasks and to increase political participation. Theoretically, this means dealing with 
institutionalization not as something inherently good or bad but as a dynamic property of the 
polities. Empirically, this means that political development requires institutions to be stable 
but at the same time adaptable to ongoing macrosocial changes. 
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APPENDIX A – ELECTION DATA SOURCES 
 
A1 – Sources per country and election 
Country # Elections Lower house election  Source OBS 
Benin 
1 17 February 1991  
La Cour Constitutionnelle du Bénin 
* Grateful to Akil Elegbede who personally collected the 
electoral data in Benin. 
2 28 March 1995  
3 30 March 1999  Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook 
4 30 March 2003 Commission Électorale Nationale Autonome  
5 31 March 2007 L'Assemblée Nationale 
6 17 April 2011 Commission Électorale Nationale Autonome  
Botswana 
7 1 March 1965  
African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ 
Accessed on between 19-11-2010 and 22-11-2010 
8 18 October 1969  
9 26 October 1974  
10 20 October 1979  
11 8 September 1984  
12 7 October 1989  
13 15 October 1994  
14 16 October 1999 
Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa: 
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/bot1999results3.htm  
15 30 October 2004 
Independent Electoral Commission: http://www.iec.gov.bw/  
16 16 October 2009 
Burkina Faso 
17 24 May 1992  
Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook 
Accessed on 01-12-2010 
18 11 May 1997  
19 5 May 2002  African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ 
20 6 May 2007  Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante 
Cape Verde 
21 13 January 1991  
Boletim Oficial de Cabo Verde 
Accessed on 17-02-2011 
22 17 December 1995  
23 14 January 2001 
Semedo, Barros e Costa (2007) 
24 22 January 2006 
25 6 February 2011 Comissão Nacional de Eleições: www.cne.cv/  
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A1 – Sources per country and election (cont.) 
Country # Elections Lower house election  Source OBS 
Gambia 
26 26 May 1966  
African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ Accessed on19-01-2011 
27 28 & 29 March 1972  
28 4 & 5 April 1977  
29 4 & 5 May 1982  
30 11 March 1987  
31 29 April 1992  
32 2 January 1997  
Independent Electoral Commission of The Gambia: http://www.iec.gm/results  Accessed on 18-02-2011 33 17 January 2002  
34 25 January 2007 
Ghana 
35 29 December 1992  
Electoral Commission of Ghana: http://www.ec.gov.gh/node/63 Accessed on 18-02-2011 
36 7 December 1996  
37 7 December 2000 
38 7 December 2004 
39 7 December 2008 
Guinea-Bissau 
40 3 July 1994  Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook 
Accessed on 26-11-2010 and 18-01-2011 
41 28 November 1999 
Comissão Nacional de Eleições: http://www.guine-
bissau.com/eleicoes/index.aspx?action=1 42 28 March 2004 
43 16 November 2008 
Lesotho 
44 27 March 1993  
Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook 
Accessed on 10-12-2010 
45 23 May 1998 
46 25 May 2002 African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ 
47 17 February 2007 
Independent Electoral Commission: 
http://www.iec.org.ls/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Ite
mid=63 
Malawi 
48 17 May 1994  
Malawi Electoral Commission: www.mec.org.mw/ 
* Grateful to Henzily Simon Munkhondya the  
Head of Electoral Services of Malawi Electoral 
Commission, who kindly sent the maps with the official 
results by email on 23-05-2011. 
49 15 June 1999 
50 20 May 2004 
51 19 May 2009 
 
 
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
245 
 
A1 – Sources per country and election (cont.) 
Country # Elections Lower house election  Source OBS 
Mozambique 
52 27 & 29 October 1994  Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa: 
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/moz1994results3.htm 
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/moz1999results3.htm 
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/moz2004results3.htm 
Accessed on 25-11-2010 
53 3 & 5 December 1999 
54 1 & 2 December 2004 
55 28 October 2009 
Centro de Integridade Pública de Moçambique: 
http://www.cip.org.mz/election2009/pt/ 
Mauritius 
56 20 December 1976 
Electoral Commissioner's Office: 
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/eco/menuitem.37ba32a3c4783128d6c8662948
a521ca/?content_id=630b9dbfa1158010VgnVCM100000ca6a12acRCRD 
Accessed on 18-01-2011  
* Grateful to the Electoral Commissioner for having 
clarified my doubts about the data.  
57 11 June 1982 
58 21 August 1983 
59 30 August 1987  
60 15 September 1991 
61 20 December 1995  
62 11 September 2000 
63 3 July 2005  
64 5 May 2010 
Namibia 
65 7 & 11 November 1989  Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook 
Accessed on 20-01-2011  
* Grateful to Bill Lindeke for information on data location. 
66 7 & 8 December 1994  
Electoral Commission of Namibia: http://www.electionwatch.org.na/ 
67 30 November & 1 December 1999  
68 15 November 2004 
69 27 November 2009 
Nigeria 
70 20 February 1999 
African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ 
Accessed on 16-01-2011 and 28-06-2011 
71 12 April 2003 
72 21 April 2007 Independent National Electoral Commission: 
http://www.inecnigeria.org/election/show_result.php?catagory=Governorship&
state=36&election=2562; http://www.inecnigeria.org/results/state_houses/  73 2 April 2011  
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
74 20 January 1991  
Archer and Tavares (2006) 
Accessed on 16-01-2010  
* Grateful to Gerhard Seibert for information on data 
location. 
75 2 October 1994  
76 8 November 1998  
77 3 March 2002  
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A1 – Sources per country and election (cont.) 
Country # Elections Lower house election  Source OBS 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
78 26 March 2006 Archer and Tavares (2006) 
 79 1 August 2010 Comissão Nacional de Eleições 
Senegal 
80 27 February 1983  
African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ 
Commission Nationale Electorale Autonome: www.cena.sn/ 
Accessed on 19-01-2011 
81 28 February 1988 
82 9 May 1993  
83 24 May 1998  
84 29 April 2001 
85 3 June 2007 
Seychelles 
86 20 & 23 July 1993  
African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ 
Office of the Electoral Commissioner: 
http://www.ecs.sc/pages/legislations/elecsys.aspx 
Accessed on 17-01-2011 
87 20 March 1998 
88 4 December 2002 
89 10 May 2007 
South Africa 
90 26 & 29 April 1994  
Electoral Commission of South Africa: www.elections.org.za/  Accessed on 29-11-2010 
91 2 June 1999 
92 14 April 2004 
93 22 April 2009 
Tanzania 
94 29 October & 19 November 1995  
Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa: http://www.eisa.org.za/ 
Accessed on 16-01-2011  
* Grateful to Deane Stuart who kindly sent me the data for 
the 2001 election by mail. 
95 29 October 2000  
96 14 December 2005  
The National Electoral Commission of Tanzania: www.nec.go.tz 
97 31 October 2010 
Zambia 
98 31 October 1991  
The Electoral Commission of Zambia: http://www.elections.org.zm/ Accessed on 30-09-2010; 16-01-2011 and 04-10-2011 
99 18 November 1996  
100 27 December 2001  
101 28 September 2006 
102 20 September 2011 
 
Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa 
 
247 
 
APPENDIX B – MAPS  
 
B1 – Map of Mozambique  
 
Source: Portal do Governo de Moçambique (Mozambique’s Government Web Portal), available at 
http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/Mozambique/mapa_mocambique.jpg (retrieved on 26-05-2013). 
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B2 – Map of Zambia 
 
Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/zambia.pdf 
Map No. 3731 Rev. 4 United Nations, January 2004, Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
Cartographic Section (retrieved on 26-05-2013). 
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APPENDIX C – INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
Presentation  
My name is Edalina Rodrigues Sanches I am a PhD candidate at the Institute of Social Sciences – University of Lisbon, and 
currently a visiting researcher at the University Eduardo Mondlane/University of Zambia. My thesis analyzes the process of 
party system institutionalization (PSI) in sub-Saharan Africa, with a particular emphasis on the cases of Mozambique and 
Zambia. I would like to pose you a group of questions about politics [electoral process, legal framework, interactions 
between political parties, strategies of competition, linkages to groups of civil society etc.], which I believe might be related 
to the process of PSI in Mozambique/Zambia. The interview has an estimated duration of 45 minutes.  
 
Permission to record and confidentiality  
Before starting the interview I would like to ask your permission to electronically record the interview, as well as to take 
notes during our conversation. The interview will be used for my research only. Please feel free to ask me to stop recording 
or taking notes in case you would like to say something “off the record”. If you are not comfortable with a particular 
question feel free not to answer. If I decide to quote parts of this interview in my PhD dissertation may I attribute the 
information to you personally or would you prefer to be referred to anonymously? Can I contact you in case I have 
additional questions?  
 
 
Part I – Background questions  
 
1. Could you tell me a bit more about your personal background? [educational, professional and political career and 
motivations to become involved in politics] [ALL] 
2. How would you describe the electoral process in [Country]? [quality, voter turnout, main political issues] [ALL] 
3. What are in your opinion the main characteristics of national party politics in [Country]? [ALL] 
4. Can you give me further information about your organization/institution? [mission, main political activities, sources of 
funding] [NGOs ONLY]  
 
Part II – Parties’ foundation, organizational continuities and changes [POLITICAL ELITES/PARTY MEMBERS ONLY] 
(This bloc of questions was adapted from EISA) 
 
5. How was [the name of the party] founded and what were the key motivations for its establishment? Have there been 
any changes in the party’s aims/objectives over the years?  
6. Did your party received initial support from civil society organizations or social groups [i.e. ethnic, regional, urban, 
rural, religious, military, business, civic groups, trade unions]? Have patterns of support changed over the years? 
7. How have the party’s organizational structures evolved since the first election? What were the main changes?  
8. How would you describe your political party in terms ideology? [right, left, pragmatic, conservative, liberal, socialist, 
green, religious, nationalist etc.] Have there been changes in the ideological content of the party? [For JOURNALISTS, 
ACADEMICS and NGOs: “how would you describe political parties ideologies ...”] 
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Part III – Dimensions of party institutionalization  
 
9. Electoral and party laws are considered relevant to party system development. What would you say are the main 
constraints and incentives to your party in this regard [electoral formula, rules for funding etc.]? [For JOURNALISTS, 
ACADEMICS and NGOs: “How relevant are electoral and party laws in shaping electoral outcomes...”] 
10. Who finances the party? [State funds, foreign funding, member’s quotes]? [POLITICAL ELITES/PARTY MEMBERS ONLY]  
11. Would you say your party is better organized than other parties? Why? [For JOURNALISTS, ACADEMICS and NGOs: “In 
your opinion, which party is better organized...”] 
12. Are there any updated figures on membership? [POLITICAL ELITES/PARTY MEMBERS ONLY]  
13. What have been the main changes within the party [party splits, mergers, change of leaders]? [POLITICAL 
ELITES/PARTY MEMBERS ONLY]  
14. What are the principal campaign strategies? [POLITICAL ELITES/PARTY MEMBERS ONLY]  
15. Does your organization/institution help the development of political parties? If yes how? [NGOs ONLY]  
16. Are your organization/institution claims represented by any political party? [NGOs ONLY] 
17. How would you characterize the relationship of your organization/institution with political parties? [NGOs ONLY]  
 
Part IV – Dimensions of party system institutionalization  
 
18. How would you characterize your party relationship with other parties? [informal, cooperation, antagonism, etc.] 
[POLITICAL ELITES/PARTY MEMBERS ONLY] 
19. Would you say that all parties compete in equal conditions? If not what are the main differences? [ALL] 
20. What is your opinion about the one-party dominance in Mozambique?/ What is your opinion about the reverse of one-
party dominance in Zambia? Do you think it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither? Why? [ALL] 
21. What are/were the main causes for this continuity/change? [ALL] 
 
 
End of interview.  
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APPENDIX D – LISTS OF INTERVIEWS 
D1 – Interviewees in Mozambique 
# Name Institution Position 
Political Elites     
1 Leonardo Simão Frelimo  Former Minister  
2 Manuel Tomé Frelimo  Current MP 
3 Luísa Diogo Frelimo  Former Prime Minister  
4 José Luís Cabaço Frelimo  Former Minister (during one-partyism) 
5 Morais Mabyeka Frelimo  Party Secretary for Organization 
6 Jorge Rebelo Frelimo  Former Minister (during one-partyism) 
7 João Colaço MDM 
Former member of the Party Secretariat 
and former Chief of Strategy 
8 Lutero Simango MDM Parliamentary caucus leader 
9 Ismael Mussá MDM  
Vice-President of Parliamentary caucus 
(Ex- Renamo) 
10 Benedito Marime MDM 
Party Deputy Chief of Foreign Affairs (Ex-
PCN) 
11 Máximo Dias Monamo President 
12 Fernando Chapane Pahumo President 
13 Paulino Nicopola Palmo President 
14 André Balate Parena President 
15 Francisco Campira Pasomo President 
16 Raul Domingos PDD President (Ex-Renamo) 
17 Magalhães Abramugy Pimo Secretary-General 
18 Fernando Mazanga Renamo Renamo Spokesperson 
19 Maria Angelina Enoque Renamo Parliamentary caucus leader 
20 António Muchanga Renamo Member of the State Council  
Civil Society Organizations     
21 Adriano Nuvunga  Centro de Integridade Pública  Director 
22 Alice Mabote LDH - Liga dos Direitos Humanos em Moçambique  President 
23 Brazão Mazula  
CEDE - Centro de Estudos de Democracia e 
Desenvolvimento  
Former CNE President 
24 Elisa Muianga AWEPA - Parlamentares Europeus com África Acting country representative 
25 Hermenegildo Mulhovo 
NIMD - Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy 
Acting country representative 
26 João Gundana 
AMODE - Associação Moçambicana para a 
Democracia 
Director 
27 Marcos Macamo CCM - Conselho Cristão de Moçambique Secretary-General 
28 Salomão Muchanga Parlamento Juvenil Director 
29 Sheik Abdul Carimo Vazirna CISLAMO - Conselho Islâmico de Moçambique Secretary-General 
Journalists      
30 Francisco Carmona Savana Editor 
31 Lázaro Mabunda O país Editor 
32 Salomão Moyana Magazine Independente Editor 
Academics     
33 João Pereira University Eduardo Mondlane  
Professor (also leader of civil society 
organization) 
34 Domingos Rosário  University Eduardo Mondlane  Professor  
35 José Jaime Macuane  University Eduardo Mondlane  
Professor (also leader of civil society 
organization) 
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D2 – Interviewees in Zambia 
# Name Institution Position 
Political Elites     
1 Lizu Kakoma ADD Secretary-General 
2 Chozi Ng’uni  APC President 
3 Charles Zulu  Independent  Current MP 
4 
Chembe Nyangu and Alfred 
Ndhlovu  
MMD 
Party Information and Publicity Secretary 
Party Deputy National Secretary  
5 Elias Chipimo Jr. NAREP President 
6 Tentani Mwanza  NDP President 
7 Cosmo Mumba  NRP President 
8 Chanda Mfula  PF Party media and publicity Director  
9 Inambao Inambao ULP Secretary-General 
10 Winstone Chibwe  UNDP Secretary-General 
11 Langton Sichone ZDC President 
12 Wright Musoma ZRP President 
Civil Society Organizations     
13 Goodwell Lungu Transparency International Zambia  Executive Director 
14 Heiner Naumann Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Resident Director 
15 Horrance Chilando Zambia Center for Inter-Party Dialogue Executive Director 
16 James Banda LAZ - Law Association of Zambia President 
17 McDonald Chipenzi  FODEP - Foundation for Democratic Process  Executive Director 
18 Boniface Cheembe 
SACCORD - Southern African Centre for the 
Constructive Resolution of Disputes 
Executive Director 
19  Juliet Chibuta ZNWL - Zambia National Women's Lobby  Executive Director 
20 Neo Simutanyi CIP - Centre for Policy Dialogue Executive Director 
21 Suzanne Matale CCZ - Council for Churches in Zambia General Secretary and CEO 
22 Richwell Mulwani AVAP - The Anti-Voter Apathy Project  Executive Director 
23 Sombo Chunda Diakonia Acting country representative 
Journalists      
24 Speedwell Mupuchi The Post online Deputy Managing Editor  
25 
Brebner Changala* / Clayson 
Hamasaka 
Political activist*/Zambia Watchdog Political activist*/Journalist  
26 Patson Phiri  PAZA - Press Association of Zambia Executive Secretary  
Academics     
27 Jotham Momba  
UNZA - Department of Political and Administrative 
Studies 
Professor 
28 Njekwa Mate 
UNZA - Department of Political and Administrative 
Studies 
Head of Department  
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APPENDIX E – REGRESSIONS MODELS 
 
Model 1 
 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     29.15383   1.711384    17.04   0.000     25.79958    32.50808
   inflation    -.0010551   .0153912    -0.07   0.945    -.0312214    .0291111
         gdp     .0081438   .0871065     0.09   0.926    -.1625817    .1788693
 publicfundx     .1517983   .0588579     2.58   0.010     .0364389    .2671578
    partyage    -.0023805   .0254048    -0.09   0.925    -.0521729     .047412
        enep    -.8697261   .1207429    -7.20   0.000    -1.106378   -.6330744
presidenti~y     .0067846   .7753236     0.01   0.993    -1.512822    1.526391
  frac_index    -1.206224   .7794738    -1.55   0.122    -2.733964    .3215169
 turnout_vol     .0079518    .025949     0.31   0.759    -.0429072    .0588109
     durable     .1025112   .0461857     2.22   0.026     .0119889    .1930336
timefistelec    -.0260386   .0398816    -0.65   0.514    -.1042051    .0521279
                                                                              
       PSI11        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                         Panel-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        11          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Wald chi2(10)      =   1797.06
Estimated covariances      =       190          R-squared          =    0.4623
Sigma computed by casewise selection                           max =         8
Autocorrelation:  no autocorrelation                           avg =  4.368421
Panels:           correlated (unbalanced)       Obs per group: min =         3
Time variable:    time_panel                    Number of groups   =        19
Group variable:   id                            Number of obs      =        83
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
                                                                              
       _cons     27.30372   6.185487     4.41   0.000     15.18039    39.42706
    religion    -2.271127   1.141141    -1.99   0.047    -4.507723   -.0345307
majority_d~y    -1.144351    .505005    -2.27   0.023    -2.134142    -.154559
        PR_N    -.0933518   .1721992    -0.54   0.588     -.430856    .2441524
      PSIlag     .0806448   .1949887     0.41   0.679     -.301526    .4628155
   inflation     .0159265   .0162261     0.98   0.326    -.0158761     .047729
         gdp     .0769828   .0803236     0.96   0.338    -.0804487    .2344142
 publicfundx     .0949321   .0569206     1.67   0.095    -.0166303    .2064945
    partyage    -.0076982   .0238667    -0.32   0.747    -.0544761    .0390798
        enep    -.9991129   .1922921    -5.20   0.000    -1.375999   -.6222273
presidenti~y    -.4005219    .741804    -0.54   0.589    -1.854431    1.053387
  frac_index     2.390498   1.393975     1.71   0.086    -.3416433    5.122639
 turnout_vol     -.018734   .0221332    -0.85   0.397    -.0621142    .0246463
     durable     .1088208    .052326     2.08   0.038     .0062638    .2113779
timefistelec    -.0041361   .0468487    -0.09   0.930    -.0959578    .0876857
                                                                              
       PSI11        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                         Panel-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        15          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Wald chi2(14)      =   1069.12
Estimated covariances      =       190          R-squared          =    0.5213
Sigma computed by casewise selection                           max =         8
Autocorrelation:  no autocorrelation                           avg =  4.315789
Panels:           correlated (unbalanced)       Obs per group: min =         3
Time variable:    time_panel                    Number of groups   =        19
Group variable:   id                            Number of obs      =        82
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
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Model 3  
 
 
 
Model 4  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     26.47982    5.59601     4.73   0.000     15.51184     37.4478
      adqPSI     1.814739   .7752933     2.34   0.019     .2951918    3.334286
    religion    -3.836053   1.601326    -2.40   0.017    -6.974594    -.697512
majority_d~y    -1.013839   .5298291    -1.91   0.056    -2.052285     .024607
        PR_N    -.1964183    .177975    -1.10   0.270    -.5452429    .1524063
      PSIlag     .0421544   .1887974     0.22   0.823    -.3278817    .4121904
   inflation     .0151438   .0132661     1.14   0.254    -.0108573    .0411449
         gdp      .070428   .0676881     1.04   0.298    -.0622382    .2030943
 publicfundx     .1301975   .0567031     2.30   0.022     .0190615    .2413334
    partyage    -.0046241   .0255332    -0.18   0.856    -.0546682      .04542
        enep    -.9239291   .1875985    -4.93   0.000    -1.291615   -.5562428
presidenti~y    -.0949369   .8055296    -0.12   0.906    -1.673746    1.483872
  frac_index     5.396012   2.402697     2.25   0.025     .6868119    10.10521
 turnout_vol    -.0157412   .0218083    -0.72   0.470    -.0584847    .0270024
     durable     .0935584    .048751     1.92   0.055    -.0019919    .1891086
timefistelec    -.0044341   .0455155    -0.10   0.922    -.0936429    .0847746
                                                                              
       PSI11        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                         Panel-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        16          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Wald chi2(15)      =   5255.55
Estimated covariances      =       190          R-squared          =    0.5599
Sigma computed by casewise selection                           max =         8
Autocorrelation:  no autocorrelation                           avg =  4.315789
Panels:           correlated (unbalanced)       Obs per group: min =         3
Time variable:    time_panel                    Number of groups   =        19
Group variable:   id                            Number of obs      =        82
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
                                                                              
       _cons     28.93722   1.824874    15.86   0.000     25.36053     32.5139
   inflation     .0093583    .018033     0.52   0.604    -.0259857    .0447023
         gdp      .062213   .1008002     0.62   0.537    -.1353518    .2597778
 publicfundx      .125884   .0660025     1.91   0.056    -.0034785    .2552465
    partyage     .0024057   .0253279     0.09   0.924     -.047236    .0520475
        enep    -.8217729   .1243902    -6.61   0.000    -1.065573   -.5779726
presidenti~y    -.6661895    .684431    -0.97   0.330     -2.00765    .6752706
    religion    -2.749211   .7624863    -3.61   0.000    -4.243657   -1.254765
    language     .4431111   1.200437     0.37   0.712    -1.909702    2.795925
      ethnic     1.044395   1.696358     0.62   0.538    -2.280406    4.369196
 turnout_vol      -.00646   .0229753    -0.28   0.779    -.0514907    .0385707
     durable     .1067392   .0493587     2.16   0.031     .0099978    .2034805
timefistelec    -.0298774   .0437077    -0.68   0.494    -.1155429    .0557881
                                                                              
       PSI11        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                         Panel-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        13          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Wald chi2(12)      =   2039.73
Estimated covariances      =       190          R-squared          =    0.4974
Sigma computed by casewise selection                           max =         8
Autocorrelation:  no autocorrelation                           avg =  4.368421
Panels:           correlated (unbalanced)       Obs per group: min =         3
Time variable:    time_panel                    Number of groups   =        19
Group variable:   id                            Number of obs      =        83
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
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Model 5  
 
 
 
  
       _cons     26.32278     5.9731     4.41   0.000     14.61572    38.02984
      PSIlag     .1074311   .1984788     0.54   0.588    -.2815801    .4964424
   inflation     .0088312   .0156324     0.56   0.572    -.0218077    .0394702
         gdp     .0446205   .0946242     0.47   0.637    -.1408395    .2300805
 publicfundx     .1398135   .0666622     2.10   0.036     .0091579     .270469
    partyage     .0000776   .0247867     0.00   0.998    -.0485034    .0486587
        enep    -.9144813   .1876082    -4.87   0.000    -1.282187   -.5467759
presidenti~y    -.6050069    .665537    -0.91   0.363    -1.909435    .6994217
    religion     -2.35915   .9221973    -2.56   0.011    -4.166624    -.551677
    language     .5166723   1.154296     0.45   0.654    -1.745706     2.77905
      ethnic     .8165923   1.777589     0.46   0.646    -2.667417    4.300602
 turnout_vol    -.0170378   .0229739    -0.74   0.458    -.0620658    .0279902
     durable     .0907992   .0559838     1.62   0.105     -.018927    .2005254
timefistelec    -.0218479   .0470622    -0.46   0.642    -.1140881    .0703922
                                                                              
       PSI11        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                         Panel-corrected
                                                                              
Estimated coefficients     =        14          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000
Estimated autocorrelations =         0          Wald chi2(13)      =   1881.78
Estimated covariances      =       190          R-squared          =    0.4934
Sigma computed by casewise selection                           max =         8
Autocorrelation:  no autocorrelation                           avg =  4.315789
Panels:           correlated (unbalanced)       Obs per group: min =         3
Time variable:    time_panel                    Number of groups   =        19
Group variable:   id                            Number of obs      =        82
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
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APPENDIX F – ANOVA RESULTS 
  
 
F1 – Frelimo vs. Renamo 
      Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Q10. Abandon economic reforms vs. 
accept hardships 
Between Groups (Combined) 3,153 1 3,153 3,270 ,071 
Within Groups 614,343 637 ,964     
Total 617,496 638       
Q11. Economic policies helped most vs. 
hurt most 
Between Groups (Combined) ,595 1 ,595 ,480 ,489 
Within Groups 875,681 706 1,240     
Total 876,275 707       
Q16. Question actions of leaders vs. 
respect authority  
Between Groups (Combined) ,036 1 ,036 ,028 ,867 
Within Groups 905,261 708 1,279     
Total 905,297 709       
Q17. Leaders treat all equally vs. help 
own community 
Between Groups (Combined) ,744 1 ,744 ,561 ,454 
Within Groups 921,618 694 1,328     
Total 922,362 695       
Q18. Government like a parent vs. an 
employee 
Between Groups (Combined) ,002 1 ,002 ,002 ,963 
Within Groups 844,144 730 1,156     
Total 844,146 731       
Q19. Government bans organizations vs. 
join any  
Between Groups (Combined) 2,354 1 2,354 2,047 ,153 
Within Groups 766,815 667 1,150     
Total 769,169 668       
Q20. Government close newspapers vs. 
free to publish 
Between Groups (Combined) ,035 1 ,035 ,031 ,861 
Within Groups 772,316 678 1,139     
Total 772,351 679       
 Q21. Govt. suppress expression vs. 
people speak minds 
Between Groups (Combined) ,408 1 ,408 ,388 ,534 
Within Groups 692,651 658 1,053     
Total 693,059 659       
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F2 – MMD vs. PF vs. UPND 
      Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Q10. Abandon economic reforms vs. 
accept hardships 
Between Groups (Combined) 3,341 2 1,671 1,177 ,309 
Within Groups 817,305 576 1,419     
Total 820,646 578       
Q11. Economic policies helped most vs. 
hurt most 
Between Groups (Combined) 18,590 2 9,295 10,796 ,000 
Within Groups 524,325 609 ,861     
Total 542,915 611       
Q16. Question actions of leaders vs. 
respect authority  
Between Groups (Combined) 7,223 2 3,612 2,925 ,054 
Within Groups 751,854 609 1,235     
Total 759,077 611       
Q17. Leaders treat all equally vs. help 
own community 
Between Groups (Combined) 5,304 2 2,652 1,800 ,166 
Within Groups 908,921 617 1,473     
Total 914,224 619       
Q18. Government like a parent vs. an 
employee 
Between Groups (Combined) 5,621 2 2,810 1,840 ,160 
Within Groups 944,151 618 1,528     
Total 949,771 620       
Q19. Government bans organizations vs. 
join any  
Between Groups (Combined) 11,878 2 5,939 4,988 ,007 
Within Groups 687,010 577 1,191     
Total 698,888 579       
Q20. Government close newspapers vs. 
free to publish 
Between Groups (Combined) 8,668 2 4,334 5,717 ,003 
Within Groups 446,546 589 ,758     
Total 455,215 591       
 Q21. Govt. suppress expression vs. 
people speak minds 
Between Groups (Combined) 8,123 2 4,062 5,445 ,005 
Within Groups 441,564 592 ,746     
Total 449,687 594       
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